

- Produtos e de suas aplicações no quotidiano e etc.

à Editora da Universidade São Paulo, 18 de Abril de 1966.

Ilmo. Sr. José Ferrater Mora

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Ilustríssimo Senhor:


Sou autor de um "Dicionário Filosófico" (inédito), do qual envio-lhe dois clichês (anexos), que dão o esquema geométrico, numérico e parabólico do mesmo. Este trabalho resultou da pesquisa, intensa e extensa, de vários anos de estudos encyclopédicos, na base de estudos de textos, modernos e clássicos. Evidentemente, dada a direção de minha pesquisa, tornei-me leitor habitual de dicionários e encyclopédias - de todos os assuntos. Tenho, inclusive, um trabalho sobre o próprio problema do dicionário como dicionário.

Em particular, trabalho como tradutor (espanhol, francês, inglês, alemão, italiano, latim e grego) e, evidentemente, tenho interesse em dedicar-me, apenas, a traduções de dicionários e encyclopédias. Considerando, que seu Dicionário ("Diccionario de Filosofia") tem tido boa aceitação entre nós, especialmente a 5a. edição e considerando, também, os diversos aspectos do comércio do livro, que "dificultam" ao livreiro a tradução de uma obra como a sua, gostaria / que o senhor, tendo em vista meu trabalho e, portanto, a possibilidade de uma tradução conscientiosa, se interessasse em indicar-me como tradutor de seu Dicionário, a alguns de nossos livreiros, em especial de São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Pôrto Alegre.

Em caso afirmativo, eu contaria com a colaboração do sr. José de Souza Pinto Júnior, especial admirador e leitor habitual de sua obra.


Em caso afirmativo e em caso negativo, gostaria de ter uma resposta particularizada.

Atenciosamente,


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VISTO:



e José de Souza Pinto Júnior

1-5-66.

(informe) notório em seu gabinete, relativa ao

estabelecido (outra e vital) constitui, certamente, o maior

de todos os seus, encarregos, encarregos de execução, e que

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many different ways that it is highly unlikely, empirically, that some physical state will be found that invariably correlates with it. But this isn't to say that tables are not microphysical structures; nor is it to imply that the properties of *particular* tables aren't micro-reducible. What then lies behind these convictions? Why do we think that pains, although we do not know any physical state correlating with them (in fact we may doubt that there *is* such a state), are determined by the microphysical state of organisms, and that tables, too, are determined by physical properties of objects?

Take a table. There is no known necessary and sufficient set of conditions, statable in basic physical magnitudes, which is coextensive with being a table. There is no "bridge law" that relates tablehood with more fundamental physical characteristics. What makes us believe that tables are nonetheless physical structures seems to be just this: for any particular table there is a set of physical properties (dimensions, rigidity, etc.) it has such that if anything else has these properties, then it, too, would be a table, and, further, these physical properties, upon which this particular table "supervenes", are micro-reducible (they have microphysical counterparts). Thus, the microdeterminateness of this table amounts to the table's "supervenience" upon microreducible physical properties. It is in this sense that this table is *nothing but* a microphysical structure.

The important point to be noticed is that two particular tables are likely to have different supervenience bases. Consider the case of pain sensations. If the functional-state theorists are right about the possibility of diverse physical realizations (or even if they are not, as long as we don't have on hand the physical state uniformly correlating with pains in all organisms), human pains and reptilian pains are likely to have very different supervenience bases. Still, what makes us believe in the dependence of pains on physical states is the belief that, for humans, there is a set of physiological processes such that if anything is undergoing those processes, pain occurs to it; and similarly, there is such a set of processes for reptiles, except that this is likely to be a very different set. Moreover, the underlying physiological processes in both cases are standardly microreducible in virtue of having microphysical coextensions.

We may now state a more general characterization. The guiding idea is this: a property *F* which may lack a coextension in microphysical properties,

may nonetheless be said to be *microphysically determinate* if the following condition obtains: if anything has property *F*, then there is a set *N* of properties, each of which is microphysically reducible (via biconditionals), such that the thing has all the properties in *N*, and anything else with these properties must have the property *F*. Further, we can say the event or state, an object *a*'s having property *F*, is microphysically determinate if the property *F* is microphysically determinate. It is clear that *a*'s having *F* and *b*'s having *F*, where *a* ≠ *b*, may not share the same "base family" of micro-reducible properties, as indeed they should not if the account being offered is to model cases like pains and tables.

The connection between this notion of microphysical determinateness and the concept of supervenience is straightforward and may be brought out in the following way. Supervenience, as we earlier explained it, turns out to be equivalently definable as follows: a family of properties *M* is supervenient on another family *N* just in case for any object *x* and a property *F* in *M* if *x* has *F* then there must be a property *G* in the set *N*, such that *x* has *G* and, necessarily, anything having *G* also has *F*. Thus, to say that the property *F* is microphysically determinate is to say that the unit set consisting of *F* is supervenient upon a set of microphysically reducible properties. This result is, of course, what we would have expected. I believe the second way in which we have developed these concepts is not a mere redundancy over the first: it has the virtue of making explicit, in an intuitively plausible way, in what sense a microphysically incommensurable property may nonetheless be said to be microphysically determinate. And the equivalence of the two accounts show that supervenience commits us to the existence; for every supervening property, of at least locally sufficient conditions in the supervenience base.

Given this notion of microphysical determinateness, the conviction that once microphysical world is fixed, everything else is fixed can be expressed thus: *Every property, and every event, is microphysically determinate.* (We should note that every property that is microredundantly commensurable is, trivially, microphysically determinate.) And given certain natural readings of modal terms in our definition, this thesis can be seen to be equivalent to Terence Horgan's "supervenience principle", which he states as follows: "For all microphysically accessible possible worlds *w* and *w'*, if *w* and *w'* have identical microphysical histories, then *w* = *w'*".¹² The thesis

¹² Terence Horgan, "The Supervenience of the Mental," presented at the 1976 meetings of the American Philosophical Association, the Eastern Division. For further interesting relevant discussions see Horgan's doctoral dissertation, *Microreduction and the Mind-Body Problem* (Ann Arbor, 1973).

two possible relationships between the supervenient family and its supervenience base: (1) whether there are biconditionals giving for each property in the former a coextension in the latter, and (2), failing in the biconditionals, whether there are one-way conditionals giving for properties in the supervenient family necessary or sufficient conditions in the base family.

First of all, it is clear that if there are biconditionals from all properties in M to properties in N^* , then M will supervene upon N . For the existence of the biconditionals will guarantee that things that diverge on some M -property will necessarily diverge in the set N^* . (The source of "necessarily" in the preceding statement will have to be the necessity attaching to the relation of definability or the law-likeness of the bridge laws.) It follows, therefore, that *reducibility and definability each entail supervenience*.

Suppose now that M supervenes on N . What follows with regard to the existence or connections between M and N ?

Let P be a property in M and let some object x have P . Since all the N -maximal properties, namely the properties in N^* , are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, there is some unique N -maximal property, say Q , that x instantiates. As noted, N -maximal properties are the strongest properties that can be formed from N : if two objects have the same N -maximal property, they cannot diverge in the set N^* . Therefore, if any y has Q , it too must have P . For, if y lacks P , then x and y would coincide in N^* and yet diverge in M , which contradicts the assumption that M is supervenient upon N . This gives us the following conditional: if anything has Q it has P . Since this holds for each property in M , it follows that if M supervenes on N , each property in M which is instantiated has a general sufficient condition in N , and I don't see how such generalizations could fail to be lawlike. If this is correct, Davidson's attempt to retain the dependence of the mental upon the physical while arguing at the same time for the nonexistence of psychophysical laws cannot succeed.

In fact, if Q_1 and Q_2 are two N -maximal properties each of which is sufficient for P , an M -property, we have the stronger M - N correlation: if anything has Q_1 or Q_2 , it also has P . In favorable cases there will be a finite maximum number of these Q 's in N^* in which case we have the following maximal N - M correlation for P : if anything has Q_1 or Q_2 or ... Q_n , it has P .

The result can be strengthened when this kind of maximal N - M correlation exists for a given property

in M . Suppose we have:

$$Q_1 \vee \dots \vee Q_n \rightarrow P$$

as a maximal N - M correlation for P in M . Do we also have its converse:

$$P \rightarrow Q_1 \vee \dots \vee Q_n?$$

Suppose some object x is a counter-instance to the converse: that is, x has P but lacks each of Q_1, \dots, Q_n . Since N^* of all N -maximal properties is exhaustive, x must have some N -maximal property, say K . Now, let y be any object that has K . By the supervenience of M on N , y must also have P since x and y coincide on N^* and x has P . So we have the M - N correlation:

$$K \rightarrow P.$$

This means that K must be one of the Q 's, and therefore x cannot lack each of Q_1, \dots, Q_n . So the converse of the M - N maximal correlation for P has no exceptions and can therefore be strengthened to a biconditional:

$$P \leftrightarrow Q_1 \vee \dots \vee Q_n.$$

Thus, generally, if a maximal M - N correlation exists for any property in M , it can be strengthened into a biconditional. Since the existence of a maximal M - N correlation can be guaranteed for each P in M as long as the set N is finite (if N is finite, so is N^*), we have the following result: *If M is supervenient on a finite N , then each property in M which is instantiated is biconditional-correlated with some property in N^* .*

It turns out that supervenience is a very strong relationship, indeed. The finiteness of the base family N of properties, we should note, need not be an overwhelmingly restrictive condition, for two reasons: first, if we accept certain infinitistic methods of property construction, the restriction might be removable; second, the finiteness of N may simply amount to the finiteness of the primitive nonlogical vocabulary of a theory in N (this will be the case if the vocabulary lacks functors). The above derivation of M - N property correlation was conditioned on the assumption that the given property in M is instantiated. In most cases this will be safe enough to assume; but even if it is not we should take note of the fact that if a property is not instantiated its complement surely is, and that our argument goes through for the complement property.

To summarize: (1) if M supervenes on N , there are property-to-property correlations between M and N ; (2) every property in M has either a necessary or sufficient condition in N (if a property is not instantiated, then its complement has a sufficient condition in N ; so it has a necessary condition in N ;

however, our aim is to develop a reasonably precise concept of supervenience in terms of which certain issues concerning microreduction and psychophysical reduction could be formulated and clarified.

III

For any set of M of properties we define M^* as the closure of M under the usual Boolean operations (including perhaps infinite conjunction and disjunction, and any other operations whereby properties are generated by other properties). That is, M^* is the set of all properties constructible from those in M . We also define a subset M^* of M^* as follows: if M is finite, each member of M^* is a maximal consistent conjunction of the properties, and the complements of the properties, in M ; if M is not finite, the members of M^* are maximal consistent sets of the properties in M and their complements. We refer to the members of M^* as *M-maximal properties*. An *M-maximal property* is the strongest consistent property constructible in the set M , and, for a finite M , any property in M^* is equivalent to a disjunction of *M-maximal properties*. The account to follow can be generalized to relations, but for the sake of simplicity, we shall confine this discussion to singulary attributes, that is, properties.

We explain supervenience as follows: a family M of properties is *supervenient on* a family N of properties with respect to a domain D of objects just in case, necessarily, objects in D which share all properties in N^* will also share all properties in M^* . (We shall henceforth omit references to D , assuming it to be fixed for any given case.) Supervenience, therefore, comes to this: *indiscernibility with respect to N^* , the closure of the supervenience base, entails indiscernibility with respect to M^* , the closure of the set of supervenient properties.*

The foregoing captures, in a straightforward way, the idea of dependence or determination in the quotations from Moore, Hare, and Davidson. The modal term, "necessarily," which occurs in the definition will have to be interpreted in an appropriate way to suit particular applications of the concepts involved. Moore and Hare appear to have had in mind a strong sense of logical necessity; perhaps a weaker sense ("nomological necessity") would be more appropriate for Davidson. As we shall not dwell on this issue, our general arguments will, at least partially, be affected by the lack of clarity surrounding the notion of necessity; but the generality of our treatment makes this unavoidable. It is likely, however, that as different interpretations

are attached to necessity, compensating adjustments are forthcoming elsewhere to keep the general line of our considerations unaffected.

Supervenience as explained is a relation between two families of properties. Our main concern in this section is how this relation is connected to other interesting relationships between them, specifically reducibility, definability, and the existence of laws connecting the properties in the two families. By *reducibility* we shall understand the Nagel-reducibility: this is a relation obtaining between two theories; however, the primary requirement for this type of reduction is that each primitive descriptive term of the reduced theory be connected by a biconditional bridge law with some predicate of the reducing theory. In the material mode of speech, this connectibility condition amounts to the requirement that each property expressed by the descriptive terms of the reduced theory be nomologically coextensive with some property in the reducing theory. The other requirement of Nagel reduction is that the laws of the reducing theory entail those of the reduced theory; we interpret this requirement in such a way that it is trivially entailed by the connectibility condition; that is, we may, if necessary, supplement the reducing theory with the images, under the bridge laws, of the basic laws of the reduced theory.

Definability is not a clear notion; that definability requires coextension is perhaps all that most philosophers will agree on. Normally we would want some sort of "conceptual," "necessary," or "meaning" relationship between expressions or properties before granting definability, but it is pointless to go into these matters here. Coextensionality is the only firm ground we have, and as we remarked earlier concerning the necessity operator in the definition of "supervenience," it seems best to leave the matter in its present state with the hope that compensating adjustments are made where necessary or desirable in the application of our general considerations to specific cases. Similar comments apply also to the nomological character of the "bridge laws": the precise interpretation of "lawlikeness" is no less problematic than an account of "conceptual necessity," and here again the only firm ground we have is coextensionality supplemented perhaps with the condition that the predicates or properties occurring in the laws be "purely qualitative." For our purposes, the core of both reducibility and definability is the presence of appropriate biconditionals between the two sets of properties. We will therefore focus on the following

propiedad F en M , si x tiene F , entonces debe haber una propiedad G en N tal que x tiene G y si algo tiene G , también tiene F . Así pues, decir que F está determinado microfísicamente equivale a decir que el conjunto F superpone respecto de un conjunto de propiedades reducibles microfísicamente. El resultado final es que no obstante que una propiedad es microfísicamente incommensurable, puede estar determinada microfísicamente. De suerte que, por ejemplo, a pesar de que el que un objeto es una mesa es incommensurable nomológicamente, hay ciertas propiedades nomológicas que tiene, respecto de las cuales superpone su ser mesa. Igualmente, pensar en la luna no parece estar relacionado nomológicamente con otros eventos, pero cuando alguien piensa en la luna, hay ciertas propiedades que la persona ejemplifica, que entran en la red de conexiones causales por virtud de sus nexos nomológicos con ciertos acontecimientos respecto de los cuales superpone el evento genérico "pensar en la luna".

Si mi elaboración del concepto de superponencia se sostiene, entonces hay cierta base para defender la distinción entre la causalidad y el determinismo causal. Lo primero requiere leyes, pero lo último sólo requiere superponencia respecto de acontecimientos que forman parte de una red causal. Ciertos eventos son manifiestamente causales, son nomológicamente mesurables. En cambio, otros eventos se vienen a inscribir en la red causal gracias a su superponencia respecto de eventos que a su vez superponen respecto de eventos que a su vez... respecto de eventos nomológicamente mesurables. Si no me equivoco, esto ofrece un punto de vista fructífero para examinar, entre otros problemas el de la reducción de lo macrofísico a lo microfísico y el de lo mental a lo físico. Naturalmente, hay que suplir más detalle; por ejemplo, es menester precisar la clase de leyes requeridas (posiblemente las leyes de conexión de Nagel son un punto de partida útil para discutir este tema), también hay que elucidar la noción de los operadores modales que hay que admitir, y explicar si los cuantificadores se toman en sentido sustitutivo. No obstante, tal como lo he expuesto, la superponencia parecería ofrecer una alternativa digna de atención.

clausura de S bajo las operaciones booleanas habituales, incluyendo la conjunción y la disyunción, así como toda operación mediante la cual generamos propiedades sobre la base de propiedades. Es decir, S^t es el conjunto de todas las propiedades construibles a partir de las propiedades en S . Defino un subconjunto de S^t , al que doy el nombre de S^* , como sigue: si S es finito, cada miembro de S^* es una conjunción máximamente consistente de las propiedades (y de los complementos de las propiedades) en S ; si S no es finito, los miembros de S^* son conjuntos máximamente consistentes de las propiedades en S y sus complementos. Los miembros de S^* son propiedades S -máximas. Toda propiedad S -máxima es la propiedad consistente más robusta en S , y, para un S finito, cualquier propiedad en S^t es equivalente a una disyunción de propiedades S -máximas. Podemos definir la superponencia así: una familia de propiedades M superpone respecto de una familia de propiedades N con relación a un dominio de objetos finito, si, cualesquiera dos objetos que comparten todas las propiedades en N^t también comparten todas las propiedades en M^t . Por lo tanto, la superponencia es indiscernibilidad respecto de M^t , la clausura de la base de la superponencia supone indiscernibilidad respecto de M^t , que es el conjunto de las propiedades que tienen la propiedad de la superponencia. ¿Qué sigue acerca de la existencia de conexiones nomológicas entre M y N ? Sea P una propiedad en M y adoptemos (Ex) Px . Dado que todas las propiedades en M^* son mutuamente excluyentes y conjuntivamente exhaustivas, existe una propiedad N -máxima, Q , ejemplificada por x . De manera que si y tiene Q , también tiene P . Puesto que esto vale para cada propiedad en M , se sigue que si M superpone respecto de N , cada propiedad en M tiene una condición suficiente en N^* y por lo tanto también en N^t . Así, pues, si tal como Davidson sugiere, lo mental superpone respecto de lo físico, cada característica mental tiene una condición suficiente en alguna característica física, y resulta difícil convencerse de que no es de *tiroteo nomológico*, toda vez que algún tipo de necesidad se anuncia en esta somera exposición. De suerte que Davidson se equivoca al sostener la dependencia de lo mental respecto de lo físico conjuntivamente con la inexistencia de leyes sobre lo mental.

Deseo sugerir lo siguiente a manera de explicación de ese resultado que evidentemente Davidson no ha advertido en su propia noción de superponencia. Una propiedad, F , nomológicamente incommensurable respecto de, por ejemplo, propiedades microfísicas, puede no obstante tener alguna base microfísica si lo siguiente se cumple: si un objeto tiene F , entonces hay un conjunto de propiedades, N , tal que el objeto tiene las propiedades de N . La superponencia, recuérdese, estipula que una familia de propiedades M superpone respecto de otra familia de propiedades N , si, para cada objeto x y para cada

conexión regular entre los acontecimientos de la clase $\{x : (Ey)(Fy \& R(x, y))\}$ y los acontecimientos de la clase G (v.gr., e^*). Se hace evidente la indeseable consecuencia de que cualesquiera dos acontecimientos ejemplifican una ley si por lo menos un par ejemplifica una ley. En otras palabras, dado un par de descripciones y dados dos eventos cualesquiera, es posible formular un segundo par de descripciones válidas para los acontecimientos entre los que hay una conjunción constante, descripciones que caen bajo leyes gracias a la conjunción constante del primer par de descripciones. Nuestro problema, entonces, no ha sido resuelto por Davidson.

Ahora bien, Davidson formula una interesante sugerencia sobre la relación entre la ausencia de leyes sicofísicas y la dependencia de lo mental respecto de lo físico que, si es objeto de cierta elaboración, ofrece posibilidades interesantes para tratar de solucionar el problema que nos ocupa:

A pesar de que mi posición niega la existencia de leyes sicofísicas, es consistente con la tesis de que las características mentales dependen o superponen respecto de características físicas. Esta superposición puede tomarse en el sentido de que no puede haber dos eventos idénticos entre sí desde el punto de vista físico pero que difieren respecto de algo mental... (p. 88)

Paso a ofrecer una versión del concepto de superposición. Mi tesis es que, tal como la reconstruyo, la superposición permite establecer una relación de índole nomológica entre los acontecimientos incommensurables nomológicamente y los acontecimientos mesurables nomológicamente.

La dependencia y la superposición son mutuamente equivalentes, según Davidson. Aunque él no lo admite explícitamente, la noción de superposición ha sido elaborada por algunos filósofos en el área de la filosofía moral: su idea básica es que dos propiedades evaluadoras no pueden diferir entre sí respecto de dos objetos idénticos mutuamente por lo que se refiere a sus propiedades físicas.³ La intención de Davidson es establecer que lo mental está igualmente basado en lo físico, a pesar de que no es reducible a éste. Su objetivo es atractivo, pues parece ser consistente, por un lado, con nuestro convencimiento de que nuestra vida mental depende en cierto modo de nuestra vida material, y, por otro lado, con nuestra incapacidad de encontrar leyes sicofísicas.

Formulemos la noción de superposición con más detalle. Supongamos que S es un conjunto de propiedades. Defino S_t como la

³Véase, por ejemplo, G.E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, London: Macmillan, 1922, p. 261; y Hare, *The Language of Morals*, London: Macmillan, 1952, p. 145.

trata de resolver el problema del acoplamiento de los acontecimientos nomológicamente mesurables con los acontecimientos nomológicamente incommensurables; luego paso a considerar un concepto introducido por el propio Davidson, a saber, el concepto de superponencia: lo someto a cierta reconstrucción que arroja un resultado contrario a la tesis de Davidson, i.e., los eventos incommensurables nomológicamente guardan una relación de concomitancia necesaria con los eventos mesurables nomológicamente.

Pasemos a continuación a considerar si el problema del acoplamiento de las dos clases de acontecimientos se puede resolver mediante una sugerencia al efecto formulada por Davidson. Su objetivo es demostrar que los incommensurables nomológicos pueden hallar cierto lugar en una red causal si formulamos con alguna precisión lo que significa que un evento ejemplifica leyes. El trasfondo de su estrategia es lo siguiente: dos eventos ejemplifican una ley si se cumple la condición de que alguna descripción de ellos ejemplifica una ley. La justificación es que en puridad son las descripciones las que ejemplifican leyes, no los eventos como tales, y para poder decir que dos eventos son ejemplares de una ley debemos escoger cuidadosamente la descripción que se halla cobijada por la ley. Davidson opta por un punto de vista similar a éste, a pesar de que no lo plantea en términos de descripciones. Su posición es que un evento pertenece a varias clases de eventos (pertenece a eventos genéricos, por así decir), y que reclamar que dos eventos ejemplifican una ley equivale a decir que pertenecen respectivamente a dos eventos genéricos relacionados entre sí nomológicamente. Supongamos que "*a*" significa un evento que ejemplifica el evento genérico "*A*", que "*b*" significa otro evento y que "*B*", significa el evento genérico que "*b*" ejemplifica. Davidson sostiene que basta con escoger cualesquiera *A* y *B* (o, en la formulación alterna, cualesquiera par de descripciones de *A* y *B*) relacionados entre sí mediante alguna ley, y entonces podemos establecer una relación de índole nomológica entre cualesquiera *a* y *b*.

Hallemos esto muy débil, toda vez que tiene la indeseable consecuencia de que resulta muy fácil que un acontecimiento ejemplifique leyes. Para convencernos de esto, consideremos en qué consiste que dos descripciones ejemplifican una ley. De acuerdo con Davidson, las descripciones *D* y *D** ejemplifican una ley en caso de que *D* conjuntamente con la ley tenga a *D** como consecuencia, pero no *D* por sí solo ni la ley por sí sola. Adoptemos, por nuestra parte, que *F* y *G* son las descripciones respectivas de los eventos *e* y *e** y que una ley estipula que cada evento de la clase *F* se halla seguido por uno de la clase *G*. Tomemos además otro acontecimiento cualquiera, *f*, y adoptemos que *R* es una relación entre *e* y *f*. El predicado (*Ey*) (*Fy* & *R* (*x,y*)) es verdad de *f*, con el resultado de que la regularidad entre los acontecimientos *F* y los acontecimientos *G* garantiza una

En un artículo que ha sido objeto de relativamente poca atención, Donald Davidson defiende una tesis que expresa de la siguiente manera:

Eventos mentales, tales como las percepciones, los recuerdos, las decisiones, al igual que las acciones, resisten captura en la red nomológica de la teoría física.¹

El título general de los acontecimientos que exhiben esta característica es "incommensurables nomológicos". La literatura reconoce dos tipos, a saber, de una parte, propiedades incommensurables nomológicamente, y, de otra parte, eventos incommensurables nomológicamente. Los últimos ejemplifican las primeras. Una mirada somera a nuestro alrededor parece confirmar que hay propiedades tales y acontecimientos tales: no hallamos, por ejemplo, leyes acerca del ser mesa de una mesa ni leyes acerca de perder un libro. A propósito de esto Quine lamenta la ausencia de leyes acerca de las cosas rojas y Putnam argumenta que no puede haber leyes acerca de los solteros.² Ello lleva a Davidson a sostener que no puede haber leyes acerca de los eventos mentales que sirvan para enmarcarlos en redes causales (pág. 91).

Adopto un punto de vista contrario al de Davidson. Me propongo tratar de ubicar el estudio de los acontecimientos que parecen ser incommensurables nomológicamente dentro de la tradición filosófica que entiende que su análisis hace uso de leyes. Mi plan sigue el siguiente desarrollo general: primero, critico el modo como Davidson

¹ Donald Davidson, "Mental Events", en Foster & Swanson (Eds), *Experience and Theory*, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1970.

² W.V. Quine, "Natural Kinds", en N. Rescher, *Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel*, Holland: Dordrecht, 1969; Hilary Putnam, "The Analytic and the Synthetic", en Feigl & Maxwell, *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Minneapolis: 1962, vol. III.