



J. VICENS VIVES

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CONFERENCIES

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Conferències generals

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THE POPULAR AND INTELLECTUAL STRUGGLE  
IN SPAIN AGAINST THE NAPOLEONIC INVASION .-

One of the most dramatic episodes in the history of Spain was the crisis unleashed by the invasion of Napoleon's troops. Many factors contribute to make it of interest to historians, not only of Spain, but to all those who concern themselves with the origins of contemporary Europe, (or what we might perhaps call the phenomenology of historical events). In effect, we find ourselves confronted by a double process; the decline of the Ancient Régime in Spain and the Violent convulsion produced in the Country by the impact of the New Europe, symbolized by the legions of the Emperor. With these considerations before us, we must reconsider the view, common to the histories written on this subject, which holds the Spanish rising of 1,808 as the first popular national explosion against the political, economic and ideological system which the Great <sup>Corsican</sup> ~~Corsair~~ ~~Nap~~ wanted to establish in Europe.

In the study of history myths are readily accepted. (We shall not now try to discern whether what is important in the life of humanity is the mythical Erlebnis (the mythical acceptance) of an event.

The truth is that we modern historians live enclosed in a net of mythical living experiences, suspecting some of them to be originally false, but being unable to doubt them all, much less



to be able to re-establish with certainty the absolute authenticity of the event which gave them life. However, the inquietude of the investigators and the intrepid desire of the best of them to reconstruct and understand the past in its exact dimensions, help to bring about a constant overcoming of those barriers between the past and the present which have been erected by these myths. In this way an approximation of the truth is arrived at which becomes progressively more convincing.

▷ When we come to the Spanish War of Independence, <sup>that</sup> ~~tabb~~ is, the reaction of Spain in the face of the Napoleonic Invasion, the myth is the unanimous rising of <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ people, not only against those that threatened their sovereign independence, but especially against the Revolution inherent in the French <sup>Army</sup> ~~Legions~~. Writers of every stamp, whether liberals or conservatives, Spanish or foreign, have contributed to the development of this <sup>myth</sup> ~~delusion~~. Above all, from the religious point of view. It was the traditional religiosity of the Spanish people, <sup>opportunistly</sup> ~~opportunely~~ fomented by a fanatical clergy, ~~with the scales~~ that decisively turned the scales in the state of mind of the Spanish people <sup>in</sup> ~~of~~ 1808, and unleashed a fierce spiritual ~~ferocity~~ of resistance. Recently this view has had two great apologists in <sup>Spanish/</sup> historiography: Federico Suarez Verdaguer and Rafael Calvo Serer. The former finds the fundamentals of the "unanimous decision" of the Spanish people to lie in religion, the King and <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ independence <sup>of the</sup> ~~of the~~ ideas, customs and life of the country <sup>in face of</sup> ~~from the~~ foreign yoke. <sup>1.</sup> Rafael Calvo Serer, on the other hand, insists on the "Religious Spirit" of the War of Independence as the only explanation possible for the heroic resistance of the country against the Napoleonic Empire. <sup>2.</sup>

The truth is far more complex, so complex indeed, that it is almost impossible to fathom completely, because it depends on manifold personal positions, reacting in the face of only one comprehensible fact; the fall of the traditional monarchy and the disappearance of the old Administrative State established by the



Borbonas. Nevertheless, one must turn back to the facts as shown revealed by ~~the~~ contemporary documents. ~~From these, it is clear, for example,~~ Among these, for example, is shown the revolutionary character that the Absolute Monarchy, restored by Ferdinand VII in 1814, attributed to the <sup>revolt</sup> ~~events~~ of the 2nd of May 1808 in Madrid. It was the constitutionalists of 1820 and the liberals of 1833 who instituted one of the most respected national days still observed in traditional and conservative Spain. (3) In effect, ~~tax~~ in the eyes of ~~contemporaries~~ it was not possible to be mistaken: the 2nd of May in Madrid had not only been an explosion of hate against the French Army, but the dawn of political liberty, or at the least the sound of a deep rumbling of political reform, which resulted in uniting all classes of the country, from the clergy to the University Intellectuals

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ORDINARY { To consider carefully the profundity of the reform movement which arose in Spain in May 1808, we must make ourselves familiar with the internal details of the reign of Charles IV. Until now Spanish historical research has overlooked this interesting period overshadowed by Godoy, the omnipotent Minister and favourite of the then Monarch. On referring to the immoral ~~dictatorship~~ dictatorship of that epoch, the historian could generally be satisfied. But, what really happened during those twenty decisive years, when Spain first faced the Revolution and then collaborated with it both militarily & politically? What became of ideological currents that were spread abroad during the reign of Charles III? How were the minds of people working so that even minorities were formed which <sup>in</sup> 1808 assumed responsibility for change of course <sup>of</sup> in the direction <sup>of</sup> that Spanish political life was taking?

The ordinary historian was satisfied by a casual reference to the 'immorality' of the Godoy's dictatorship.



The influence of the French Revolution on the supposed <sup>trend</sup> reactionary ~~turn~~ of the Government during the reign of Charles IV has been judged over-hastily. Certainly, the rapid succession of events in Paris <sup>weakened</sup> ~~weakened~~ in many intellectuals and enlightened thinkers the fervent hope which "the voice of liberty" had awakened in their breasts, this is affirmed by Manuel Quintana, the Poet, referring to his youth. It is true that the circumstances ~~arising~~ arising from the war of 1793-94 against the Convention contributed to the ~~slow~~ ~~slow~~ slowing down of the <sup>changes</sup> ~~reforms~~ initiated by the Monarchy and his Ministers, giving a new lease of life to those who considered as noxious these politics and prejudicial the system of Ministerial despotism in which it was represented. The spectre of the Civil Constitution of the clergy and Robespierre's Reign of Terror gave to many Spanish Ecclesiastics a belief that was profoundly anti-revolutionary, <sup>LETTERS</sup> (as can be seen by reading the ~~messages~~ <sup>from the</sup> and sermons of that time, ~~starting with the~~ proclamations and edicts of the Catalan Bishops in 1793 to the famous Encyclical letter published in 1812 by several bishops who were in refuge in Mallorca ~~(in 1812)~~). At that time the slogan "Religion, King, Country" was born, which was later, in 1808, to be proclaimed by the guerrilla bands. (This slogan first appeared when the flag of the First Regular ~~Corps~~ Volunteer Corps of Barcelona was hoisted in 1794. There was also the growing confusion of Political terminology, so that terms which were actually revolutionary, such as nation, "patrie" and citizen came to swell the vehement speech of the conservatives. ~~§~~

In this exchange between the forces of progress and tradition the ~~manually~~



monarchy ~~agreed~~ brought about the dismissal of the Count of Floridablanca in 1790 and of the Godoy-Jovellanos team in 1798. But the revolutionary propaganda continued in a thousand ways to infiltrate into the interior of the country, despite the censorship and the "cordon sanitaire". (Recently Miguel Artola and Carlos Corona have referred to this. The former has given us new data concerning the initial phases of the Revolution, including the period during the Ministry of Floridablanca. But it is Carlos Corona who has gone more deeply into the question in an extensive and authoritative study entitled "Reaction and Revolution in the Reign of Charles IV". His findings agree with those of another investigator, Emili Vigo, who has shown us the Catalan politics of the Great Committee of Public Safety in 1793-1795 which had as its aim, first, the separation <sup>of</sup> the Cataluña from Castilla, and secondly to convert Cataluña into a Satellite Republic in the style of those which flourished on the borders of the "Grand Nation", (Revolutionary France). But, <sup>A</sup> apart from the mass of leaflets and propaganda sheets, sometimes in prodigious quantities, there were also the many reverberating echos that resounded each day in ~~the~~ intellectual and urban circles as a result of the revolutionary ideas and events; echos which were brought by the immigrants themselves, by the merchant ships and very soon by the officials of the French Republic when they established embassies and consulates.

Towards the year 1797 the "pre-liberal" groups (it is difficult to define them in any other way) recovered their confidence in the future of France and her Revolution. A mass of details demonstrate this. It was in these times that at Osuna, near Sevilla<sup>e</sup>, the meetings of the "Academia Silé" took place, organized by Manuel Maria Arjona, in which reference is made to the "infamous blanket" that covered Spain. In Madrid, (December 1797), there were cheers for the tricolor as well as a play called "To die for your Country is Glory", whose revolutionary theme is evident; and in Barcelona in May of the same year, Rafael d'Amat, Baron de Malda, author of some delightful memoirs, writes about the agitation of the "rumour-mongers and riff-raff" of Barcelona



and the anti-religious feeling in Barcelona, ~~inspired~~ inspired by the French Revolution. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ To this troubled atmosphere must be ascribed the well known decree of 1798 which again prohibited the circulation of <sup>forbidden</sup> ~~prescribed~~ books in Spanish Universities.

It is quite possible that this eruption only manifested itself in certain isolated parts of the country, and that over the rest the traditional conformist feelings prevailed. This point has not been examined. Nevertheless, what can be affirmed is that between 1792 and 1808 every well-informed Spaniard was faced with the dilemma of the future of Spain and her political regime, the more so as, with every day that passed, the economic or diplomatic scene worsened. No one has taken into account that the economic expansion registered in the last 20 years of the XVIII Century, marked by violent crises and terminated by the ~~inflationary~~ inflationary boom of Government Bonds, provoked serious upsets to the wealth of shareholders and the ruling classes in general, including the Church. Above all, the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie were left severely weakened, to such an extent that some firms were ruined. The inflation also struck at the lower classes of the urban population, swallowing their wages in the continual rise in prices. ( This is borne out in the cost of living index calculated by Pierre Vilar for Madrid; 96.1% in mid-century against only 59% for the five years period 1796-1800. In so far as the country districts are concerned, the discontent caused by the famine on the land was endemic, since the rise in price of agricultural products and the increase of population registered between 1760 and 1765. )

There is no need to refer to the bitterness that was rife as a result of the <sup>disaster</sup> ~~fracas~~ in the international arena. <sup>From</sup> After the Peace Treaty of <sup>BASLE</sup> ~~Basilea~~ in 1795, acclaimed in the circles of the Court as a triumph of the diplomatic shrewdness of Godoy, who was honoured with the title of the Prince of Peace, stems the disaster of the two wars against England. Of the wars, emphasis is laid only ~~only~~ on the two Naval battles of Cape Vincent (1797) and Trafalgar (1805) which gave a really powerfull blow to the prestige of the Spanish Crown.



But <sup>it</sup> is often forgotten that these defeats excluded Spain <sup>from</sup> the Atlantic and prepared the way, with the law of 1795, which authorized neutrals to trade with the overseas colonies, for the imminent collapse of the Spanish Empire in America.

The Government (permeated with the influence of Godoy both from within and without) appeared to be oblivious to these facts, and was satisfied by the cloud of incense with which its <sup>admirers</sup> ~~adorers~~ covered it. Its only policy was to maintain the dictatorship, that is to say, <sup>to ensure</sup> ~~avoided~~ that the Monarchy should <sup>not</sup> have to face any of the ~~many~~ many types of problems which it was creating. In order to do this, Godoy was counting on three faithful elements in the country: the censorship, the army and the administration. In this way the regime continued to survive, ~~In this way the regime continued~~ and also in this way it was continuing in the development of a policy that we could call "ilustrada" (<sup>ENLIGHTENED</sup> ~~inspired~~). (Thus Carlos Corona qualifies <sup>it</sup>.) But it was a narrow-minded measure, overflowing, we might almost say, with propaganda, ~~whereas~~ whereas the real part of the country lived under a corrupt administration and with a complete loss of any sense of direction. (Juretschke says, ~~with~~ correctly, that "the censorship, applied with contradictory zeal, instead of ordering the minds of the people, confuses them even more because it does not allow the spontaneous formation of a public opinion.")

The <sup>of</sup> Godoy system - Califa Godoy, as Dr. Santpons of Barcelona called him, persisted because the fear of the revolution paralyzed the spirits of those who could have proposed a change and carried it out. But when it became evident that Prince Ferdinand, heir to the throne ~~there~~, could be used as a lever, so that the serious problems of the break-up of the dictatorship could be resolved peacefully, there began what Corona calls the <sup>"alienation"</sup> ~~dissension~~ of the privileged classes <sup>from the regime</sup>. Before him J. Perez de Guzman had seen the intensity and breadth of the movement. The plot, led by a nobleman of Ferdinand's party, failed at its first attempt in October 1807. But when Napoleon's troops obliged Godoy, by ~~a~~ the menace of superior forces, to move the Court from







Castilla, took part in the plot which put an end to the Old Regime. The anti-Godoy explosion in Madrid on the 19th of March; that of Toledo on the 21st and the 22nd; the celebration of the fall of the Minister ~~brought about~~ by the bourgeois of Barcelona; all these were ~~additional~~ additional signs of the social unrest and agitation against the dictatorship of the Prince of Peace. (At the same time, behind the scenes, countless figures, whose part has never been completely defined, were acting in the shadows, ~~weaving~~ weaving the pattern of history.)

The decisive revolutionary step was taken by the officers of the Artillery on the 2nd of May, when they delivered to the people the arms with which to fight against the Napoleonic troops, who, <sup>failed to support</sup> unexpectedly, ~~broke with~~ the results reached at Aranjuez and became auxiliaries of the abhorred dictatorial system. (Of course, they could not guess the thoughts of the Emperor, <sup>to</sup> ~~for~~ whom the members of the Spanish Royal Family were so many more marionettes, which he moved in his vast political and strategic designs.) In the impassioned ferment of April and May in the year 1808, Bonaparte was a traitor to the Revolutionary cause, the flagrant tyrant who was trying to reduce the Spanish people to slavery.

When the news of the events of May in Madrid reached the outskirts of the Peninsular, the reaction was analogous in all parts. In the last ten days of that month the provinces revolted. At this time it was not yet known that Napoleon was going to hand over the crown to his brother Joseph (who himself did not know until the 19th). However, the consecutive abdications of Charles IV and of Ferdinand VII were known. The revolt was directed not only against the French, but also against their collaborators, namely the officials of the old regime, whose aim was to secure the <sup>peaceful transfer</sup> ~~transmission~~ of power. Underneath, there were movements against the military and civil hierarchies ~~whose~~ <sup>appointed by</sup> appointments had been created under the Ministry of Godoy. Thus the echoes of the revolt of Aranjuez reached the most distant corners of Spain as a final, and this time decisive, rebellious wave, in which the Spain of the 18th Century was finally cracking up.

It was for this simple reason that the resistance against the Napoleonic Army had to be organized ~~from regional centers of the country,~~ <sup>on a regional basis</sup>



which ~~still existed~~ at that time. All the machinery of the central government was geared to the politics of Godoy and so it vacillated internally and remained abominable externally. For this very reason, the take-over of power by the Provincial Juntas was not pacific, and there were uprisings, assaults and murders. As one goes more deeply into the constitution of these Juntas and the numerous episodes of the municipal revolution in May 1808, one discovers new factors which throw into relief the clash between the old administration and the new Reformative Spain which was wanting to emerge, and which, did <sup>burst</sup> definitely and dramatically ~~burst~~ forth in the midst of a military and political crisis without precedent. (The occurrences in Oviedo, Zaragoza, Cadiz, Sevilla, Badajoz, Gerona and Tortosa, among many others, are of profound significance in this historical movement.)

So the ~~reigns~~ <sup>was</sup> of power ~~were~~ <sup>ing</sup> held by a series of forces, which, generally speaking, we can call reformative. This generation looked hopefully to the persons who had not been connected with the governments of Charles the IV and who had been, to a certain extent, the victims of Godoy: Jovellanos, the Count of Floridablanca, Francisco Saavedra, Valdés, and so on. It was their first reaction, and <sup>it</sup> was inevitable. They needed them to organize the uprising, which was more urgent because of the hostile attitude of Napoleon's troops. It was only afterwards, after the unforeseen and popular ~~and~~ victory at the Battle of Bailén -- a Battle which resounded disagreeably in the ~~aristocratic and collaborationist~~ Madrid of the moment -- that there was the opportunity for everyone to examine his own conscience and to decide in ~~what~~ <sup>in</sup> direction and to what end the Revolution was to be organized; it was now called <sup>in Europe</sup> the Spanish Revolution ~~in Europe~~, both from the Military and Political point of view.

So now we can realize what can be called the mental level of the the Juntas Provinciales, which very soon, through force of circumstances, historical inertia and <sup>because of</sup> ~~through~~ the impetuous centralizing tendency of Spanish Jacobinism <sup>nism</sup>, would have to give way







time obtaining the resignation from ~~the Junta~~<sup>it</sup> of the Mayor, (Augustín Alberch, placed in that position by the Magistrate of Villafranca del Panadés.)

"Corregidor" or magistrate

Juan de Torch had been assassinated by the mob, suspected of communicating with the French, (that is to say, of Godoyism). Later this same mob was to support the military dictatorship of the Partisan and rebel leader Antonio Roca. Roca ~~aimed~~<sup>aimed</sup> his policy against the local seat of power in the person of the nobleman Antonio de Padró, who was dispossessed of his rents and accused - logically enough - of ~~Gallicism~~<sup>afrancado or franchisme.</sup>

Near Igualada, on the road to Barcelona, another Junta had been set up in Martorell. This was supposed to represent the Corregimiento (or Magistrate's Office) of Barcelona, (but the subterfuges of the capital, which was in the hands of Dutesme, never extended as far as the village).

It ~~They~~<sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ under suspicion as a result of ~~their~~<sup>its</sup> social ~~beginnings~~<sup>origins</sup>. The very Town Council itself was dominated by the Junta, which acted authoritatively, imposing taxes, raising its own troops and administering justice and the functions of the police. At first, the offices of the Junta were held by ~~people of power~~<sup>notables notables</sup>; later ~~they were~~ by intellectuals and the professional classes. The ordinary citizen was barred. But it unmistakably proved itself on more than one occasion, especially when it threatened the rich and landed gentry as collaborationists and brought about a ~~xx~~ more just social system.

These two examples are revealing, and it would be easy to quote more. In the underlying popular movement reflected in the local Juntas and Magistrates' Courts (Corregimentales) can be seen the first ~~simmerings~~<sup>\*</sup> of a social and political attitude which was to come to the boil during the following years. There was no revolutionary outbreak which had any definite aims. Nor was it possible that there should be. But the public took a part in the events, sometimes governing, sometimes ~~hindering~~<sup>\*</sup> government. With the few words they had been taught, they fought and died for their homes and the religion of their fathers, while beneath a new world was seething, different from the old. Because of this, many of the future volunteers of the liberal ~~army~~<sup>army</sup> ~~are considered as guerrilla~~<sup>were former</sup> troops in the war against France. Without any doubt the most characteristic of these was the peasant from Navarra, Espoz y Mina.



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The consolidation of the anti-French and anti-Godoy risings after ~~Basilea~~ <sup>Basle</sup> (?) brought complete liberty of speech to thousands of Spaniards. Considerable quantities of printed matter were distributed throughout Spain, supporting ideas of every kind, even the most radical. (Priests and intellectuals of every type entered the fray to defend their particular points of view. A detailed examination of the contents of these pamphlets has ~~xxx~~ <sup>never</sup> been made. At most, some extracts have been used to support a \_\_\_\_\_ hypothesis or a subsequent idealogical interpretation. The only extensive material which has been subjected to study by historians consists of the replies formulated by the ecclesiastical authorities, corporations holding distinct views, and even ordinary individuals, to the information made available by the Supreme Central Junta in compliance With Art. IV. of the decree of 22nd May, 1809 "re-establishing" - such is the word used - the Spanish Cortes or Senate. The presentation of this work, which we owe to F. Jimenez de Gregorio, suffers from some scholastic imperfections. But there is more than enough to take us to the core of the Spanish political and idealogical feeling during the summer~~months~~ in 1809, before Marshal Souët's <sup>?</sup> (Soult) offensive against Andalucia, the tenacity of spirit due to the prolongation of the war and the emotional climate aroused in Sola de Leon's parliamentary<sup>1</sup> debates in Cadiz. It was a period of tolerance and even of rectification of positions forced to be taken up at the beginning of the revolutionary disturbance.)

A glance at ~~these documents~~ these documents taken as a whole is sufficient to convince one of the spirit of reform which invaded the most varied sectors of Spanish society after May, 1808. Without either geographical or mental distinctions, the governing minorities of Spain declared themselves ready to avoid the ~~fall into~~ <sup>into</sup> decadence <sup>fallen into</sup> which the country had ~~suffered in~~ <sup>suffered in</sup> the previous years, by reviving the ~~practical~~ <sup>(Parliament)</sup> tradition of the Cortes. Concerning this, it must be borne in mind that this tradition was very real and that there had not been the <sup>long</sup> ~~secular~~ lapse <sup>as</sup> which ~~entrained~~ in France ~~had~~ caused dissension in the last edicts of the ~~Estados Generales~~.

*Estat Generales*



Although ineffectually, Charles IV had restored the Spanish Cortes ~~in~~ in 1789, but moreover the tide of erudition was beginning to make itself felt : Martínez Marina, director of the Academia de la Historia, had been working on a study of the Castillian Cortes since 1801, and in 1807 this work was practically finished; For their part, learned Catalanes, such as Antonio de Capmany, had covered the Cortes of Cataluña, Aragon and Valencia in their studies, and had an exact knowledge of their functions and development.

It is not suprising, therefore, that there is (was) general agreement in considering the Cortes as the sole means not only of giving the country a government that would direct and unite the common efforts of Spaniards in the ~~X~~ war, ~~but also~~, but also of restoring the country to greatness and improving the lot of the people. What is suprising is the radicalism of many of the 58 ~~accounts~~ <sup>reports</sup> received, <sup>by the Junta Suprema,</sup> (nearly a third of which were ecclesiastical. In order to explain this phenomenon <sup>error</sup> Hans Juretschke recalls the psychological impact produced on the minority by the popular rebellion of 1808, which he calls " the myth of the people's power, <sup>the</sup> the conviction that they were irresistible and that they had obtained substantial concessions and rights." Actually, although only a small minority had attempted to unloose the general wave of rebellion, the response had been on a scale and with an impetus that had not been dreamed of. For this reason, an ambitious politician of the hour, Juan Perez Villamil, author of the proclamation made by the Mayor of Mistoles inviting the Spaniards to insurrection under the slogan " the country is in danger", was a few months later clamoring against "the rabble thronging the streets and squares", and against the Provincial Juntas "self elected".

The fact is that Perez Villamil, and others like him, moved <sup>who</sup> by different ideals, were directing or attempting to guide the ~~struggle~~ struggle against the French, knew that it was only the tenacity of the "rabble" - later to be called the heroic people - that had made it possible to keep up a resistance of any sort against one of the



greatest war machines of all time. This is especially so after the collapse of the Spanish Army of the Old Regime in the Winter of 1808 ~~xxxx~~ before the French Legions commanded by the Emperor himself. One of the most active members of the revolutionary movement, Calvo Rosas, the deputy for Aragon in the Central Junta, ~~xxxxxxxx~~ blamed the Generals, -the victor of Bailen, Castanos, in particular, -for the disaster in the defence of the National Front on the Ebro. For their part, the soldiers under the command of Field Marshal Benito San Juan, who had failed to defend Somosierra, accused him of ~~xxxxxxx~~ treachery and murdered him at Talavera de la Reina. His companion in the field, General Heredia, fled to save his <sup>own</sup> life. The gravity of the event lay in that the insubordination demoralized ~~the~~ not only the men, but also the officers. In the other fields of battle an analogous despondency became rife, ~~due to~~ the distrust of the Generals who had thrived under Godoy. Mutual trust could exist only among the people themselves, but this was paid for in unlimited sacrifice, such as in the defence of Gerona and Zaragoza.

There is no myth about this; only the strict truth. This explains why the governing minorities wanted to take their place on the new social platform that was now reappearing on the historical scene. Certainly, the problem can be best understood in the light of the encyclopedist doctrine put into practice, namely the belief that a just constitution would be returned to the people, with their sovereignty and liberty, and finally, their happiness.. ~~Risxxx~~ "I believe" wrote the Bishop of Barbastro on the 22nd of August in 1809, "that the Spanish people, who have recaptured their liberty and independence by their struggles and the spilling of their blood, are today absolutely free to set up for themselves a Constitution and establish therein the principal agreements, conditions and mutual duties between the Head of State and the Nation.". If a member of the ecclesiastical hierarchy thought in that way, it cannot come as a surprise that among the ordinary civil population such opinions were plentiful. But, apart from the constitutionalist rhetoric, several other sources of information lead to the same central problem set by the rising of May, 1808; that was the need to adopt a measure of social reform



that would inevitably prejudice the interests of the aristocracy and landowners. "The time has at last come", wrote the lawyer Ignacio Maria de ~~Tunes~~ in the name of the Town Council of Totana, "the time when the oppressed labourer, who until now has sweated to maintain and feed the crime of injustice, can throw off his bonds and ask for some relief; when the tradesman can cast off the shackles that confine his business and when the wise man and the craftsman can regard the results of their skill and industry as objects prized and dignified by the nation.". Other reports indicate that the wings of the clergy and aristocracy, ~~had~~ ~~already been clipped~~ "fruit of the Dark Ages", had already been clipped, and that the accumulation of wealth by whatever person was to be prohibited "using appropriate measures", while the fortunes and estates of the great were to be reduced. This socializing movement had as one of its sources the (suspicious) attitude taken towards the most ancient nobility of Castilla, whose members, instead of joining the army, had fled to Mallorca, Gibraltar or Ceuta, "waiting for the result of the war"; or they were travelling throughout Europe on passports issued by the occupation authorities. Such were, (records F. Jiménez de Gregorio,) the Dukes of Infantado, Orgaz, Híjar, Santa Cruz, Montellano, Santa Coloma, Osuna, Fernán-Núñez and Parque. An "Economic ~~Survey~~ and Political Memoir on ~~Survey~~ of the Gentlemen and Great Landowners", printed in Salamanca in 1813, assails the nobility "for effeminacy and degeneracy in general".

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Confronted ~~by~~ with these essential problems, thrown into view by the cataclysm of 1808, the polemics between absolutism and liberalism ~~are less important~~ carry less weight than has so far been given the dialectical ideology caused by the Napoleonic invasion. Generally the theory is put, in the simplest terms, that while the Catholic population fought against the Revolution, a minority group deceitfully encouraged it from the Cortes gathered in Cadiz. The two great streams of XIX<sup>th</sup> century ideologies were certainly outlined in that assembly; above all they were at the root of the debates on the National Sovereignty, the freedom of the press and the Inquisition. But to try to reduce to the two streams the complex social and political scene, produced by the break up of the ancient Regime, is to blindly renounce any possible understanding of the ~~agent~~ ~~confusion which was created in~~.



XX agonizing confusion which was created in Spain by the Napoleonic crisis.

The War of Independence and the subsequent popular rising very often brought out hidden qualities in men, changing their destinies and even their ideology, at any rate externally. Therefore it is impossible to generalize about the position of any single person <sup>it</sup> referring to ~~the~~ his class or politics, much less to accept such positions without investigating the matter thoroughly. When, as an example of patriotism the Bishop of Cuenca, don Ramon Falcosi i Salcedo, for his donations in favour of the combatants, is made "President of the Provincial Junta by unanimous decision of the people", it is to ignore his complacency under Murat's regime after May the 2nd 1808, and the attack in which he was a victim of the columns of volunteers of Valencia who were marching on Madrid in co-operation with the offensive initiated in Bailen. This is not to say that the Church supported the French, but that each ecclesiastical authority had his own special problems which he then tried to solve within the limits of the ominous circumstances of the time.

We see the same thing happening in the much discussed case of the Frenchified Spaniards, that is, those who were punished in 1814 as collaborators of the Napoleonic Regime. We may ask who the Frenchified or pro-French were. Some, the fewest, were without doubt those who held positions of responsibility in the Josephine administration; and others, the majority, were those who swore in Joseph I as King of Spain in order to keep their ~~positions~~ positions. Amorós estimates that more than two million Spaniards were put on oath, 2 (?) a figure which appears excessively high. Of the exiles of 1814, twelve thousand families seems to be the figure generally accepted. But these were the people who had the most to fear from the National Victory. It is impossible to say how many remained in Spain. ~~xxxx~~ What, ever the figure, it does not necessarily indicate the subversive opinions of the people concerned. Some were driven to the side of the French through their wealth and the impossibility of their being respected in the midst of the turmoil and anarchy of the populace; others because they were service to any regime of authority, of whatever sort.

If we accept as pro-French those who wished to form an ideology



soaked in the French culture of the XVIIIth century, then it is as good as saying that there was not a progressively minded man nor a member of the intellectual aristocracy who would not accept any principle of the Golden Century or the French Revolution. But while there were some, the real Frenchified, <sup>Cavallós, Llorents, Moratín, Lista</sup> who thought that the revolutionary movement was now absorbed (consumed), and it only remained to graft it on to Spain according to the formulae <sup>Napoleonic</sup> and French bayonets, others estimated that there were more possibilities in fighting simultaneously for the liberty of the country and against the Napoleonic dictatorship. Called "insurrectionists" by the wholeheartedly Frenchified, they were soon to earn the approval of the liberals in so much as they opposed the ~~political~~ political action, social and religious, of the pro-French in the Cortes in Cadiz.

18th century

Between the purely pro-French and the sworn collaborators on one side and the liberal patriots on the other, there were, obscurely united in the basic emotions of certain Spanish urban structures, three great social groups. First, there were the defenders of the Ancient Regime, that is, as the P Villapadierna says, "those who persisted in the absolute power of a monarch who carried the title of 'His Catholic Majesty' (Majestad Católica), in the ideology of the Divine Right of Kings, and a firm belief in the salvation of the Church by the proclamation of its absolute legitimacy." I would not say, as does the illustrious Jesuit historian, that all the Church thought in this way; but certainly some of the high ecclesiastical hierarchies did, as they <sup>saw</sup> their privileges attacked as much by the pro-French as the liberals. The return of Ferdinand the VII <sup>in 1814</sup> made these Churchmen the authentic representatives of the national spirit ~~displayed~~ displayed in the War of Independence.

The second large block was that of the neutrals and those who conformed to the actual state of affairs. There were many who thought that Napoleon was invincible, and that "there was no other solution but to ~~acquiesce in the circumstances~~ bow to circumstances and make the best of the approaching situation"; thus thought a group belonging to the same social circle as the Casana, in Toledo. We do not know how far this conformability went, without which







~~xxx~~ to find since 1827 a solution between progress and tradition,  
order and liberty as inseperable elements from the future of the country.

T H E   E N D