

Co-existence of Being

$$1 - \underline{x \text{ alone}} \begin{cases} y = 0 - \text{Noumism} \\ y = x - \text{Pantheism} \end{cases}$$

~~x = Being~~ ~~y = Being~~ y = cambrando / agon' o  
de remangement de l'air de.

$$2 - \underline{x \neq y} \begin{cases} y < x \begin{cases} y - \text{part of } x - \text{Eminentism} \\ y - \text{appearance of } x - \text{Idealism} \\ y - \text{creation of } x - \text{Creationism} \end{cases} \\ y \leq x \begin{cases} \text{made by } x - \text{Deism} \end{cases} \\ y \neq x - \text{Dualism} \\ y > x - \text{gods made by men} - \text{Deification of natural forces} \end{cases}$$

$$3 - \underline{y \text{ alone}} \begin{cases} x = 0 - \text{Atheism} \\ x = y - (\text{Pantheism}) \end{cases}$$

I Introduction

A. Status quaestionis: the Integration of the Indian Idea of Creation

II Conditions of Integration

1. Understanding of Christian Theology
2. Theological Understanding of Indian Philosophy

III Principles of Integration

1. Principle of homogeneity
2. Principle of profundity
3. Principle of tradition

B. Quaestio: the Dogma of Creation

IV The Religious Meaning

V The Metaphysical Meaning

1. The Christian Data
2. The Philosophical elaboration
3. A Metaphysical Typology
  - a) the Metaphysics of the One (Essentialism)
    - aa) the Dialectics of the Idea
    - ab) the Dialectics of the Good
    - ac) the Dialectics of Value
  - b) the Metaphysics of Being (Existentialism)
    - ba) the Dialectics of Causality
    - bb) the Dialectics of Light
    - bc) the Dialectics of Consciousness
  - c) the Metaphysics of the "I" (Personalism)
    - ca) the Dialectics of Monologue
    - cb) the Dialectics of Dialogue
    - cc) the Dialectics of Trialogue

VI The Purpose of Creation




C. Responsio

VII The Dogmatic formulae

VIII The Mahāvākya of the śruti

IX Indian-Christian Integration

1. The Category of Creation
2. Creatio ex nihilo sed a Deo
3. The Indian Horizon of Creation



fourth quarter: creating  
unlike world

305

4 4 4 9 9 9 9  
4 4 4 9 9 9 9  
4 4 4 9 9 9 9

Publicaciones pendientes.

- 1 - Crónica de la India (entregado a Tomas Subirag - 24/VII/58)
  - copia a Fr. de Guenne 26/VIII
- 2 - Crónica religiosa de la India actual
  - " " "
  - Enrichia Cantelli - n'lo quiere - escrito
  - escrito a De Guenne 4/VII/58 4/VII/58
- 3 - S. Phenom. aspect. Hind. Spirituality to-day
  - Oriental Thought - lo quiere
  - Cantelli - lo quiere (No lo publicará XI-58)
  - Emmanuela De Guenne - escrito 4/VII/58
  - Escrito a Balthazar - 4/VII/58
- 4 - The Crisis of Indian Philosophy
  - escrito a Balthazar - 4/VII/58
  - Podría escribir o mandarlo a Derrin
  - Presentar Andrei V.P.
  - preguntar también a Staal
- 5 - God and The World
  - preguntar Andrei V.P. i también a Staal
  - pregunt a Balthazar - 4/VII/58
  - preguntar también a Suprenica
- 6 - Existential Phenomenology of Truth
  - exponer con el publica el Sriacca
  - escrito a Mundam per la trad. castellana 8/VII/58
- 7 - The Theological Basis for Christian-Non Christian Cooperation
  - India
  - Argentina - Rono - 4/VII/58
- 8 - The Integration of Indian Philosophical & Religious Thought
  - escrito a De Guenne
  - escrito a Balthazar 4/VII/58
  - Clergy Monthly - India
  - India - Protestant
- 9 - A Meditation on Melchisedech
  - escrito a D. Bede <sup>VII</sup>/VII → per la Downside Review
  - Poter a Christ Centre of the World
  - o a Rhythme du monde
  - o a Eglise Vivante (Fravet de Dufrenoy)

10 - The Place of Scripture in Christianity → Bangalore (Protestant)  
→ Rome

11 - De como yo explicaria la Encarnacion a un idolatra

1/III/60 enviado a /Chunauy  
que si no le interesa  
que la envíe a  
Vereno

Summary

The idea of unity, Indian and Christian

I - Introduction

A - Status quaestionis

II - Conditions (presuppositions)

- 1 - Understanding of Christian  $\phi$  → of Christianity → fulfillment, of  $\phi$
- 2 - Theological understanding of Indian  $\phi$
- 3 - Real experience of the problem

III - Principles of integration

- 1 - Principle of homogeneity
- 2 - Principle of profundity
- 3 - Principle of tradition

B - Quaestio

IV - The problem in itself

- 1 - Religious
- 2 - Metaphysical

V - A metaphysical typology

- 1 - metaphysics of the One → Essence (= the content of the One)
- 2 - metaphysics of Being → Existence (= the expression of Being)
- 3 - metaphysics of the I good → <sup>Person</sup> the ontological attitude (= impression of an experience)
- 4 - ~~metaphysics of Value~~

The One  
 The Good  
 The Idea  
 The Value  
 Cause  
 object  
 person  
 Being

VI - The dialectic of the One - (Greek & Indian)

VII - The dialectic of the Being - (Greek & Indian)

VIII - The dialectic of the Person (Greek & Indian)

C - Responso

D - Suggestio

The degree of Creation is { 1 - A part of our Faith } (a) because there is more than Creation  
 { 2 - a particular - right answer to a universal problem (and it is the only one) } (b) .. The is only one element of our credo

B - Quaestio (as an example of A).

The problem is itself

(a) is (Essentially) - Metaphysical <sup>and it is the only one</sup>  
 (b) meaning - purpose (Essentially) Religious <sup>and yet particular</sup>

- a) what is creation
- ~~ii~~ - The problem is itself the two
- iv The Religious meaning
  - 2. Metaphysical
- v The metaphysical meaning

- 2. The Christian data
- 1. The philosophical elaboration
- 3. A metaphysical typology -

logical  
 ontological  
 anthropological  
 pathos

- a) - The metaphysics of the One - (Essence)
- α) dialectics of the Good Idea
- β) Idea Good
- γ) Value

- b) - The metaphysics of the Being (Existence)
- α) dialectics of causality
- β) light
- γ) consciousness

γ) - The metaphysics of the Person (Personalism)

- α) dialectics of Monologue
- β) Dialogue
- γ) Triologue

vi - The purpose of Creation

C - Responsio

- vii - The dogmatic formulae
- viii - The mahavakya of the sūtri
- ix - Indian Christian integration
  - 1. Category of Creation
  - 2. Creatio ex nihilo, a Deo
  - 3. The horizon of Indian thought

## B - Quaestio

The dogmas of creation - part of our faith

particular concrete & yet right answer

- 1 - Faith has no parts - vital salvific act
- 2 - part of the ~~Faith~~ - there is more than creation. Gen. I.1 - John, I.1
- 3 - essentially - part of the Credo.

2 Problems:  
What is creation  
What is its function

### IV - The Religious Meaning

Existential attitude - Creation stands for modern Hindu literature.

Absolution of the Creator  
Self-responsibility of man - (liberally) "retain" reality of the world.

We must experience the momentum for us. (like a the calling of Abraham).

### V - The Metaphysical Meaning

what is creation.

1 - The philosophical elaboration: - man a thinking being.

3 sources of information (phenomenology)   
 { world (& man himself)  
 { tradition (culture - Revelation)  
 { Revelation (Empiricism).

Instrument - all forms of knowledge - Faith, Intellect - senses

The problem of the elaboration of the data. - depends on the type of metaphysics - & ureksha (Scottism - Thomism). (the elephant in the dark room)

Communication only possible knowing

the language - 2 types of learning → adults - foreign (word to word)

to know the language of Indian imperatve only of Christian &

→ children, natives trying to word. go to school, like children

What is this?

The naked problem -

→ creation  
→ māyā

2 - The Christian Data - 3 mahānākyas - (p. 11).

3 - A Metaphysical Typology - 3 fundamental attitudes → content of the One

a) metaphysics of the One - Essentialism - logical attitude

(p. 31) - The One and the Other - (the many - the two)  
Relationship.

p. (12) - The first difference: God - One - world - many  
become One → perfect - indivisible - simple  
How the Many? → Sures - Plotinus - upward

Essential Unity - Accidental Multiplicity (Vedānta).  
 The whole is not only pervading everything - is everything - Only the isolated things are isolated.  
 (p. 63) samasti - vyasti - Totality - individuality - sam - is  
one, bored to be alone. Wish to be many!  
 Isolation = illusion.

Dialectics of the idea — How can the One produce the many without ontological degradation of Itself?  
 God  $\equiv$  idea  $\rightarrow$  but the world?  
 Participative - die  $\in$   $\in$   $\in$   
 Tom do fore of St. Thomas  $\rightarrow$  ideas = enemies  
 but Existence given.  
 Hegel

Dialectics of the Good - Plato.  
 ... value - value instead of substance  
 (Ram Prasad Singh  $\rightarrow$  Sarkara).

b) Metaphysics of being - Ontological attitude. (Existentialism) Expression of being.  
 p. 32 - Two - but two things. We can call it light  
commensures  
being  
idea ---  
 Problem not only relation, but ex-sistence  
 co-existence  
 Katha - antiti it is!  
 Dialectics  $\times - \gamma$   
 (has 65 fiches).

p. 52 - Non-being - cannot receive the being. - Terminus ad quem  
 Christian participative - of Greece - explained  
 no par no acceptio away by the  
 Christian  $\Phi$  -  
 p. 54. role of Indian  $\Phi$ . but.  
 No creation? - Certainly no creation of Being.  
 māyā - the world neither being - is not, but is not  
 $\rightarrow$  not-being not-beingness  
 dialectics of  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{causality (21)} \\ \text{light} \\ \text{commensures} \end{array} \right.$

c) Metaphysics of the Person. (Personalistic attitude - Experience - Faith) Impression of  $\rightarrow$   $\Phi$  (grit)  
 p. 34/35 God I Am! - two - beings - the I.  
 Religious attitude (not interested in what He is, but that He is)  
 God & World - He I of the You.  
 Someone - somebody else.  
 p. 40 Transit to mystical experience. Neither logic nor  
 terms of science or existence. Integral experience.  
 He is the I, I am his You.

May 67 - Adoration - The Supreme

62, 4) Dialectics of Monologue - Sankara

The 2 Mahāvākyas

→ 61/62, 1  
Aham-brahmāsmi  
tat-tvam asi

wrong to say I (ego) = Brahman.  
Brahman is Brahman. Pure Monologue

I has no thought, no echo - no creation.

All reflexion is a lie! → Direct attitude

→ like reflexion without breaking the first.

20, 2) Dialectics of Dialogue -

God → Silence

↓  
Word (of Father) → dog's.

Personal relationship!

↓  
I am meditating  
in silence!

Hebrew Religion - Child - Spouse -

God = He who speaks - beloved  
Man ---- listens

Creature - The echo - divine calling

that's why exist → nothingness

it is unform as it answers.

Dialectics of Dialogue

Either God or the World?

Either I or You! - Image: trinitas  
creata a t. i.

Trinity - Christ

Creation through the Son - in the Son

Pater dicendo se  
dicit omnem creaturam! → Christ

VI - The purpose of creation

71 -

God - principle & end

a) The purpose of God (in creation)

→ divine liberty - Will

→ not hope, Dharma

No purpose (beyond)

b) - witness purpose of creation -

History

- Christocentric  
conception.

of History - not only series of  
events - but end &

fulfilment of creation - Mystical body - Eschatology

Sankara → Beatific Vision - I br., II, 26

Spec., II, 6

the only thing - historicity is  
a real dimension - real  
be-coming

## C. Perseus

vii - dogmatic formulae

viii - Mahāvākyas of the Upanishads - 120 texts

ix - Indian-Christian Integration.

The category of Creation —

sui generis - Unique  
it is not relation, (quaedam ~~est~~ Thomas) not cause-effect  
neither - not - { sat-asat of the world is creation  
nothing else

creatio a deo ex nihilo a deo

↳ reaction against the Greek -  $\pi\rho\sigma\tau\eta\ \epsilon\delta\eta\iota$

not ex deo - a deo & in deo.

nothing separate outside proper  
substances only secundum quod <sup>being</sup>

Deus: ex nihilo - since created  
qua alone.

### The Indian Horizon of Creation

1 - God & world - not two independent self-sufficient  
beings. One needs the other

(even if the other has no consistency  
and is rooted in Brahman)

2 - Creation first seen

as a real God-problem  
and not world-problem.

3 - Theological problem (De deo uocante - we forget it sometimes).

4 - Immanence & transcendence in one. It is not a God  
outside, nor inside

5 - <sup>no</sup> myth & symbol - character.

mythum cum fundamentis in  
re  
atque in uerbo.

6 - dialectical ambivalence

as the only way to encircle the real.

On these lines, I think —

a Theological course on Creation in India could be fruitful!

## Problems of Creation

### Thesis Denyances:

Deus trinus mundum ex nihilo creavit —  
quando voluit, non ab aeterno, sed ab initio tempore, libere ex bonitate sua.

Creatura distinguenda est a deo

mutabilis, non idem ac Verbum, neque et primum nihilum, neque omnia unum sunt.

Finis quem Deus in creando habuit, non est ipsius beatitudo, sed manifestatio bonitatis suae.

Mundi finis est gloria Dei, rerum omnium principium et finis

Providentia sua Deus gubernat universa et universa, eaque protegit, vere agendo in mundum et homines.

### Thesis: Schmaus

#### I - The fact of creation of the world

The Genesis

The divine idea

The Trinity and creation

→ unum universorum principium: creator omnium (D. 428)

→ The Father creates the world through the Son in the Holy Spirit (Schmaus, 44)

Consequences of creation - The world is good, makes sense, is finite, obedience man king of creation, respect for other beings

Temporality of the world

liberty of the creative act

Reason for creation - done for himself

Motifs of the creation

→ glory to God - christologic aspect

→ happiness of the creatures - hierarchy of creation

#### II - Conservation - of the world

Cooperation of God in every act of the world - Problem of liberty

Providence.

Thomas Aquinas

I, q. 44 - De processione creaturarum a Deo, et de omnium entium prima causa

1 - de productione creaturarum q. 45

2 - de eorum distinctione - q. ~~46~~ 47

3 - de conservatione et gubernatione q. 103

LOVELLY BOND  
MADE IN SWEDEN

The Idea of Creation, Indian and Christian

R. Panikkar

I - Introduction

A - Status quaestionis

The Integration of the Indian Idea of Creation

II - Conditions of Integration

- 1 - Understanding of Christian Theology
- 2 - Theological Understanding of Indian Philosophy

III - Principles of Integration

- 1 - Principle of Homogeneity
- 2 - Principle of Profundity
- 3 - Principle of Tradition

B - Quaestio

The Dogma of Creation

IV - The Religious Meaning

V - The Metaphysical Meaning

- 1 - ~~The Christian Data~~
- 2 - ~~The Philosophical Elaboration~~
- 3 - A Metaphysical Typology Typology
  - a) - The Metaphysics of the One (Essentialism)
    - aa) - The Dialectics of the Idea
    - ab) - The Dialectics of the Good
    - ac) - The Dialectics of Value
  - b) - The Metaphysics of Being (Existentialism)
    - ba) - The Dialectics of Causality
    - bb) - The Dialectics of Light
    - bc) - The Dialectics of Consciousness

'I'

- c) - The Metaphysics of the  $\mathbb{Z}$  (Personalism)
- ca) - The Dialectics of Monologue
  - cb) - The Dialectics of Dialogue
  - cc) - The Dialectics of Triologue

VI - The Purpose of Creation

C - Responso

VII - the Dogmatic formulae Formulae

VIII - The Mahāvākya of the Śruti

IX - Indian-Christian Integration

- 1 - The Category of Creation
- 2 - Creatio ex nihilo, sed a Deo
- 3 - The Indian Horizon of Creation



Mr. Radhak's idea of Hinduism is in fact - is far more Christian than his own idea of Christianity.

111 - Principles of integration (what is integration of overleaf)

(The most wrong thing to compare - i.e. scholastic formulae with Indian theological intuitions).

1 - Principle of homogeneity

- A closed system leaves no room for it. (Ex. Scotism & Thomism. A choice at the very beginning & no higher synthesis possible unless we abandon the 2 systems because they claimed to start from the ultimate point of view.)

2 - Principle of

2 - Principle of profundity (Principium abysale)

- Only from the depths an integration is possible. could be called also principle of organic growth (but not of system or position)

only when I have such an insight in the other system that I discover its truth & its deviation from it - only when I could be able to express better than my partner what he really wants to say. (One work of rain (mythology & theologian) (cf. Ernst Bloch, Utopie (Karl Mannheim))

3 - Principle of Tradition -

Precisely because Christianity is not merely an affair

of the mere intellect (neither Kantian conclusions nor a kind of supernatural metaphysics) nor of the individual theologian, but of the whole Church in its her growth towards her fullness; precisely because the Church is an integral reality in which history is a fundamental dimension we cannot ignore XIX Centuries of Catholic Q, we cannot begin anew and start from an hypothetical zero. Even if it were true that XIX Century had Christianized Aristotle (it is not!) we are not more in the same situation and cannot be satisfied by merely baptizing Shankara's doctrines for instance. The situation is irreducibly & irreversibly distinct. - (a) Thomas believed that his cultural world was the whole world. (The Indian Culture is for us no more the only Culture of the world. (We are no more in the XIX Century in Malabar)) (b) - The Church has grown up, has for included in dogmatic propositions the Christian belief ---

of my fixa  
Proposed of  
the study of the  
main - and guiding -  
examples of Indian  
Greece - Statue - growth etc  
India - clay - pot - snake  
shell ---

Cf. text in  
Lacombe 40, 59

bandy & putra  
(bawen - woman son)  
wider of square circles  
Existential instead of essential  
example  
cf. Lacombe, 73

But tradition is  
a living stream,  
cannot be frozen,  
must ~~let~~ leave  
the part behind,  
over-come it.

The idea of creation - Indian and Christian

*h. quoniam in ipso condita sunt universa"*  
Col, I, 15

I - Introduction

Our common endeavour here is concerned with the problem of a possible "Integration of Indian Philosophical and religious thought" in Catholic Theology [as Catholic Theology is what has to be taught in the clerical studies for the formation of Religious <sup>and</sup> Priests].

Our <sup>own</sup> problem, therefore is neither that of pure theological speculation, nor that of mere practical apologetics. Pure theology would lead us too far (and coming back from such an excursion we would be too tired to begin to tackle our particular problem). Mere Apologetics would lead us nowhere. Not because Apologetics are of no use, but because apologetics deals with the opposite problem that we have to elucidate. I think it is important to keep in mind this different attitude, not only to justify ourselves from utilitarianism and pragmatism — two mortal enemies of true Contemplation — but also to understand our concern. Apologetics <sup>would try</sup> ~~tries~~ to study how to introduce <sup>and make acceptable</sup> (The Christian ideas of Creation) to the ~~the~~ non-Christians (that we are going to reduce to Hindus only). We would like, on the contrary, to study how to introduce <sup>non Christian</sup> (the Hindu idea of Creation — <sup>— say Hindu</sup> ~~supposedly~~ that something of this sort exists — into the Christian mind: Our concern is thus neither

pure Theology, nor mere Apologetics, and yet it will prove, I hope, an important Theological chapter and a strong apologetical value.

My problem is, thus, to study how Indian Philosophy can help us to understand and to express the Christian dogma of Creation. It is a traditional idea that Philosophy is "ancilla Theologiae". Now, the ancillary character of Indian Wisdom can only be known if we allow to Indian Philosophy the full development of its service. "Ancilla" does not mean slave. And if for some time Philosophy and Indian Philosophy have seemed to be have ~~bound~~ <sup>fettered</sup> hands, it is high time that we allow to ~~them~~ the full freedom to see whether we can accept or must reject the service offered. Short of this freedom there is no Philosophy and much less service. It would be neither "Philosophia", nor "ancilla".

This amounts to saying that we do not attempt either a comparison of both ideas ~~and~~ a criticism of the Indian ~~and~~ conception. This third limitation must also be kept in mind.

To understand and <sup>evaluate</sup> ~~valorate~~ this paper I have to presuppose a double knowledge. Without it we could not proceed further [and we have been reminded that, "there is no need of discussing once more the need of such adaptations"]. We have to take for granted, on the one hand the knowledge of Indian Philosophy,

at least in its main trends and specially in connexion with our problem (1), and on the other hand the understanding of the Christian idea of Creation. [And when I say understanding I mean something more than having heard and being able to repeat scholastic <sup>theses</sup> (and even dogmatic statements)].

As this kind of approach that we intend seems to me rather important and though not new at all, has been sometimes overlooked, before entering into the subject proper we shall have to linger for a while on the required conditions for the fruitful results of such an approach and also to mention briefly the main principles that allow a Christian integration.

Our problem is, in consequence, this: Does Indian Philosophy somehow and how far helps us <sup>in the</sup> ~~for~~ understanding of the Christian dogma of Creation? Does it provide us with better concepts in which to express that Christian mystery? Does it prove of some use ~~for~~ in deepening what the "ratio fide illustrata" already knows about Creation? Or, does it illuminate complementary aspects? Or, perhaps helps us to put the problem in a better, or different background from which a somehow new understanding arises? Or have we simply to deny all these interrogations and recognise that Indian Philosophy in this point is not "ancilla", so that we shall have to do without its resources?

(1). cf. my studies on the subject: "Indische Schöpfungskosmologie" and "God and the World, according to Brahma-sūtra I, 1, 2".

## A - Status quaestionis

### B - Conditions of Integration

#### The integration of the Indian idea of Creation

Before starting our inquiry we should be fully aware of what integration means and of what it presupposes.

Integration is more than merely adaptation. To put it shortly, adaptation is to make our own something that in nature does not belong to us. It is almost or at least a mainly juridical term. We may have a full right to adopt Indian culture, but it shall remain always an adopted child of other parents. It may also be perhaps necessary as a previous step, but adaptation can hardly go beyond the stage of expressing our own ideas in a foreign terminology. It may seem useful *prima facie* and even be really effective some times, but ~~not only~~ there is the danger that the parents <sup>might</sup> claim back their child again. Moreover even without this and even in the case that the parents were dead — they are not — the very future Christian generations living out of adapted concepts will hardly be able to draw from them the full Christian life required for an autochthonous and authentic growth.

Integration means ~~as~~ to assume really some principles, ideas, attitudes and make not only room for them, but to convert them — and it is a real conversion — into an integrated part of the Christian life, tradition and doctrine. In order to integrate we must ~~really~~ in fact assimilate what we assume and make it our own. So much so that there is no more difference <sup>between</sup> ~~into~~ the old and new elements of the synthesis.

Integration means that we had such ideas not before. Now we very nature of Christianity as fullness leads to say that integration does in the realm of ideas what explicitation does in the existing. real historical order. We integrate ideas but we only explicitate the Christian reality. In both cases any way is a real growth, but of a different order.

If we have to integrate some of the ideas provided by Indian Philosophy into ~~the~~ the Christian conception of Creation, that must ~~must~~ be done in a total ~~or~~ spirit of detachment — regarding the old Christian ideas as well as the new Indian integrated ideas. Not because they are Indian, or because they may help Indians or Hindus to understand better this point of the Christian faith, but because they are actually worth while to be integrated into the Christian Theological patrimony and have a positive ~~&~~ value disregarding their eventually apologetic or utilitarian use. Likewise we must hold the ancient and present

Had some idea or attitude or principle of Indian Philosophy prove to be, in fact, integrable we ~~should~~

Christian ideas, not because they are ancient or western or we feel comfortable in them, but because and, only in so far as, they convey and express the Christian message.

should assume it in such a way that after the integration is done it is <sup>should be</sup> ~~not~~ more  
 hardly recognisable as ~~of~~ Indian. In Christ neither Jew, nor Greek, nor  
 Indian, nor Western (1). And yet those ideas will be not only Indian  
 in their origin, Indian in the flesh (2), but truly and perfectly  
 Indian because Christian (3)

(1) -

(2) - cf. St. Paul saying he is Jew according to the flesh.

(3) - Id. affirming that he is nonetheless a true Jew and Pharisee.

## II - Conditions of Integration

The integration with the name is not an easy affair, because if something (integration is not), it is ~~ecclae~~ syncretism. It is not question of picking up here and there analogous thoughts and complementing one with another according to a previous mental scheme we have in mind. It is a rather difficult operation. For this reason we would like to mention a few conditions.

### 1 - Understanding of Christian Theology

It is quite obvious that we shall never be able of any integration if we minimize or narrow the nature of Catholic Theology.

Theology is not a kind of supernatural metaphysics, nor a mere rational science drawing conclusions from certain revealed "premises". God does not reveal "premises" of syllogisms, but He reveals Himself.

Theology is further not a private affair of the individual, — and much less the monopoly of a class, even if its name is clergy — nor a ready-made and complete and closed set-up of doctrines.

If we want to call it a science we cannot forget that, it is only a "scientia subalternata" <sup>(1)</sup> a science participation in the divine science by which God knows Himself and the whole universe. <sup>(2)</sup>

(1) . Cf. D. Thom., Sum. Theol., I, q. 1.

(2) . Cf. R. Paniker - Sobre la esencia de la Teología.

Theology, or "Theologia uiae" as St. Thomas calls it (1) is the normal expansion of Faith, is the "fides quaerens intellectum", searching for ~~for~~ understanding, for a spiritual understanding of Reality given us in Faith and through Faith. It is "intellectus fidei". As its very name signifies Theology is λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ is the logos, the word of God in the double sense of the genuine objective and subjective. The very Word of God speaking to men and the words of men about God attempting to understand and to follow, i.e. to realize His message. This living and indelible Theology is a constant companion of man in his pilgrimage on earth helping him to decipher <sup>the meaning</sup> (and to worship <sup>the reality of</sup>) the living Word of God that came <sup>down</sup> and dwelled among us (2).

For our concrete purpose, these ideas — that we cannot develop here at length — amount to saying that Theology is the effort of the Christian, especially of the Christian mind, in the Church, trying to understand further and deeper the mystery of Reality as it is unveiled to us in Christ. Or, in other words it is the dialogue that the believer constantly holds with God in his interior prayer and with

(1) - Sum. Theol., I, q. 1, a. 2.

(2) - cf. R. Paniker - "Sobre la Teología y la Universidad," and many other yet unpublished articles.

men <sup>and the world</sup> (that surround him in his Christian action. A Theology deaf to the environment where it has to live would become very soon also dumb for that milieu. „Verbum Dei non est alligatum" (1). Or in the original Greek <sup>suggests</sup> words: the logos of God, the Theo-logy is not — and cannot be — tied up — to any particular culture, world, clan and civilisation. St. Paul himself speaks of a „wall of separation" that we have to break down (2). An isolated and chemically pure Theology for fear of contamination — like the Jews that crucified Christ (3) — would, to say the least, remain barren and ineffective.

Hinduism as such must be the subject-matter of our Theological endeavour, for the double reason of the possible presence of the Word of God in it and the undeniable fact of the words about God of such men that we call Hindus. This double „Word of God" belongs to Catholic Theology to whom could be also applied that injunction of Christ: colligite quae superseruit fragmenta (4) attempt to integrate also all those fragments, all those broken pieces that have fallen from heaven to earth since people began to love, to sin, to think — to love in this land of India — for He has universal Providence <sup>over</sup> of all

(1) - II Tim., II, 9.

(2) - Eph., II, 14.

(3) -

(4) -

(5) -

his children (5)

ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ οὐ δεδεσται

Ultimately, the understanding of Theology, rests on the total and correct understanding of Christianity. We must be full aware that Christianity is not a sect, not a doctrine — though has doctrines —, not a Religion, not an Institution.

If we call the other creeds 'religions', then we must denominate Christianity the Religion, not besides, or outside, or above the others, but their fulfillment, perfection, sublimation, Transformation. "Catholicism" is neither a geographical, nor an historical "note" of the Church of God primarily, but an ontological dimension of Christianity. Catholicism is not all excluding, but all-embracing. But we must immediately clarify that only embraces it is a real embrace and not the politeness of a saloon, that is to say, it only embraces reality, being, goodness and not error, falsity, sin. Let us not be manichaeans, <sup>(let us)</sup> remember that evil and error have no substance and be mindful of <sup>what</sup> St. Thomas says somewhere very seriously: peccatores in quantum peccatores, non sunt! ☺

## 2 - Theological understanding of Indian Philosophy

Almost as a corollary of the first condition arises this other condition for any possible Integration. We may study Indian Philosophy and nothing prevents us <sup>from</sup> deepening <sup>it</sup> as much as we can ~~into it~~. But even in this study, and much more to carry on our purpose, we should never forget the theological perspective not only of Indian Philosophy itself — that is more a Theology than a Philosophy —, but of our study and approach as well. About this second point we should like to say a few words.

Indian Philosophy, or Theology — doesn't matter for the moment — Indian Wisdom in short is not ~~and in consequence forbids~~ such a mere intellectual set up of ideas, but an existential reality almost very akin if not identical sometimes with religion. In consequence our theological approach shall be not only a speculative inquiry about the "objective" or "abstracted" ideas, but also an existential effort of understanding Indian Philosophy as an existential factor that, on the one hand has shaped the mind of the people of India and in consequence her culture, and on the other hand, has in fact lead — within a whole gamut of success and failures — the Indian people to know, to love and to attain the only true reality of things.

We could speak here about the cosmic Covenant of God with the successors of Adam outside the Testament of Jehovah with his ~~pe~~ elected people, we could speak of primitive Revelation and even of natural religions (at least regarding the latter insofar as it is a misleading expression of something true). But we don't need to introduce all these elaborate conceptions in order to understand and admit what we mean by Theological approach to Indian Philosophy.

We mean to say this: the spiritual and intellectual food of the people of this vast Continent since Millennia has been Indian Wisdom. So far <sup>as</sup> they have been saved and reached heaven and ~~go~~ led a good life, they have done it in and through and from Indian Culture, or Religion. Unless we suppose that all the past and present generations of Hindus are damned and lost we must admit that God ~~is~~ and even Christ — is at work there. But this instrument has been the values and ideas and attitudes that we find in studying Indian Philosophy. In other words, salvation and even the grace of God — and of Christ — has come down to them wrapped and embodied in Hindu values. Practically — I repeat, practically and for the time being — Hinduism and Indian Philosophy have taken the place, have been a substitute of Christianity and Christian Theology. But a substitute that somehow

has worked and succeeded at least in such cases where salvation has been achieved. And they have been saved without changing their philosophies.

The possibility of integration is closely related to the discovery of the existential character or rather Christian function of Indian Philosophy. The ideas ~~have~~ might not be Christian but the meaning, the existential meaning of those ideas, the real bearing of those attitudes were pointing ~~to~~ to the Christian reality. <sup>To put in other words, sanctifying grace was passing through those channels though the channels might have not been perfectly permeated by it.</sup> It may be for instance that the correct

philosophical relationship - creature - Creator - has not been discovered by the Indian mind, but whenever a good Hindu soul is at prayer to his god that relationship must existentially be there.

This theological approach, prevents from indulging in false and too optimistic irenisms, for it does not ignore the place and role of evil in the world. Not everything is good under the sun and not everything can be integrated into a Catholic theology. This sifting power or faculty of discrimination belongs to the very essence of any true Catholic theological endeavour. It is not at all unlikely that many a time the doctrines and ideas of men have been rather an obstacle to the working of the grace.

III - Principles of integration

A theological animulation of any Philosophy must, in my opinion, take into account the three following principles, that we would like ~~to~~ to explain briefly.

1 - Principle of homogeneity

It looks quite obvious, but it has sometimes been, in fact, forgotten, that a real meeting can only take place when it occurs at the same level. To animulate means precisely to convert something foreign into our own substance. It implies transformation of the foreign body into animulable elements, i.e. into homogeneous elements with the rest of our organism. Likewise only homogeneous doctrines can be integrated.

Any comparison, for instance between scholastic formulae about a problem and Indian Theological intuitions is doomed to failure, because they are not at the same level. The scholastic formulation tries to express ~~an~~ a part of the Christian truth in an intelligible formula manner inside a given system and presupposing the acceptance of the Christian faith very often. The expressions of the Upanisads, for instance, don't intend this at all, but try only to formulate either a deep primary intuition by means of a symbolic expression, or to put into concepts that very intuition, without trying to systematize it or to express it in coherence



This applies also for two philosophical systems whatever. I can ~~either~~ submit to a pure Scotistic thesis, for instance, to a pure dialectical criticism, for instance, but I cannot introduce even the corrected Scotistic thesis in the Thomistic system. There is a choice without violating both schools. Each consistent philosophical system has some fundamental intuitions that work as pillars of the whole construction. And very often, as in the case of Scotism and Thomism there is a choice at the very beginning, at the root itself of the idea of being, so that unless a higher synthesis is found there is no reconciliation possible. And a higher synthesis means somehow to give away with the existent systems as their stand, for they claim to start from the ultimate point of view and we affirm to have discovered a still more final starting point<sup>①</sup>

of course we can compare two homogeneous items, for instance two doctrines or two human attitudes, but comparison and criticism doesn't mean integration.

When we

① - cf. in reference to Thomism and Scotism the enlightening work of E. Gilson, Duns Scotus

~~When we~~  
The difficulty of comparison & increases  
enormously when we try to compare two Philosophies arising  
from two different faiths, because properly speaking faith  
~~is~~, the personal and real faith does not allow any  
comparison. We can compare the expressions of this faith  
or the ~~the~~ Theological explanations, but not faith  
itself, for faith is an ultimate vital act that  
touches essentially the Reality, or if it fails it is  
not faith at all. Only if my faith can include and  
comprehend somehow the faith of my partner the  
dialogue can appear and an integration is theoretically  
possible.

Here we understand that the claim of  
universality of Catholicism is the keystone  
~~to~~ clue to understand from within any other  
Philosophy or Religion.

2. Principle of profundity

What is this?  
ask the child  
(p. 9)  
"Prin"

We are led by now to this second principle - only from the depths, only from the starting point of a Philosophy is an integration possible. Only when we have an in-sight in the other system so that we discover its truth and also its deviation from it, only when we are able to express better than our partner what he really wants to say a higher synthesis can be reached.

That amounts to saying that a serious effort of Incarnation must be done before Redemption can take place. Or in other words, we must experience the problem in question in its pure nakedness beyond not only word and formulalrum, but also of concepts and symbols and explanations. It is a work of mystic theologians much more than of learned scholars. The intuition of a saint is here of much more use than the ideas of the philosopher. And we have striking examples <sup>of it</sup> in the work of the Fathers of the Church and of the saint Thea Doctors of the Church in regard to the helanic Culture and Philosophy.

of course, "learning has to be acquired before being used" (1), but learning is only possible in this attitude of humility, discipleship and incarnation.

(1) E. Gilson - History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, London, 1955, p. 275.

We could formulate this principle also as the principle of organic growth. There is no real growth, i.e. real integration by juxtaposition. It must be a development from inside, from that growing point that we must be able to discover connecting with which we shall be able to let the full Christian truth grow in the field of a Culture so far practically untouched by the Christian Redemption. The Theologian under this light is utilising his ecclesiastical charisma, "in aedificationem corporis Christi" (1). His theological speculation is really a function of the whole Church and at the service of her in an integral spirit of devotion and love. The contemplation of the Theologian is one of the first apostolic forces for the instantiation of all things in Christ (2).

This is the proper Christian word: contemplation. Principle of contemplation would be another name for this principle. Only true contemplation and not mere rational enquiry opens in the doors of Indian Wisdom. Without it we shall miss the point altogether.

Contemplation, besides being a supra-rational "intuitus veritatis" as real

(2) -

(1) -

cf etiam my paper: Magister in sacra pagina, p. 9 - S. Benaventure.

Contemplatio  
aliis modis  
S. Th. II, II, 188, a. 6.

## Dialectics of Being

Indian

For Śaṅkara "being is thought and thought is being. Between them there is not mutual exclusion --- Brahman is defined as being or as thought, or as the one and the other" (1). Only this way we can fully understand the "revealed" texts of the Upaniṣads. Brahman is nothing but knowledge" (2). "Brahman must be understood as being" (3).

The consequence is clear. Knowledge is not only an imitation of being, it is the coincidence with being, it is being. We are insofar as we know, but we know only as far as we are. Salvation means "realisation", discovery of that that we are. Salvation means to be and we are when we know that we are. The whole world in consequence is that which it is not (yet), because it does not know, it is māyā, it is simply avidyā.

Does it mean, that there is

(3) - Katha Uf., II, 6, 3.

(2) - Bṛhad. Uf., II, 4, 12

(1) - Śaṅkara Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya - III, 2, 21

no creation? It means only that there is no creation of "being", but only "production" of a make-believe, of a point of view, of a māyā, that gives the impression, the veils being. Salvation is literally revelation, the unveiling of māyā and the finding of being.

⊗ Brahman as Being and Thought can obviously not think anything else. ~~There are no~~ ~~places~~ There is no place for any other thought; for a real Thought cannot be void of being and being is fully exhausted by the Brahman.

What is then the world? It? The world is nothing. Not nothingness, but has no being. The world is māyā, that is neither being, not nor non-being. It is here that the dialectic of the Person creeps in.

→ admette les deux  
divinités, dans  
Révélation, dans  
Atmabudhi. "F. Schlegel,  
Sensien de Gnore, Paris, 1952, p. 83.

(somewhere)

... "à la question : le monde « est-il » Dieu? nous répondons : « non », si l'on entend par « monde » la manifestation ontologique en tant que telle, c-à-d. sous le rapport de sa séparabilité existentielle ou demiurgique; « oui », si l'on entend par « monde » la manifestation en tant qu'elle est causalement ou substantiellement divine, rien ne pouvant se situer en dehors de Dieu; ... Dieu seule « est »; le monde est un « aspect divin » limité, car il ne peut — sous peine d'absurdité — être un néant sur son propre plan. Affirmer, d'une part que le monde n'a aucune « qualité divine », et d'autre part qu'il est réel à côté de Dieu ... revient à

will not only enrich Christian Theology, but it will also provide us with a precious instrument ~~to~~ for ~~the~~ finding out more genuine Christian "categories" drawn not only from one culture alone, but found out in the point of ~~intercession~~ intersection between the word of God and the words of men. "Multifariam multique modis"---(1)

ALFRED BOND  
PUBLISHED IN SWEDEN

(1) - Hebr., I, 1.

Secondly, it seems to me, that a priori, as well as a posteriori we can say, that it helps to work out a better and more genuine Christian "categories" in which to wrap or to express Christian faith.

A priori, for the following reason: We know that Christian faith is independent of any form of culture. On the other hand it cannot be expressed without utilizing concepts borrowed from a certain cultural world and even it cannot take shape and reach precise formulations without a certain culture. ~~Not only the danger, but almost inevitable~~ Now, there is not only a danger, but it is also almost inevitable that if the Christian faith gets formulated within the framework of a ~~or~~ unique culture, it becomes almost identified with it and so it loses its specific character of universality and independence. The effort of expressing the whole Christian faith in another cultural language will undoubtedly help, to at least, to remind us that the garments are not the body and the utilized concepts not only the reality, but not even the full expression of that reality. We do not presuppose by this that any culture is capable or apt to express ~~the~~ Christian faith, but a sensible effort in this line will prove an invaluable point of reference.

Moreover, a second and more or less successful attempt of expressing the Christian faith

To the Christian mind a new approach to the problem in one of the two indicated ways? The answer seems to me also unquestionable. Yes!

Firstly it introduces not only a new, but new periods of view under which to tackle the problem of creation. After all Christian  $\phi$  is nothing but the living dialogue of the Christian believing mind with a given or existent culture. It can be that those periods of view seem to be fully superfluous to those framed in the Western Philosophy and Theology; but we cannot forget the ecclesiastical and apostolic function of Theology itself. It is not only there for us, or for the already convinced Christians, but also for the whole world and for the future Christian, oportet haec esse! <sup>(1)</sup> certainly; but also woe to those who have been the occasion of scandals <sup>(2)</sup>. A right approach to this problem may avoid many future complications. We should meditate very seriously about the lessons of the Church history regarding the Oriental Crisis and the Protestantism <sup>(3)</sup>.

(+) - ontologically  
For instance  
it is not possible  
to consider the  
effect also directed  
from the cause  
(cf. Lacumbe #1)

(3) -

(2) -  
(1) -

philosophical explanation and not the statement of a mystery: God is, the world also is, though not in the same sense, but in which different sense? Because Sankara is installed in the divine sense of Being ~~does not~~ cannot understand the worldly sense of the beings. Because Greece is rooted in the cosmic sense of beings cannot grasp the ~~or godly~~ godly sense of the Being. Only one thing is in favor of Greece, that we, in fact, "are" not the "divine" reality. For the rest — India has the priority.

The Catholic orthodox doctrine foisted in the Christian Revelation only stresses the following points:

God is, and is the absolute Reality.

The world also is, but in a secondary sense.

And this sense implies:

1 - The world is only a Deo — ab alio — and in consequence, "ex nihilo".

2 - The world is, but "neither God nor "nothing".

The orthodox technical term implying this, is "creation". The world is "created" and God is "Creator".

The philosophical or theological explanation of this "creation" is left to the human disquisition, provided the explanation gives account of the just ~~mentioned~~ points and does not contradict the already given and accepted "thesis" or "hypothesis". (Principle of Tradition). But nothing <sup>else</sup> stands on the way ~~either~~ to introduce other "categories" to make <sup>Christian</sup> ~~our~~ faith intelligible. or to introduce a new viewpoint

Does Indian Philosophy make one or three two things? The answer is unambiguous. No! ~~Does~~ ~~Ind~~

Does Indian Philosophy open or suggest

Śaṅkara's effort is to see the world not from our point of view — that is only for the disciple that has not yet discovered the absolute reality of God —, but from the standpoint of that divine Reality itself, ~~if~~ if it can be ~~still~~ still called a standpoint. We cannot therefore ask how the world looks like from the point the view of God, but what the world is "in" "from" God. And again this "in" or "from" is already a compromise, then God has neither "in" nor "from". The world "for" God is not "our" world. <sup>On the one hand</sup> if it were "something" this "something" would be either He Himself or "another" thing. If it were He the world would be no more "world", but God. If it were something "else" God would be no more God, i.e. the Absolute. On the other hand if it were "nothing", absolutely nothing, the world would not "exist" at all. What is then the world? It is neither "something" — always for the ultimate standpoint of the Divinity — nor "nothing". This "intermediate" is called māyā, that which cannot be explained — nor explained away. (1) All what we can say about the world is not only wrong, it is also non-existent. It is only our idea, our ignorance. Its only consistency is an epistemological one. It is our ideas of it, our superimposition (2). Imposition on what? It can only be on the unique what, on Brahman itself.

If Christian Philosophy can say something better, Śaṅkara will have to accept it. But it must be a

(1) anādir bhavarūpa ~~an~~ sadasadanirvacanīyā. (cf. Deussen, 66)

(2) adyāsa (2)

For Sankara the "non-being" cannot receive the Being, as for Aristotle the  $\delta\lambda\iota$  or the potency receives the Act. Cf. Lacombe, 68.

From this point of view it could be ~~easy~~ a Christian theory of creation could be easier elaborated than under the presuppositions of the  $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$  of Plato or the  $\delta\lambda\iota$  of Aristotle. The medieval christianisation of Greece was reduced to say that the "terminus ad quem" of the divine act did not exist producing the unhappy though necessary formula of a creation "ex nihilo". This ~~is~~ was the infirming of the second term of a very rational scheme under which hellenic metaphysics had tried to make intelligible the origin and production of the world. But the mental scheme was hardly overcome. The Christian participation unlike the platonic μετεξέσις (2) is neither a "pass" of God nor an "acceptio" from side of the world. The "partem capere" suggested is neither existent in either aspects. The Christian "nihilum" is nearer to the Vedantic "māyā" than to the Greek  $\delta\lambda\iota$ .

Sankara does not reject the Christian idea of creation for the simple reason that he didn't know it. But he would certainly full heartedly welcomed the idea that the world does not add anything to the Creator and that God and the creature are not two. (1)

(1) - O. Lacombe rightly suggest that Manism is a wrong name for Sankara's system, then it would imply that māyā is somehow included in the only one Being without a second. op. cit., p. 68.

## Indian creation

- For Śāṅkara causality cannot jump from the relative to the absolute (dacombe, 41)
- The Brahm migration is without beginning - Śāṅkara BSO, II, 4, 34 (dacombe 250).
- The Christian idea of Creation is inessential in Indian ☿

○ "How even what appears to be other than Brahman is really Brahman, or what is really Brahman appears to be other than Brahman — This is the key-judgment of Śāṅkara's doctrine of creation" R.P. Singh, op. cit., p. 292.

○ cf. the idea of R.P. Singh that Śāṅkara's Saguna Brahman has no ontological reality. (cf. note in my Brahma Sūtra - (German) p. 3).

To understand terminology - śāṅkara says: "If a thing cannot subsist apart from something else, the latter is the eneme of that thing" ⇒ Brahm. S. B., II, 4, 7 (apud Singh, 293). Consequently Singh writes: "To find out the cause of a thing is to ascertain the eneme of that thing" (293). In that sense Brahman is the cause, thus the eneme of the world. cf. B.S.I, 1, 2.

## Terminology

- kārya - effect
- vikāra - modification
- anavasthā - regens in infinitum
- apauāda - ἀποφασίς - via negationis
- vi vyāvahārika - The practical order
- nāyanānanya (neither (being) nor different from (being)) — is Māyā (dacombe 62)



In a way any effort of elaborating ~~the~~ an answer to our problem must somehow include these three unavoidable positions: God as the I, as the am, as the only one. <sup>Listen Israel</sup> (I am who am, the one God!)

LOVELY  
 TELL  
 BORN  
 ON  
 N  
 D

WAVE  
 IN  
 THE  
 M

Person, as someone with whom is possible to enter into relationship and have a dialogue — of whatever kind and in any type of interpretation whatsoever. Religion experience is primarily affected by the reality of God. This God may be called Absolute or dau or by any other impersonal name, but still it is a living reality that exacts, demands, — and vis-à-vis whom I, my ego reach, take decisions, enter in tune with it were, etc. In this context — God and the World — do not appear as the One and the Many or the Being and the Beings, but as the I and the You, as the someone and somebody else, as the This and the That, as the two poles of a vital tension and of a loving or fearful dialogue, though these poles might be on a very different level.

It is not intended primarily in ~~know~~ elucidating what He is, but in context that He is

Religion in one way or another must speak of salvation and salvation is nothing but going back, but reaching, realizing, discovering the Union with — with that other pole, the real centre of our existence. We may be spoken as one or two, as being or shadows, but always something of a personalistic attitude remains there. God may be interpreted not only as self, but also as my self. Even then there is my ego as non-self that has to realize, that has even to pray, that has to take a "personal" attitude towards that self.

→ 40  
x x x

Certainly Religion implies metaphysics, ~~but~~ and  
 conversely hardly can it be metaphysics without religion or taking  
 its place; but without any kind of doubt ~~either~~ metaphysics  
are not religion. The metaphysical attitude will very likely be  
 religious, but the religious attitude need not to be, as  
 posture, metaphysical.

Now, the most genuine religious attitude  
 in face of our problem is the personalistic interpretation. I  
 do not say anthropomorphic, but personalistic, though we  
 must recognize that <sup>for these</sup> ~~there~~ is a danger in mixing up  
 the two ~~is~~ conceptions.

The religious experience does not need  
 to imagine God as the absolute Other, or the good Father,  
 or the personal Creator; but certainly experience God as  
Somebody, as a living Who, as an absolute I, an allmighty

τὸ σὸν δὲ ἐστὶν ἡμῶν σὸν δὲ - Plat., Symposium, 493 a.

The body is for us a tomb - (The monument - Enchiridion, 89)

We have now not to deal with the problem of the personality of God, — (1). Nor with the almost magical ~~mis~~ misunderstanding between Indian and Western of regarding this question. Except for one important question of the Christian conception of the Trinity, Indian of denies personality to God, when it ~~does~~ it, for the same reasons for which Christian of attributes to God — the being personal (2). Namely to abolish from ~~his~~ conception any shadows of imperfection, limitation and anthropomorphism (3).

But we were at pointing out the main features of this attitude that we called personalism, but that we could equally denominate the religious attitude.

(perhaps in another place)

(3) — "For the religious consciousness, God as pure being is not of much importance."  
S. Radhakrishnan, Eastern religion and Western Thought, London<sup>2</sup>, 1951, p. 125

(1) Cf. De Smet —

(2) — The reason regarding the Trinity is this. For one reason cannot God be a person, says Indian of. for if "He" were a person "He" would require a "second" person, he would not be Unique or (advityam.) — without a second — for an I requires a You and who knows if also a He. God the Father demands God the Son and both are only completed — as it were — in God the Spirit, ~~the~~ If Indian Wisdom could "know" — I mean believe that this Trinity that it surmises does not destroy the unity that it discovers, would welcome Christian Theology as its own crown culmination.

I feel premature to manifest my findings in this occasion---

We have already mentioned the ~~10~~ mahavakyas of the Old Testament regarding the problem. In them we find the dialectics of the One as well as the metaphysics of the Being, but an unbiased reading finds first of all the attitude of the Person. Our God is certainly one, but He is God. His own definition is to be an am - the Being - but it is He who is the am, it is the I who is the am. It is this I that created heaven and earth. The neo-platonic mentality ~~was~~ was taken by the Ones, the medieval-hellenic mind was caught by the Am, it is the ~~just~~ spirit Hebrew spirit that sees primarily the I, the living God of his people, of the Promise, of the whole Universe. And strikingly enough it is the metaphysics of the I the most akin to the Indian Philosophy and the aspect any Indian mind would stress in front of the Revelation of the Exodus.

God is One, God is Being, but God is primarily the I, the First Person, the Mahapurusa, the Person κατ' ἑξῆς Χθδ (1). We know how close we are here of the Indian Philosophy! (2)

(1) - cf. the enlightening study by Karl Rahner

(2) - cf. R. Panikkar - "Existenziale Phänomenologie der Wahrheit" - Philosophischen Jahrbuch - München 1956, p. 7.

(anthropological)

### 3 - The personalistic attitude

In one way of another the problem takes the form of Being and beings, of a relationship between two "things", two ~~things~~ kind of "beings". But because the problem arises in us, living beings, thinking persons the whole problem has a certain personalistic dimension.

By this we do not ~~mean~~ <sup>mean</sup> a particular personalistic interpretation, but something to which the personalistic approach gives a name, <sup>though</sup> ~~but~~ that is <sup>also</sup> ~~also~~ in the other metaphysics more or less explicitly.

It is this attitude the fundamental position of the Christian Revelation of the Old as well of the New Testament, and it is this attitude that though it implies a metaphysics has ~~not been found~~ not yet a full development in the Christian theological tradition and yet it is the genuine Christian core that will bring us closer not only to orthodox thoughts — as we can have them in any suitable philosophical system — but to a Christian thinking itself. I see precisely here in the development of an authentic Christian thinking, i. e. in the finding, working out of the pure Christian categories in which <sup>to</sup> ~~to~~ express the Christian message, the most urgent theological task of our times. And undoubtedly Indian Wisdom can be a <sup>very</sup> valuable point of reference for ~~in order to~~ disentangling the Christian message from the greek heritage without doing harm to none of them. But this again transcends my paper here, though I could try to show in this problem of revelation how it could be done. But again

if we prefer this expression.

It is important to see that we are not begging the question by implying that our problem is that of a relation between two classes of being, firstly because we are now utilizing these words in the widest possible sense in order to include all types of metaphysics and secondly, because even those answers that deny the problem ~~by denying it~~ they accept not only our "stated question" ~~but~~ (what is obvious in anybody contradicting something), but also they presuppose it by affirming their own position. The most strict and absolute Monism, for instance, must say that there is only One Thing; that is to say that the other thing that we "imagine" or "ask for" or mistakenly take for "truth" is neither other nor thing; i.e. a "non-other" and a "non-thing", illusion, appearance, unreality, fraud, error, mistake; but the whole problem remains: what is the relation between "truth" and "falsehood" and what are the contents of "truth" that makes "falsehood" derived of "contents" of "being"? →

○ cf. The Kat, Up. II, 6, 12: "it is" (astiti) as another expression of the metaphysics of being.

cf. Laccoube 119 - "Il faut le comprendre en jugeant qu'il est"

(II, 6, 13 (2))

comprendre la  
à la 120B

elements of the problem it remains always that we have to face the problem of the One and the Other, even if we deny any reality to the "other" and any plurality to the "One."

In other terms the logical attitude will have to say that the whole problem lies in the explanation of a relationship. If "relation" means something it will have to be a — peculiar and unique — relation.

## 2 - The ontological attitude → 12

Again, in whatever metaphysics we cannot avoid to deal with two, certainly on the one hand, but with two things on the other, even if we deny the proper character of "thing" to one of them or two both.

Here the metaphysics of being has an unmistakable priority. We can call it value, light, good, idea or consciousness, but we can't avoid not only calling it by some name, but giving to it some content, some "substance". Even if the second term is <sup>declared</sup> nothing or nothingness, it remains not only an empty "second" ~~term~~, but a void "term", "thing".

The problem here is not primarily that of a relation, but that of an ex-istence, that of a tension between existence itself, that of a co-existence

"nevere et diere omne quod quocumque modo est a Deo esse"

O. Thom., Sum. Theol., I, 9. 44a. 1.

### 3 - The several philosophical attitudes

- A dialectical typology

from 12 →

But before let us examine the several types of metaphysics in themselves.

(We have tried to describe different types of metaphysics without any claim of exhausting them, neither in theory nor in practice. They give us, anyway, enough material to try a certain systematisation, that may prove useful for the understanding of our problem.)

First of all among the several types of metaphysics we discover three fundamental positions that correspond to a different mental attitudes, and that cannot be altogether exclusive. These attitudes are in fact not mutually exclusive. Only as metaphysics they exclude one another and not as philosophical perspectives.

#### 1 - The ontological attitude

Whatever we may tackle the problem between God and the World, whether with the aid of one or another categories, we can't avoid the fundamental attitude of the metaphysics of the One. Whatever we may think about it, ~~it~~ them, it remains a problem between the one and the manifold, between a two we could say, though these two may be of a so different a nature, that we have no right to call them two. In whatever metaphysics and whatever content we may give to the

but a particular determination of the cause itself (1).

(1) - cf. Śaṅkara Brahma-Sūtra-bhāṣya, ~~II, 17~~ II, 2, 17.

from 23

For Śaṅkara, to put a typical example effect and cause are correlatives. They belong to the same level, the realm of māyā. The effect cannot lead us belongs obviously to the realm of the transitory and contingent, otherwise it would not be an effect. But if we could jump, as it were, from the contingent effect to a necessary cause, i.e. to the Absolute, this cause would neither be transcendent nor absolute for it would show a relation — of causality — with the ephemeral.

① The ultimate reason for Śaṅkara lies at the hand. It cannot be a cause of being. Being cannot be caused. It would not be being. Being is simple ③, full ④, infinite ⑤, purely being ⑥. The non-being does not come to be, does not become; the being does not cease to be, does not become nothing ②. It would be sheer contradiction. ⑧ The effect is nothing even according to him

⑧ - How then can Śaṅkara admit the famous second Brahma-sūtra that affirms that Brahman is the Cause of the World ~~according to~~ ? Only in the sense that this world has its ground and foundation of Brahman and in the distorted vision (avidya) of Brahman. cf. my study "God and the World, according to Brahma-sūtra, I, 2, 2".

~~confused~~

⑦ - cf. Gīta, II, 16 and Śaṅkara in h.!

② - cf. O. Lacombe, d'absolu selon le Vedānta, Paris, 1932, p. 41

① - cf. Gīta bhāṣya, II, 16. ‡

③ - ekarūpa

④ - pūrṇa

⑤ - ananta.

⑥ - sanmātra.

Contradictory if B is somehow different without any  
"reason", any "cause". If A is self-duplicated as it were  
in B and why does this self-duplication should stop at B?  
B is not A but the "reason" of self-duplication, for in this  
case that "reason" and not A would be the cause of B.  
So B has the same "causal" power than A and should  
"cause" D and D, F, etc.

ei. True Joke  
confirmed  
in a thorough  
criticism  
or drop it.

IN SWEDEN

will have some impact in the effect - very being of the effect, for causality is a kind of transferring being from the cause to the effect. (1)

Causal

The critique of causality, being "the central problem in Indian Philosophy" (2), is nevertheless seen in a rather physical way. The Mādhyamika criticism of the Indian System, for instance (3), reduces the whole thematic

25 ←

to a pair possible views: That A is cause of B can mean

- 1 - B is the self-expression of A
- 2 - B is fully unrelated to A
- 3 - B depends on A plus other factors C
- 4 - B is the other expression of A due to interference of other factors

This scheme seems to be reduced to the first two cases, as the causality of other factors C must be either of the type 1 or 2. In the case 2 on the other hand there is no causality at all, but the production of B is sheer chance. But the case 1 is also hardly to be included under causation and in fact either superfluous or contradictory. Superfluous if B is *in* identical to A.

(1) "Causa importat influxum quemdam ad one causati" - D. Thom., In metaphysis, V, 1. cf. a sensible explanation by E. Gibbon, The spirit of mediæval φ, op. cit., 86, 90, etc. p.

(2) - T.R.V. Murti, The central φ of Buddhism, London, 1955, p. 166

(3) - cf. Mādhyamikakārikās of Nāgārjuna, I, 1; Candrakīrti, Mādhyamikāvātāra, VI, 8; etc, apud T.R.V. Murti, loc. cit.

Likewise, the problem of causality is

cf. Munk, 168

There is a fundamental difference between the ontological conception of Causality in the Christian Middle Ages and the rather physical vision of a great part of the Indian Philosophy, more akin in this to the concept of Causality in the modern science. Only that science is not  $\phi$ .

For the Scholastic cause is first of all cause of being  $\textcircled{1}$ . Not of action or movement. Any cause

$\textcircled{1}$  "Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit; sicut ferrum fit ignitum ab igne". D.Th., S.Th. I, q. 44, a. 1

$\textcircled{2}$  "Quae sit prima causa entium" is for St. Thomas (Sum. Theol., I, q. 44, introd.) is the first question arising from "de productione creaturarum a Deo". How do they proceed? As effects. What kind of effects? effects in their very being. Their esse causatum is for him synonymous of esse creatum. cf. the very title of the article dealing with the first question "Utrum sit necessarium omne esse esse creatum a Deo".

See Causality means making

$\textcircled{3}$  "Plato" "Nisi tu sentias, quod totalitas rerum ab ipsa (euentia divina) procedit, non sentis de Deo piissime. Plato commendavit animam suam factori, sed Petrus commendavit animam suam Creatori". Bonavent., In Hexaem., IX, 24 (apud E. Gilson, The spirit of medieval  $\phi$ , London, 1950, p. 437.

5 - the metaphysics of causality

If the relationship between God and the world is received under the framework of the causality, then we will have again a new doctrine, of that of God cause of the world (1). But again this causality can be seen under many different aspects. It can be seen in the light of the several types of causality that we experience here on earth. According to them the relationships between the Cause and the effects will be envisaged ~~to~~ and interpreted in one or another manner. The mixing up of the different types of causality and applying them to God lead to the most opposite metaphysical doctrines, like Pantheism, Monism, Theism, etc.

God for scholasticism will be, for instance, final, exemplar and efficient cause, but not formal, nor material cause (2). He is the "causale esse omnium" (3)

(1) - cf. Brahma-sūtra, I, 1, 2 and the many commentaries upon the text by all the classics of Indian φ - cf. etiam my study, God & the World according to Brahma-sūtra, I, 1, 2.

(2) - cf. R. Paniker - El concepto de naturaleza, Madrid, 1958, p. 23.

(3) - cf. S. Bernard, In Cant. Cant. serm. IV, 4 (P.L., 183, 798) followed by S. Thom., In I sent., dist. 8, q. 1, a. 2, ad.

The metaphysics of being

→ 32

MADE IN SWEDEN

LOVELLY BOND

LOV

Value is identified with Reality, for instance (1) <sup>One, to deny</sup>  
 If the metaphysics of Value tried to avoid  
 its ontological connotations, certainly the difficulties of  
 participation, information, and the like are avoided, but it  
 schlucks das Kind mit der Badewanne. What are the values in  
 relation to the Value?

(1) - cf. the interesting effort of Ram Prataf Singh, The Vedānta of Śaṅkara (A metaphysics of value), Jaipur, 1949, to interpret the whole Advaita of Śaṅkara in a sense of a metaphysics of value. But what Singh understands for Value is nothing but Being with its transcendental goodness ("We shall cease to separate ontology from axiology" (i.e. to say all this is to say "the notion of Reality is that of Value" (ib). (p. 24)

#### 4) The metaphysics of value

The tremendous power of suggestion and of inspiration of the metaphysics of the ideas and that of the idea of the good especially has lead modern times to enlarge the frame work of such a metaphysics and to avoid by it the shortcomings of them. So ~~it came to be~~ the metaphysics of value came into being.

The complications of the metaphysics of the idea interpreted in a realistic way and that of the good is the good and rather materialistic interpretation of the participation, of ~~το μετε~~ μετεχειρις. If the idea has to descend or to be incarnated it requires a receiver, a pure passivity, the prime matter. The metaphysics of value will try to overcome this difficulty purifying and enlarging the ideas of introducing the notion of value instead of that of substance, or of being. It may be that things "are", but this is irrelevant, their importance lies in the value they have. The higher a thing is the higher is its value, so much so that God properly speaking is not, but has the highest value (2).

In fact a metaphysics of value either builds up on a being. metaphysics or unspools the qualities of being changing simply their name. So when

(2) - The German language will utilize a verbal form that will not yield to the grammatical tyranny of the verb to-be. Gott gilt (und ist nicht).

3) The metaphysics of the Good

If we <sup>can't</sup> want to avoid ~~the~~ falling into the extreme idealism of the metaphysics of the idea by trying to ~~find~~ ~~can~~ find the contents of it. But either the supreme idea is a kind of circular and self-centred thought that thinks itself as in Aristotle's *νοησις νοησως* (1), or the ~~idea~~ supreme idea is not unique or supreme and it exists side by side with matter and god as in the Platonic system. The

(1)

(2) - "Omne autem bonum est aut Deus aut ex Deo est"  
 August., *De vera religione*, XVIII, 35 (Hunt & Gihon, the spirit of the medieval  $\phi$  - London 1950, p. 458)

to elaborate  
 & comment /  
 cf. Gihon, 156

The metaphysics of the idea finds perhaps its best and most consequent representation in the absolute idealism of Hegel. Because being is idea and beings ideas, the absolute ~~presence~~ the world is nothing but the finite of the infinite, for the finite being, & i.e. the concrete idea is an essential moment of the infinite being, the absolute idea. "Ohne Welt ist Gott nicht Gott", without the world is God not God. The two questions are dialectically answered by Hegel. The world is the otherness of God — "das Andersseyn" —, thus cannot be more different, for it is precisely the pure differentiation. The world has received from God this whole being — other — anderseyn —, but this otherness of the world is nothing but a moment in the dialectical process of the Godhead, the otherness is subsumed, assumed in the infinitude of the divine Idea. Things are the ideas of that Idea and all together form the dynamic whole of Being, the absolute Idea. (2)

(1) - Cf. Hegel, Philosophie der Religion, etc.

Hegel  
of Hegelism  
an exaggeration  
& consequence.

of the idea either have had to accept the dualism  
God-matter or have been forced to solve the ~~force~~  
difficulty by a "tour de force" not always consequent if they  
maintain themselves in the realist line. This has been  
the fate of the Christian  $\phi$  almost without exception  
due to ~~and~~ ~~the~~ the Hellenic inheritance <sup>(2)</sup>. Only ~~now~~ nowadays  
there exist various attempts to overcome the pattern  
of the idea and without to get a genuine Christian  
feeling with independence of the Greek  $\phi$ . It is here  
that the contact of the Christian mind with Indian  
wisdom is of the utmost importance.

The "tour de force" of Thomas Aquinas for instance is to introduce besides the  
idea that would represent the essence of things the ineluctible  
existence that make a thing to be what it is, what to be ~~that~~  
it. The Thomistic conception of being as esse an existence is  
the general manœuvre to ~~overcome~~ <sup>take profit of</sup> the Greek "idealism" without  
falling in its pit. <sup>(2)</sup> Only nowadays.

(2) - cf. ~~the~~ Augustin; Confessiones, VII.

(2) - cf. E. Gilson, d'être et l'essence, Paris, id. Being and  
some Philosophers, Toronto, A. Forest, la structure métaphysique  
du concept selon saint Thomas d'Aquin, Paris, 1931

## 2 - Metaphysics of the idea

How can the One have produced the many without an ontological degradation of itself? Only the "ideas" thought by the One do not affect its unity. The "ideas" in the One are the One (1), but they are the "reason" of the multiplicity (2) in God. There are ideas and there are the exemplary causes of the things. The true being nature of a thing seems to be more in its idea than in itself; but this metaphysics seem to give also an answer to our question. The world has received from God the idea that makes it to be. But what distinguishes the idea in God from the "thing" from the incarnated idea? This is the weak point of the doctrine if it will avoid the classical answer of the "ensomatosis" of the Greeks. It seems that only the dualism of a primordial matter is truly consequent with a metaphysics of the idea. And in fact all representations of the metaphysics

(1) - cf. H. Thomas saying, "Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo omnium rerum. Unde idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia." Sum. Theol., I, q. 15, a. 1, ad 3.

(2) - cf. D. Thom., Sum. Theol., I, q. 15, a. 2

"Creatura in creatore est creatrix essentia" St. Anselm  
(Rich 51130)

One How can be the One principle of Multiplicity? (1)

The internal dialectics of the ~~the~~ metaphysics of One leads us to the answer of the Gnosis and Plotinus and as such ~~betrays~~ ~~the~~ abandons the requirements of the biblical orthodoxy: the multiplicity is nothing but a descent, a degradation of the One (2). The more imperfect a being is the more multiplicity has in itself. The many is the imperfect and the imperfect can only come from the perfect as a descent or as the whole Gnosis will say, as a fall (3). → 63/64

But the Christian Tradition has tried to avoid this temptation of the metaphysics of One by following another line equally coherent with such a metaphysic. This second line is a consequence of the metaphysics of One, but has been ~~so~~ much developed that it has become in some philosophical systems the ~~one~~ all dominating met Idealism.

(1) - "How the One has not remained in Itself" asks almost with anguish and horror, Plotinus, Ennead. V, 1, 6.

(2) - cf. Plot., Ennead., V, 3, 16

Three things about this God, that developed one after one give birth to the 3 kinds of metaphysics that we find in the history of the human mind. God is One, He is me or rather I am.

The world is God's creation. God exists. And God is only One. Well. But what is the meaning of that creation? It means obviously that all what the world is it has received it from God. It implies undoubtedly also that God and the world are not the same. But now the two questions arise: What has received the world from God? What is the difference between both?

Let us try to give an answer to these questions according to the different types of metaphysics. → 31

### 2 - The metaphysics of One

For a metaphysics of the One, that has a long tradition inside as well as outside Christianity and that the human mind cannot dismiss altogether the problem appears like this:

The first and undeniable difference between God and the world is that God is One and the world is Many. Even the most austere metaphysics of being cannot overlook that the first difference distinction between the Being and the beings is that the former is One and the latter Many. Plato, Plotinus, Denis the Areopagite and in a more delicate sense Augustine and Thomas Aquinas accept the metaphysics of the One.

Because <sup>God</sup> is One <sup>He</sup> God is perfect, indivisible, simple, independent and above all comprehension.

The One can exist without the many, but not viceversa, the One is the reason of the multiplicity (1)

But how the many come out of the One? (2)

(1) cf. e.g. Dionys. de div. nom. I, 4 (P.G., 3, 589); I, 5 (P.G., 3, 593) II, 2 (P.G., 3, 637) where God is said to be the One, the supreme unity above all ~~all~~ unification and unities.

(2) - "eius subsistentia non potest esse nisi unum". D. Thom., Sum. Theol., I, q. 44,

a. 1.

(3) "Unde et Plato dixit quod necesse est ante omnem multitudinem ponere unitatem". D. Thom., Sum. Theol., I, q. 44, a. 1 (Plat. Parmenid., ~~xxvi~~; xxvi (164c-165e)).

## V - A metaphysical hypothesis

Now, either by Revelation or by reason (or by both) we come to know

The x and the y and again by one or the other means or by both we are told or we discover their relationship. How to make this relation intelligible? This is the problem.

from 10, 2 →

### 2 - The Christian data

Let us suppose that we have the fullness of the Revela-

tion of the Old Testament concerning the problem, namely:

- 1 - "At the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" - (1)
- 2 - "Hear O Israel, the Lord <sup>our</sup> God is One God" (2)
- 3 - "Ego I am the God who is", "I am who I am" (3)

That is to say. There is only one God creator of heavens and earth. Still the sense of this statement can be understood (and interpreted) in very different way, according to the underlying metaphysics by which we receive that sentence.

The mix of the problem of creation lies evidently in understanding God the Creator. Now the Revelation of the Old Testament tells us

"Ego sum qui sum"

3 - Ex., III, 14 - cf. the wonderful explanation of the philosophical momentum of this text in E. GILSON - The spirit of medieval philosophy, London, 1950, p. 517. and for

2 - "Audi Israel, Dominus Deus noster Dominus unus est." cf. Deut., VI, 4. cf. Marc., XII, 29 - "Dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est" cf. etiam Matth.,

1 - Gen., I, 1. We are convinced by the reasons given by CLAUDE TRESMONTANT, Études de métaphysique biblique, Paris, 1955, p. 72 in order to delete the art. determinative article from the beginning. Bereshit is without article and the beginning of creation is a permanent one, now as it was at that particular beginning. The Genesis speaks of a beginning

only and most definitive formulation. The <sup>occasion</sup> ~~example~~  
of Indian Philosophy offers us an example of  
how we have to distinguish the dogma from its  
formula — but distinction doesn't mean separation,  
nor that we are allowed to reject the formula either,  
and how we can try to obtain a deeper „intellectus fidei“.

→ 11

from 11 →

Now my point is this. The understanding of the intellectual meaning of divine Revelation depend in a great extent on the previous categories by which we receive or rather we try to understand it, because Revelation is ~~not~~ ~~dear~~ ~~not~~ being with it the revelation of a philosophical or theological system. If India has a certain metaphysical background, this will provide the categories for understanding the revealed truths as far as their intellectual content is concerned. They will understand Revelation in a certain way that may be as valuable as another and that will prove better fit for the Indian mentality.

My effort is this. In order to integrate we must go down to the very elements that have to be integrated. We have received certain truths, by Revelation, and we have understood and interpreted them in a certain way, that was dependent on our metaphysics. We have sometimes forgotten this fact and identified Revelation with a particular interpretation of it. We know, on the other hand that this interpretation is truth if the Church has officially approved it. But we can't say that it is the

(1) And when St. Thomas received his private illumination Christ told him, "hinc respicis de me, Thomas!" De me, not de materia et forma, acta et potentia, causalitate et ideis.

A metaphysical hypothesis  
3 Philosophical

What is the ~~name~~ name of this object? The Christian name is Creation, the name given by Indians is māyā, <sup>and</sup> ~~but~~ it has many other names also within the Indian Philosophy.

But what is the object? Though it is not possible to point to the object without words and concepts implying already a whole metaphysics I would like to try a kind of logical description of the object in question before giving some examples of the different types of metaphysics that have ~~tried~~ <sup>attempted</sup> to understand and express the problem.

The ~~masked~~ <sup>pure</sup> problem would have more or less the following formal structure: There is a series  $x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots$  with such a property that none of the elements can "stand" for themselves ~~itself~~ alone, nor the whole series unless we assume that the addition of all the ~~the~~ elements gives a ~~result~~ <sup>something</sup>  $y$  different in nature from the mere ~~the~~ sum of the  $x$ . Now if  $y$  can "stand" the several  $x$  can only "stand" in  $y$  or due to  $y$ . But on the other hand if only  $y$  properly "stands" what is the "standing" of the  $x$ ? That is to say the series  $x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots$  claims for an  $y$ , but the  $y$  exhausts so to say all what the  $x$  stand for, so that it must be worked out how both the  $x$  and the  $y$  can "stand" together or side by side. Are they really not one and the same? Or perhaps there is a  $z$  that includes both?

children and natives. The first one proceeds comparing "words" with "words", i.e. in our case concepts with concepts and when it is a little more advanced idioms with idioms. The person who thinks in one language and speaks in another one however great his technique and mastery might be will always be a foreigner in <sup>the second</sup> ~~such a~~ language in <sup>the second</sup> ~~such a~~ culture.

The second way, that of the children — where, by the way, is the Kingdom of God — is not of comparing words with words, but of discovering relations between words and things. We cannot understand the Indian Culture if we do not go at her school like little children and try to learn things and their meanings. All kinds of juxtapositions, to say the least, are barren. How to understand from within, the Indian Philosophy is a vast subject of which I can only sketch an attempt in one particular point.

What is this? asks the child pointing with his finger a particular object. If we were able to point with our intellect the object subject of our problem without utilizing words nor concepts we would be able to understand the answers of the several philosophies, because we would be already in real contact with the things themselves as the child touches with his hand the object whose name he is inquiring.

On the other hand it would be an unfair minimisation of the structure of reality as well as of the Christian Revelation if we would think that only one type of metaphysics is apt to give an adequate account either of Reality or of Revelation. We are not allowed to identify the existential order of things with an essential thinking about them.

Now, it is not possible to express that fundamental intuition alluded to without recurring at a particular type of metaphysics. This is the reason why the misunderstanding is so easy and the dialogue so difficult. Communication is only possible when at least one of the partners knows also the language of the other and is able to undertake a metaphysical translation. To know the language (and by this I mean something more than the concepts or the terms) of Indian  $\phi$  is an imperative duty of the Christian  $\phi$  if ~~it~~ ~~also~~ ~~the~~ latter claims to be the intellectual exposition of a truth that affirms itself as universal, as catholic.

There are two ways to learn a language. One proper of adults and ~~aliens~~; the other the manner of foreigners.

the philosophical history of mankind, each of which must  
 needs express the same problem in different ways. To know  
 these types is very important because it can very well  
 happen that the same deep experience will acquire a  
 completely different expression, and we shall be unable  
 to understand them unless and even the underlying  
 resemblance or identity unless we are aware of the  
 existence of such types. ①

It goes without saying that the  
 even in the case of an identical intuition the <sup>choice or</sup> dialectical  
~~development~~ <sup>acceptance</sup> of a type of metaphysics is not irrelevant  
 for the Indian, or let us say, the orthodoxy of the  
 particular system. The internal dialectics of a metaphysi-  
 cal point of departure can, consciously or unconsciously  
 lead to a negation of the primordial intuition or  
 to consequences incompatible with other fundamental  
 philosophical issues. The ultimate criterium for the  
 choice of a particular type of metaphysics is always  
 an extrinsic one, namely the adequacy of such meta-

philosophical principles to give an explanation of Reality. We  
 have examples of such cases inside the Catholic  
 faith tradition, for instance Thomism and Scotism  
 as well as outside it.

not too clear  
 to develop it

① - cf. the classical  
 example of  
 Indian dialectics:  
 that of an Elephant in a dark room described as a pillar, a branch, a tail,  
 etc. [cf. Anandabrahma's quot.]

The predominant part, for we strive at the intellectualization of the question.

In order to have a complete understanding of the problem we are obliged to know those data and to check the way by which they have been worked out into a -- Weltanschauung, darshan, Philanthropy, Theology.

But in fact, the deep study of all those systems or systems of the world, or philosophies or theologies, gives very often the ~~opposite~~ <sup>at the</sup> impression, namely that all these data have been received into a peculiar mental structure they are ~~not~~ <sup>not</sup> the result of the ~~an elaboration~~ without presuppositions the acceptance of the data and a thinking thereof, but ~~rather~~ <sup>rather</sup> that they ~~are~~ <sup>were</sup> ~~existing~~ <sup>pre-existing</sup> mental structures that received and elaborated the data. ~~according to the~~ Most probably the process has been <sup>a two-way traffic.</sup> ~~double~~.

The data have shaped a particular mental categories and these have made <sup>automatically</sup> ~~on the other hand~~, a selective selection of the data or rather have been blind towards some of them and stressed others under a particular perspective. We know rather well to-day that no science nor knowledge can consist of being absolutely without presuppositions.

~~We find, in fact, different~~

Now, either because they have been elaborated a posteriori or because they existed a priori, we find in fact several types of metaphysics in

Two  
ellipses

Metaphysical Learning  
1. The philosophical elaboration

Paragraph 2

Man is a thinking being and can't help being it. He can't stop thinking, i.e. philosophizing and he is compelled to find out not only the concrete existential answer of the origin and end of his destiny, but the implications of it in all <sup>the</sup> spheres of reality and the larger ~~to~~ frame-work into which his personal fate is inscribed. and that gives a fuller intelligibility to his existential problem. So the question about my origins and end leads to the wider problem of the origin and end of this world.

What kind of data does ~~the~~ man possess in order to elaborate a full answer to this?

Phenomenologically speaking we find three sources of information: the world at large, including <sup>man</sup> himself and the whole reality he is aware of; tradition in the widest sense, including the culture of his environment past and present and the possible revelation that tradition hands down to him; and thirdly, only in special cases we find revelation including inspiration in those men who claim that God has spoken to them or inspired them in order to know something more about the problem.

The instruments by which man elaborates the answer are the all possible forms of knowledge from faith down to the sense knowledge. In the elaboration of the problem however, what we can call the intellect plays

mean a different attitude. In the first case we have a philosophical problem. In the second case we have, besides, a religious divergence. In the first case

~~there is still a third possibility~~ we have to prove the inconsistency of the philosophical structure based in the existential attitude common to both. In the second case we have to show that the very attitude, beyond all philosophical divergences, is a wrong one, i.e. does not correspond to the real situation.

There is still a third possibility in this effort of dialogue, namely to discover that the existential attitude of our partner is not altogether wrong, but only incomplete and thus false insofar as it extrapolates, i.e. prolongs, those <sup>(obs)</sup> une positions to outside their realm of validity, ~~→~~ they would <sup>then be</sup> also false insofar as they take the part for the whole.

There is again a fourth possibility of stressing two different aspects of a wider thematic. The attitude in all these cases should be different. This is the task we ~~would~~ <sup>should</sup> have

to perform regarding our problem, if we intend an effort of integration.

~~of a wider thematic~~  
~~we stress one aspect~~  
~~and the other one~~

Transcendence of God, etc.

From our point of view we would say that the doctrine of creation stands for our absolute dependence on the creator and the self-responsibility of man in working out his own destiny within the frame-work of his ~~relation with~~ being in God. In other words, creation is a concept that ~~we~~ intends to harmonise on the one hand the absoluteness of God and on the other the liberty and dignity of man. Saying "creation" we mean to ~~save~~ <sup>maintain</sup> the two poles of the dilemma. If another ~~of~~ philosophical or religious tradition saying "manifestation", "appearance", "emanation" or whatever it may be, intends to ~~save~~ <sup>maintain</sup> the same things we want to hold, we have a common ~~existent~~ ground of an existential attitude, though we interpret it in different ways. We mean to say the same and we have a kind of antical communion. Whether those doctrines are equivalent to our doctrine or whether there are inconsistent even with what they intend to say is another different problem altogether. Again there is not excluded the possibility that they not only say a different thing, but that they

There is however the second question. And we must keep it always in mind in our dialogue with other religions. What creation stands for? That means to say, not the theoretical answer to the problem of God and the world, but the existential attitude that ~~is~~ intend to ~~bring close to us~~ help us in finding personally ~~not the theoretical answer but the existential solution for us. That the problem arises~~

Reading modern literature about the old Indian Wisdom for instance & we find explicitly stated and not seldom even in Christian terminology that the ancient Indian philosophical traditions aimed at helping ~~the~~ man in having a quite healthy — and we would even add Christian — attitude towards the ultimate problem of his destiny (2). They are not reading Hinduism with Christian eyes, but they are finding the real — Christian — core of Hinduism. They will <sup>tell</sup> say us, for example, that the idea of māyā ~~doesn't~~ doesn't want at all to stress the unreality, but also the non-self-consistency of the world, that the impersonality of Brahman doesn't mean the absence of a personal relationship with the Absolute, but ~~the~~ only to stress the

(2) - S. Radhakrishnan among others could provide us with more than one example.

from 3, 5,

We can put the problem of creation from a two different angles according to our first or second Condition respectively: I - what is creation. II - what is the meaning, or

rather the function of creation.

→ 3 → I The metaphysical being's elaboration

from 4

The first question asks for the nature, for the intelligible way of explaining the fact that this world has come out of God — de processionem creaturarum would say St. Thomas (2).

Here we can discuss and try to find out a solution that explains somehow the facts, namely the existence of — or whatever it may be — of the two poles, and is in congruence with the rest of our conception about reality. Emanation, Causation, Production, Information, Manifestation, Imitation, and the like are here the proper concepts, of course at variance.

This question is of the utmost importance not only because of the primacy of the theoretical life in man, but also because of its practical consequences. From the fact that we adopt one or other solution all our attitude towards God's life depends. For that we may deepen in our theology and try to find the right answer to the concrete problem. → 5

(2) - Sum. Theol., I, q. 44.

faith (1) and hope (2).

Every Religion must needs give an answer to this fundamental human craving not only of telling man where he comes from, and whither he goes to <sup>and what he is</sup>, but in helping him to fulfil his destiny even if this is understood as annihilation.

We cannot forget this dimension of the problem. Even if we are given a full Revelation of the question so that we can speculate on the intellectual role of it, God's Word does not intend primarily to set our brains in movement, but to save us, our whole being.

Before any elaboration of the answer we must, first, experience personally the problem, and secondly be convinced of the solution.

Moreover, whatever our "pure" philosophy might say, in fact, the philosophical and much more the theological answer is not that of finding out a solution, but that of explaining a conviction. Conviction that has been "given" to the Philosopher by his Religion, by his faith. He will try to make as intelligible as possible the answer that he holds for truths because it is the expression of his firm — religious — conviction.

(1) - cf. Helen, I, 38, etc.

→ 4.1

(2) - cf. I Pet., I, 3.

B Quaestio example of A) regarding the problem of Creation.

Sum 4, 1  
44

→ 4, 1  
the problem in itself. (5) This double aspect of the problem is so important that we shall have to treat them separately. The first one is mainly a metaphysical one, for attempts to lead the individual to a, let us say, practical solution. We shall begin with the second one.

"De potentia creaturae a Deo" is the expression of St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, q. 44, c. 1, 2, in God.

shall have to treat them separately. The first one is mainly a metaphysical one, for attempts to lead the individual to a, let us say, practical solution. We shall begin with the second one. Religion means itself all ultimate problems are neither philosophical or scientific or merely moral, but religious - Religion being the ultimate answer to any <sup>ultimate</sup> problem whatsoever.

→ 4, 2 The religious problem to which Creation gives an answer is the fundamental human issue of the beginning and end <sup>and present status</sup> of existence, especially of our human existence: where do we come from, and whither do we go to. <sup>and what are we actually.</sup> We must grasp and feel in ourselves the specific momentum of this double question before we swallow any ready-made answer, that in spite of its perfection cannot substitute the real existential answer that I have to give - I and alone myself - not with my intellect but with my whole being. In fact, we <sup>shall</sup> never understand where we come from, and we do not know exactly where we are going to. <sup>and not even what we really are</sup> Our existential state is that we cannot (1). Every calling of God, including the calling of our whole being into existence is like Abraham's vocation a calling to <sup>and a unique adventure</sup> a journey <sup>without</sup> knowing where the journey will take us (2).

(4) cf. neventalers Phil., II, 12

It is not fear the fundamental attitude (4) but that of uncertainty (3), and the overcoming of it by

- (1) - I cor., X, 12
- (2) - "et exist, nesciens quo iet." Hebr., XI, 8. cf. Gen., XII, 1
- (3) - cf. the canon 15 & 16 <sup>(of the Sen. VI)</sup> (of the Council of Trent - Sess. 825, 826, 832). (De justificatione)

formula as such but in the "res significata" as St. Thomas would say.

Now the ~~res~~ "thing signified" is really signified, meant, by the right answer. Even if the answer formulated answer doesn't develop all aspects of the question, it contains implicitly the complete right answer and covers all possible aspects of the question, even of those for which the answer was not meant. Of course these aspects cannot be developed out of the answer itself, but with the help of the new remainder of the problem that the question brings with it. We see now the theoretical possibility of a great help from the side of Indian philosophy, even if it helps only to develop more and more the potentialities of the right answer.

After this introductory remarks we can try to come a step nearer to the problem of our concern.

→ 412

sustain them. So the first communication must be sought in seeing the problem rightly, but the right answer does not exhaust as it were the whole truth unless it embraces also the whole Thematic of the problem. Or in other words the right answer has also to cover obviously not the wrong answers, but yet it has to be not only an answer to a particular way of putting the problem, but to all the ways in which the problem has been put and experienced. That gives us the reason why a right answer has to be constantly re-elaborated and re-thought if it has to continue being the right answer.

We <sup>can already tell</sup> shall see an example of it later on. That we shall see in some detail later on:

"Creatio ex nihilo" is without doubt a right answer, but it may not be the whole answer when the problem of "ex materia" does not arise and that answer has to take another shape, for instance "creatio a Deo" when the problem is first seen in a different context.

But there is identity on the other hand between the right answer and the general problem, otherwise it is not a right answer, but only a partially true one. But this identity doesn't lie in the

2 - The Christian dogma of creation is a particular and yet right answer to a general and universal problem.

This means that there is a kind of identity and diversity between the problem and its answer. Short of understanding this peculiar dialectic we may fail to reach the common ground on which to begin with dialogue is possible.

There is diversity for the problem open to the human mind is that of the origin, end and nature of this world, or in a more precise way that of our relationship with the Absolute. It is the problem of the Relative and The Absolute and their relationship. From the very fact that the problem is a human philosophical problem, our mind is capable of grasping some aspects of it and ipso facto of surmising a general and vague answer. This answer ~~may be~~ must be at least generically and dialectically right. The ~~a~~ wrong answer will <sup>commit</sup> be in the one-sidedness or in the false direction in which the answer is given, due perhaps also ~~is~~ to the fact that the problem is seen in a one-sided <sup>way</sup> or in a false direction. But even ~~as~~ like evil has only consistency in a broader and deeper burden and goodness that

contain the word "creare", but speaks of The Father  
 "factor coeli et terrae" and of The Son "per quem  
 omnia facta sunt". But these suggestions may be  
 sufficient for our purpose now (2)

Extrinsically, the dogma of creation  
 is only a part of our Credo, an element of the  
 Symbol of our faith, and though all Christian  
 dogmas are intrinsically connected so that we  
 can't deny the least of them without  
 denying implicitly the others, nevertheless we  
 cannot identify the part with the whole.  
 The absence of the dogma of Creation — as in  
 Indian Philosophy for example — doesn't imply  
 ipso facto the contradiction of it, as it would be  
 if it were not a "part" of a whole.

① - cf. my studies

When we say a "part", therefore we don't mean an element, an ingredient of that faith, but an aspect, <sup>or rather</sup> an expression of an aspect of that living act.

Certainly it is an important and central act aspect, but it is so to say an "actus secundus" and as such not to be confused with the "actus primus" of the act of faith.

Secondly it is an aspect, a "part" of our faith in a double sense: intrinsic and extrinsic.

Inhincably the dogma of "creation" is not the whole aspect of our relationship with God. If we are "created" we are also "redeemed" and there is something real that we call the "new creation". Or in other words the dogma of creation does not exhaust what God is making in and of us. I would rather say that it is an "abstraction" — in the literal sense of the word of a more complete act of God by which we come into existence. I would be inclined to say that creation is rather an ~~old~~ a truth of the Old Testament that has to be understood and complemented under the light of the Revelation of the New. That is to say Genesis I, 1 must be integrated into John I, 3 and similar Christocentric texts. And in fact our Credo doesn't

from 2, 20

B - QuaestioThe dogma of creation

Keeping in mind all the precedent reflexions we should now make an attempt of applying them to our particular problem.

The first thing we have to do is to be mindful of our first condition and try to understand the meaning and the place of the Christian dogma of creation.

To begin with we should understand that the dogma of creation is:

1 - a "part" of our faith in a double sense and in a peculiar way of being a "part."

Firstly, it is a "part" of something that as such has no parts. Our Christian faith as the living and existential act of the whole of our person answering freely to the free gift of God is a simple and indivisible act by which we recognize Him as He is and in consequence surrender our whole being fully to Him. Only this is the living faith that saves. And we could quote Christ, St. Paul and the official doctrine of the Church (1).

(2) - cf. for an explanation a development of this idea Aubert, Le problème de l'acte de foi, Louvain, 1945

and doesn't begin with the XVII century.

is not more living. Tradition doesn't mean custom, and  
the very essence of Tradition implies to leave behind  
and below the steps by which we <sup>climb</sup> station up to the  
mountain where the living God dwells. Tradition  
is precisely there to go straight forward, to be  
not to be set upside down — no revolution —  
but to be over-come — real progress and evolution.

→ 3, 1

the present cultural and theological structure of the Church.

This doesn't mean at all that we have to stick by all means at the old formulae or that we have to give up all Thinking and re-thinking and progress. It only means that we cannot overlook the historical reality and the historical situation of our times. It doesn't mean that we have not to bother about Śaṅkara. It means on the contrary that our concern is much deeper and broader at the same time. Deeper, because it is not more question of only christianising Śaṅkara — taken always as an example —, but of introducing Śaṅkara hand in hand with Plato and Aristotle in the Christian synthesis. Broader, because we cannot be only concerned in presenting the Christian faith to the Hindus, but to incarnate in ourselves that Christian faith for the whole and vast world in which we live to-day.

Moreover, principle of Tradition doesn't mean either principle of staticism. That would be rather a principle of stagnation. Tradition is a living stream in the Church, Tradition cannot be frozen and stopped. The moment we stop Tradition we are no more Traditionals, but traitors, we don't convey any more and the living message we don't transact with it — like in the parable of the talents we are asked to do — but we bury it for sheer fear of losing it, because our faith

is and remains the greatest Augustinian of all times, mainly because Augustinism and Christian Tradition were at his time almost identified. Where he doesn't correct Augustin he always prefers him. It is his starting point. He simply tried to profit from what he thought he could profit from Aristotle, he didn't care so much about the historical Aristotle or about the truths that he was able to formulate with the aid of the "Philosophus". And Philosophy was for him clearly definitively "ancilla"

§ The second reason is this. Thomas's situation was psychologically and ontologically distinct. Psychologically, because he believed that his cultural world was the whole world and so introducing Aristotelian ideas he was thinking to do an ecumenical task. Whereas we cannot believe that the Indian Culture or the existent Christian Culture is the only culture in the world, or that the existent Christian culture is the only possible Christian culture. Ontologically our situation is also different because we are no more in the XIII Century in the European Middle Ages or in the X Century among the Christians of Malabar (They really missed the chance!). Now, the Church has grown up, has formulated in dogmatic propositions borrowed from that transmission, many of the truths of our belief. Now, we cannot ignore

### 3 - Principle of Tradition

Precisely because Christian Theology is neither an affair of the mere intellect, nor of the individual man, but of the whole Church in her growth towards her fullness, precisely because the Church is an integral reality in which History is a fundamental dimension, we cannot ignore twenty centuries of Catholic Theology and begin anew, as it were, starting from an hypothetical  $\emptyset$ —and nonexistent—zero. We must ~~connect~~ work with our present situation and carry on the theological speculation from within the Church and from the point where Catholic Theology now stands. Even if this is sometimes felt as a burden, to take on this burden is a part of the redemptive task of Thee the Catholic Theologian.

It is sometimes said that the same as St. Thomas Aquinas christianised Aristotle we have ~~to~~ now to try to baptize Sankara. I have the good intention of those who speak like this, but I wouldn't admit to put it that way for two main reasons. First of all it is not completely accurate to say that St. Thomas christianised Aristotle, and it is plainly wrong to affirm that he had tried to do so. St. Thomas did not break with the Christian Tradition, and he didn't want to begin from a kind of Cartesian starting point and put Aristotle on the ground of his Theology. St. Thomas

2, 16(2)

intuition is simple, unifying, transcending word, concepts and multiplicity.

is yogic meditation open to us, is Advaita experience possible for a Christian contemplative, is at all Hinduism capable of being lived, contemplated from inside?

The theoretical answer is <sup>as</sup> easy, <sup>as</sup> the practical difficult. All more things are open to the Christian — I don't say to every Christian — as far and only as far as they are good and true.

But ~~and~~ how far are they good and true? No answer a-priori is here possible. That is the existential and serious effort of the theologian, the essay of giving concrete answers by trying to get that in-sight of contemplation in the particular aspects of Indian Philosophy.

We could put it in words of St. Thomas Aquinas. The function of the theologian, he would say of the "magister in sacra pagina" "ex plenitudine contemplationis derivatur" (1). Only then he can really share in the function of the only one Master and "contemplator aliorum Trade-re" (2).

(1) - Sum. Theol., II-II, 9. 186, a. 6.

(2) - ib.

The great philosophical difficulty of Advaita-Vedānta to admit Creation, seems to be its incapacity of conceiving the analogy. The problem presents, in a sketch, the following form: The Absolute is the only Being — because there can be only one Being (if they were two ~~either~~ there would be no difference between them, the difference being another "being" if at all real, etc....). The rest is only appearance. This appearance by definition is not real, is not the real, but it is ~~not~~ not mere nothingness, either — it is māyā and result of avidyā. The appearance is not the real, but the appearance of the real. It is therefore real as Brahman whose appearance it is. The Absolute is, in consequence, the appearance; only that we do not know it so long we are stricken in ignorance and have not yet discovered the illusion of the appearance and the reality behind it. What the phenomenon, the appearance really is, is the Absolute. Thus, "the Absolute is but the phenomena in their essential form" (1) Here we have now the phenomena devoid of their all enemies and made one with the enemy of the Absolute. ~~It is true that~~

(2) - T.R.V. MURTI, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, London, 1955, p. 321, ~~referring to~~ referring to "The common form of all absolutisms" (italics mine).

It is true that the Absolute is the phenomena in an "absolute" form, in a form ~~non sui generis~~ sui generis, peculiar, unique to the way the Absolute is the things. It is not an enemy, but a ~~pre-enemy~~ presence — (pre-enemy) (1). Presence which is superior to the enemies of the things themselves and more interior to the things than their enemies (2). But this presence of God in everything is so powerful that "gives" them their own enemies and existences. A "thing" is, only because God "is" there in that thing and it is precisely according to the "way" or "manner" God, the Absolute is present there. His presence is really creative. It confers to the phenomena their phenomenonic being. This phenomenonic existence — the whole world being a φαινόμενον, a manifestation of the "glory" of God — is precisely creation, the creature (3).

(1) — cf. "Deus immediate est in omnibus per eventum praesentiam et potentiam". D. Thom., Sum. Theol., III, q. 6, a. 1, ad 1.

(2) —

(3) — cf. R. Paniker. El concepto de naturaleza, Madrid, 1951, p. 139-79.

Dialectics of the penon

Indian

māyā is the śakti, the power, the creative power of Brahman. Or rather, the magic power of Brahman producing the "illusion" of this world like the magician produces in the mind of his spectator the vision of the images that appear. For Brahman, the magician nothing "appear", nothing has been "created". For the spectator the "illusion" appears as something, as being ①

cf. (Lacombes 244)

① - cf. Śaṅkara B.S.B. II, 1, 14

The two most fundamental mahavakyas of Vedānta, aham-brahmāsmi (1) and tat-tvam-asi (2). "I am Brahman" and "that are you" in spite of certain interpretations, are one of the most perfect formulations of the metaphysics of the person.

They say namely that Brahman is the I, the absolute I, ultimately the only I, the only that can say properly I and I am (3). There is <sup>ultimately</sup> only one I. God, the Absolute is here presented and experienced in the  $\S$  most pure personalistic form, the I, the only one I, the only one subject of attention, the only one irreducible Person, source and origin of everything else. God is the I, God is I, "Brahman is I" aham-brahmāsmi.

But this is not all. Have we changed the popular ~~and~~ subject-predicate order of the first statement — I am Brahman, doesn't mean that my ego is Brahman, but that Brahman is the I — so we

(1) -

(2) -

(3) - cf. R. Panikkar - Existenzielle Phänomenologie der Wahrheit,

are going to be obliged to change in reverse the order of the second statement. Tattvamasi does not mean either "Thou art that," namely Thou i.e. your ego is that, i.e. Brahman, but exactly the contrary: "that art Thou", or in other words that what you are, that is a Thou; a Thou of Brahman of course, a Thou that as it is spoken by the I it is identical with it, with Him.

I am not saying that this is the meaning that we usually find in Hinduism. I only say that 1) that this meaning is also there, 2) that is the true meaning of the text and 3) that the violence done to them is much less than the ~~Platonic~~ Thomas's interpretation of Aristotle.

Dialectic of the One  
Indian

The ἓν καὶ πολλά of Plato has a peculiar expression in Adv. Vedānta: samasti and vyasti; i.e. the totality and the individualities (1). The images recurrent images are those of the forest and the trees, the sea lake and the drops of water of it. But it is not to be understood as the whole and its parts in a quantitative sense. It is rather the essential Unity and the accidental Multiplicity. The plurality is neither a part nor a division of the One, but rather the One and its reflexion, or its many viewpoints. The diversity is only the appearance of the One, only an artificial division from our point of view of what in itself has not neither part nor multiplicity. This distinction is the clue for the identity and yet diversity between Brahman and the jīva, the soul in Śaṅkara's Advaitism. The whole is not only pervading everything; it is in fact everything; but the isolated thing is such a thing insofar as it is isolated. The "thing" is real — real as Brahman — only the isolation is an illusion, almost a lie if we affirm it.

(2) - sam-asti and vy-asti; i.e. the sam the whole of the as, the being and the <sup>vi</sup> distributive aspect of the same being.

(Lacombe)  
262

The multiplicity has but some  
positive character in Indian Thought. It is not good for  
the One without a second (1) to be alone (2). It wishes  
to become many (3). There is a desire for the  
many manifold. The manifold is the expansion of  
the One, it is its garb, somehow its expansion and  
"extra".

(1)  
(2)  
(3) - Chand. Uf., VI, 2, 3

65

Dialectic of Being

Let us call  $x$  the ~~Be~~ absolute Being and  $y$  the relative being. In a metaphysics of being the ~~pro~~ dialectical problem arises as the possible forms of co-existence of  $x$  and  $y$ .

There are the following possibilities, all of them given in the History of Philosophy:

~~1.  $x$  &  $y$ , both exist with extraneous relations.  $x$  may be the cause of  $y$ , but there is something in  $y$  that does not proceed from  $x$  or even this proceeding is so real that properly speaking  $x+y$  is a higher thing and what ~~pro~~ in fact should receive the name of  $x$~~

We don't understand by it only a personalistic attitude in a rather anthropomorphic sense. It is rather that attitude that realizes that the Absolute cannot be reached by the intellect alone and that the will is also essentially required. It is not exclusively an attitude of love, but includes it essentially.

Moreover it is not only intellect and will that will shall reveal to us the Supreme, or that shall join us <sup>with</sup> Him, it is our whole being, i.e. our full person that aspires, longs for Him and that receives and "suffers" and understands Him.

A comprehensive personalistic approach will not reject any of the means of the person to attain the Supreme. Adoration is its category. Adoration that implies, of course, knowledge, love, surrender, dedication, but that transcends all this.

(67) 1

## Dialectics of Monologue

The Absolute is the I, the pure I without a Thou. How could ~~be~~ it be a Thou without breaking the purity and oneness of the I? This I has been most commonly interpreted as pure consciousness, but a consciousness so pure that it has no object. What could the knower know? Not even himself, for he is the knower and by no means the known.

The most consequent absolutism of the I is to be found in Sankara's system. Because there is only the I, salvation cannot mean to "reach", to "attain" the Absolute. The I is already there, the I is and there is no other subject than He. Once the intuition "I am" gets hold of "me" realization is there. It is a misinterpretation of Sankara's point of view to say that he teaches that I am Brahman, i.e. my ego, or my adman, or my jiva is Brahman. Sankara does not accept diminution, nor the divine character of anything else but Brahman, the I. When "I am Brahman" is so veridically true, that it is a mere tautology. The Brahman is the I, the I is Brahman and ~~is~~ only hence only the I can truly say I am

brahman. It is not my ego that will reach that stage where he will discover that he is (also) brahman. He, the ego, is nothing, is pure illusion. Aham brahman, because nothing but the I can say it. The Monologue is pure and the First Person alone.

Because of this "monologic" attitude,  
— rather than monistic — the world is simply the Non-I. But non I doesn't mean nothing. It means that the I doesn't know the world and with it the world is not. It only "appears" to those who do not know the I. Who are those? Śaṅkara will say that ~~the~~ "those" are precisely the world, only the world appears to itself. It is the wheel of saṃsāra in a perpetual illusion. But also this perpetuity is illusory. Illusion means superimposition, means to be outside the I, ~~for~~ i.e. not to be at all without being sheer nothingness. That is why māyā is precisely that what is contradictory in itself.

The I has no echo, has no thou. The world is not creation, and doesn't praise the glory of the Lord. Without a second, without a thou, there is no place for reflexion. All reflexion is a lie. That is to be realised in order to understand the peculiar situation of Śaṅkara's Philosophy.

on the one hand - it has the profound appeal of all great direct attitudes, of all simple and straight positions. The moment you think that you pray you are praying no more, used to say the Christian fathers of the desert. The moment you think about something you lose this deeper contact with it. A reflexive love is a poor love. An egotistic desire for salvation is a very reprehensible a very pitiful spirituality. Our own language speaks of the good in terms of straight, right and the like and of evil in terms of crooked, twisted things and similar. The I is absolute, the Being has no being and no parts, the Absolute Consciousness has no ideas at all. The supreme realization has no words, no object, no multiplicity of any kind and is not reflexive at all. I am! When the I am in us is more than a word then we are no more and yet then and only then the full being is there saying as it were, I am.

On the other hand - because it lacks reflexion it cannot explain at all the peculiar character of the universe, the reflexive feature of even the most our beings, the reflexion of our constant experience. It cannot explain anything, because it explains away everything. There is nothing to explain. All duality is left behind and with it the need of

any explanation of dualism. If we ask, it means  
that we have not yet realized and not understood  
what Saikara's Monologue stands for. It is the  
pure and entire Silence of the I.

Dialectics of Dialogue

God Father is Silence. I would say the Father of the Church. But out of the Silence of the Father came out the Word, the divine Word that allows the Father to be purely silent, because it takes for himself to speak out all what the Father ~~is~~ has to say, all what the Father is.

The silence of Sankara, the absolute I of Advaita can only be overcome without ceasing to be Advaita ~~in the~~ + introducing, or rather realising, i.e. here in this case believing in the Second Person of the Trinity.

But before describing it, we should linger a while on ~~the philosophical meaning of this~~ ~~attitude~~ another example of this attitude of Dialogue.

It is the characteristic of the Hebrew mentality and the Thematic of the Old Testament.

God is the I, certainly, but he speaks and we listen. We enter into a personal relationship with God. We obey or disobey, we

love or hate and he punishes or rewards, he intervenes in History. He is the living God, the first person. We are the second one. The whole people of Israel as a whole is in the beloved spouse of God or his dear child. God is Father, we are his children and the whole creation the garden where man king of creation should have enjoyed this gift of the Father ~~were he would he~~ have not sinned.

<sup>at</sup> All the metaphysical shortcomings or historical narrow-mindedness of the Hebrew Religion are overcome in this personal attitude of dialogue between Jehovah and his elected folk, between God and the man. But there is a deep metaphysics underlying this attitude. The ~~most~~ personalistic metaphysics of Dialogue.

God is He who speaks — for excellence. Man — and every <sup>the whole</sup> creation — is he who listens. The creature came to be, comes to be out of a calling of God, it is His call. The creature is nothing but the result, the echo, the term — terminus — of this divine calling. The creature

has no consistency of itself. It is simply answer, and it is  
 insofar as it answers. That's why evil is non-being, because  
 it is this lack of answer to the calling God, ~~it's~~ the wrong  
 answer, the "conversio ad creaturas" is an "aversio a Deo" and  
 that means to fall into nothingness. "Extra Deum nihilum".

The biblical idea of creation is not that  
 of a "relation", but that of a dialogue. That's why Adam  
 commissioned by God just a name to all the beings in  
 order that the answer may be perfect. Because this dialogue  
 things, lands, fruits, even objects can be blessed or  
 cursed by God. The whole creation is not simply "being", or  
 "being" in this impersonalistic way, but is partner of God  
 in His inevitable design of making shine His "Shekinah" (?)

MADE IN SWEDEN  
 LOVELLY BOND

20, 5

## Dialectics of Trialogue

Christian Theology has deepened and explicitly elaborated the personalistic dialogue and has found its way in the triologue as the intimate structure of all beings and of Creation.

The mystery of Trinity is the ultimate clue to this problem. ~~as to all~~ Only the simple and ineffable Trinity of God can combine and harmonize all the antinomies that the problem of Creation arises.

Our reason alone may not be capable of discovering the Trinity real in the whole creation, but nevertheless it exists and everything that is, is "imago vel vestigium Trinitatis". But this means something so deep and intimate in all beings that all the acumen of the light of our reason cannot discover it, being as it is the very structure of being, i.e. of creation.

"Trinitas creata a trinitate increata" defines Albert the Great the human soul. ①  
Or as he himself puts: "Pater dicendo se creavit omnem creaturam"

① - cf. *Catholica*, 1955 (II).

(71)

## The purpose of creation

There are few dogmatic statements about the purpose of creation. They can be summarised by saying that being God the principle and end of everything creation has God as its principle and God as its end. Or in other words, God in creating the world can have only Himself as the end of his creation. That amounts to say that He created the world for the manifestation of his goodness and not as a kind of necessity to increase his own happiness. <sup>(1)</sup> The world has, in consequence, as its ultimate goal the glory of God <sup>(2)</sup>

Now this idea can be developed in a twofold direction.

1 - The analysis of the purpose of God, the Creator and, 2 - the study of the intrinsic purpose of creation from the point of view of creation itself.

- (1) - Finis quem Deus in creando habuit, non est ipsius beatitudo, sed manifestatio bonitatis suae.
- (2) Mundi finis est gloria Dei, rerum omnium principium et finis.

Regarding the first point Christian speculation has stressed two ideas.

One, that of the divine liberty in creating the world (2). God is neither forced nor obliged to create the universe. The world is not a necessary divine manifestation. Though it has no sense to say that God could have not created the world, for God is fully actuality and He has no potentialities, no "coulds" of any kind. The statement when it is made like this, it means that the real world "could" have not been at all, for God created it out of his free and sovereign Will without any kind of ~~some~~ necessity neither from his own Nature, nor from any other — inexistent — cause.

The second idea is this. The purpose of God in creating the world does not lie in any — again inexistent — extrinsic or superior motive. He is not creating the world in order to fulfil a certain order or to follow a determinate fate. Christian Theology has rejected the Greek idea of moira or of any other cosmic law or dharma that He would simply fulfil. He does not submit Himself to any law or destiny or Fate in creating the world.

(1) *Libere, ex libertate sua*

God has no external purpose, no superior motive, no outside pattern, no ulterior end than Himself. God has no other why in creating beings than He. Properly speaking the divine creative act has no why, has no at ulterior reason, has no motive beyond.

Speaking about the purpose of God's creative act, of any kind of anthropomorphism. We must discard all our formulae, for us, purpose or motive means something outside ourselves that we strive at. This doesn't apply to God.

2 - But has not creation itself, from the point of view of the creator, not a purpose, not an end? The answer to this second question is the whole Christian conception of History. And is precisely in this problem that the mere scheme of Creation according to the Old Testament is not sufficient to explain the purpose of Creation. History. The concept of Creation must be not also complemented but really transformed and elevated to the genuine christocentric conception of this universe made by and for Christ the alpha and omega of Creation and sustainer of all.

Theology of History is not only and not even mainly a theory of events, but of the dynamic process of Creation, and it has to deal not

(1) cf. R. Paniker  
(2) . cf. R. Paniker

simply with the meaning of human events, but also with the sense of the end and fulfilment of creation.

The growing of the Kingdom, the forming of the Mystical Body of Christ, the purpose of creation in the most possible detailed insight into the way, how each being fulfils God's Will, individually and collectively are the main problems of a Theology of History.

We have not to develop this thematic here (1). Our concern is only to vindicate not how far Indian  $\phi$  has discovered these problems and given them a satisfactory answer, but how far the Indian mind, i.e. the mentality formed by the ways of thinking of the Indian  $\phi$  can help us — and Indians — to understand and even to deepen ~~those Christian~~ the thematic alluded to.

Let us take, to begin with, an instance that is a typical feature, at least of one of the schools of Indian  $\phi$ , and that enlightens in an uncommon way one of the main concerns of the Theology of History, ~~the Esch~~ the Eschatology.

(1) - cf. R. Paniker

We have already pointed out that the main effort of Advaita-Vedanta is to see the world as it <sup>seem</sup> is from God, i.e. as it is in God (pag. 53). We can put it this way. The central <sup>point</sup> ~~intuition~~ ~~problem~~ of Advaita is a  $\emptyset$  of the beatific union, or in other terms the union of being not at it "is" — or appears — now but as it shall be at the end, since the world has framed some and "time shall be no more" (1). Certainly — and that would be a pertinent criticism, if we had to begin a critique —, the passage from this temporal being to the ~~et~~ everlasting one is not for Advaita a real passage, an evolution, a growth, but a discovery, an unveiling, a realization. Sankara would not admit, or rather he did not even think possible, the Christian conception of the historicity of beings, of History as an actual becoming. But nevertheless there is something extremely valuable in his conception. Beings are not really beings until they reach the Being. The being is at the end, as it were. It is the goal and end of  $\emptyset$  creatures, to be. And to be is to be one with God. (2)

(2) - ut sint unum sicut tu Pater in me et ego in te. ...

(1) - Apoc., VIII, 6.

Harvard 1922

- Myth & Symbol - A study of Primordial Religions  
An Introduction to African, Arian and  
Western Religions

(Tuesdays-Thursday) 10

Lectures: Readings of Vedic Scriptures: A Study of Religion  
and Change in Human Consciousness

Paper (or week) on Theism - Monoism - Atheism  
& Polytheism

(Thursdays 4-6 p.m.)