

Supernatural ?

What is a Christian ?

If we are not accepting
orthodoxy but orthopraxis as the ^{exclusive} ~~only~~ criterion will be
forced to say:

a Christian is he who declares himself to be such.

One can ask further:

- What makes him to say this ?
- What lead him to such an affirmation ?
- What reasons does he give ?

We exclude bad faith, lie, insincerely
 He will then say that he meantly believes that he is a Christian,
 that he considers himself to be one
 that (perhaps) others take him equally as to be one.

Again the question pops: why ?

- Can he define his proper orthodoxy ?
- Is to be a Christian a mere question of a
private will to be one ?

Probably the minimum required which will find acceptance
among most Christians will be to say:

(because) I have an allegiance with (to) Jesus Christ

i.e. an existential commitment which at the same
time does not exclude the other (to be a Christian is a generic
and not a proper, exclusive noun).



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Change of Continuity (in Christian Tradition)
or elsewhere

- A Christian is one who declares himself to be such
- He will have some reason for it
- This reason cannot be totally private. It has to have a communal convincing power also. Then there are other persons calling themselves Christians.
- Is there a common denominator?
- History proves that this common denominator does not belong to orthodoxy but to orthopraxis
- This orthopraxis is a certain allegiance to the figure of Jesus Christ.
- The coefficient of this allegiance varies with the times (personal and collective). Sometimes you need the official seal of a church, other times the implicit recognition of a community, other times your own conviction, etc.

Supername - Names

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Another often source of confusion is the peculiar and subtle use of ~~the~~ articles in different languages. Without going too far the correspondences between say English and Spanish are almost opposite. Where in Spanish you would put the definite article English would tend to put the indefinite or to eliminate any article all together. (1) Latin has no articles and it is the Vulgate which for almost a millennium has shaped the understanding of the New Testament Bible in the West. Greek has the two articles but often they are translated or not according to the understanding of texts (2). God or the God is not the same (3) or it is not indifferent to say The Father and the Son in the case of Christ or a father and a son in the same

of any father-son relationship ④.

limiting ourselves to our question

Exegetical ①

②

③ cf. K. RAHNER

where he shows that ~~the~~ ὁ θεός in the New Testament overwhelmingly means ~~the~~ God the Father (of Jesus Christ) and θεός simply God.

④ - cf. J.A.T. ROBINSON, The Human Face of God
Philadelphia (Westminster Press) 1973, p. 186-99. where he
argues that the famous passage Io. I, 14: δόξαν ὡς
μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός (gloriam quasi unigeniti
a Patre of the Vg.) simply means: "glory as of a
father's only son".

3)

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we shall have to ask: is the Supername
The name, a name or simply name?
 what is that name? a particular general
 and universal name, a particular and
 concrete name or simply name? Is the
 fulfillment of man, his salvation, linked
 (religata) to the acknowledgment of
~~the~~ The one name (Jesus), a name
 (of which Jesus is one) or it is simply
 linked to the recognition of name, i. e.
 of the verbal (word (tois lo'gos)) character of reality?

SupernameThe Name -

It has to have a name. — ~~to be real~~, to be not only at the reach of the human eye and within human consciousness, but to be real [the Buddhist intuition is right, nirvana is not real]. The Christ-event is the Name-event. I am not saying the language-phenomenon, but the event of the invocation, of real prayer, of the discovery that there is a name, which is neither a mere designation of a 'thing', an abbreviation for a 'concept' nor a ~~poor~~ psychological unwarranted extrapolation of our own wishes; a name that names a reality transcending the human being as we are capable of understanding it, ~~a reality~~ a name that names the divine, God, a superior agency which cannot be periphrased or in independence of the name and which is ~~essentially~~ not just a sound or a designation; a name which represents the Real. Christians see this name in Jesus, but they cannot forget that he who sees ^{(both}

him as the Father ^① and that he who serves any
of 'these little ones' serves him ^②, that he
is the mediator ^③, not the intermediary, that
his name: Son of Man ^④ represents, makes
present not only human but also divine
solidarity and cosmic harmony ^⑤:
The already mentioned cosmotheandric
principle ^⑥.

⑤ - Qui es cetera?
see & wonder they -
cf. Robinson - Human Face
214 for footnote

SB

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my copy to be
completed at my return
1-43 - given to D for
retypering -

~~SALVATION IN CHRIST: CONCRETENESS AND UNIVERSALITY~~

THE SUPERNAME

list of abbreviations

R. Panikkar

The Supername

The Idolatry of the Name and the Apostasy of the Silence

←————— A Contemporary Christophany

740319

To (all) those for whom Christ
is not a hollow word

τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντων ὄνομα

The Name above all name

Phil. II, 9

THE SUPERNAME

The Idolatry of The Name and The Authority of The Sentence
A Contemporary Christology

R. Panikkar

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Introduction

Why do you ask my name?

At sundry times and in divers manners men have in the past spoken about their wishes, saviours and gods. In our days they have been not less concerned with their own fulfillment. In season and out of season, in politics and in business, in peace and in war of every kind, contemporary men, in the same way as their ancestors, have been haunted by the problem of the meaning of their life, i.e. their destiny. Jesus Christ, the once unifying and meaningful symbol of a part of mankind, has become again 'sign of contradiction,' this time not only so much from without as from within its own tradition. Christological books, with or without this label, are innumerable and it can be said that one of the central and ever-recurring themes of almost any christian gathering is the understanding of Christ in relation to men of other beliefs. →/a

In the present day intermingling of cultures, world-views, languages and religiousness of all sorts, to name with whatever concrete name any universal value, ultimate concern and absolute conviction amounts to incurring the almost inevitable danger of idolatry. ^{Has} /any name to be limited, relativised, partisan, provincial? On the other hand, not to name, to withdraw, to fall into silence, not to commit oneself, amounts to falling prey of the almost inevitable danger of apostasy. Has any silence to be escapism, elitism,



But this is not a christian peculiarity. The same structural question is asked in any human encounter: what is the relevance of my ideas? for you How my convictions can also apply for you, outside the ~~scope~~ field where those convictions were at home? ~~In Africa~~ Are Marx' doctrines important also to Africa? Is technology not a solution also to the problems of India?

re/remarks)

betrayal, inhuman?

Any word we say may become a lie, for every word has an in-built truth-claim which exceeds the horizon of the speaker and which may not coincide with the horizon of the listener. Any silence may become a betrayal, exactly for the same reason. Its horizon may not be shared by the partner. Philosophically speaking the formulation of this fact may be couched in the undebatable statement - for its contestation already presupposes it - : the truth lies in the interpretation. The interpretation is the locus, where the truth both shines and hides itself, where it manifests itself as it is and as it is not. Truth is the symbol with which every being covers itself.

Sociologically speaking we may say that those loyal to traditional beliefs have turned into idolaters in the eyes of the 'moderns,' and that the rebels or radicals have turned into apostates in the eyes of the conservatives. Is there any way between the idolatry of one's own conviction and the apostasy of them?

This is the main issue at stake in this study, though from a particular and concrete point of view: the particular contemporary western perspective and the concrete christian problem. From the very outset I want to say that I could have adopted some other starting point, the point of departure of a humanist or of a hindu or buddhist. We are dealing with a human problem and not an exclusively christian one. Yet, the christian standpoint is somewhat

paradigmatic, for both its uncompromising concreteness and absolute claims to universality. Is this not the very meaning of the Incarnation (the universal Logos becoming concrete flesh)? Furthermore, for reasons I have explained elsewhere, there is an intrinsic justification to study the christian problematic in our historical situation. In point of fact, it is within the christian and western community where the question is historically urgent and theoretically important.

In order not to water down the traditional assertions of the christian tradition and edulcorate its demands with modern philosophical interpretations, in order to stick to the greatest possible concreteness we shall center our problem around one of the most concrete and scandalous formulations of christian scripture: 'There is no other name ... by which we may be saved'. Can such an affirmation today be still maintained?

Now, the consistent way of being radical is to go to the roots of one's own being and tradition. This means to explore the very foundations of one's self and the roots whence this self has come to be, viz. the tradition or traditions one is rooted in. This shall be our enterprise.

This study is the result of many conversations public and private with people and institutions of different nature trying to explore the middle way between monodimensional allegiances to the old or the new, the traditional or the modern, the concrete or the universal. It is

by being a good son how I may learn to be a good father, but it is also by being a good father how I may learn to be a good son. My concern is that it be not too late, because the father has already died or the son has run away. Is it not by endurance, patience, tolerance how shall we be masters of our lives?

Besides the presentation of parts I and II at Bangalore and Nagpur respectively at two theological conferences, as reported in the text, the gist of this study was submitted in a lecture at the Inauguration of the Ecumenical Institute for Advanced Theological Studies, Tantur, Jerusalem in September 1972 and the full manuscript was the basis of the William Belden Noble Lectures at Harvard University in March 1973. The author feels grateful for all those invitations and the opportunity given to him to learn by sympathy, i.e. by sharing with others one of the greatest burdens of man today: how to be fully human without allowing either the 'beast' or the 'angel' to alienate man from his real destiny.

However, this study is mainly the fruit of long years of contemplation more than action, of meditation more than reading, of praying more than preaching, of experiencing the problem in me rather than experimenting it on others. It is in a way my christian testament.

This explains also why, unlike some of my writings, the language and the perspective here is one of the christian tradition. Sometimes I had to incur the risk of sounding superficial for the sake of speaking a transcultural

language in order to make sense to people from different traditions. I may be allowed here to use the specific christian terminology, speaking from within that tradition, and face the challenge of universality.

All too often, in my opinion, the undeniable crisis of present day christians has been fostered either by the equally undeniable shortcomings of the traditional christian bodies or by the also patent multiplicity of almost contradictory doctrines put forward by christian writers. No need to fustigate now the churches or to underscore the fact of the doctrinal confusion in the minds of many. Not too long ago 'liberalism' was a sin, 'socialism' was subsequently the banned word, 'marxism' went from total rejection to the irony of becoming an almost 'holy' word. From doctrines propounding Christ without God or without religion, to the most fundamentalist theses, all seems now to be possible for a 'christian' position. What do christians stand for? - the average man asks himself and his neighbour.

Far from the intention of this study to minimize the urgent demands for Peace, Justice, Action and of the ethical problems. Equally foreign to this work is to play down the doctrinal problems of theology, christology and philosophy. Yet, the present book attempts to address itself - and invites the reader to do likewise - to an underlying anthropological problem.

Is it not true that the deeper cause

I should say perhaps more clearly that:

The attempt at solving
the problem of universality and concreteness here
lies to avoid the double pitfall of exclusivism
and inclusivism.

Exclusivism will say that my concrete religion,
vision of truth, world-view is the only fully
real and true one and thus universal. Indeed
christians will not say this individually, but they
will put this claim in the church, in the community
~~and~~ (christian belief) and on God (christian
revelation) without realizing that any such claim if made by
any man is endowed with the limitations of any man.
Inclusivism will say that all the other views,
religions, beliefs, are included in mine
so that ultimately my concrete religion, etc. is
the really true and universal one.

Indeed christians will ^{not} say this of their own
private belief, but will put this claim in

the figure of Christ (universal christology) —
without realizing that any such claim cannot be
freed from the in each case particular understanding
of Christ.

What this study would like to show
is another middle way which neither enthrones
my concreteness into universality nor dissolves it forms
for the sake of the latter.

Thus it is neither saying 'Christ' is
the only Saviour nor 'Christ' is the fullness and
head of ~~all~~ every Saviour. It says that
Christ is that particular name naming the
Supername which neither transcends all names
so as it could be without name, nor is immanent
in all names, so as it were an inner core the
same in all names.

This middle way will certainly assert the universality and finality of Christ, that he is not the monopoly of christianism, for he is alpha, and omega, and also what beta, epsilon and all what lies in between. But will immediately add that this Christ cannot be pinpointed in the East or in the West, here or there (1) for he is (2) the I am (3) ^{mirrored} reflected in the numberless reflections of any consciousness authentically re-enacting the I am of that mystery which exists since the beginning of the world up to the end of all times (4).

for the present-day christian crisis lies in the unformulated disorientation of (his) anthropological identity? What is the christian as man?

'La tradition des clercs', the scandals of Christendom are not new phenomena, nor the plurality of doctrines and doctrinal wars are novelties in christian history. What seems to be relatively new and a sociological novelty is the increasing deterioration of christian identity. The average christian today can hardly any longer believe that he and only he alone has a passport to heaven, is saved, knows the truth, acquires the human - or divine - plenitude, has the right means to overcome the forces of evil and finds his life fulfilled either here or hereafter. He feels dethroned or at least disenchanting. What is the Church or even Christ offering him if the others are in all respects equally so well-off?

Far from the purpose of these overcondensed pages to restore or to revive any type of christian monopoly or triumphalism. The thrust of the following reflections consists rather in an effort to situate the christian in the fellowship of men, or, in other words, to strengthen his communion with man. In order to contribute to find the christian's identity we are not going to tackle the problem of man or the issue of God, but simply to try to situate the figure of Christ: Christ's identity we are going to say. We shall be dealing in this way with the central christian issue.

→ 1,2

Hence, the second subtitle of the book.

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It is not a Christology that we are offering directly and much less a theology. We call it by an old and yet new name: a christophany. Our purport is to describe how Christ appears to contemporary consciousness, how he manifests himself - if we prefer a more traditional way of speaking - to present day man, how he is risen and alive today in the world. — 1, 9

The traditional interpretation of the christian scandalon was seen in the fact that the 'others' and the world at large would not understand nor accept the true christian. No wonder that the 'scandal' after centuries of such self-justification and the success of the so-called 'christian civilisation', had become rather comfortable to live with. The actual scandal is not an alibi, it is not to be thrown to the others who do not understand the christian, but it is rather the fact that the christian himself does not grasp the mystery of his own existence and yet lives in confidence and joy - without being irrational.

Our effort is not directed to reassure the christian or to undermine him. It simply attempts to describe the christophany of a constantly transfigured Lord, so that men may not be tempted to install on any spot three fragile tents, because since the beginning the ever recurring christophany has planted its tent among us.

R.P.

Santa Barbara, California

Feast of the Transfiguration of the Lord

1973

The purpose of this study is not to ^{so much} argue that the 'Death of God' theology is like the 'Death of Christ' christology ~~is not~~ ^{is} ~~happened~~ ^{so much} because the θε'ος or the πνεύμα's are dead but because the λόγος λόγος with which men have approached the divine and the christic mystery was a deadly one. With ~~the~~ light ~~(of reason?)~~ ~~in our hands~~ we cannot see darkness, with the λόγος we cannot discover the πνεύμα, the spirit is elusive to the mind like the night is invisible ^{during} the day or the other side of the moon, like the other side of man can only be believed. or in a more forceful way we could repeat with the blind - baul surgeon in Bengal :

I am blind

I cannot see darkness.

The purport of this study does not want to resurrect the deities of Theology or the Christ of Christology, without wishing to bypass or to attack these two great cornerstones of ~~the~~ human and Christian culture. My purport is more modest though more radical. It is less concerned with these two venerable 'objects' ob-jects or with man's pro-ject of wholeness, fulfillment, salvation, even if to reach it he has to become the sub-ject of an all-encompassing mystery.

→ 1, 6

~~SALVATION IN CHRIST, CONCRETENESS AND UNIVERSALITY~~

~~THE SUPERNAME~~

~~R. Panikkar~~

~~Ἡ ὀνομασία ἡ ὑπὲρ πάντων ὀνομασιῶν~~

~~The Name above all names~~

~~Phil., II, 9~~

I - Myth: Salvation (X)

→ 2.1 (perhaps an introduction, § like 23)

2.1 →

1.- The Text, the Context and the Texture

In scarcely a single other epoch of history and undoubtedly never on such a world-wide scale as today, has man been so acutely confronted with the question of identity: What or who are we? It is one of the basic problems of every culture lurking in every human consciousness: How may man preserve his own identity without falling into solipsism or being drawn into an undifferentiated collectivity? How may a world-view be both concrete, without

→ 2.2


2.1 →

(1) A shortened version of this first part was delivered as a paper in the Consultation held at Dharmaram College, Bangalore, in September 1971 on The Meaning of Christ and ~~will~~^{has} been published in the Proceedings of the Consultation.

And in his **N**ame shall the peoples hope

Matth. XII, 21 (1)

(1) Cf. Is. XLII, 1-4 as for the historical context.



7

Και τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ ἔφυγ. ἐλπιοῦσιν

And in his name shall the peoples hope

Matth. XII, 21 ①

① cf. Is. XLII, 1-4 as for the ~~and~~ historical context.

2,2

being closed, and universal, without being ~~abstract?~~ ^{abstract?} ~~collective?~~ How may I be loyal to my own tradition and yet open to another one, without being 'dogmatic' or vague? How may I be traditional and contemporary, both the son of my parents and the father of my children, all in one, without schizophrenic fits or double standards? If we are to state this problem of self-identity for a contemporary christian consciousness, we may ask: how is it possible to be a loyal christian owing allegiance to one particular religious tradition of the world and at the same time a contemporary man open to the awareness that the family of man has not only a common origin but also a common destiny and thus an equal chance of reaching that goal? Or, to use the most blunt terms of traditional christian terminology: how can a ^{"pagan"} ~~non-christian~~ reach salvation? (1).

We can also express the same idea in evolutionary terms, more acceptable to some ears. In the passage from "we-consciousness" (i.e. from group-consciousness for which there is no individual and thus no sense of 'my' life or 'my' death), from the state of innocence, if we prefer, to the individualised state, to the birth of the ego, where is the place for both the concrete and the universal? Where is the place for the mature human person, which is neither an abstract -and abstracted- individual nor a faceless -and impersonal- collectivity? Or in still more general terms: does the logos necessarily dispel the myth? Are logos and myth incompatible? Is self-consciousness always consciousness of the ego and never of the self - of itself? —

The ~~philosophical or~~ hermeneutical approach to the same problem may also serve to illustrate our query.

(1) — 2

We are fully aware today that no text can be properly understood outside its context. Each text leans on a context, i.e. on a background out of which the text emerges and against which alone it has ^{its intended} meaning. The morphological difference between the text and the context is that the latter is not thematically understood, but only indirectly known when set over against a new and wider context. In this case the context has become already another text. The context is thus ^{multiple} double: there is the immediate context which renders the text intelligible and ^{There are further wider contexts until} ~~the~~ the ultimate context, which we would ~~like to~~ call the texture. The texture is taken to be universal, that is, it is taken ~~to be~~ ^{to be} universally granted. The context ^{becomes apparent} ~~is supplied~~ by a knowledge of the immediate intellectual environment of the text; the texture is provided by the actual range of human experience -qua human and not qua tribal. It constitutes in each case the underlying myth which offers the basis for any understanding. → 3, 1

2,1 → The relation between context and texture is a peculiar one. Once we are aware of the fact that the understanding of the text depends on the context, we direct ~~also~~ ^{also} our attention ^{to} the context, but in order to know the context we need to view ^{it} ~~over~~ against the background of a wider context which becomes the texture when it has a claim ^{to} universal validity. Now what has happened in the cultural situation of our time is that men have become increasingly aware that they have to do not only with several texts, but also with various contexts.

Limiting ourselves to the christian situation, we may say that the context which has hitherto given meaning to the christian text has enlarged in two different directions: there has grown

3 → The texture is the horizon which invisibly supports the
for us in each case ultimate context. This ultimate context
appears to us so self-supporting, evident, transparent or
the like that it does not require any further instance. This
invisible instance inbuilt in the for us ultimate context is
the texture - of our knowing and feeling experience.

—————→3

out of the dynamism of this context a degree of consciousness that some thinkers would like to call post-christian. It is a growth or it is a rupture, but it is undoubtedly a new context. Rightly or wrongly contemporary man sees himself and the world over against a different context. It is a challenge for the christian to decide whether the new emerging horizon is a really new context or a mere mirage. In either case his situation is different. Furthermore, this context has also outgrown its own boundaries by allowing itself to be penetrated by alien forms of experience that are no longer merely marginal or complementary. Asian and african experiences are beginning - just beginning - to be part and parcel of modern-western-christian experience and vice-versa (1). In short, the only possible horizon which can provide today a valid context for the understanding and evaluation of any text is the planetary horizon of a world-wide experience: the human texture.

For the sake of accuracy we must add that this is by no means a formal novelty. It has always been claimed that the context of any text offers a universal range of experience - for the particular text of which it is the context. This is what is meant by the truth-claim in-built in any text. The new factor today is the awareness that the old mountains and seas are no longer 'finis terrae' and 'non plus

(1) Cf. the immense bibliography of these last decades under the slogan of (missionary) adaptation. Cf. as a single instance Th. OHM writing the article Akkommodation in H. FRIES (editor) Handbuch Theologischer Grundbegriffe, München (Kösel) 1962, I, pp. 25-30. "Heute gehört es zu den Ur- und Grundworten der Missionswissenschaft und der Theologie überhaupt" (p. 25).

ultra^o, that they have become provincial, that the ^ooikumene; is no longer the mediterranean sea and its cultural colonies but the "four seas" of our planet. The novelty today is not just the discovery that there is another land beyond the mountains, but that those ^oterrae incognitae^o are also populated with people who have their own horizons and that only by meeting together in the valley of peace, which at first is a no-man^os-land but which may soon become the promised-land, can human experience be brought into harmony and unity - a goal which does not mean, obviously, dullness and uniformity.

—————→5

Nor is this all. We should not fall prey to an easy optimism. The ways of becoming aware of a context are certainly not the means by which we understand a 'text'. There are different types of intelligibility. A text becomes clear and intelligible when it is understood, i.e. when it is situated under the stand of its proper context. This cannot be the case with the context, for this would constitute a 'reductio' or a 'processus ad infinitum'. The context is simply taken for granted and we are only aware of it in and through the understanding of the text; we do not understand a context as if it were a text. The context allows for consciousness but not for reflective consciousness. When knowing a context I do so with reference to a wider horizon which becomes in turn the actual context and converts the former context into another new text. Indeed unless that wider horizon emerges for me I cannot know the context. This means that the search for a wider context cannot be thematic or pragmatic. New horizons cannot be directly thought out or planned. The process is an existential common growth in which we are all involved with the whole of ourselves including our thoughts and our reflection on the problem (1).

This being so, we can in no way manipulate the horizon of our human experience, and, in fact, once the horizon of human experience has changed, the understanding of a text will have undergone a change also. Of one thing we may be

(1) Cf. the pertinent criticism of modern thomistic philosophy by L. DEWART, The Foundations of Belief, New York (Herder and Herder) 1969, passim, but specially: Appendix 2 -pp. 499-522- and in Religion, Language and Truth, New York (Herder and Herder), 1970, Appendix -pp. 145-169- specially.

sure; if we go on repeating the text without being aware that its context has altered, the text we repeat does not convey any longer that which it did convey to those who had another understanding of it (1). In our case, the context against which the universality of Christ's salvific action was understood has changed so radically that in order to understand that 'text' we shall have to adjust it in accordance with this change of context, i.e., we shall have to translate, to shift its message and, paradoxically enough, its 'meaning' in order that the meaning may remain the same (2). The sun ~~always~~ ^{always} in the east precisely because the east stands in every place and it is simply where the sun happens to rise.

The tantalizing question remains. Can we, in any possible way, understand the experience of the other man, his culture or his religion, in order to incorporate it in our personal horizon? Can we understand a text which has emerged out of another context, unless we share in that context or in a wider horizon which includes that context? In other words, have we the right to speak for the whole mankind if our horizon is not that of the whole humanity? Have we the right to extrapolate without knowing the rules of extrapolation? Moreover, how shall we know the rules of extrapolation before we share in the experience of the

(1) We may refer here to Rudolf BULTMANN and the whole problem of demythologization.

(2) 'Meaning' stands here for platonic or otherwise unchangeable essences and meaning points toward a dynamic relation between the understood 'object' and the understanding 'subject'. Cf. C.K. OGDEN and I.A. RICHARDS, The Meaning of Meaning, New York, (Harcourt, Brace and Co.), 1938, 5th. ed.

rise

~~sun~~ always in the east precisely because the east stands in every place and it is simply where the sun happens to rise.

all 2
entire 2

other? I may know that there are people living behind the mountain opposite, but this does not mean that I know those people or that I have a real message for them. It may be, perhaps, mere wind or sheer platitude. All this is a cluster of problems underlying our question and we cannot tackle all of them here, but we need to be aware of them in order that our own special field of enquiry may not be vitiated from the very outset (1).

Exclusivism and Inclusivism

We now revert to our more limited concern, which is one instance of the more general problem. How ~~may~~^{can} our thinking be concrete and universal at one and the same time? Can there be a concrete way of salvation claiming at the same time to be the way of salvation?

Not only within the christian tradition but also within most of the other religious traditions of the world we find two types of dialectically possible answers. We may call them the exclusive or discriminatory and the inclusive or assimilatory (2).

2.- Exclusivism

This type of answer preserves self-identity by exclusion and thus affirms that, properly speaking, only those of a particular group fulfill the prerequisite conditions

(1) This ^{cross-cultural approach} has been one of the main thrusts of the present writer's courses ~~during the last five years~~ at ~~Munich~~^{the} University.

(2) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, Religionen und die Religion, München (Max Hueber), 1965, pp. 19-24 where the two corresponding psychological approaches are described.

for salvation. Salvation is seen here as a privilege rather than as a right. It is not the right of birth, but the privilege of rebirth; it is not 'natural' but 'supernatural'; not wages, but grace. We could call this attitude the oligarchic complex: the chosen ones.

There is not injustice in assuming that not everybody is called to the same destiny when this destiny is not seen as the terminal of human existence as such but as the culmination of a supernatural process. Moreover, rarity or scarcity seems to be the character of any great (extra-ordinary) value. In practice, there is found in almost all traditions a trend of thought maintaining that salvation -whatever this may be- is the lot of only very few. Furthermore, even nature seems to indicate that its law is that of a hierarchical structure maintained at the cost of tremendous and lavish expense: only a thin layer of matter is organic matter; of this organic matter an even smaller portion has developed into living organisms, while among these the vegetable kingdom outnumbers the animal kingdom and the latter is more extensive than the human species; among men those who reach nirvāna, heaven, realisation, the end, salvation, are even fewer. A whole world-view undergirds this conception. The 'other', the outsider, the non-initiated, the non-civilised, the barbarian, is not necessarily despised, but undoubtedly belongs to another category: christians: non-christians, blacks: non-blacks, civilised: non-civilised, brahmins: non-brahmins, proletarians: non-proletarians and so on. Self-identity is reached here by recognising identity in confrontation with and contradistinction from the other, the non-identical. Identity here corresponds to transcendence. God is transcendent -in this line of thought- precisely because he is identical to himself (and/or vice-versa). → 8, 1

What would be the value of salvation if it were the ordinary outcome for everybody. This type of thinking argues.

8

The type of thinking undergirding this attitude, be it cause or effect - this is not our problem here - relies on the primacy of the principle of non-contradiction among all our ways of thinking. Probably the unsurpassed formulation of this "the most indisputable of all principles" (1) goes back to Aristotle: "It is impossible -he wrote - for anything at the same time to be and not to be" (2). If 'a is not non a', the more 'a is a', the more 'a will be not non a'. In other words the more a being will be what it is, i.e. itself, the more that being distinguishes itself from and is not another being. This is what we meant by preserving self-identity by exclusion and transcendence by self-identity (3). A perfectly self-identical being can only be a transcendent God, an essence which is non-participable as much as his existence, an a which is absolutely not non a.

Coming to our point, a christian will be the more a christian the more he distinguishes himself from a non-christian and if his being a christian means to be given access to the Way to salvation, the non-christian will have to

(1) ARISTOT. Metaphys. IV, 4 (1006 a 4-5).

(2) ib. (1006 a 3-4). Aristotle dealt with this principle also elsewhere, vgr. Anal. post. I, 11 (77 a 10 sq.); De interpret. VI (17 a 34) and VII (17 b 16 sq.).

(3) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, Le mystère du culte dans l'hindouisme et le christianisme, Paris (Cerf) 1970, pp. 37 sq. where these two ways of thinking are described as characteristic of western and indian ways respectively.

be just the opposite. This is the reason why, when contemporary theology will like to save the non-christian also -for seeing no reason to deny salvation to him - will consequently say that the non-christian is an anonymous christian (1). Is it not true that in many languages a man of 'distinction', a 'distinguished' speaker, a 'distinct' honour is supposed to be a great compliment, implying that to be different is the highest quality?

→ 9

(1) Cf. K. RAHNER, Schriften zur Theologie, Einsiedeln (Benziger) 1962, vol. V, p. 155 sq. and the subsequent controversy in theological circles.

3.- Inclusivism

This second type of answer preserves self-identity ^{either} by including the others ~~either~~ within the particular group (~~and~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~means~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~group~~, baptism of desire, everybody is born a mussulman, etc.) or by recognising a common sharing in a higher instance (grace outside the church, bona fide worshipper, etc.) ^{9,1}

^{9,1} → Salvation is here a common term which stands for the fulfilment of man. Men attain it because, though religions may be different rivers, what really matters is the quantity and quality of water that the rivers carry. Religions, according to this view, if they cannot be said to be the same (for they may represent higher and lower stages in human evolution, etc.) are nevertheless considered valid ways towards salvation in so far as they carry saving waters. Saved are not only those of one particular way, but those who, though following their respective ways, share in the same waters, because there exists an underlying unity and the ways are ultimately, mutually inclusive up to a certain point. About the number of those reaching the goal, one can here hold either position, i.e. that practically everybody reaches it or that hardly anyone fulfils the conditions for this personal achievement.

The plausibility of this mentality derives from its conviction that all men are ultimately equal and that they have the same destiny and therefore equivalent means for reaching it. Self-identity is reached here by recognising identity through participation in the other. Identity here corresponds to immanence. Brahman is immanent -in this line of thought- precisely because he is identical to himself (and/or vice-versa).

9 →

In the first case we have still the first type of mentality, only that finding hard to maintain an elitistic position strives to open a back door for the 'others' to enter into the fold also. The second case is the typical example of this attitude. We could call it the democratic complex: everybody is equal.

↳ 9


9

The type of thinking undergirding this attitude - and again we overlook the issue of what came first the thinking or the attitude - relies on the primacy of the principle of identity among all our ways of thinking. Having quoted Aristotle before it is fitting here to recall the two basic sentences of Parmenides: "...that being is and it cannot be that it is not" (1), and this is possible to say "then thinking is being" (2), or as it is generally translated 'that which can be thought is identical with that which can be', 'thinking and being are the same'. If 'a is a', the more 'a is a' the more 'a will be a'. In other words, the more a being will be what it is, i.e. itself, the more that being assumes to be what it is, the more it is, the more being it assumes. This is what is meant by preserving self-identity by inclusion and immanence. A being the more it is, the more it is (being, Being). A perfect self-identical being can only be an immanent absolute, an essence which is so perfect that it cannot be excluded from anything that there is, a being which is Being and the Being of all beings (3).

(1) Fragm. 4, verse 3 of DIELS edition:

(2) Fragm. 5:

(3) Cf. my "Excursus on Brahman" in The Unknown Christ of Hinduism, London (Darton, Longman & Todd) 1964, pp. 104-115, and a little more elaborated in the french or spanish editions of the same book.



9 →

The type of thinking undergirding this attitude — and again we overlook the issue of what came first the thinking or the attitude — ~~always~~ relies on the primacy of the principle of identity among all our ways of thinking. Having quoted Aristotle before it is fitting here to recall the two basic sentences of Parmenides: "...that being is and it ~~is~~ cannot be that it is not" (1), and ~~again~~ this is possible to say "denn thinking is being" (2), or as it is generally translated 'that which can be thought is identical with that which can be' (3), 'thinking and being are the same'. If 'a is a', the more 'a is a'

(1) Fragm. 4, verse 3 of Diels edition: ἢ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι.

(2) Fragm. 5: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι.

Bringing this attitude to our case, a christian will be the more a christian the more he assumes the human condition and becomes man among men. This may be the reason why contemporary christian spirituality likes to speak of Christ as the universal brother, of the christian as the man for others and the like. Is not the once famous controversy on 'christian humanism' a sign of this trend of mind? (1)

└───────────> 10

(1) Cf. extensive bibliography and discussion in my Humanismo y Cruz, Madrid (Gredos) 1963, pp. 178-253.

In the final analysis, these two different ways of approach ~~are conditioned in great measure by two different types of thinking: by exclusion (relying mainly on the principle of non-contradiction) or by inclusion (relying mainly on the principle of identity): "A is that which is not Non A" and "A is that which is A" (1).~~ These two different types, though one or the other may be more prominently present in one or another tradition, are not peculiar to any religion and so we find theological schools defending either position in the several religious traditions of the world.

4.- The Universality of the Church

We turn now to the present-day christian situation. The Church has always lived under the tension created by the belief that she is, on the one hand, concrete, a little flock, incarnated, historical and historically committed to the facts of history (2) and, on the other hand, universal, "tailored" for the whole world, possessing within herself a constitutive thrust toward expansion, claiming to have a message for everybody and a right of existence in every people.

(1) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, Kultmysterium in Hinduismus und Christentum, Freiburg im Breisgau (Karl Alber), 1964, pp. 39-41.

(2) Cf. as a single instance, H. KÜNG, Die Kirche, Freiburg (Herder), 1967; passim, specially pp. 158-160 and 408-425.

race and culture (1). It is the tension between the Church considered as a visible social organisation or as mystical body (2). We could call these two notions, the sociological and the theological one and/^{to}remark that in point of fact, they do not have the same 'material' object. —> 11,1

11,2

~~The tension was until now more or less mi-~~
~~nimised, or rather made dynamic,~~ under the assumption that the values that the Church represented were universal and valid for every human being qua human being (3). The Church represented in her own eyes the embodiment of the universal message of salvation for mankind (4). This message was substantially identified with certain "universal values", understood in the light of the particular time and culture in which she happened

(1) Cf. also as an example: H. de LUBAC, Méditation sur l'Eglise, Paris (Aubier), 1953, 3rd. ed., passim, but specially pp.9-40; -107-137; 175-203.

(2) Cf. DENZ-SCHÖN. 350, 3166, 3685 and C.I.C. 1322 § 2, for instance.

(3) Cf. the traditional doctrine of de virtutibus, for example, with its three theological and four cardinal virtues, etc. claiming to offer an all-embracing anthropology. But, what about equally central and basic anthropologies like those of Taoism, Confucianism, etc.? (Not only yin and yang, but also iên and yi for instance, etc.).

(4) Cf. the second introductory paragraph of the Constitutio dogmatica de Ecclesia: "Cum autem Ecclesia sit in Christo veluti sacramentum seu signum et instrumentum intimae cum Deo unionis totiusque generis humani unitatis, naturam missionem-que suam universalem ..., declarare intendit.", Lumen gentium, I, 1 of Vatican Council II. —> 11,2

(H. DENZINGER-
A. SCHÖNMETZER,
Enchiridion
Symbolorum, 34ed.
Bacino (Header)
1967), Nhs.

(The Canon Law
of the Roman
Church), Can.


There have been latent, in point of fact, all along the twenty centuries of christian history, two fundamentally different ecclesiologies, often undifferentiated, always in tension, sometimes creatively, other times destructively. It is ultimately the same polarity of the Incarnation and the four famous adjectives of the IV Ecumenical Council at Chalcedon in 451 apply equally to the two 'natures' of the Church, which have to be considered: 'without confusion, unchangeable, without division, inseparable' (1). All along the history of christian consciousness there has been a tension between an invisible and a visible Church, or spiritual and temporal, poor and powerful, internal and expansive, religious and social, supernatural and natural, etc. (2).

It is not of our incumbency here to propose a more advaitic or non-dualistic approach to the problem. Our concern here is to point out that the notion of universality of the Church is intrinsically tied with the understanding of its nature. How can a particular society with a particular message justify its universality? The answer was given —> 11

(1) Cf. DENZ-SCHÖN. 302:

Or in the latin version: "Unum eundemque Christum Filium Domini unigenitum, in duabus naturis inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter agnoscendum,..."

(2) As it is known the coming universal synod of the Roman Church in the Fall of 1974 intends to deal with the so-called problem of 'evangelization' and the polarity is already apparent between the notion of a Church contributing to 'human - and



11

There have been ^{latent} in point of fact, all along the twenty centuries of christian history, two fundamentally different eschatologies, often undifferentiated, always ~~intermingled~~ in tension, sometimes creatively, other times destructively. It is ultimately the same polarity of the Incarnation and the four famous adjectives of the IV Ecumenical Council at Chalcedon in 451 apply equally to the two 'natures' of the Church, which have to be considered: 'without confusion, unchangeable, without division, inseparable'

①. All along the history of christian consciousness

① cf. DENZ-SCHÖN. 302 : ~~ἁπλοῦς~~ ἁπλοῦς ἁπλοῦς, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωριστως. ~~inconf~~ or in the latin version: "Unum eundemque Christum Filium Dominum unigenitum, in duabus naturis inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter agnoscendum, ..."

(perhaps for
1111a)

cf. as extreme examples the latest book of the late
 JACQUES MARITAIN, On the Church of
 Christ and Her Personnel, Univ. of Notre Dame
 Press, 1973 (~~it was then~~ published in French
 when the author was 88) and the
 devastating review of it by no less than
 JOHN L. MCKENZIE in The Critic
 (March
 April 1974) pp. 57-59.

11 → The whole Constitution is filled with the same claim to
from footnote universality:
(4)

"Omnes homines ad hanc vocatur unionem cum Christo, qui est
lux mundi, a quo procedimus, per quem vivimus, ad quem ten-
dimus." §3.

"Ad novum Populum Dei cuncti vocantur homines." §13.

Comment on the very connection of universality
& the reflective difference

cf. RS 163 - (Comparative Mysticism)

pp. 24 - 25 - 33

Comment on the mystical or universal
conception of the Church as in

Eph. I, 22-23 (Greek!)

cf. NEB
different translations

cf also $\pi\alpha\upsilon$ to $\pi\alpha\tau\eta\rho$ $\omega\lambda\eta\delta$
Col. I, 19; II, 9

(Robinson, 221)

either here § I 4 or in § I 8 [think whether these
two chapters should not coalesce]

cf. Robinson p. 235 & quotation

there is a semantic
option: either the 'body of christ' is the
universal and 'church' is the concrete
or both are universal & coextensive, the
concrete being then any locus where
salvation takes place.

Seen from within in any concrete locus there
is an in-built claim to universality - not an
extrapolation (~~but~~ or the great temptation)
but as interpolation (

Example: I am a concrete human being and
I think I can reach fulfilment my complete
humanness without for that exhausting
humanity or denying that other people can
reach it also

not clear (re-considerable)

to live. It is true that the distinction between the natural and supernatural realms afforded a high degree of flexibility so as not to impose structures or doctrines considered to be of the natural order only; but even theoretically that very distinction is meaningful only in a very particular context and in practice there is no doubt that the Church in her doctrines, practices and even self-understanding is by and large a product of the mediterranean world. Are we so sure today, for instance, that idol-worship without distinctions is intrinsically evil, that polygamy is not compatible with christianity, that bread and wine are indispensable for the sacrament of the Eucharist, that certain philosophical systems are intrinsically wrong, that the Roman sacrum imperium first and a more general christian imperium afterwards were of divine right and the universal and 'civilised' forms of human government? But do not many today still think that Democracy and Science, for instance, are positive and universal values embodied in the christian understanding of man and the world, just as before they were hailing Christendom and Monarchy?

→ 12,1

12,1 →
5.- Religious Pluralism

Another attitude is gaining ground today. It tries to go a step further and preaches more tolerance. The key word for this is pluralism. Most christians today have reached the conviction that political, philosophical, theological and, though perhaps with greater reserve, that even ethical and cultural pluralisms are justified within the Church and they insist that christian faith does not aim at turning those who accept it into thomists, calvinists, rightists, democrats, westerners

12 →

Even admitting the traditional scheme, common to most of the branches of the abrahamic religious trunk, of God revealing his Will and disclosing his Truth, in order to understand God's language man has to relate it to his universe of experience, to his particular context which implies the necessary relativization of the absolute (1).

→ 12

(1) This is what seems to lurk behind modern declarations like the following:

The Church, to which we are called in Christ Jesus, and in which we acquire sanctity through the grace of God, will attain her full perfection only in the glory of heaven. Then will come the time of the restoration of all things (Act. III,21). Then the whole world, which is intimately related to man and achieves its purpose through him, will be perfectly re-established in Christ. (Cf. Eph. I, 10; Col. I. 20; II Petr. III, 10-13). Vatican Council II - Lumen Gentium, transl. by W.A. ABBOT, The Documents of Vatican II, New York: (Guild Press) 1966, p. 24 sq.

(Supername)

Pluralism is not a super-system, not an ideology or a world-view. It assumes nevertheless that there is no exhaustive representation of reality, to use words already burdened with too a particular meaning. It assumes that the three main horizons, that we can discover today or having been the three different backgrounds over against which man has tried to explain himself or to represent for himself the mystery of reality, are neither mutually exclusive nor capable of being included in an overall synthetic view.

I am referring to what elsewhere I called the three dominating myths in human consciousness.

ness, and that we could rather call
horizons: the mythical, the
ontological and the historical
having respectively belief, reason
and experiment as anthropological
categories or the physical, the
metaphysical and the scientific
periods in man's development

Pluralism will accept that
there can be a physical, a meta-
physical and a scientific explanation
of reality according to the
different categories of intelligibility
man recognizes: the mythical,
the ontological and the historical.

It will accept that they are not mutually exclusive that they are not on the same level and thus not ~~incompatible~~ mutually incompatible. But it will not accept that they can be brought under one single denominator or asked to form part of a supersystem → 4

can be reduced to one another or that one of them can give reason of the other: myth cannot be eliminated, nor ^{the} ontological dimension can be said to be obsolete or that the historical factor is irrelevant once we become conscious of it. None of the three dimensions can be eliminated. They are irreducible. But Pluralism will further deny that more than three dimensions

embracing the other. The unity
is an unreachable ideal. It
would represent the infinite
mind and plenitude is a
human attitude that accepts
man's radical finitude
and then renounces to
deny the human condition.

We called that horizon
an experiencing the place or rather
the horizon where we locate the real:
in myth, in ontology (in being), in history.
These three horizons are offered in
the background of intelligibility
but none of them can supplant the
other, nor a superhorizon can
supplant them. This is human finitude

and the like. In spite of cautions, provisos and distinguos, we can fairly say that those pluralisms have been recognised by the majority of theologians and ^uauthorities in the christian Church.

Indeed we should add immediately that the Church has never considered herself to be monolithic. She has thought of herself as being catholic, i.e. perfect, complete, and thus also universal (1). The Church would say that she is not imposing a certain limited and particular structure, but proclaiming the liberation of man from man-made chains and structures. But the question arises again the moment we ask critically what is considered to be man-made and how do we interpret a supposedly universal message. Whereas some values may appear to be universal for a certain degree of consciousness, they may look different from other angles of vision or for other forms of consciousness. On what grounds can one speak of (let alone impose) a universality de jure if there is no universality de facto?

We are approaching now our specific problem. In traditional terms one may ask what is the minimum required for being a christian -interpreting this as meaning the minimum required for salvation (2), for the Church does not want to 'impose'

(1) It will be opportune to remember that the original meaning of καθολικός applied to the Church, besides stressing her contrast to a single congregation, was not the aristotelian universal καθόλου (Cf. De interpretatione, 17 a; Metaph., 103, a; etc.) but rather the concept of perfection. The Church was primarily considered catholic, not because of her universality, but because of her perfection or completeness.

(2) Cf. Hebr., XI, 6 and the theological commentaries upon it.

The myth of pluralism i.e. pluralism as a myth

It cannot be intellectually encompassed. It would then
be an ideology, a super-system. ^{we} ~~I~~ can only believe

in pluralism (like in myths: we find them plausible)

[so at hand
that we clap them in
applause].

Pluralism means also provisionality, i.e. the holding of a particular situation for the time-being only: the renunciation to the temporal extrapolation of everlasting systems, invariant truths, constant situations, etc.

It means the conviction not only that no system can embrace the whole range of the human experience, but also that no system can be assured of its perdurability.

Pluralism does not say that all is transitory and bound to decay. It only affirms that ~~nothing can~~ the contrary cannot be affirmed, viz. that something is perennial.

anything which is not absolutely essential (1). Or, in our terms, what is the kind of concreteness compatible with the claim of universality? If salvation is in Christ and this salvation is offered to all men, how must we understand this Christ, in whom alone there is salvation?

It is here that we should introduce the notion of religious pluralism -and not only of cultural or theological pluralisms. In christian theological parlance, what is the place of the religions of the world in the economy of salvation? There is, de facto, a plurality of religions. Is there any way of justifying de jure, not only of tolerating, a pluralism of religions? Have not only theologies, philosophies and cultures, but also religions their pluralistic raison d'être? or again, is there any middle way between a narrow-minded exclusivism, which verges upon fanaticism, and an amorphous ~~syncretism~~, egalitarianism, which verges upon a disincarnated and thus inhuman attitude? What is the passage, the transit, the pascha from Plurality to Pluralism? (2).

One word should be added straight away regarding the nature of pluralism. Real pluralism does not mean that we recognize the equivalence of and intellectually equate them the different systems. Pluralism does not mean the discovery of

(1) Cf. Act., XV, 28, where the problem is originally and paradigmatically stated.

(2) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, "Christianity and World Religions" in Christianity, edited by Punjabi University, Patiala 1969, pp. 78-127, but specially 117-120.

the fact that there are several translations of one and the same "thing". If this were the case, he who knows more than one language, or the system which could speak a metalanguage, would have the upperhand and that system would then be the real and true system, for it would embrace more than one world-view by possessing the clue of the different translations. This is not pluralism, because it allows for a supersystem which governs and docket the different systems. There cannot be a pluralistic world-view, a pluralistic system. This would be a contradiction in terms, nor would it take seriously the claim of the different philosophical or religious traditions of the world to offer each one of them a universally valid view. If I claim to understand the other and even make room for him, though ^{distorting,} or ^{ing him as he understands himself,} (the other ~~does~~ not understand ~~or even tolerate me,~~ this is not pluralism but paternalism (1).

Pluralism means that we accept the non-recognition of the equivalence of the various world-views, religions, ideologies, systems. Pluralism cannot be manipulated, by those who recognise it, against the 'sectarians' who are not pluralistic. Pluralism means the existential acceptance of the other as other, i.e. without being able to understand or to co-opt him. Pluralism is humble, only knows that I or we may not possess the whole truth and does not pass judgement as to whether the other may also be right or, as it may turn out, wrong.

Pluralism belongs to the order of confidence -that the other may be also right; of hope -that we may reach a

A certain type of

(1) Madhyāmika, neo-vedānta and christian liberalism could offer examples from amidst their followers -just to cite from three different traditions.

higher and more comprehensive understanding; of love -that embraces, makes room and accepts what it does not know or understand. Pluralism is a modern word standing for the old and perhaps abused term of mysterion (1). In any case it is an emerging myth -and certainly it does not belong to the order of the logos, but of the myth. → 16,1/

16,2 → Minimalism and Maximalism:

These two words sum up the theological attitudes today regarding the problem of the universality of the Church.

6.- Minimalism

In view of the difficulty and implausibility of considering that the Church in her present day structure embodies of different persuasions to give up a direct claim to universality a universal value, there is a trend among theologians and take refuge in being the 'small flock' and the 'remnant' of the Lord with a very limited and particular mission. The Church, according to this trend, would give up her claim to convert the whole world or to proclaim her message to the vast universe so that she may really be humble, a servant, leaven and the like. This mood claims to represent the end of the constantinian era and the winding up of all her triumphalistic pretensions. We might mention also at this point the modern distinction between Church and Kingdom, of which modern exegesis has shown the scriptural basis. The Kingdom would then be what Jesus preached

It ~~emphasizes~~ emphasizes again her ~~mission~~ continuation of Israel's vocation as leaven to the world with a pretty mission for the entire world.

(1) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, "Pluralismus, Toleranz und Christenheit" in the collective volume, Pluralismus, Toleranz und Christenheit, Nürnberg (Abendländische Akademie), 1961, pp. 117-142.

Pluralism is an eschatological myth and at the same time a myth of the human condition. It believes that all parallel lines meet at the infinite and that each human line is limited and thus incapable of speaking for or experiencing the whole range of the human experience. Pluralism is both, the recognition of the actual human insufficiency and the hope of its eschatological transcendence. Pluralism does not give up the human instinct towards synthesis, but renounces to build up a system - though it may believe (or not) its eschatological possibility. Synthesis implies a dynamic tendency towards unity, whereas system assumes an actual over-seeing the totality of the data.

Pluralism, on the other hand, does not take away the possibility of moral or intellectual evaluations. It does not eliminate the sense of good or evil and right or wrong, but it situates any judgement within its own context and would not allow us to extrapolate any notion without a previous justification. Furthermore, pluralism may be inclined to deny the possibility of an a-priori criterion of extrapolation. It will rather rely on the dialogical dialogue by means of which two human horizons may reach terrains of coincidence. It will have this constitutive openness which amounts to a basic thrust in reality so that we may live a full human life now without precluding the ontological surprise, i.e. the radical novelty in and of being - and Being - itself. Pluralism is based on that fundamental human attitude which in

note: on the original MSS. there is indicated (1) after synthesis - subsequently crossed out; yet the footnote remains: (1) Cf. my study, the first article of Arbor, Nr. 1, Madrid 1944 (pp. 5-40) "Visión de síntesis del universo".

On the next page (16,2) the foot note is numbered (2)--which seems to indicate that (1) is intended for inclusion, yes?

christian tradition was expressed in the so-called theological virtues - understood as the basic cosmotheandric thrust of reality itself as manifested in the human being (2).

We should now revert to our concrete question:

—————→16

(2) Cf. my analysis of the 'theological virtues' as also cosmological ones, i.e. as of necessity being faith, hope and love not of a 'separated' God but of God and God's world all in one: "Christians and so-called 'Non-Christians'", Cross-Currents, XXII, 3 (1972), 281-308, specially pp. 284-292.

and be really universal, whereas the Church would be only a very particular community. → 17,1

17,1 →
7.- Maximalism

The other and opposite trend, equally evident today, considers the Church as being by nature the place of human encounter, the place which, precisely because of its specific character in traditional terms ^{of} its supernatural character offers men the effective platform for meeting, dialogue understanding and also disagreement. The Church, precisely because she represents a Kingdom which is not of this world, is, according to this view, the agency capable of presenting a meeting ground in which the most disparate tendencies may meet and come to grips with one another, even eventually, fertilize each other because each will function within that underlying human communion or community. This agency some would still call the kyriaké, i.e. the Church, the place or property of the Lord, or the ecclesia, the assembly, the congregation of the sons of Man as the people of God. → 17,2

17,2 →
on the one hand,
on the other hand,
It is clear that this dilemma is full of immediate consequences as it betrays a double and opposite ecclesiology. If the Church is "only a remnant" she does well in resisting external influences and in retaining her compact organisation, Latin, Gregorian, ^{parishes, moderators} or whatever values have given her, a specific identity. If the Church is the universal congregation, it is urgent and good that she is stripped of ~~from~~ everything not corresponding to her universal vocation and that she gets disentangled from her present status quo in order to become ready for an ever new and renewed incarnation in the world.

The modern appeal of such an attitude is obvious. Christians may in this way retain their identity and renounce to the grandiose ideas of converting - or dominating - the world, they may be again humble and servants and yet have a sense of mission and recognise their vocation not so much as a privilege as a burden, not so much as a right before others as a duty towards them. Needless to say that exegesis and history can prove the reasonableness of such claims.

When all this is said, it remains, however, to listen to the outside voices, which say that this attitude has as much arrogance and exclusiveness as the triumphalistic claims it seemingly rejects. The leaven will certainly not convert the whole man into leaven, but it is so indispensable and important that without it the entire man will not raise. The vocation of being the propitiatory victim or the necessary mediator for the whole world, the link, the totem, the channel is equally exclusive and unique in its aristocratic pretensions as the more democratic and simple attitude of wanting to convert the entire universe into christianity.

We are, so far, only describing the different aspects of the problem. We shall have to revert to it in the third part of our study.

17 →

The contemporary attraction of this second attitude is also patent. Christians will, accordingly, no longer be the exclusive club of the saved or the elitistic group of the stewards of the Kingdom. They will be brethren among brethren struggling for anything good, truthful and beautiful, they will throw away their label of selected or elected ones and be like the Son of Man, really children of humankind. And here again christian scripture and tradition vouch unmistakeably for the existence of such an attitude.

Outsiders may also here raise their voices to say that this attitude becomes suspicious unless christians share with others the government of the assembly of the people of God. Are the christians now to be the only truly universalists and all the others, hindus, marxists, muslims, humanist or whatever, only factions of humanity, partial ideologies. What is then Church in this context? Are we not doing violence to words?

x x x

→17

8.- Extra ecclesiam nulla salus.

It is in this connection that the discussion around the old saying outside the Church there is no salvation can be seen in its proper ecclesiological and theological perspective (1). Either the Church has nothing to do with salvation -and this would represent the total ~~secularisation~~ ^{destruction} of the Church, ^{qua Church} which thus becomes a non-religious agency for ~~humanitarian~~ ^{partial} purposes of all sorts- or there is no way of escaping the dilemma as to whether or not there is salvation only inside the Church. 18,1
18,1 If we say that there is salvation outside the Church, ~~it will be added~~ that the Church has nevertheless a unique role to perform, a pars pro toto, that, in the words of the Bible allegorically interpreted by Vatican I, she is a signum levatum in nationes (2) or, in the terms of Vatican II, a sacramentum mundi (3). This amounts to saying that the Church is supposed to have a universal role, even if this role is not understood

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- (1) Cf. among other modern documents the four contributions of KÜNG, FRANSEN, MASSON and PANIKKAR in the Theological Congress of the Bombay International Eucharistic Congress of 1964, edited by J. NEUNER, Christian Revelation and World Religions, London (Burns and Oates), 1967, *specially Küng's chapter.*
- (2) Cf. DENZ-SCHÖN., 3014, for Vatican I, quoting Is., XI, 12.
- (3) Cf. Lumen gentium, 1, in the Introduction.

18 → There remains the question of what is the specific relation between Church and salvation, in whatever sense we might have enlarged the notion of salvation. In other words, what is the relationship between the salvation outside and the salvation inside the Church? Is it there is a unique saving power active in different ways and agencies? The fact that most christian theologians will claim to link this unique saving power with the action of Christ, will lead them to affirm → 18

salvation not in ecclesia, but 19

as involving geographical expansion; salus per ecclesiam. If, on the other hand, one maintains the principle that there is no salvation outside the Church, it will be necessary to affirm that the Church is not ~~overlapping~~ identical with the visible Church. ~~the~~ ^{for instance,} assertion has been repeatedly refuted that extra ecclesiam nulla conceditur gratia (1), i.e. the opinion has been declared heretical that the grace needed for salvation cannot be found also outside the Church. Now,

~~The only way of solving the dilemma is to reconsider~~ the very concept of Church, ~~for undoubtedly it~~ cannot be the same in both statements without falling into flagrant contradiction (2). If outside the Church there is grace and grace is what is required for salvation, this amounts to saying that there is salvation ^(given by grace) outside the Church. The 'Church', outside which there is grace (and thus salvation), is the institutionalised or visible Church. The 'Church', outside which

in this case by definition,

(1) Cf. DENZ-SCHÖN, 2429, 3866-3873.

(2) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, "Extra ecclesiam nulla salus. Die innere Unzulänglichkeit einer nicht-christlichen Welt" in Neues-Abendland, X, 5, München, May 1955, pp. 259-266.

there is no salvation, is the ontological Church, whose relations with the 'visible' one is a serious ecclesiological problem (1).

In order not only to avoid plain contradiction, but also to be true to the traditional insight of the Church as the Ark of salvation we would like to reverse the phrase and unambiguously affirm that the Church is so constitutively the place of salvation that, wherever there is salvation, there is the Church: the Church being the locus, the place, of salvation by definition (2). —→ 20,1

20,3 → We may now recall what we said earlier about pluralism and understand that to say that the Church is the place where the ultimate human encounter can take place is to affirm that the Church is the place of the mystery (3). Any other limitation of the Church makes her a sect. The Church is

(1) For the latest event in the Roman Church condemning a narrow interpretation of this principle, cf. the inside account of the story of the "Boston Affair", by C.G. CLARKE, The Loyolas and the Cabots. The Story of the Boston Heresy Case, Boston (Ravengate Press), 1950. cf. DENZ.-SCHÖN. 3866-3873 for the official condemnation and doctrine.

(2) Cf. the IV Proposition of TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, in his article of 1947 reprinted in L'Avenir de l'Homme. Oeuvres, Paris (Seuil), Vol. V, p. 285: "Dans la genèse de l'organisme social humain, l'Église n'est pas un épi- ou paraphénomène; mais elle forme l'axe même (ou noyau) du rassemblement." Or, to quote a very recent article by Cardinal J. DANIELOU: "En ce sens, elle [the Church] est le rassemblement de tous les sauvés depuis les origines de l'humanité jusqu'à la fin des temps. Le Monde, (23-VII-1971).

(3) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, "Church and the World Religions" in Religion and Society, Bangalore, 1967. Vol XIV, Nr. 2, pp. 59-63.

We can very well understand the feeling of some modern theologians preferring to drop altogether the traditional interpretation of the Church as ark of salvation (1). And certainly the tight identification of the visible Church with the ecclesia as the locus of salvation is by all standards untenable. Yet to drop away this principle altogether looks like wanting to kill the child of Solomon's judgement so that nobody will have it or, simpler, to throw away the baby with the bathwater. The great and holy men and women of christian history as well as the innumerable and loyal christian folk down the ages had a love for and a commitment to the Church, certainly not as if the Church were a nice group of people accidentally gathered together, or as a natural society by right birth. They all saw the Church and pledged fidelity to her as mother, as fountainhead of the saving grace and depository of the saving mysteries, as the body of Christ, as the historical continuation of the Incarnation, as a Theandric mystery. And it was precisely this ultimate attitude which gave to christian existence all its beauty, risk, heroism and also fanaticism and uncompromising - often narrow - loyalty and ultimate faithfulness: "Even if she

(1) This metaphor of I Petr. III, 20 referring back to Noah's ark of Gen. VII, is at the origin of the patristic and scholastic formulation extra ecclesiam nulla salus.

kills me, I will have hope in her!" (1). As if they were saying, even if we do not like her conduct, do not understand her ways or even condemn her behaviour, we have no other place to go - "to whom shall we go?" (2) - because she is our own body, our own being, the theanthropocosmic reality which prevents us from an ontological suicide. We cannot leave the Church as we cannot leave our own bodies. And yet: "I will still argue my ways before her" (3), I will combat her and fight with her as Jacob with God (4). "This also shall be my salvation" (5).

(1) Iob. XIII, 15. This text which carries the weight and tragic of christian fidelity to history and prevents him to escape into partial realms of a broken reality has been understood in this sense by christian tradition as the Vulgata rendering vouches: "etiam si occiderit me, in ipso sperabo." "Though he slay me, yet I will trust in him" says the AV. "Yet I will wait for him" translates the RV; whereas the NEB version is: "If he would slay me, I should not hesitate;" - in order to link it with the second part of the distic: "I should still argue my cause to his face." It would yield a poignant note to study the several translations into the european languages of this single verse.

(2) Io. VI, 68.

(3) Cf. Iob. XIII, 15: "I will argue (maintain) my ways before him." "Verumtamen vias meas in conspectu eius arguam."

(4) Cf. Gen. XXXIII, 25 sq.

(5) Iob. XIII, 16. My liberation. "My success" plays it down the NEB. Salvation is the word of AV and RV.

For hypocrisy is the only thing that does not resist her face (1). To say that their attachment to the Church was the attachment to something unrelated to the ultimate salvation of man and of humanity is to commit an historical mistake and to misunderstand christian tradition. To tell also that present day missionaries did consecrate their lives to a particular agency for the welfare of mankind but unrelated to the salvation of the peoples is to miss the point and to commit an injustice towards them - in spite of the many weaknesses of the system and the other cultural or even political factors which may have accompanied some of the missionary movements.

Their inaccuracy was not that the Church is not the place of salvation, but that the Church was only their particular group. It was a geographical or a cosmological error, if we want. They mistook the limits of the Church and identified them with their own particular organisation, confusing organisation with the organism whose soul is the divine Spirit - to speak again in terms of the most traditional theology. The mistake was not one of intention, but of extension. They thought the world was flat, the earth was the center of the universe and the Church was their society. They were wrong in the predicate, yet they were nevertheless in the world, in the earth, in the Church.

—————→20

(1) Cf. again Iob. XIII, 16.

not the society of the elected but the congregation of the called (1).

The ~~difficulty~~^{impossibility today} (of the first alternative (that the Church is only a visible body) is to defend universality, whereas the difficulty of the second (that the Church is a mystical body) is to maintain concreteness. The relationship between the sociological and the theological Church is a standing problem, but both concepts are not incompatible. The fact that

(1) Besides some bibliography given below, cf. some modern essays favoring a certain type of universal salvation:

- C.S. DUTHIE, "Ultimate Triumph", Scottish Journal of Theology, XIV, (1961), pp. 156-171;
- H.H. FARMER, God and Men, New York (Abindgon-Cokesbury Press), 1947;
- J. FEINER, "Particular and Universal Saving History" in One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic, edited by VORGRIMLER, London, 1968.
- N.F.S. FERRE, The Christian Understanding of God, New York (Harper) 1951.
- J.A.T. ROBINSON, In the End, God, London (Clarke), 1958.
- ----- "Universalism - Is it Heretical?", in Scottish Journal of Theology, II (1949), pp. 139-155.

Against an indiscriminated universalism and offering an alternative, cf.:

- J.D. BETTIS, "A Critique of the Doctrine of Universal Salvation" in Religious Studies, VI, 4 (1970), pp. 329-344.

22

We have here again an epistemological factor playing a decisive theological role. To affirm that the Church can adopt different visible forms to different people has a diverse meaning according to the connotation of form with forma, and thus essence or with mere shape, nāma, rūpa and thus not implying a different basic reality.

between the sociological and the theological → 22

between the sociological and the theological → 22


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
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
between the sociological and the theological → 22



22



We have here again an epistemological factor playing a decisive theological role. To affirm that the Church can adopt different visible forms to different people has a diverse meaning according to the connotation of form with forma, μορφή and thus essence or with mere shape, nāma, rūpa and thus not implying a different basic reality.




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22 →

This is the problem, for as for the kingdom there is almost universal agreement. This is what we mean by the myth of salvation as one of the universal ultimate conviction of mankind. Man is viator, itinerant, an unachieved being, a fragmented existence in space, time and also reality. Notions about the nature of salvation, ideas about the fulfilment of man and thus regarding the ways to reach it vary enormously and on the notional or doctrinal level there is sheer incompatibility. We should not neglect the fact of this discrepancy about the nature of the final destiny of man. No need for us to elaborate further on this. Not only traditional religions differ widely, also modern movements and ideologies contradict one another. We use then the word salvation to designate the final destination of man in whatever sense it may be understood.

Yet, and this is our point, there is a common myth of salvation, liberation, freedom, happiness and the like, be in time or outside time, as a reality or as an asymptotic possibility, etc. There is a universal unarticulated myth, something mankind takes for granted and offers a certain texture on which we weave our particular myths and this in the in-finiteness of man, his in-finitude, i.e. that he is not - or not yet - finished, achieved, realised, that he is still on the way - even if this human condition were the of reality.

Obviously we cannot ask how to reach sal-



Yet, and this is our point, there is a common myth of salvation, liberation, freedom, happiness, and the like, be it in time or outside time, as a reality or as an asymptotic familiarity, etc. There is a universal unarticulated myth ~~otherwise~~, something mankind takes for granted and offers a certain texture on which weave our particular myths and this is the in-finiteness of man, his in-finitude, i.e. that he is not — or not yet — finished, achieved, realised, that he is still on the way — even if this human condition were the $\pi\rho\omega\tau\acute{o}\nu$ $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\omicron\varsigma$ of reality.

Obviously we cannot ask how to reach salvation if we do not know what salvation is. But how can we know it if we have not reached it ~~it~~ or if somebody, some enlightened one, has not reached it? How, without a certain revelation of salvation itself? Is there any saviour? We stop here to revert to our Christian query. —→ 23

vation if we do not know what salvation is. But how can we know it if we have not reached it or if somebody, some enlightened one, has not reached it? How, without a certain revelation of salvation itself? Is there any saviour? We stop here to revert to our christian query.

—————→23

the Church is visible does not imply that its limits are visible to everybody or even to anybody. Precisely because she is visible, she makes possible that there be different limits of visibility, ^{and even different forms to different peoples} Whereas some do not see much beyond their churchyard, others encompass a wider horizon. To affirm then that her confines touch the very limits of mankind -without saying that they coalesce- does not contradict the visibility of the Church ①.

→ 22, 1

22/1 →
9.- The Keys of the Kingdom

We may sum up by saying that the problem of salvation and of universal salvation is central, both in the christian economy and in most of the religious traditions of the world, even if salvation is not called by the same name or interpreted in the same way. Moreover, the myth of salvation is an almost universal myth. There exists, in fact, an underlying conviction that man is a pilgrim, that he finds himself on pilgrimage (individually or collectively), proceeding towards a goal which may well be called the salvation of man. Who has the keys of the Kingdom?

→ 22, 2

* * *

① cf. the interesting dialogue by Three 'systematic Theologians' of the University of Basel, H. OTT, F. BURK and J.M. LOCHMAN: "Dogmatisches Gespräch über die Kirche", Theologische Zeitschrift, XXVIII (1972) pp. 43-74.

II - Logos: Christ ~~IX~~

→ 23, 1

23, 1 →

[We shall not study here the role of Christ in the universal economy of salvation, i.e. how he may or may not be considered the universal saviour, or what kind of knowledge of or link with him may be required in order to reach salvation: neither shall we study the many possible understandings of the term salvation. We will limit ourselves here to a critical essay on the meaning of the name of Christ as expressing that ever hidden, though liberating, mystery which transcends all names (1).

1.- Who is Jesus?

John the Baptist, performing his true role of forerunner, poses the right initial question: "Are you the one who is to come, or are we to expect some other?" (2). The answer of Jesus is in fact very precise, but many commentators -significantly enough- seem to find it somewhat vague. ~~III~~

Quotation margin


(1) A shortened version of this second part was submitted as a paper for the International Theological Congress on Evangelisation held at Nagpur in October, 1971 and ~~will be~~^{was} published in the Proceedings of the Congress: Evangelization, Dialogue and Development (Documenta Missionaria - 5), Roma, 1972, pp. 195-99.

(2) Matth., XI, 3; Luc., VII, 19. Cf. Dan. IX, 26 and Mal. III, 1
for the biblical context.

unto the man
you gave me...

I have manifested your name (unto men)

Io. XVII, 6.



711

~~Ἐφανερώσα~~

Ἐφανερώσα σου τὸ ὄνομα (τοῖς ἀνθρώποις)

unto
De men
you came and

I have manifested your name (unto men)

Jo. XVII, 6.

Jesus' answer is found evasive ^{only when} ~~it is because~~ it is expected to be couched in terms of a static and individualistic conception of "him", while on the contrary, it indicates a set of actions, giving concrete examples of a certain function he is performing. His name does justice to his works, which are fulfilled before God (1). His answer is functional and not substantive. This danger in misunderstanding him may be the reason why he adds immediately that "blessed is the man" who is not offended, scandalised by him. The who of Christ cannot be individualised by pinning him down to a "here" or a "there" or pinpointing his localised presence (2). He is constantly $\delta \epsilon\rho\chi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma$ "the coming one", and even ^{as} the "Risen One" ^{he} is ever "not here" (3). ^{This is his answer:} "Go and tell John what you hear and see: the blind recover their sight, the lame walk, the lepers are made clean, the deaf hear, the dead are raised to life, the poor are hearing the good news -and blessed is the man who does not find me a stumbling-block" (4).

Jesus' answer, in point of fact, is ~~the most~~ appropriate both for John the Baptist and for us: for John, because he was expecting the 'kingdom' of which the Messiah is only the 'regent' in God's name, and therefore the ^{emphasis} ~~whole interest~~ should (not be centred) in one individual, but in one collective event for the people of Israel; and for ourselves in every age, because it liberates us also from obsession with individuals and focuses our attention on the performance, the actions being accomplished, the mission and the things that are happening. "O unbelieving generation" (5). $\longrightarrow 24,11$

(1) Cf. Apoc. III, 1-2 and the interplay between action and name.

(2) Matth., XXIV, 23.

(3) Matth., XXVIII, 6: "(He) is not here — i. e. — (he) has been raised".

(4) Luc., VII, 22-23 ~~of~~ (Matth. XI, 4-6). Cf. Luc. IV, 18 and The ^{entire biblical context of}

(5) Marc., IX, 19 of Is. XXXV, 5-6; LXI, 1; etc.

24

It is important to stress that Christ's answer is an account of active relations, of liberating relations: to see, to walk, to recover the health, to hear, to relate to the surrounding things again, to understand that human existence as such - then the poor have no other side-pleasures - has a meaning and a joyful meaning. We have no longer to expect another because our expectation, the human expectations are being fulfilled, our relationships with the surrounding reality are being established or re-established, we are being opened to all that there is to hear, to see, to walk into, to experience, to understand. And it is this very fulfillment that is coming. He is coming in the opening up of our relations to reality. He seems to want to disappear, lest we stumble our feet on him and fall instead of walking. Blessed is the man who does not stumble upon him. It is good that he disappears (1).

→ 25

(1) Cf. Io. XVI, 7 as well as Io. VI, 15; etc.

Nevertheless, the quest for the person is impossible. For the average human mind
~~impossible~~ (It was and is of no avail to say that Christ did not want to be called even 'good' (1) or to accept the common title of 'Father' (2), to recall that he acted as a servant (3), and even "clothed himself" with the form of a slave (4), and 'made himself nothing' (5). The question persists and from the very beginning the search for the who has stirred human consciousness (6). "Are you the ^{coming} One?" → 25,1

25,3

2.- No Other Name.

We know the traditional answer of "Peter filled with the Holy Spirit" (7), which, incidentally, seemed ^{to} ~~the~~ echo the word of the Lord regarding the scandalon (8): "There is no salvation in anyone else, ~~(ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐδεὶς)~~ for there is no other name ~~(οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἕτερου)~~ under heaven ^{created} to men by which we may receive salvation." (9)

more ample margin
 as quotation

(1) ²⁵ Marc., IX, 9

(2) Cf. Matth., XXIII, 9.

(3) Cf. Io., XIII, 4, sq.

(4) Cf. Phil II, 7

(5) Ibid.

(6) Cf. incidentally RV X, 121, 1 and more explicitly ^{TB} ~~Ps~~ II, 2, 10, 2, etc. where God is named simply the interrogative pronoun Who? Cf. U.M. VESCI, "Ka, le nom de Dieu comme pronom interrogatif dans les Védas" in E. CASTELLI, editor, L'Analyse du langage théologique. Paris (Aubier), 1969, pp. 145-164.

(7) Act., IV, 8

(8) ^P Act., IV, 11. Cf. Ps., CXVIII, 22

(9) Act., IV, 12 : καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐδεὶς ἡ σωτηρία· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὄνομα ἐστὶν ἕτερου ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὸ δεδομένου ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐν ᾧ δεῖ σωθῆναι ἡμᾶς.


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Significantly enough the divorce between theology and spirituality, between theory and praxis has often misguided the doctrinal speculation when paying an almost exclusive attention to the objective contents of the answer forgetting the subjective framework of the question: "are you the coming one - ?" So that if you do not expect anybody to come, the answer has no meaning; if you are not in an expecting mood, if you are not longing or at least waiting for he who is to come, no answer will satisfy you, because he is certainly no answer to a mere mental curiosity. This is to say that man is a desiring being and that God is the end of man in the sense that God is the end of every desire - in the double meaning of the subjective and objective genitive: the end, the final fulfilment of every desire (God stands at the evry end of any desire, so that what we ultimately desire is ultimately God) and the end, the extinction and exhaustion (the nirvāna) of every desire. The Mediator, he who comes is both he who fulfils the longings of the human condition and he who by fulfilling them brings them to an end, a standstill overcoming that very human condition, allowing us to become not like gods (as the Tempter whispered (1)) but God (as the Redeemer promised (2)) sharing the fulness of his Life (3). "God became man in order that

(1) Cf. Gen. III, 5. One could also read God perhaps.

(2) Cf. Ps. LXXXII, 6 and its contextually different use by Jesus in Io. X, 34. Cf. the many passages of Scripture and Tradition regarding the or divinisation of man brought about by Christ. Cf. vgr. Io. VI, 57.


(3) It is the notion of the Trinity which allows the total div-



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25
theology and spirituality, between theory and Praxis has often misguided the doctrinal speculation ^{when} ~~to~~ paying an almost exclusive attention to the objective content of the answer forgetting the subjective framework of the question: "are you the coming one — ο ἐρχόμενος?" so that if you do not expect anybody to come, the answer has no meaning; if you are not in an expecting mood, if you are not longing or at least waiting for ~~at~~ he who is to come, no answer will satisfy you, because he ^{is certainly} ~~it will be~~ no answer to a mere mental curiosity. —→ 25,2

25,4
On the other hand, a certain piety or spirituality disconnected from the Theological speculation has hardly ~~payed~~ paid attention to the answer and focused on the question only. No wonder then that the pious ones have tended to make him king and even god and without meditating on the answer have ^{proclaimed} ~~gone~~ everywhere ~~with~~ their ^{particular} quest as if it were the universal query of man. —→ 25,4



25,2

not like ~~god~~ ^{gods} ~~As~~ ^{As} the temple ~~said~~ ^{whispered} promised (1)
~~but~~ but God (as the Redeemer promised (2))
 sharing the fulness of his life (3). "God became
 man in order that man
 become God" has been the
 summary of the Theology of
 Incarnation during long centuries (4).

→ 25,4

(4) - The sentence is literally ~~from~~ ^{from} S. Augustine
 already, (Sermo 128; PL 39, 1992) but its meaning is to
 be found in Clemens of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzus, Athanasius,
 Irenaeus, Cyprian, etc., as I have quoted elsewhere.

- ① - cf. Gen. III, 5. One could also read God perhaps
- ② - cf. Ps. LXXXII, 6 and its application ~~use~~
 contextually different use by Jesus in Jo.
X, 34. cf. the many passages of scripture and
 tradition regarding the θεϊοσις or divinisation
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Jo. VI, 57.
- ③ - It is the notion of the Trinity which allows the total
 divinisation of man (becoming one with the ~~second~~
~~Person~~ Son) ~~and~~ - without confusion with the Divinity,
 an indiscriminate

man become God" has been the summary of the theology of Incarnation during long centuries (1).

An exclusive attention to the answer would amount to a reductionism leading to a dilution of the christian message or as a mere philanthropic activity, as an agency for development and social welfare (2).

On the other hand, a certain piety or spirituality disconnected from the theological speculation disconnected from the theological speculation has hardly paid attention to the answer and focussed on the question only. No wonder then that the pious ones have tended to make him king and even God and without meditating on the answer have proclaimed everywhere their particular quest as if it were the universal query of man.

inisation of man (becoming one with the Son) without an undisciminate confusion with the Divinity.

(1) The sentence is literally from S. Augustine (Sermo. 128; PL 39, 1997) but its meaning is to be found already in Clemens of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzus, Athanasius, Irenaeus, Cyprian, etc., as I have quoted elsewhere.

(2) We have here again the dominion of one of the two ecclesiologies mentioned above. The importance for the present day action of christians and their sense of identity can hardly be overstressed.

An exclusive attention to the question would not amount to an exasperating narrowness of the christian message reducing it to the psychological acknowledgement of the figure of Jesus as it appears in a very limited context (1).

Is there a way of avoiding one extreme and the other without chopping off the valuable insights of both positions and falling into a mediocre accomodating attitude which would elminate all the creative tensions of human existence? This is again, in different words, the main issue of this study. Let us pack the problem where it seems to be more radically uncompromising and central.

—————→²⁵

(1) Not only 'Jesus freaks' and fundamentalists but also a purely 'supernatural' ecclesiology should be reckoned as examples here.

If we want to find a christian answer, we cannot escape this affirmation. That salvation is in the name of the Lord is a recurrent proclamation of the New Testament: salvation is in the name of Jesus (1), miracles are performed in his name (2), the demons are expelled in his name (3), baptism is performed in his name (4), the prayer that is granted is that which is prayed in his name (5), it is at the name of Jesus and of no other that the three worlds should bow (6), etc.

From the point of view of a morphological analysis of cultures one could easily show that sacred names usually perform such roles and that they can only be properly understood if the mythical power of names and their mythical contents are taken into account, so that to interpret those sacred names outside their context would distort their proper meaning. One could also add that as soon as the mythical dimension of names is shifted or loses importance, the name becomes either magical or a mere label. (7)

(1) Cf. in the Acts alone: III, 6; III, 16; IV, 10; sq.; V, 40; VIII, 12; VIII, 16; IX, 14, sq.; X, 43; X, 48; XV, 25; XVI, 18; XIX, 5; XIX, 13; XXII, 16; etc.

(2) Act., III, 6; IV, 10.

(3) Marc., IX, 38; XVI, 17; Luc., IX, 49; X, 17.

(4) Act., II, 38

(5) Io., XIV, 13; XV, 16; XVI, 24; 26.

(6) Cf. Phil., II, 10.

(7) → 26,1

26 →

(7) Cf. the impressive though unfinished manuscript published later by his colleague G. GOETZ in the volume XXXVI of the Abhandlungen der phil^{og}ische-historischen Klasse der sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Nr. II, 1927) of R. HIRZEL, Der Name - ein Beitrag zu seiner Geschichte im Altertum und besonders bei den Griechen, new edition: Amsterdam (A.M. Hakkert) 1962. Hirzel died in 1917 after almost 72 years of strenuous academic work.

These reflections apply also to our particular study and they should convey a hermeneutical warning not to commit the katachronical mistake of interpreting ancient concepts with contemporary tools of understanding. We are concerned here, however, neither with exegesis nor with justifying scriptural texts. We try simply to elucidate a truly acceptable position for today, such as takes into account the contemporary situation keeping loyalty to christian tradition without betraying other streams of mankind's religious experience.

Christian Scripture and Tradition cannot be more precise and emphatic; there is only one name in which there is salvation. Yet it is also readily recognised that the name here stands for the named, that the name is not a mere nominalistic label, but the real symbol of the 'thing' so named (1). The whole question will, thus, be to know who or what ~~is~~ this name. ^{names} Obviously it is not a sound, of which there is no record available but only at the most a guess. Nor is it a ^{mere} sign. No sign can save. ~~A sign can be, at most, an intermediary, not a mediator (2).~~ ^{This saving name cannot be} Furthermore ~~it is not~~ (a label ^{either,} for It would amount to the worst type of magic to claim that you have to know a label in order to be saved. ^{The saving name} ~~is~~ (is a symbol, i.e., the ^{reality (it} ~~thing~~ ^{names)} as it appears to be in the world of our experience. The

(1) Cf. Apoc., III, 4 where ὀλίγα ὀνόματα (few names) means, obviously, few persons.

(2) Cf. the happy phrase of Ernst CASSIRER in "Sprache und Mythos reproduced in Wesen und Wirkung des Symbolbegriffs, Darmstadt (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft), 1969, p. 78: "An allem Zeichen aber haftet der Fluch der Mittelbarkeit".

24 → reasonably claim that there can be no other sign signaling the same reality. A sign can be one of many possible intermediaries between (inter) man and the signaled end, but not a unique mediator (1) between (intra) man and his end. Christian Scripture itself will say that there are many signs (2) in spite of the only one name (3). A sign is always an epistemic device only, and has not the character of immediacy(4).

← 27

(1) Cf. I Tim. II, 5.

(2) We refer not to the miracles as signs, but to pointers and of the one mediator. Cf. vgr. Jesus saying that Scripture speaks of him: Io. V, 39; Paul affirming that the Rock in the desert was Christ: I Cor.X, 4; Hebr. I, 1 disclosing that God has spoken in very many ways before speaking in his Son; etc.

(3) Cf. the famous rik: ekaṁ sad viprā bahudhā vadanti: "The seers call in many ways that which is One" RV I, 164, 46. Cf. also RV X, 114, 5.

(4) → pg. 27.

symbol stands for the 'thing'; it is the ~~thing~~^{reality} as it stands, but this standing is its proper manifestation, so that the symbol reveals what there is by the very fact that it clothes and expresses it. Existence is never naked, as it were; it is always symbolical, ^{always embracing,} in one and the same act of existing, the object and the subject, the form and the contents. No 'thing' can exist without a name. No ^{pure} 'thing' ~~exists.~~ It is ^{the} ~~the~~ symbol that exists.

What is then, this real name apart from which there is no salvation? "Is there anything greater than the name?" asks one Upanisad (1). And the answer is categorical: "The word, certainly, is greater than the name" (2). —→ 28,1

Modern scholarship has for at least three or four generations, meditated about so-called primitive thinking (3). It has rediscovered the old wisdom that names are not mere signs,

(1) CU VII, 1, 5

(2) CU VII, 2, 1

(3) Since 1910 Lucien LÉVY-BRUHL's Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures and 1912 Emile DURKHEIM's Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse up to 1962, Claude LÉVY-STRAUSS, La pensée sauvage (where there is no longer a question of the thought of 'primitives' but of primitive thought) we have gone a long way and yet we are just beginning to surmise that we also have our own myths.

The 'thing-in-itself' is an abstraction of the mind.

28,1 →

28

When you do not respond to the name any longer, when the name does not name you, when you disobey to the call of the name or when the caller abusing of his power instead of reflecting the silence you name in vain, when the name is no longer an invocation (in the vocative), when the name has severed its connection with the living word and does not name anymore, when, in short, the name dies as a symbol, though it remains a sign, a label, a number perhaps, then it only designates, conveying a meaning only to those who have been previously instructed how to manipulate with signs or to handle them. Knowledge is then reduced to algebra.

But "the word is greater than the name" and when a name degenerates, i.e., when it only designates externally without being any longer a call, then the word recoils from the name, as it were (1), leaves the name devoid of sense so that it dies out slowly having become the mere shell of a word. The living and real word is then named by a different name. Any study of language will show the lifespan of names, the shifting of meaning of names and the sui generis relationship between word and name. Is not language the struggle of the words to find their appropriate names?

—————→ 28

(1) Cf. the upaniṣadic saying: "Whence words recoil together with the mind"; TU II, 4 (and also II, 9); though here the reference is to a total apophatism.

but real symbols, epiphanies of the things so named (1).

This does not apply only to so-called primitive thinking but to any name-function (2). Any name even in the most sophisticated and nominalistic culture, is always a part of the thing named; it is a name and not a mere sound precisely because it is understood as a pars pro toto. ~~In other words,~~ ^{has to name something, i.e. it} a name, in order to be a name, has to have some meaning; but the moment that a name has a meaning it ceases to be a merely conventional nominalistic sign (even if it were so at the beginning), for it enters into or springs from our minds so as to form part of the thing so named. It is the name that links together the ^{intended} 'thing' ~~intended~~ -whatever this may be and my understanding of it, my concept (3). The name is infinite as one Upaniṣad says (4). Any name with meaning is not autonomous but has a proper ontonomic constitution. The name is

(1) Cf. the epoch-making study by Hermann USENER, Götternamen, Versuch einer Lehre von der religiösen Begriffsbildung, Bonn, 1896. New edition, Bonn (Bouvier), 1948.

(2) Cf. the deep intuition of RV X, 71, 1: "O Lord of the Holy Word! That was the first beginning of the Word when the seers fell to naming each object", which describes the theandric function of name giving. Cf. also Gen., II, 20 where Adam gives names to all the animals, and also PLAT. Cratylus 400 d-e on the names of the gods and our names to them.

(3) Cf. again the mediatory function of the word vāc, in the vedic tradition.

(4) BU III, 2, 12: anantaṁ vai nāma. (Cf. also TB II, 8, 8, 4).

Sankara comments that the name is infinite because it is eternal, echoing here the mimāṃsā tradition. Cf. Ia. LVI, 5 speaking of "an

eternal name" as
The gift of the
dāid.

(A name has to name and thus it already links subject and object.) 30

neither merely subjective nor solely objective. Any real name is a symbol and a symbol is precisely that which is "thrown" from the subject to the object and vice-versa, remaining -"swinging"- in the middle (1), but expressing all that there requires to be expressed (2).

It is the name that survives men, according to more than one tradition, not excluding the biblical.⁵ The name has a special role to play in human immortality. Hence also the importance of the real name, which many a religious tradition carefully preserves as a secret (3) and which certain traditions forbid to utter, except in the worshipping vocative (4).

We could again formulate the problem in more purely philosophical terms. Any language is not only a collection

(1) Symbol comes from $\sigma\upsilon\upsilon$ and $\beta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega$ to throw, to put, etc., but also to swing.

(2) A legend of the maoris reports that when they arrived in New Zealand they did not carry with them their old gods but only their names, i.e., the prayers which gave the maoris power over the gods themselves. Apud E. CASSIRER, *op. cit.*, p. 115, quoting S. BRINTON, Religions of Primitive Peoples, New York, London, 1907, p. 103.

(3) Cf. B. BAUMER, "L'Analyse du langage théologique", edited by "Le nom secret dans l'hindouisme", in E.

CASTELLI, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-144.

(4) Cf. the biblical and qurānic strictures against the making of images of God and the utterance of his name in vain. Cf. also: K. KERÉNYI, "Theos e mythos" in E. CASTELLI's Il problema della demitizzazione, Padova (Archivio di Filosofia), (CEDAM)1961, pp. 35-41, for a study of greek religion, in which the divine is less esoteric and mingles with the human more than in other traditions.

30 →

(5) Cf. R. HIRZEL, op. cit. p. 17 quoting Penelope, Ennius, Firdusi, Lessing, etc.

of different sounds and signs, but represents also a different conception of the world. → 31,1

31,1 → Any name belongs to a particular language and in this language it has its proper meaning. To affirm that a certain name has a universal validity involves the affirmation that the particular world-view from which that name originates has a universal validity. This, in point of fact, was the underlying assumption on more than one occasion in the history of religions. In the present world's religious and human constellation such an assumption seems untenable.

To affirm, further, in order to escape the just mentioned aporia of the universalisation of names, that a particular name is not universal as such, but that it is translatable ^{into any other language} amounts to saying that the name in question is a common name and not a proper name and this fact would render meaningless the affirmation of 'no other name'. It implies, further, that we have the key to the translation by having access to the reality intended by the name by means of sources other than the name in question, so as to be able to establish the equivalence.

How can we, therefore, meaningfully understand if at all, that there is no other name by which we may attain salvation? → 31,2

31,2 → 3.- Which Name?

It is here that the real problem starts. "This people honours me with their lips, but their heart is far from

cf. *Agostino II, 920*
proper & common names

It would then amount to a tautology: "there is no other name than that name than the saving name"

① → 31,2

31 →

Language is not an instrument man has, but an expression of what man is. Language is not primarily a tool man uses, but a manifestation of man. We could draw an analogy with the body - which is also man and not man's instrument - underscoring the fact that the well-being of language as well as the health of body depend on both my care about them and the surroundings in which I live. Body and language express what man is and both are result of a complex web of interactions - the difference being that whereas the body is the crystallisation in space and matter, of certain relationships, so that there is a private body, the language remains in the interaction between persons, so that there is no private property over language. And yet no language is universal, but like race, history, religion, culture, only the manifestation of a certain corporate human existence. Any language is a kind of subtle or 'mystical' body of a human group.

31

That there is no other saving name can then not reasonably mean that there is no other label or sign. It would be sheer magic. It cannot mean either that there is a common name, i.e. a set of 'saviours' responding to that name outside which there is no salvation. 'No other name' can then only mean that there is no other reality than that named by the name under which there is salvation. What is this reality? Whose name?

→ 31

31

(1) Cf. the opposite movement in Matth. XVI, 18: "You are Rock (Peter, *πέτρος*, *Kefa*) and on this same rock (*ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ*) I will build my church". A common name is here converted into a proper one.

me!" (1). Calling the name alone will not do (2). "It is not those who say to me 'Lord, Lord' who will enter the Kingdom of Heaven!" (3). Where can we pinpoint Jesus? ("Where is he"?) "Who is he?" "Who do men say that the Son of Man is?" (4). Peter's answer is the perfect one in his context: "You are the Messiah, the Son of the living God" (5). However, this answer needs to be effectively translated, if it is to be understood (in the sense the christian understands it), the moment we take one step outside the jewish world of Saint Peter (6). If the translation is not

(1) Matth., XV, 8; Marc., VII, 6

(2) Cf. Luc., VI, 46

(3) Matth., VII, 21

(4) Matth., XVI, 13

(5) Matth., XVI, 16 (17): εὐ εἶ ὁ Χριστός ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ζῶντος;

(6) At the instance of the present writer, the Indian Theological Association dedicated its triennial session of 1969 in Ranchi to seeking a right translation of the Petrine answer in the various indian languages and in the indian contexts, for, if literal translation is given, it certainly fails to convey the original meaning: indian tradition can say of almost anybody that he is the son of the living God. Cf. the previous remarks of K. KLOSTERMAIER, Christvidya, Bangalore (C.I.S.R.S.), 1968, and R. PANIKKAR, "Confrontation between Hinduism and Christ", New Blackfriars, Cambridge, Dec. 1968, pp. 197-204.

⑦ cf. Luc. V, 21; Io. V, 12; etc.

⑧ cf. Io. VII, 11; etc.

made and if we do not belong to the semitic cultural world, we may well understand that the jews had a particular god and were expecting some saviour and that now he has come, but we will not relate him to ourselves nor will we be able to give any further or relevant meaning to that revelation. We will ~~take~~ ^{take} ~~it~~ ^{cognizance of} it only in its own particular terms, but without any internal participation, just as we may ~~understand~~ ^{surmise} the meaning and even grasp the beauty of Uitzilopochtli, the protector of Tenochtitlan, the old city of Mexico. One cannot transplant a text outside its proper context without finding first the growing points ⁱⁿ ~~of~~ the other context, which alone will permit the transplant be viable and the translation authentic.

Let us adduce an example of such "translation". The elders of a certain tribe in Australia once received an explanation of the christian sacrament of the Eucharist. When they understood what it really meant, they translated it by saying that it was all a dance (1). Dance was for them an act in which gods and men, as well as other spirits and creatures, took part; dance was the concrete expression of the union between the material and the spiritual, the body and the soul, nature and supernatural; dance was the sacrifice, the offering and the victim together, dance was the cultic act par excellence. Hence they did not know of any other way of translating what the christian Mass was it all about. Had they any other way to express what the christians from other lands wanted to express? Is not a positive symbiosis the first step for understanding?

(1) Cf. E. RECLUS, Le primitif d'Australie cited by E. CASSIRER, Wesen und Wirkung des Symbolbegriffs, op. cit., p. 109.

The historically trained western mind has taken spatio-temporal coordinates as the central point of reference for answering the question of who Jesus is, being well aware, however that this answer is not sufficient. If Jesus-Christ were actually only what the tempo-spatial coordinates yield, no christian could speak of the real presence of Christ in the sacraments, nor accept that whatever we do to these little ones we do *it* unto "him" (1), nor that he is "yesterday, today and for ever" (2), much less admit that he ~~was~~ ^{is} before Abraham (3) ^{or The Son of God (5).} The cosmic Christ of the Epistles of Saint Paul and many other sayings of Saint John, his Prologue, etc., would be unintelligible. Indeed if Christ were only that, i.e. a reality merely of the temporal and spatial order, which existed at a certain time in history and had a certain place in geography, the whole of the christian faith would collapse (4). No christian will say that the living Jesus of his faith is only a being of the past, nor affirm, on the other hand, than when, for instance, he receives Christ in the Eucharist, he is eating the proteins of Jesus of Nazareth who was walking in Palestine twenty centuries ago.

Who, then, is Jesus? If our translation is only literal one, it is not a real translation outside the confines of the semitic world and we shall remain within the context

(1) Cf. Matth., X, 40; XVIII, 5; Marc., IX, 37; Luc., IX, 48; X, 16;

(2) Hebr., XIII, 8

(3) Io., VIII, 58; „Before Abraham was born, I am“.

(4) Cf. I Cor., XV, 14.

(5) cf. math. III, 17 (XVII, 5); VII, 21; XII, 27; XIV, 33; Luc. II, 49; Io. I, 1; Io. III, 34-35; V, 17; XI, 4; XIV, 10, 28; etc.

of mediterranean cultures. What about those who were expecting no Messiah, for whom "he that cometh" (1) has no meaning whatsoever? What about those who think that we are all sons of the living God? (2) What about those for whom the very words of the Petrine answer do not exist in their languages or have a radically different meaning? Have they to be 'converted' to the ways of judaism? Have they to be circumcised in their minds, despite the fact that the first Council of Jerusalem decided that circumcision, the most sacred token of the fidelity of the Covenant between Yahweh and his people, was no longer needed? (3). In order to understand what Jesus is all about -let alone to accept him- has one to enter into the categorical thought-world of one particular culture?

It is here that we have to ask whether many of the assumptions, which christians until now have ~~made~~

(1) Matth., XI, 3

(2) Cf. the typical indian reaction: "It was more than I could believe that Jesus was the only incarnate son of God, and that only he who believed in him would have everlasting life. If God could have sons, all of us were His sons. If Jesus was like God, or God Himself, then, all men were like God and could be God Himself." M.K. GANDHI, An Autobiography of the Story of my Experiments with Truth, Boston (Beacon Press), 1957, p. 136.

(3) Cf. Act., XV, 1 sq.

taken for universal assumptions, are not peculiar to the western world. Is it not a new consciousness now emerging, which disturbs those who believe that the christian message is truly universal and appropriate to all men? How can such a question be decided a priori? In other words, ~~unpopular or~~ ^{perhaps} disturbing ~~though they may~~ ~~be~~ has one necessarily to be a semite spiritually in order to be a christian? Or, more theologically, what is the place and function of the Bible in christian faith?

If any language about Jesus is to be intelligible to one who lives outside the cultural area in which that language has been forged, it will have to be really translated and not only transliterated. Here we may remember that 'the letter killeth' (1). There is no possible intelligibility -and much less a proclaiming of any message- if between two parties there is no sharing in the same context of experience. The worst possible misunderstanding would, in that case, occur: that which claims to understand when in fact it does not even know that it does not understand.

We should not blur the issue by oversimplifying ^{in,} an uncritical fashion ^{the fact} that a christian has only to accept the person of Jesus Christ or to confess that he is the Son of God. This is firstly, in point of fact, not so. In order to be a christian today one is constrained to accept a score of ideas, to affirm a set of statements and to follow a series of practices which only make sense within a particular culture. To be a christian in the twentieth century is not the same as to be christian in the first century -for not only is there a certain evolution

(1) II Cor., III, 6; Cf. Rom., II, 29.

in christian dogma, but also a real growth in the understanding of being a christian- and thus in the christian himself. Secondly, even the bare affirmations stated above are far from being universal, acceptable or even understandable to all cultures. I repeat: has one to accept and to follow the semitic tradition if one wants to acknowledge Christ?

We should face the problem in all earnestness and with its far reaching consequences. Although we cannot deal here with the entire problem, we shall have to revert to our central question. Who is Jesus of Nazareth, the Messiah, the Son of the living God? Who is HE? Whose name are we speaking about?

4.- The Principle of Individuation → 37,1

One particular way of framing the understanding of Jesus' identity has had serious consequences in the history of christian thought. We refer to the application of the so-called principle of individuation ~~in order to find out the identity of Jesus~~ (1). "Who is Jesus" has then ^{been} understood as synonymous with "what makes Jesus, Jesus"? i.e. what individualises or distinguishes him? When can we say that we have him or touch him? When can we say that he is really present? Or, what or who is the 'Jesus' whom we name when we pronounce that name? → 37,2

37,2 → The many attempts of the western tradition (2) to solve this 'great' (3) 'highly involved' (4) and most

(1) Cf. for example, the entire discussion around the 'historical Jesus' from the last century up to our days: Christ of history, Christ of faith, etc. → 32,1

37,1 →
attempt of finding his identity by looking for his identification by means of the implicit or explicit use

37 → As long as the 'who is Jesus' was or is present and living and even putting himself the question as in the case of the Apostles, as long as christians could or can experience the presenee of the Risen One, as long as they had or have faith in him and not mere trust in the faith of others, the question of the identity of Jesus is not confused with that of his identification. But when believing Theology turns into 'make-believing' Apologetics, when the dialogue becomes dialectics one is forced to speak about Jesus with the available tools of understanding of a given culture. It is here that the problem begins.

→ 37

(fn. (1))

37 →

"Die Frage, vor die wir heute gestellt sind, ist nicht an erster Stelle die Frage nach dem Christus des Glaubens, sondern jene nach dem historischen Jesus" says J.R. GEISSELMANN in his article Jesus Christus in H. FRIES (editor) Handbuch Theologischer Grundbegriffe, München (Kösel) 1962, vol. I, p. 739.

37

The principle of individuation has a long story in the western world (1). It goes back to Aristotle, who taking more seriously than Plato the proper reality of the 'individual' substances had to figure out what makes each substance to be what it is and not another one (of the same species, for instance) (2).

→ 37

(1) Cf. J. ASSENMACHER, Die Geschichte des Individualitäts Prinzip in der Scholastik, 1926.

(2) Cf. D. THOM. Sum. Theol. I, q.14, a.11, ad 1; q.29, a.2, ad 3; q.44, a.3, ad 3; q.115, a.1, c.; I-II q.51, a.1, c. and also C. Gentes I, 42; II, 49; etc. Or again another significant text striking another note: "Unde non plurificatur humanitas in pluribus hominibus, sicut nec unitas in pluribus unis. Nec ipsa humanitas potest a pluribus hominibus, quibus dat nomen, quod sint homines, aequaliter participari. Homines enim sunt ex participatione immultiplicabilis humanitatis et inaequali participatione, quae facit eos esse plures." NICOL. CUSAN. De venatione sapientiae, V.

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- (2) For another tradition, Cf. v.gr. P. HORSCH, "Le principe d'individuation dans la philosophie indienne" in Asiatische Studien, X (1956) and XI (1957-1958).
- (3) 'magna quaestio', so AUGUSTINE in his Epistola XIV, 4
- (4) "implicatissima", so SUAREZ in his Disputationes Metaphysicae.

'thorny' (1) question may be reduced to two types of answers, the one¹⁾ finding the principle of individuation in the very being itself (2) or in some constitutive elements of it (3) and the other⁶⁾ finding it in some principle extrinsic to the being in question, such as space and time which differentiate between things (4). The famous principle of indiscernibles formulated by Leibniz (5) and taken up by modern logical analysis (6) could provide for us the criterion of distinction.

→ 39,1

~~In fact, if the principium identitatis indiscernibilium is true, i.e., if two indiscernible things are identical and the same, then, the principle of individuation is~~

- (1) "spinossisima", so LEIBNIZ in his Confessio philosophi.
- (2) V.g. the haecceitas of DUNS SCOTUS, or the individuum seipsum individuat of LEIBNIZ.
- (3) V.g. most of the scholastic theories originating in ARISTOTELES like that of materia signata quantitate of AVERROES and THOMAS AQ.
- (4) SCHOPENHAUER could be adduced here as example.
- (5) Monadologia, § 9 (Edition Gerhardt: V, 608), etc.
- (6) Cf. for example, A.J. AYER, "The Identity of Indiscernibles" Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy, Brussels, 1953, Vol., III, pp. 124-129; D.F. PEARS, "The Identity of Indiscernibles", Mind., N.S., LXIV (1955), pp. 522-527.

The first part of the report deals with the
 general situation in the country. It is
 followed by a description of the
 various projects which are being
 carried out. The last part of the
 report is a summary of the work
 done during the year.

~~The second part of the report deals with the
 details of the various projects. It
 is followed by a description of the
 results of the work done during
 the year.~~

The third part of the report deals with the
 financial aspects of the work. It
 is followed by a description of the
 results of the work done during
 the year.

a) The principium identitatis indiscernibilium will affirm that there cannot be absolutely indiscernible things. Each thing is thus ^{discernible} discernible due to its own being and not due to some accidental or external cause. *Two* indiscernible things would have no proper *sufficient reason* to be *two*. In other words the principle of individuation, as that principle which makes things to be precisely that which they are in their individuality, is intrinsic to the things themselves. It is apparent that an atomistic substantialistic or monadologic tendency is here implied. There are no indiscernible things, this principle will say. Everything that is, has in itself the *sufficient reason* to be what it is and thus it is intrinsically discernible from any other entity. There are not two identical things in the world of being. Each entity is what it is precisely because it is discernible as what it is.

b) The other attitude will reason in the opposite direction. Discernibility is only an epistemological and not an ontological category (1). Let us assume two elementary particles occupying an elementary field of observation: They will appear as one within that field and as two when they move outside that field. We will have to say that they are two in spite of the fact that they may be indiscernible in the first field. In a symmetric universe the corresponding particles would also be undistinguishable and yet not identical. The individualisation in this case is external to the entity. It is because a certain position in time and space that we

(1) → 40.

individualise a certain particle for instance.

→ 40

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De potentia Dei absoluta, according

to the absolute power of God, i.e. by virtue of a radical
possibility, would some scholastics argue, nothing stands
on the way that two entities be really two in spite
of the fact of being indiscernible by men. In this
case the things would be indiscerned, but not indis-
cernible, would the opponents retort

~~extrinsic to the things, whereas if there can be de potentia Dei absoluta at least two indiscernible things, it is because the principle of individuation is intrinsic to the thing itself (1).~~

39,2 →

and not perhaps the best to tackle our specific problem of the individuation of Jesus

However we may regard the philosophical principle of individuation (2), ~~its application to our case is not without difficulties, for~~ it presupposes a particular form of thinking (3). What do we ask, in fact, when we apply the principle of individuation? We search, undoubtedly, the identity of a 'thing' -Jesus in this case- by looking into what that 'thing' is in contra-distinction to and differentiation

39,2 →

- (1) KANT, for instance, could not accept LEIBNIZ, ^{principle} since for him the appearances do not yet constitute the thing itself. Cf. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 264, 320; etc.
- (2) Cf. J. FERRATER-MORA, Diccionario de Filosofia. Buenos Aires (Editorial Suramericana) 5a. ed., 1965, sub voce "Individuación" for a good summary. For the thomistic hypothesis, cf. G.M. MANSER, "Das thomistische Individuation sprinzip" Divus Thomas, Freiburg, XII (1934), pp. 221-237; 279-300.
- (3) BASIL Mg. speaks of a 'criterion of differentiation': λόγος διαφορᾶς Epist., XXXVIII, 3 (P.G., 32, 328 C) and applies it to the Trinity, making it clear that it is competent to differentiate but not to individualise.

from all other things. We assume that ^{That} (which a thing is, is something exclusive and 'individualising'; we assume that what makes Jesus Jesus is 'something which is his 'own', his 'exclusivity', his private individuality.

Now, in ^e this western world, since Leucippus and Democritus, the individual, the indivisible, the ἄτομον, called 'the each one', τὸ καθ' ἑκάστου was the very opposite of either the universal, τὸ καθόλου or the species, τὸ εἶδος (1). In either case, however, we are dealing with the numerical individualisation of a series, whether this latter be conceptual or factual. The word 'individual' presents, thus, a dangerous ambivalence not always clearly detected. ^{it can suggest} the opposite to the many ^{or} ~~and~~ the opposite to the other. This may be, incidentally, the reason for its shift of meaning, specially in the english language (2). Starting from the traditional and etymological definition of an individual (3) we may say that a thing has singularity when it is indivisible in itself, is undivided, atomic (in se indistinctum) and that it has individuality when besides this, it is

(1) Cf. ARISTOTELES, Metaphysica, I, 4 (985 b).

(2) An 'individual', when applied to persons, has often a pejorative meaning in the latin languages, which is not the case in english, which commonly uses the word "individual" for "person".

(3) Cf. the traditional definiton: "individuum autem est, quod est in se indistinctum, ab aliis vero distinctum", D. THOM., Sum. Theol., I, q. 29, a. 4 ("the individual is what in itself is undivided, but is divided from others").

concreteness

different from others (ab aliis distinctum). The two moments should be carefully differentiated (1). Singularity is the particular case of a plurality (2). There is no singularity except over against a plurality. To call single something which cannot have a plural is a contradiction in terms. Individuality, on the other hand, does not need to be quantitative and stands for the internal constitution of those beings which have a certain possession of their being. ⁴ → 42,1

From this point of view one could distinguish a double principle of individuation: a principle of singularity which would rely on external factors in order to distinguish one thing from another and a principle of individuality which would be grounded in the internal constitution of beings capable of self-identity (3). The principle of the identity of indiscernibles would apply to singularity but not to individuality. Two

(1) Cf. X. ZUBIRI, Sobre la esencia, Madrid (Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones), 1962, saying that: "No hay individuación de la especie, sino especiación del individuo" (p. 166) and distinguishing between singleness and individuality (p. 166 sq.). Every individuality is single, but not every singleness is individual. The elementary particles in modern physics, for instance, would be single but have no individuality, whereas a living being would have at least an inchoative individuality and man would be fully an individual, according to this terminology.

(2) Cf. ARIST., Categ. II, (1 b 6-7).

(3) De nominibus non est disputandum and the terminology is

sometimes just the opposite one, like in the following beautiful passage: "Gaudet igitur unum quodque de sua singularitate, quae tanta in ipso est quod non est plurificabilis, sicut nec in Deo nec mundo nec angelis." N. CUSANUS, De Venatione sapientiae,

4 - Terminologically we could have said just the opposite. Here it is the distinction, not of names.

700820

(42,1)

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indiscernible particles, crystals, molecules (if they were to exist) ~~would~~ ^{still} be two; two indiscernible human beings ~~(admitting the case)~~ ^{not exist} ~~would still remain two~~ (1). → 40,1

40,2 → Now, two questions emerge for us. First, how is it with the case of Jesus? Second, has the question of identity necessarily to take the form of singularity?

(1) We have to renounce here further elaboration of this old question, a little neglected in our individualistic times. Cf. for an initial study:

- Bernard BOSANQUET, The Value and Destiny of the Individual, New York (Kraus reprint), 1968;
- ----- The Principle of Individuality and Value, New York (Kraus reprint), 1968.
- Wolfgang BÜCHEL, "Individualität und Wechselwirkung im Bereich des materiellen Seins", Scholastik, XXX, 1(1956) pp. 1-30. (Herder) Freiburg.
- ----- "Zur philosophischen Deutung des quantenmechanischen Indeterminismus", Scholastik, XXIII, H.2 Freiburg (Herder), 1952, pp.225-240.
- Karl LÖWITH, Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen, Darmstadt, (2nd ed.), 1962.
- Jan LUKASIEWICZ, "On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle", The Review of Metaphysics (March, 1971) XXIV, 3, pp. 485-509.
- Rainer SCHUBERT-SOLDERN, "Kann man heute noch von Individualität sprechen", Akten des XIV Int. Kongress für Phil. Vol. V - Philosophische Anthropologie- Wien (Herder), 1970. pp. 21-29.
- SCHAUMANN, "Das Prinzip der Individualität bei Alexander Vinet" Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 1902.

43

Singularity is a numerical quality. Individuality an ontological character.

We cannot put apples and oranges in the same basket, we cannot blur the difference between individual human beings and single material things. The importance of this double principle is that it refuses to treat things as persons and persons as things - as we are going to stress below when speaking about personhood. For the moment suffice the methodological reflection that one and the same method cannot be indiscriminately applied to heterogeneous entities. If the human being is something in the world which has the peculiar character of reflective consciousness we cannot apply a merely 'body-counting' procedure to 'individuate' him.

To have applied the principle of singularity, which only counts differences by virtue of different extrinsic characters like those of the diverse situation in space and time, instead of the principle of individuality, which recognises the intrinsic irreducibility of each 'individual', has caused havoc - we submit - in human civilisation. It has produced the domination of number, the tyranny of the quantitative over the qualitative, the social order based on the maximum (of wealth, power, property, children, ...) instead of the optimum, which should not be arrived at by extrinsically i.e. often violently curtailing the expression of things, but by realising the harmonious growth of beings all ontonomically.

related. By ontology we understand that inherent order of reality which excludes the extrinsic heteronomic domination of one order of things over another, as well as the disconnected - often chaotic, not to say cancerous - thriving of autonomous beings as if they were alone in the entire reality or with 'rights' about which the 'others' were not concerned.

Let us say once again that what makes a thing that thing that it is depends on the sort of thing that that thing is - and human beings are not just like elementary particles. The relevance of this double principle which attempts to go much beyond Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz may be apparent to the student of philosophy without need here of further elaboration.

—————→ 43

5.- The Case of Jesus.

The first question amounts to asking whether Jesus is an individual in the sense of asking for his singularity as a member of a species. Traditional theology had a very pertinent answer. Christ is not a single individual in the sense in which historical personages are said to be such (1). Christ has human nature indeed, he is Man, but he is not a human person. His "individuality" is a divine one (2). He is a divine person, the second person of the Trinity having assumed human nature. The problem, however, remains lurking below the surface, for though, after Chalcedon, it could be argued that Christ assumed human nature as a whole, he did it by assuming a human nature, the human nature of the man Jesus whose human person did not even come into being, because that person was subsumed by the divine person of the Logos (3). In this con-

(1) This would offer the appropriate context for the Adam-Christ theology. Cf. "Just as all man die in Adam, so will all men be brought to life in Christ", I Cor., XV, 22.

(2) "There is not even thinkable one hypostasis without nature" says MAXIM. CONF. Opusc., (P.G., 91. 264 A).

(3) Cf. recently, P. SCHOONENBERG, Ein Gott der Menschen, Zürich, EinSiedeln, Köln (Benziger), 1969, p. 92, where he says that Christ's unity is that of a person who is divine and human, precisely as a person.

text Christ is man, but not one man, a single individual; he is a divine person incarnated, a divine person in hypostatic union with human nature (1). The divine Logos is revealed in Christ, and through Christ man comes in contact with the Logos, but Christ's presence for the believer 's the divine presence. We are confronted in the last analysis with the issue of uniqueness instead of with the problem of individuality.

There is no need to stress the dangers of docetism or disincarnationism if such a doctrine is pushed too far. Do we really meet Jesus if he is not a human person but only a divine person with human nature which is not individualised by its human (proper) personhood, but by a divine person and which is so transformed by the divine personality that the empirical evidence of human nature remains almost invisible? It is difficult to affirm in this hypothesis that Christ assumed a human nature, for a human nature does not exist without its personality (2).

We cannot follow all the meanderings of patristic and scholastic theology designed to meet the varying

(1) In humanitate Deus, -ἐν ἀνθρώπωνότητι Θεός- says characteristically, CYRILL OF ALEXANDRIA speaking of Christ. Homil. Pasch., XVII, 2 (P.G., 77, 776).

(2) Traditional christian theology tried to solve this theo-anthropological problem introducing the concept of hypostatic union.

cf
Man's logos

objections. We are here only concerned with the main thrust of the traditional solution, namely that the living Christ is the risen Christ and that ^{as} such he has no singularity.

"God raised to life again, setting him free from the pangs of death" (1). The principle of singularity does not apply to him because he is not simply a numerical exemplar of a species 'human mortals'. Christ's divinity is defended, but his true humanity is imperilled (2).

DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION

(1) Act., II, 24

(2) Cf. the postconciliar theology on the problem after the vivid discussions (GALTIER, DIEPEN, PARENTE^{etc.}) regarding the 'I' of Christ in the decades before Vatican II. For a recent bibliography, cf.:

- J. ASHTON, "The Consciousness of Christ", The Way, London Vol. X, 1 & 2 (Jan. 1970 and April 1970) pp. 59-71 and 147-157;
- R. BROWN, Jesus, God and Man, London and Dublin, 1968;
- R. GUARDINI, The Humanity of Christ, London, 1964;
- E. GUTWENGER, "The Problem of Christ's Knowledge", Concilium, Nijmegen (Jan. 1966), Vol. I, 2, pp. 48-55;
- A.A. ORTEGA, "Cristo, su conciencia humana y su persona divina", Homenaje a Xavier Zubiri, Madrid (Editorial Moneda y Crédito), 1970, vol. I, pp. 99-119;
- K. RAHNER, "Dogmatische Erwägungen über das Wissen und Selbstbewusstsein Christi", Schriften zur Theologie, Einsiedeln (Benziger), 1962, vol. V, pp. 222-245;
- P. de ROSA, Christ and Original Sin, London 1967, pp. 1-14 and 23-72, specially.

The opposite doctrinal trend, i.e. that which stresses the humanness of Jesus, when it wants to expound the christian understanding of Christ, has to maintain equal emphasis that the man Jesus possessed in himself something peculiar, which, though it does not diminish his humanness, yet transcends it in such a way as to make possible a sui generis relationship with him. This uniqueness (given in the Resurrection) is, in a way, the very negation of singularity and individuality for by its very definition individuality is that which belongs with exclusiveness to a particular being and not to another. I can share everything with another except individuality.

What we are driving at is the fact that Christ as christian faith sees him, namely, as someone who is living, who is present in the sacrament and in others, who transcends time and with whom you can enter into an intimate relationship, does not fall into the category of individual in the philosophical and current sense of the word (1).

6.- Identity of Christ.

We were led, secondly, to question whether the identity of Christ, needs to be sought in terms of individuality. Why the desire to pin him down or at least to pinpoint him? "Then, if anyone says to you, 'Look, here is the Messiah', or 'There he is', do not believe it" (2). He is not

(1) Cf. my introduction to the spanish translation of J.GUITTON, La Virgen María, Madrid (Rialp), 1952, pp. 30-34.

(2) Matth., XXIV, 23.

an individual who can be said to be here or there. Rather "like lightning from the East, flashing as far as the West, will be the coming of the Son of Man" (1).

This may be taken as a figure of speech or as a literal utterance. But we cannot say what a who is (in our case, who Jesus is), without being ourselves involved both in the question and in the answer. An individual never answers the question of who, but only of what. When we ask who somebody is, we are not asking for his individuality, i.e. for what he is exclusively 'in itself', but for 'who he is', i.e. for the thou that he ^{is} to me or to somebody. We are not asking for a 'thing in itself', but for a living person. Asking for a who means searching for a thou (2). Individuality is essentially that which does not answer the question of who. We cannot approach nor participate in individuality (3). We are

(1) Matth., XXIV, 27.

(2) Christian spirituality has always affirmed that the true human quest for God is, in point of fact, only the conscious answer and reaction to the divine search for man: the I looking for his thou: "Thou art my beloved Son" (Luc., III, 22) were the words Christ heard in the moment of his initiation (and realisation). *That art Son - That art Thou -*

(3) Individuum ineffabile atque incommunicabile says christian scholasticism, commenting on Aristotle. Cf. for example, D. THOM., De anima, lect. 12, n. 375, on ARIST., De anima II, 5 (417 b 22). *Cf. in consequence the aristotelic-Thomistic conviction that there is no proper knowledge and thus no rigorous 'science' of individual things. Cf. u.g. D. THOM. Sum. Theol. I, q. 44, a. 3, ad 3.*

not really asking for a person if we are searching for individuality. No answer to the question who can have any meaning if it does not involve me as much as it involves him. For this very reason a merely subjective, as well as a merely objective approach will never satisfy us. Epistemological realism is as insufficient as its idealistic counterpart. The who that we seek in Jesus is the risen one whom men crucified and whom God made both Lord and Anointed (1).

We could begin with a simple philosophical reflection which seeks for the core of my who. Who am I? What makes me me, is neither my body alone, or my thoughts or my will alone, nor what I am today or what I was yesterday, neither an ever escaping and ever receding substance, nor a phenomenal bundle of empirical data. Nor will any concept or idea satisfy me as an expression of what I am. In the quest for the I, we are obliged to transcend every singularity and to overcome any essentialistic and objectified approach. To find an object is certainly not to discover the living I. What makes me, me, is not individuality, but personality, not the private property of my 'substance', but the sharing of the accusative me with the nominative I, that utters it (me), not singleness but communion, not incommunicability, but relation. The search for the I passes always through a thou and it also implies a he or she.

The identity of Christ that we are looking for is not that which we may expect from accurate historical information or a physical analysis of his bodily psychological

(1) Cf. Act., II, 36

diagrams, nor even what a philosophical scrutiny of his words and doctrines may yield concerning who he is, but that identity which is found in the encounter with a person, that knowledge which springs up when we really know and love somebody, which is more than, and different from, the results of all the examinations of the objective data (assuming that such objective data exist).

7.- Individual and Person.


Whatever solution we may be inclined to follow and without pretending to solve this ever-recurring problem of self-identity, we may study the issue at a level in which several hypotheses may concur. Whether we accept a substantialistic view or not, whether we follow an ātman-view or an anātma-vāda, in both cases we may agree that there is a fundamental distinction between "individual" and "person" (1). We shall refrain from elaborating now a whole theory and shall concentrate only on the distinction in so far as it applies to our case (2).

(1) We may note, without, insisting however, upon it, that the notion of corporate personality is closer to the biblical understanding of man and people than is that of modern individuality.

(2) Because of its importance ~~though there is no english translation~~ we should mention here, Max SCHELER, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus, which first appeared in the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, I, 1913 and II, 1916 and in a second edition, as a book, in 1921.

Indira and Penner

cf. RS 163 - Comparative Myths. 24.1



what makes x x is not the name
or what makes me me.

→ 24, 179.

Here we come upon one of the semantic games in which human culture is so ironically rich. The latin term persona, rendering the greek πρόσωπον, referred to the mask which 'personifies' the role of a human being on the stage of the theatre -as well as later on, in the theatre of the world. The mask, the persona, does not individualise, but personifies, i.e. it *free*s us *from* our individuality and consequently allows us to play our role, overcoming individualistic inhibitions, by involving us in the web of interrelations of human existence. Every human being has a different persona which allows him to perform the role for which he has been called into existence (1). Every man is a 'personified' image of God, his Creator, in the traditional christian world-view (2). You are what you act, what you perform, the role you play (3).

←
Mühlen
ex-nitenti

-
- (1) It would be ~~clumsy~~ to put all the time him/her or he/she or man/woman when speaking of the human person and we may be allowed to use the masculine form with an androgynous meaning
- (2) For the christian contribution, with numerous bibliographical references, cf. S. ALVAREZ TURRIENZO, "El cristianismo y la formación del concepto de persona" in Homenaje a Xavier Zubiri, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 43-77.
- (3) We recall the fundamental classical distinction between constitutive acts of the human being and his accidental doings in the line with the poiesis and praxis of Aristotle, the agere and facere of the scholastics, etc.

From there, the person came to mean the deepest core of the human being, his personhood (1). The mask was interiorized, but was also substantialized.

The identification between individual and person is a consequence of a complex process. On the one hand it is the result of medieval nominalism grafted into the cartesian system and mingled with other insights of the european protestant era. On the other hand it is the fruit of an evolutionary growth from a more collective we-consciousness to a more personified awareness of the intricate web of relationship which constitutes the world (2). This identification finds its climax in our technological times, which cannot deal with persons unless the person is given the status of an individual and an isolated individual at that.

However this may be, we leave aside historical and culturo-anthropological questions, as well as any metaphysical substantialistic or antisubstantialistic, ātman or anātma conceptions and we maintain that man is a person but not, properly speaking, an individual. The concept of individual is only an abstraction, for practical purposes, from the more complex reality of the human being and, if substantialised, it is the

(1) Cf. from a thomistic modern point of view, A. MALET, Personne et Amour dans la théologie trinitaire de St. Thomas d'Aquin, Paris (Vrin), 1956; and also: A. KRÜGER, Mensch und Person: Moderne Personbegriffe in der katholischen Theologie, Recklinghausen (Paulus), 1967.

(2) This would not justify to consider the "individual soul" as a "Grundvoraussetzung" of christian belief as for instance, E. CASSIRER, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance, Darmstadt (Wiss. Buchgesellschaft) 1963 (reprint of

expression of a reified, lifeless and naively realistic world-view (1).

In modern civilisation the need for an individualised status is becoming -for good or for bad- increasingly important, even for survival, but no individualisation touches the core of the human being. The purposes of individualisation are limited to problems of quantification considering man as an exemplar of a species, as an individual of a larger group. When we say individual in the modern world, we ultimately think of just the opposite of what the philosophical word suggests (2): We say individual and mean all that which is not unique and personal, but all that which is quantifiable and one element of a multiplicity: mouth (to feed), body (to cloth), citizen (to give a job), soul (to save), etc.; we mean all that is capable of being considered as one instance among many.

^{Three}
 (1) Cf. ~~two~~ modern witnesses: "... ce n'est pas en s'isolant (...), mais en s'associant convenablement avec tous les autres que l'individu peut espérer atteindre à la plénitude de sa personne..." P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, L'Avenir de l'Homme, Oeuvres de Teilhard de Chardin, Paris (Seuil), 1959, Vol. V, p. 248 (original underlinings). "The Christian does not confuse the person with the individual, and does not consider his relation to the ground of Being as a purely subject-object relationship. Th. MERTON, Mystics and Zen Masters, New York, (Farrar, Straus and Giroux), 1967, p. 214. —→ 53, 1

(2) Cf. e.g. "est de ratione individui, quod non possit in pluribus esse", D. THOM. Sum. Theol., III, q. 77, a. 2.

für 53
gestrichelt ① →

„Aber ist Person wirklich identisch mit Individuum?
Bedeutet das Ende der Bedeutbarkeit des Individuums
auch das geschichtliche Ende der Bedeutbarkeit der
Person?“ MAX MÜLLER, Erfahrung und
Geschichte, Freiburg, München (Alber) 1921, p. 84

The concept of the person does not belong to this field. A person is not quantifiable. Five individuals are or may be more valuable than three and it might be justifiable to sacrifice ten individuals in order to save a hundred. All this does not apply to the person. My person does not end in my fingernails; my person is the centre of a network of relationships which may extend to the very limits of the world (1). A person cannot be seen or judged from inside, a person cannot be manipulated nor amassed in a heap; it is not quantifiable, and thus, there is no meaning whatsoever in the affirmation that ten persons are worth more than ~~a hundred~~^{three}. Each of them is unique, or, to say the same in the language of logic: anything may be predicated of a person, but the person cannot be the predicate of anything (2). The person is not a predicate (3)

(1) Cf. Father Zossima's Brother giving to the Russian Monk as his Testament the insight that "everyone is really responsible to all men for all men and for everything" in DOSTOEVSKY's The Brothers Karamazov, VI, 1.

(2) Cf. ARIST., Categ., V, (2 a 11) saying that the οὐσιαστικῆς πρῶτης can have predicates, but cannot be itself a predicate.

(3) Cf. the famous: "Sein ist offenbar kein reales Prädicat" as against the ontological argument. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 598, B 626 (p. 181 in the english translation of The Great Books of the Western World). Cf. also AVERROES saying the same, centuries before in his Tahāfut-al-Tahāfut (ed. Sulaymān Dunyā - Cairo, Ma'ārif, 1964-Vol. II, p. 80 and the Commentary on it by T. IZUTSU, The Concept of Reality of Existence, Tokyo (The Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies), 1971, pp. 81 sq.

its entity resides in its entire being (1). A person is a unique center of relationship as a qualified knot in the fabric of ontological threads composing the warp and woof of reality.

There has been in modern times a growing confusion between these two terms, due in part to the emergence of individual consciousness, characteristic of western modernity.⁽²⁾ If the birth of consciousness can be said to be the original sin originating the birth of the species homo sapiens (3), the birth of individual consciousness represents the cultural sin of the west, although in both cases one could speak of a felix culpa (4). However this might have been,

(1) Cf. the LEIBNIZ's thesis: "omne individuum sua tota entitate individuatur" A. VI, i. II § 4. or his already quoted dictum (in his Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui, Edit. Gerhardt, IV, 18); this is true, properly speaking, only of the person.

(3) Cf. recently the works by R.C. ZAEHNER, The Convergent Spirit, reprinted as Matter and Spirit, New York (Harper & Row) 1963; Evolution in Religion, Oxford (Clarendon), 1971, propounding again this old thesis.

(4) Cf. the chapter "La superación del humanismo" of my book, Humanismo y Cruz, Madrid (Rialp), 1963, pp. 178-253.

(2) Existential anxiety, in TILLICH's sense, is nothing but the consciousness of becoming more and more an (isolated) individual. It cannot be removed, of course, unless the individualistic root is deleted.

the fact is that in more traditional societies personal consciousness was lodged, as it were, in the collectivity and thus, the awareness of the knot in a net of relationships (what we today call a person) was somewhat blurred. Or rather the knot was what is known as corporate personality; a fruit of the collective conscious. We should not undervalue the importance of the growth of personal consciousness and its disentanglement from the web of more complex and amorphous human conglomerates, but this should not blind us to the fact that the person disappears if we immobilise those centres of relationships and handle them as if they were independent knots, capable of separate manipulation.

I discover myself as a knot when I discover the braids that are concurring and being entwined in that knot. Without the plaits I would be nothing, but the knot is something more than just the plaits, even if this "more" is neither quantitative nor independent from the threads that make the knot.

In point of fact, the term person does not, properly speaking, allow for a plural, not only because each person is unique and thus non-quantifiable, but also because a peculiar plural ^{ity of relations} or rather polarity is internal to the very concept of person; a person being always society, always relation with several centres or focuses, so that the very concept of an individual and individualised person would be a contradiction in terms. Properly speaking neither the singular nor the plural applies to the person. An I is only such if there is a thou and vice-versa. There is not an I without a thou and

there is not a thou without an I. It is a vital circle. Furthermore, the I-thou (we-you) relationship is only such if there is a he or a she (they), i.e. yet another pole of the person, offering the horizon, as it were, in which the I-thou/thou-I (we-you/you-we) relationship emerges and becomes meaningful and real. These relations are not only psychological, but ontological or, simpler: constitutive (1).

8.- Personal Identity.

We may now approach the issue of personal identity, applying it immediately to our case. The theological formulation of it could perhaps be that "no one ^{can} (say 'Jesus is Lord' but in the Holy Spirit" (2). In other words, no one can

(1) Here again the problem transcends our limits and the literature is overwhelming. Cf. only as a sample:

- K. NISHITANI, "The Personal and the Impersonal in Religion", The Eastern Buddhist, III, 1 (June, 1970), pp. 1-9.
- R. TAYLOR, "The anattā Doctrine and Personal Identity", Philosophy East and West, (October, 1969), XIX, 4, pp. 359-366.

(2) I Cor., XII, 3.

really point toward Jesus and refer to him as a living person except under the action of the Holy Spirit, i.e. except under the spell of love and the inspiration of an inner contact, a participation in an ontological network of relationship in which Jesus is disclosed not as a mere individual, but as a person. This can only be done if one enters into a personal relationship with him, if the discovery is really a personal encounter with a living thou that conditions me (my I) -as my I conditions him (his I) also (1). Personal relationship should not be here imagined as an external dialectical encounter between two 'beings', but as the constitutive relation, which in that particular string was inchoative and ^{potential} ~~abstract~~ until the moment in which the thou, which in the relationship emerges, makes the I

(1) This is implied in the christian conception of the Mystical Body of Christ, along with the christian idea of the growth of Christ not only in the heart of the believer, but also in history and reality. This leads to the 'una persona' of Saint Augustin and his definition of heaven: 'et erit unus Christus amans seipsum', Epist. ad Parthos, (P.L. 35, 2055). Cf. also E. MERSCH, Le Christ, l'Homme et l'Univers, (Museum Lessianum - Theol. 57), Paris (Desclée de Brouwer), 1962.

meaningful and real (1).

What makes Jesus ^{truly} (Jesus is his personal identity and this personal identity can only be said to be real and thus true if we enter into a personal relationship with him. Only then may one discover the living Christ of faith who lives in the interior of oneself (2).

We should not confound personal identity with ^{individual} personal identification. The latter means the identification of a person by means of external marks of identification, i.e. by all those empirical characteristics, which properly speaking, do not belong to the person. It is a juridical term and an expression used by the police to 'identify' an individual. It has little or nothing to do with the person. The personal identification belongs no more to the person than an identification card. It responds to the question 'what?'.

(1) Cf. the two recent theological studies by H. MÜHLEN, trying to recover the personal-centeredness of ecclesiology and pneumatology: Una Mystica Persona: Die Kirche als das Mysterium der heilsgeschichtlichen Identität des Heiligen Geistes in Christus und den Christen: Eine Person in vielen Personen. Paderborn (Schöningh), 2 ed., 1967 and Der Heilige Geist als Person in der Trinität, bei der Inkarnation und im Gnadenbund: Ich-Du-Wir. Münster (Aschendorff), 2 ed., 1967.

(2) Cf. Rom., VI, 10; XIV, 7-8; Gal., II, 20; Phil., I, 21.

Personal identity, on the other hand, refers to the core of the human being present to oneself and to others; it means that which makes the person his or her own self. Personal identity is that which responds to the question "who"? and it is expressed by the real name, the authentic I which is only real when involved in the network of personal relationships.

The personal identification of Christ will discover him as an undoubtedly interesting and probably great man in history, but it will not entail any living relationship with him whatsoever. The historian mistrusts the believer, in the same way as the judge is suspicious of a man who is witnessing for some close relative or intimate friend. The knowledge that emerges in this way cannot be called properly personal but only historical. Jesus will appear as an historically relevant figure of the past, with a still uncommon influence on the present, but the only point of reference will be his historical coordinates and his impact on the lives of other men.^① Ultimately this approach does not discover Jesus as a person but only as a historical personage. The risen Christ has here no place and any kind of resultant belief must be catalogued as mere psychological conviction.

Personal identity, on the other hand, can only be discovered by entering into a living relationship with the person concerned. It enables ^{one} to answer the question of 'who' because it has discovered the who within oneself, i.e. it has become a thou or at least a he or she. In other words, only in faith, i.e., only in the Spirit, can we have a personal relationship with Jesus and discover his personal identity.

① Cf. as typical example: K.N. LATOURETTE, Anno Domini (A survey of the influence of Jesus on the quality of life in the twenty centuries since his death) - New York (Harper & Brothers) 1940.

This implies that the word Jesus has two basically different meanings: one as a historical category and another as a personal category. The former is reached by means of historical identification, which permits us to speak about Jesus and about the belief Christians have in and through him. The latter is reached by means of personal identity and allows us to discover him as a 'part' or rather 'pole' of our personal being, as one of the many traits that make our person. The personal identity concerns the other as well as me and it is only this internal discovery which allows me to take upon my lips the real and proper name of the other: the personal name.

We are dealing here with the special case of Christ, but the distinction between personal identification and personal identity applies to any human person as well. There cannot be any personal relationship, love or even personal knowledge without the involvement and participation implied in personal identity. And to discover the personal identity is to enter into the mystery of the person. The concept of neighbour could perhaps be developed here. "Who is my neighbour?" (1). The answer does not just say "every man", but defines him as the one who is really close to me, he for whom I am also effectively a who, a thou, a person, and who, thus, possesses a constitutive relation with me. Until men become neighbours to us, they are not yet really men for us, nor we for them, but only objects. Our humanness is the quality, intensity and closeness of our relationship with our fellow-beings -and the same could be said regarding God. We can only love God as our neighbour and he can only become such to us in as much as he enters into personal identity

(1) Luc., X, 29.

with us; otherwise he remains an object, an idea perhaps, but not a living reality. We begin by discovering God as a He, subsequently he becomes the Thou and finally the I. (2)

Reverting to our case, the Jesus of the christian believer is in fact the Risen Lord, in whatever way we may care to interpret the Resurrection. In other words, he is not simply the historical Jesus but the Risen One, a Jesus who as person enters into the very structure of our own personal existence. He cannot be discovered in the exclusively outer world of history, nor in the exclusively inner world of our own thoughts, feelings or beliefs. Morphologically speaking the figure of Christ is ambivalent and, in a way, theandric.

While recognising this ambivalence, we can proceed to affirm, that from all the elements of the Petrine answer: 'thou art the Messiah, the Son of the Living God', (1), the only universal element is the thou and that the fundamental issue is not so much to elucidate intellectually the predicates of the sentence, but to discover existentially the subject, the real thou, who is more than just a projection of my own ego. Now this thou cannot be pinpointed by any unequivocal means of identification and it is not without reason that idolatry, i.e. the freezing of the ineffable Supreme in one particular object of the senses or of the mind, is said to be the greatest sin — against the Spirit. The thou has identity but no identification.

(1) Matth., XVI, 16 (17).

(2) explain more

The historical context situates us in a
chronological universe and the very
cosmological world-view is mainly
seen in temporal if not
evolutionary categories. It belongs,
for instance to ~~man~~ contemporary
man's background to think of
man as that peculiar newest and
thinnest though mightiest
creature in a universe which
seems to be 7000 million years
old living in a planet 5000
million years old and sprouting
from life which appeared on

earth was 2500 million years
ago in order to become huminoid
some 4 million years ago and
of our 'sapiens species' some
100 000 years and historical
only in these last 10 000
years.

What is the meaning of
Chunt if it is ~~as~~ a historical
figure of the last 2000 years in the
~~corner~~ western corner of the
world is certainly a problem which
requires a substantially different
perspective than that of a traditional
cosmological ~~set~~ setting of
just 100 years ago

© René Pomy
& Edgar Morin
Le Paradigme perdu,
de la nature humaine
Paris (Seuil) (1977)

"Why do you ask my name?" (1).

9.- The Cosmological and the Historical Context.

One of the causes of the present-day disorientation regarding the figure of Jesus is the shift from the cosmological context to the historical one, i.e., the changing of the cosmological myth for the historical one

The traditional christology was seen and understood against the context of a trinitarian doctrine inscribed in a particular cosmological world-view. In this world-view, Christ is considered to be the center of the universe, ontological as well as cosmological and personal. He is the Mediator (2) -not the intermediary, as later periods have tended to imagine him to be (3)-, who assumes the innumerable polarities of reality

(1) Gen., XXXII, 29. Cf.: Is., IX, 6; Iudic., XIII, 18; Ps., VIII, 2; Cf. also: DIONYS., De div. nom., I, 6 (P.G. 3, 596), ECKHART, I Expos. Genes., in Lateinische Werke., Stuttgart (Kohlhammer), Vol. I, pp. 95 sq. and the excellent commentary by W. LOSSKY, Théologie négative et connaissance de Dieu chez Maître Eckhart, Paris (Vrin), 1960, pp.13-96.

(2) Cf. I Tim., II, 5

(3) Cf. a good deal of the european and roman catholic spirituality of the XVIII and early XIX centuries.

and in whom all opposites coincide (1).

He is not only Man and God, or more exactly Son of Man (2) and Son of God (3), but also alpha and omega (4), beginning and end (5), he is the Only Begotten one (6), he is the First-born among the dead (7) and the living (8), the immortal one (9) and the Eschaton (10), he who made everything (11) and he for whom everything has been made (12), he who has not been

(1) From Dyonisius, Bonaventure and Nicolas of Cusa to Blondel and Teilhard de Chardin one could trace an interesting theological line. Cf. as an example, H.E. COUSINS, "The Coincidence of Opposites in the Christology of Saint Bonaventure", Franciscan Studies, XXVIII (1968), 27-45.

(2) Cf. Matth., VIII, 20 et passim.

(3) Cf. Matth., XIV, 33 et passim; Io., I, 49; etc.

(4) Cf. Apoc., I, 8; XXI, 6; XXII, 13.

(5) Cf. Apoc., I, 8; I, 17; XXI, 6, XXII, 13.

(6) Cf. Io., I, 14.

(7) Cf. Col., I, 18.

(8) Cf. Rom., VIII, 29.

(9) Act., II, 24; Apoc., I, 18.

(10) Cf. Apoc., I, 17; II, 8; XXII, 13.

(11) cf. Io., I, 3; Col., I, 16.

(12) Cf. Col., I, 16-17.

convinced of sin (1) and who became sin for men (2), he is the universal reconciler (3) etc.

Christ in this conception is the center of a cosmic mandala from which the whole reality emerges and into which it goes (4). Everything that is comes and refers to this center. It could be said that every being is a christophany (5). The universe is ordered, organic and centered. This center is, by definition, Christ.⁽⁶⁾ We have a cosmological christocentric universe. God is here less conspicuous, he is behind the ~~co~~ertain as it were. He is the Father (7), the

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- (1) Cf. Io., VIII, 46; Jc.
- (2) Cf. II Cor., V, 21.
- (3) Cf. Eph., I, 10.
- (4) Cf. E. COUSINS, "Mandala Symbolism in the Theology of Bonaventure", University of Toronto Quarterly, XL/3 (Spring 1971), pp. 185-201.
- (5) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, "Le Concept d'ontonomie", Actes du XI^e Congrès International de Philosophie. Bruxelles 20-26 Aug. 1953. Louvain (Nauwelaerts), 1953, vol. III, p. 187.
- (6) Cf. BONAVENTURE describing Christ as the "medium metaphysicum, physicum, mathematicum, logicum, ethicum, politicum, theologicum" of reality: In Hexaemeron, I, n. 11-39 (Ed. Quaracchi, V, 331-335), quoted by E. COUSINS, "Mandala Symbolism in the Theology of Bonaventure" op. cit., p. 187.
- (7) Cf. the expression of BASIL Mg.: "we confess one God [the Father], not in number, but in nature", In Epist., VIII, 2 (P.G. 32, 248 c).

fontalis plenitudo (1), the fons et origo totius divinitatis (2), the transcendent Origin, the Ultimate Cause and outside Principle (3). It is Christ who, in function of his theandric nature of Only Begotten of the Father and Firstborn of Creation, is at the center of everything and the very power of God, his shakti. Even the thomistic tradition acknowledges that by the same act that God begets the Son, he creates the world (4). The words of the latin version of the psalm: Semel locutus est Deus duo haec audivi⁽⁵⁾ are interpreted by christian tradition as saying: "God speaks out only once, but we hear it twice; eternally in the womb of the Trinity and temporally in the

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- (1) Cf. BONAVENT. I Sent., d. 27, p. 1, a, un, q. 2 ad 3.
- (2) Expression of more than one Council of Toledo (namely VI, IX and XVI) Cf. DENZ.SCHÖNM. 490, 525 and 568. Cf. AUGUST. De Trinitate, IV, 20, 29 (P.L., 42, 908 D) where the expression "principium totius deitatis" occurs. Cf. DENZ. SCHÖNM. 3326 for the utilisation of the same sentence by LEO XIII in his Encyclical Divinum illud munus of 1897.
- (3) Cf. to offer an example of the horizon of this ideas, the Propositions 2 and 18 of the Liber XXIV Philosophorum: 'Deus est sphaera infinita cuius centrum est ubique, circumferentia nusquam'. 'Deus est sphaera, cuius tot sunt circumferentiae, quod sunt puncta.' Cf. also BONAVENT., Itinerarium mentis in Deum, V, 8 (Ed. Quaracchi, V, 310) qu quoting ALLAN DE HILLE, Theologicae Regulae, 7 (P.L. 210, 627)
- (4) Cf. the astonishing and refreshing text: "Deus enim cognoscendo se, cognoscit omnem creaturam. Verbum igitur in mente conceptum, est representativum omnis ejus quod

actu intelligitur... Sed quia Deus uno actu et se et omnia intel-
 ligit, unicum Verbum ejus est expressivum non solum Patris, sed
 etiam creaturarum" D. THOM., Sum. Theol., I, q. 34, a. 3. Cf.
etiam "... quia una actione generat filium, qui est heres, lux
 de luce, et creat creaturas, quae est tenebra, creata, facta,
 non filius nec heres luminis, illuminationis et creationis",
 ECKHARDT, Expos. in Ioan., I, 5, núm. 73.

Cf. another example of the christian tradition:

"Der Vater wendet sein Auge auf sein eigenes Wesen, das seine
 Natur ist, und schaut sich selber. Und da er sich selber schaut,
 da schaut er alle Dinge auf einmal. Und da formt er ein Wort
 und spricht sich selber in das Wort und alle Dinge, und das
 Wort spricht sich zurück in den Vater." HENRICUS DE HANNA
 (HANE DER KARMEELIT) Vom ungeschaffenen und vom geschaffenen Geist,
 apud Vom inwendigen Reichtum, edited by A. DEMPF, Leipzig
 (Hegner), 1937, p. 81. Cf. also the recurrent upaniṣadic
 sentence: yato vāco ni^{vart}ante ('whence words return') TU II, 4, 1;
 II, 9, 1.

- (5) Ps., LXI(LXII) 12 (11) "One thing God has spoken, two things I
 have learnt" (NEB), or "One thing God said; these two things which
 I heard" (Catholic Biblical Association).

creative explosion of being, (1).

When this tradition speaks of Christ as the universal Savior ^{it} is simply stating a qualified tautology (as all principles are). Christ is the Savior because it is the central point which gives cohesion and meaning to the entire universe (2).

It would not be totally adequate to call this conception a cosmological one. The primacy given here to Christ is also a personal and a theological one (3). Christ is the central myth giving cohesion and conferring order to the whole universe (4). The traditional model of the Mystical Body

(1) Cf. V. LOSSKY, op. cit., pp. 51-60 for one simple example with ample references.

(2) *Q* the medieval and post-medieval discussion centered in the question: "Utrum si Adam non peccasset, Verbum incarnatum fuisset".

(3) Cf. the bibliographical references given in L.M. BELLO, "De universali Christi primatu atque regalitate" in Acta Ordin. Frat. Minor., 52 (1933), 293-311.

For more modern bibliography and discussions, cf. J-F. BONNEFOY, La Primauté du Christ selon l'Écriture et la Tradition, Roma (Herder), 1959, and for an exegesis of the capital text of Col., I, 15 with also abundant bibliography, cf. A. HOCKEL, Christus der Erstgeborene, Düsseldorf (Patmos), 1965. Or again, G. MALONEY, The Cosmic Christ from Paul to Teilhard, New York (Sheed & Ward), 1968; L.M. BOMBIN, "El título 'Primogénito de toda la creación' en el himno de Col., I, 15-20" Claretianum (Romae) X-1970, pp. 5-78.

in order to explain the place and function of Christ in the universe could offer here immense unexplored perspectives (1). This universe has also/^asoul, a vital principle, an anima mundi (2). This is the realm of the spirit, which christian tradition has considered to be the spirit of Christ.

In the contemporary scene, the emphasis has shifted to the historical realm. History plays in our modern times the mystical role played by the ancient cosmological setting. Christ is no longer seen as the Pantocrator (3), and thus, as the theophany κατ' ἑξοχήν; he ceases to be the king of the universe to become the center of history, of human history, of course. He does not need to be divinised. It suffices to stress in a particular and singular way his humanity and the role he plays in making man human (4). Every history is

post-modern

*In God's
not Christ's
attention!*

(1) Cf. E. MERSCH, La théologie du Corps Mystique, Paris (Desclée) Bruxelles (L'édition universelle) 2 vols., 1949 for a fruitful beginning.

(2) Cf. T. GREGORY, Anima mundi, Firenze (Sansoni), 1955 and E. MERSCH, Le Christ, l'Homme et l'Universe, op. cit. p. 20, sq. giving many examples also within the christian tradition, regarding the world as an alive entity.

(3) Cf. Apoc., I, 8; IV, 8; XI, 17; XV, 3; XVI, 7; XVI, 14; XIX, 6; XIX, 15; XXI, 22.

(4) The innumerable studies on and for christian humanism could offer a good example of what we are trying to say. Cf. my above mentioned chapter containing ample bibliographical references.

salvation history, the entering into history amounts to accepting the christian economy, and similar affirmations are common in recent literature (1). Christ plays here a secular role and the Gospel becomes the secular Bible (2). Now it is the Man Jesus who invites us to get rid of all trinitarian and specially christological screens mediatizing and deforming his real presence (3). In this context he cannot be said to be the 'center' of history, because by and large the circular paradigm is not appealing, but he is the new starting point and the furthermore end, the point omega, the absolute future and the like (4).

Our point here is only to stress the continuity between the previous periods and the present times. The contents have certainly changed, but ⁱⁿ each of them Jesus has a decisive role. The myths are different, but their structure remains the same. *I am suggesting that both the cosmological and the historical models are insufficient for our time. The alternative is our tradition of faith.*

- (1) The names of O. CULLMANN, W. PANNENBERG, Y. CONGAR, etc. come immediately to mind.
- (2) Cf. the works of P. v. BUREN, H. COX, G. VAHANIAN, T.J.J. ALTIZER, etc.
- (3) Cf. M. LÉGAUT, Introduction à l'intelligence du passé et de l'avenir du christianisme, Paris (Aubier), 1970.
- (4) Cf. A.O. DYSON, Who is Jesus Christ? London (S.C.M.), 1969 as an example of the TROELTSCH's cry: "alles ist geschichtlich geworden".

The Transcendent Name - The Supreme

The Nameless Name

Jerusalem

The Name above all Name

τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντων ὀνομάτων

Nomen quod est super omnia nomina. Phil. II, 9

The Dilemma - The greatest temptation -> to withdraw

to -> cleared (Memorandum) -> the elite of the intelligents -> the rest -> the not understood

The Myth I

I

Salvation

what?

(includes the whole man) (from us?)

political (social) / economical / cultural

The name - myth -

Have we to transcend Name?

one of the mythic stages: to pass over the world of names

The myth of the salvation of the individual

The Problem of Language

Myth II

II

in Christ

who?

"Is there only one historical intersection with the Omega Point through a mediator? (Santolucito)"

Not the Manager

[Is there anyway of admitting Christ without having to be spiritually a renegade?]

Not the historical fact - but through that fact

but Christ

who?

Principle of identification:

The Spirit

III

Salvation in Christ

Pentecost

The Third period

Circumcision / Baptism / Eucharist -> Christ

We need an overarch

God? - No / Christ? -> Lord / Spirit / Man? -> No / Resurrection

710601
The Sufname

idea to add

- Christ is not what distinguishes and separates, but what unites.
He is $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{originem contradictionis} \\ \text{omnia in se habet ad se ipsum} \end{array} \right.$
- Religious language (i.e. experiences) may not be equivalent, but complementary.
- Universality & concreteness cannot be overcome dialectically but in the discovery of the radical relativity of my concrete form, i.e. in the experience that my 'model', my belief, my vision of Christ is limited, particularistic, imperfect and open to the universal (in a way which I do not and cannot know).
- Delete perhaps from 6 to 15
- Too democratic, equalitarian a model. There has to be a hierarchy, a possible ascent. The christic mandala is structured & hierarchic.
- The Pentecost experience is not to speak in languages, nor to understand more languages, but to understand that though they are saying different (and for me non-comprehensible) things, they are meaning, pointing out the same and in point of fact different experiences of the same — but not necessarily equivalent.
- A little more on language & Name.
- The Name is always a Vocative (cf. Kerényi)

Liberation


III - The Spirit: Salvation in Christ

(introduction 78)
like 23

1.- Is Christ Universal and Concrete?

We may now return to our starting point. Is there any way of understanding Jesus Christ in a universal way without diluting his concreteness? Is it possible to fully acknowledge Jesus without having to be spiritually a semite? Is there any way of fully accepting the Bible as the Sacred Book of one religious tradition of mankind without having to denigrate the other traditions to mere shadows or simply preparations? Can we believe in Jesus without having to recognize christendom as the only sociological religious structure? In one word, is it possible to disentangle Jesus from the cultural and even religious garb with which he has been invested, not only the hellenic or western one, but also the semitic and biblical one? (1) Does Jesus belong

(1) "And because the life of Jesus has significance and transcendency, ... I believe that he belongs, not only to Christianity, but to the entire world, to all races and people; it matters little under what flag, name, or doctrine they may work, profess a faith, or worship a God inherited from their ancestors." wrote Mahatma GANDHI, in Modern Review (October, 1964), p. 67, apud N. MINZ, Mahatma Gandhi and Hindu Christian Dialogue, Madras (Christian Literature Society), 1970, p.42. Cf. the present-day movement of K. Subba Rao, in South India, a former hindu school teacher preaching Christ but refusing to be baptized in any "church": "Have the very fanatics that destroyed you in the name of Religion now made you an article of merchandise?", apud K. BAAD The Movement around Subba Rao, Bangalore (CISRS), 1968. Cf. also the words of R. GARAUDY quoted below.



Perkopen a
shuten wadiun

~~τῷ νικῶντι δώσω αὐτῷ~~

~~ὄνομα καινῶν~~

σ

--- ὄνομα καινῶν γεγραμμένον ---
ὁ οὐδεὶς οἶδεν εἰ μὴ ὁ λαμβάνων

--- A new name written, known to none but
him that receives it.

Apoc. II, 17 ①

① cf. Is. LXII, 2 ; LXV, 15 besides the ~~other texts~~ similar quotations
of The Book of Revelation given in the text.

to the human race or only to biblical and postbiblical history (1).²

There are, in fact two different moments of one and the same problem: a) to claim particularity and concreteness for the universal. This was the theological approach probably since the patristic period. The question was centered in the Incarnation of God. b) To claim universality for the particular and concrete. This was probably the approach of the first Church and certainly the present-day one. The question becomes here the Divinisation of Christ.

We should insert an important reflection at this point, and this is the critical appraisal of the question itself, i.e. of the way of presenting the problem. The very query about universality and concreteness, in point of fact, springs from a perspective which is far from being universal. The preoccupation for universality arises from a pre-eminently theoretical thinking, whereas the primacy given to concreteness belongs to a rather mythical and empirical level. This is to say that all too often the intellectual does not feel the need for concreteness and almost instinctively considers concreteness as a condescension needed only for the intellectually or even spiritually less developed. On the contrary, for the man steeped in the concrete, the very problem of universality does not arise (not being itself a concrete problem) and he will feel like betraying his religiousness if he indulges in much talk about being universal.

(1) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, Die vielen Götter und der eine Herr, Beiträge zum Ökumenischen Gespräch des Weltreligionen, Weilheim (O.W. Barth) 1963, pp. 126-129 and passim.

2.- Two Options.

We can now examine the two hypotheses still susceptible of christian interpretation: First, Christ is saviour but not the only one, and Second, Christ is the unique saviour.

We may repeat, once again, that though we use the words salvation and saviour we do not intend to use them in any particular and definite sense. Anything helping man to reach the final destination of his human condition, whatever this may be, suffices here ^{for} our purpose, which is not to study the nature of salvation but the meaning of the name of Jesus as Saviour.

The first option begins to be favored by an increasing number of recent studies as a reaction against the second more traditional one and as ~~one that appears to be~~ more irenic and tolerant.

We would like to show, on the one hand, that the first option is only a less direct and more concealed way of formulating the second option, and, on the other hand, that the second one does not need to be interpreted in an exclusivistic and monopolistic way.

Further, we may succeed in showing that we have ultimately to do with the main problem human consciousness is capable of: the one and the many, the $\epsilon'\upsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ of the greeks (1), the ekam ^{ev} advitīyam of the

(1) PLAT., Phileb., 15 D.

Upaniṣads (1), the one or many Saviours of our query.

Nor this is all. We may, further, like to suggest that the whole problem arises because of the reification of Christ and the confusion of his what with ~~his~~ who, i.e. his historical identification with his personal identity.

a) There are many saviors.

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This first option will admit other saviours and will have to explain the traditional christian belief in Christ's universality pointing to three factors which may account for it. The one factor is α) historical and cosmological; the second, β) psychologico-anthropological and the third γ) logico-epistemological. This explanation will amount to showing that the statement "Christ is the universal Saviour" is a valid and true text within a particular context only but not outside it. We may reflect here on the charge of horizon in our times so as to explain the supposed claim of universality of the christian saviour. It would all boil down to recognizing that the realm within which Christ's universality was conceived and affirmed covers no longer the whole horizon of human experience, so that we would recognize a certain legitimate claim to universality in as much as the context was assumed to be the universal texture, but we would deny any actual universality because the world, this is to say, the range of human experience, subjective and objective, has radically changed since the times in which the christian doctrine was formulated and can no longer be identified with the christian context. It could be said that it is a process of demythologisation, or

(1) CU VI, 21

rather of remythologisation, for it exchanges one myth by another.

2) The historico-cosmological factor points to the fact that until now most men have lived in closed cultural, geographical and historical environments. We say the whole earth, and mean mainly our country or the countries we know; we say history, world, culture and religion and do not step over the respective horizons of our experience. Christians until now have lived mostly in the mediterranean world and its colonies (of all types). No wonder that their claim to universality was tied up with the horizon of their experience. They claimed universality without realising their boundaries and now they have to recognize that those boundaries are not the confines of the human horizon. Within christian theology one could use also a number of examples taken from biblical exegesis. One could, for instance, say, that just as there is no need to affirm that darkness covered Patagonia when Christ died, for the 'whole earth' (1) of Scripture had other geographical limitations, so, the cultural limitations of Christ's saving action account for the 'material' limitations of this universality, without invalidating his 'formal' claim to universality within a given context.

3) The psychological-anthropological factor derives from the inherent claim to universality inbuilt in any statement. A is B implies that any possible a belonging to A is really B. If christians hold Christ to be the Saviour of men qua men, they are implicitly holding him to be the Saviour of Man. They may recognize that de facto this is not the case, but they will tend to affirm that de jure,

(1) Luc., XXIII, 44.

*an objective
statement*

in voto, potentially or in one way or another, the "others" are also under the saving power of Christ.

This difficulty is obviated ^{by} recognizing that such a way of thinking freezes truth, objectifying it. Over against the paradigm of objective beauty, goodness or sympathy no man can say that his wife is the most beautiful, no parents affirm that their children are the best and no friend think that his or her friend is the most agreeable and sympathetic in the world. Yet, one can easily realise that living values and relationships cannot be tackled as objectifiable ideas. Christ can be, thus, the best and most effective saviour once you discover him and enter into a believing relationship with him, like a mother can find her child the most charming little baby in the world, but the statement cannot jump over the living and loving relationship which is inbuilt in the truth of the statement itself. This should not be understood as making of Christ a merely subjective figure. To affirm that pure objectivation will not do, does not mean that we have to fall into the opposite extreme of a sheer subjectivistic position. This only means that the object-subject dichotomy of the epistemic identification has to yield to the actual discovery of the personal identity.

8) The logical-epistemological factor is tied with a peculiar way of thinking characteristic of the semitic mind. It is the way of thinking which we have already alluded to: the use of the primacy of the principle of non-contradiction for discovering the self-identity of a being.

Using this method of intelligibility the affirmation "Christ is the Saviour" is seen as equivalent with: "No other than

Christ is Saviour". The realisation that the two sentences are not necessarily equivalent may provide the rationale for this first option of Christ not being the universal saviour. The christian interpretation would then be one of accepting all positive christian tenets, without identifying them with the negation of their contraries. The statement Christ is Saviour will, accordingly, be understood as saying what it affirms, but without implying that there is no other Saviour. And even in the case were one to affirm that there is no other Saviour, this sentence would be understood as saying that there is no other Saviour for him who proclaims or understands that message.

This first option that there are many saviours amounts to saying that there is only a formal and empty concept of salvation which is then 'filled up', as it were, by the different existential and concrete 'saviours'.

What is the place of Christ therein depends again on our understanding of Christ. What is the He that is allegedly having universal saving power?

If the He is only a geographical and historical reality, i.e. if it is only a spacial-temporal reality it can be hardly said that Jesus-Christ is that universal saving power. If, on the other hand, it is recognised that Jesus promised to send his Spirit (1), that it was good and convenient that He should go, otherwise that Spirit could not come (2), that He had other disciples whom the apostles did

(1) Cf. Io., XV, 26; etc.

(2) Cf. Io., XVI, 7.

not know (1), that He was and is present in the 'little ones' whom we love and help (2), that, in a word, He is a transhistorical reality, then, ^{the position} there no need to exclude ^{that this} understanding of Jesus can lead to the acceptance of

many saviours, all of them embodying that saving power which christians believe to be the Spirit of Jesus. The remaining and serious theological problems would then be that of the relationship between Jesus of Nazareth and 'his' Spirit (3).

(1) Cf. Io., X, 16

(2) Cf. Matth., XXV, 40.

(3) The astounding affirmations of a MEHER BABA: "I am the Christ", "I am infinite consciousness", "I am the Highest of the High", "Before me was Zoroaster, Krishna, Rama, Buddha, Jesus and Mahommed" and the all-pervading love he has infused to his disciples, for instance, constitute a serious problem which an unbiased theologian cannot dismiss as simple hallucinations or aberrations. Cf. (for Baba) Listen Humanity, New York (Dodd, Mead and Co.), 1967, passim. This is only one example among innumerable ones: Only that this one puts the problem of identity-identification in a very pregnant way, in spite of the weak philosophical and historico-religious expressions as is very often the case when partners speak two different languages or ^{are} on two different levels.

Without pursuing this argument further,
we would like to turn to the second alternative:

b) There is one unique saviour.

74 → Christ is the universal saviour; is, by all means, the most traditional christian interpretation. It enshrines the core of the christian conviction, even if it has often been interpreted in an uncritical and ^{for us} unacceptable way.

I would like to propound here a valid hermeneutic without now examining other possible interpretations.

We have already seen that sentences saying 'Jesus is the unique Saviour', 'there is no other name under which there is salvation' can have only an acceptable meaning if they refer not to an individual but to a person and that this reference involves the reference ^{i.e. the speaker} as much as the person referred to. Or, in scriptural terms: "nobody can say Jesus is Lord, unless in the Holy Spirit" (1). But the action of the Spirit is never an external one. The Spirit is the immanent divine principle, the inner divine force making room for human growth and allowing man to reach transcendence.

Christ, the Saviour is, thus, not to be restricted to the merely historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth. Or, as we have already said, the identity of Jesus is not to

(1) I Cor., XII, .3.

be confused with his historical identification. To say "Jesus Christ is Lord" (1) may be considered as the epitome of the christian confession of faith, but this sentence is not reversible without qualifications. ^{It is, then, not synonymous with 'The Lord is Jesus Christ'} This is so, to begin with, for obvious grammatical reasons: we destroy the subject if we convert it into a predicate, but also because to say "Buddha is Lord", for instance, may not necessarily contradict the christian sentence. All depends on the who we refer to by so different names.

The christian will say "Jesus Christ is the Lord" but the non-christian will understand that the christian is saying "the Lord is Jesus Christ". Some buddhists will affirm "Buddha is the Lord" whereas the non-buddhist will understand that they are saying "the Lord is Buddha". Everyone not having the person^{al} access^{provided by} of faith to Jesus, Buddha, ... will invert the sentence and understand: "The Lord is Jesus, Buddha, Man, History, ..." We come back to our starting point: the what (seen from an objectifying external perspective) is not the who; but: Who is the Lord?

And it is here again when the problem of language becomes theologically and philosophically of first importance and when linguistic analysis ceases to be a neopositivistic affair to turn a central ontological problem.

3.- The Monopoly of Names.

When a name ceases to be the ^{expression} carrier of a ~~myth~~^{symbol} to become almost exclusively the sign of an idea, it tends to become the monopoly of the culture or subculture which has begotten the particular idea. When names like grace or reve-

(1) Phil., II, 11.

lation, for instance, cease to be ^{symbols} ~~myths~~ to which many people can refer without filling them up with precise conceptual contents, they become more technical expressions, say of parti-

cular scholasticisms and tend to be used only in that particular formal sense, so that any other use of them will be considered improper. (Any scholastic christian theologian will feel uncomfortable -to follow up the example- if these two words are used outside the christian context and he will tell us that to speak of revelation in the other religions of the world is confusing, because it is a different concept of revelation altogether; he will affirm that grace, the precise supernatural and sanctifying grace, cannot exist habitually outside the realm of christianity. On the natural plane, he will concede, there may be a certain 'grace', but on the supernatural order, grace is only the christian grace (1).)

We could, equally put a more secular example and adduce the word history in its modern western understanding. If by history we understand the modern western concept of historicity, most of the non-semitic tradition, of course, have no 'history' and we cannot then use this word to denote homologous notions in other cultures (2).

^{Summing up,}
~~In a word,~~ names, in a closed cultural setting, tend to become proper nouns and pass to be private property of the users of that culture.

^{It is} just the opposite in the case of names in which the mythical-^{intent} and not the logos-content is prevalent. They are of general use and common property, even if the precise concepts expressed by those names may be at variance.

(1) Cf. the abundant literature, specially in roman-catholic circles, around the 40's culminating in PIUS·XII's Encyclical, Humani generis of 1950.

(2) R. PANIKKAR, "La loi du Karma et la dimension historique de l'Homme," La Théologie de l'Histoire. Herméneutique et Eschatologie. Edited by E. CASTELLI, Paris (Aubier) 1971, pp. 205-230.

The name of God in a great part of the world today can offer us a fitting example. Hardly any religion today will claim a monopoly on the name even if it claims that its particular notion of the divinity is the right one. Allāh (Al-ʿIlāh) or Yahweh cannot be confounded with the generic term of God, but few enlightened people belonging to the traditions in which those two names occur will call the others merely atheists because they don't know the "true name" of God.

Or, to take secular instances of today: Democracy and Freedom are two names with more mythical ~~con-~~tent than logos content. The concepts of Democracy and Freedom vary to almost opposite views in the different countries of the world today and under the word Liberation one can understand ^{a progression which goes} from a purely distentanglement of earthly bounds to a freedom from class or political or economic oppression.

There is a certain ambiguity in all names depending on their balance between their mythical-^{intents} and their logos-contents. There seem to be, further, a law of inverse proportionality between the mythical universality of a name and its logico-conceptual precision.

We could now apply this to our case regarding the Name outside which there is no salvation. It is a proper or a common name? (It would be out of place here to recur to etymologies saying that Jesus means Joshua, God is salvation (1) and Christ, (Χριστός), the Anointed One as a

(1) Jesus, i.e. Yeshua meaning 'God saves' was a very common name in Israel and the meaning "Yahweh is salvation" is obviously meant in Matth., I, 21 and Luc., II, 21 giving the account of the name of Jesus. Cf. also "Emmanuel": God with us. (Matth., I 23)

Greek translation of the Messiah (Māshīah or Māshūah) (1) because the Name is not an abstract and general expression but it names a concrete reality -a person in this case.)

In other words, a real name expresses always both myth and logos: the myth provides the context of which the logos is the text. Wisdom means to have a balanced view of both. ~~Fanaticism~~ ^{Dogmatism} destroys myth and imprisons truth in the logos. Agnosticism allows truth to escape and remains in an amorphous state in which not even the myth can live.

Can, now, christians monopolize a Name in the only knowledge of which there is said to be salvation? Is the saving name a proper noun or a common noun?

This is not quibbling. It is ^{an} effort at allowing for growth in man's consciousness, i.e. for a development which does not break with the past, which allows for continuity, identity and thus, loyalty and, at the same time, is not entangled in a stagnant view of man, history and religions which would amount not only to death but also to a crime.

If we have to take christian Scripture and the world Religions seriously, we cannot lightly bypass this issue, namely that salvation as human fulfilment -in whatever sense we may take it- is linked with the recognition of a

(1) From the verb māshah, to anoint.

particular name, which requires faith in it (1). Either christian belief says that the acknowledgment^{ment} of a particular and proper name is required for salvation, or that the name under heaven, without which there is no salvation is a common name, or rather a surname in the sense we shall explain ^{in a moment} (below). In the first case christianity becomes today a sect of harmful character. (We say today because one of the underlying contemporary myths is that of the unity of the human race and of the democratic constitution of man. Other periods in history, when slavery was tolerated, when the others were called barbarians or caste was theologically justified, when the vertical dimension of human existence was considered to be the only ~~the~~ real one, it was still possible to consider a select group, that of the twice-born or born again, to be the only ones to reach human fulness and to consider thus that only christians (muslims, brahmins, men, monks, ^{civilized,} etc. for that matter) were the only ones to reach the fulness of life. This is no longer possible today without finding a general resistance and an ingrown human repugnance.) The text in our present-day context can hardly be accepted meaning the first alternative,

(1) Cf. the text and the context of the expression: "on the faith of the name of him" (ἐν τῇ πίστει τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ) and again the "name of him and the faith through him" performing the miracle of the 'Beautiful Gate' according to Act., III, 16.

(And because this point is central to the whole christian economy we cannot dismiss it either, saying that it was a wrong conviction that christians have had, but that it no longer holds. You cannot change your fundamental convictions like you change your clothes. If there is to be any continuity in the christian tradition the sentence of the necessity of the Name, which epitomizes christian revelation, cannot be so easily dismissed.) Perhaps one of the crisis in christian consciousness today is that christians unconsciously try to evade this problem with the consequent deleterious results.

Our concern is not to justify a tradition or to defend christianity, but to understand a human situation of the past and of the present and eventually to help modern man to overcome his crisis. When millions of christians have said, prayed, believed and when they are saying, praying, believing that Christ is the Saviour -what do they mean? That he is one saving symbol among many? That he is the only one? But, who is he? And this is again our problem. What is his real name? Who knows it? Can there be a monopoly on such a name?

4.- The Transcending Name.

We may begin with another scriptural reference. Certainly "there is no other name granted to men by which they may receive salvation" (1), but this name is "a name above every name" (2); it is a name which transcends

(1) Act., IV, 12.

(2) Phil., II, 9. The literal translation should be: 'a name above all name'. The english language not allowing this, we

Deal also with general names

have the alternative: 'above all names' or 'above every name'.
 The former should not be understood as saying that there is a
 name above all other names and the latter should not be read
 as saying that there is a name above every other name: τὸ

ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντων ὀνομάτων.

consciousness today is that christians unconsciously
 evade this problem with the consequent deleterious results

all names, -even those of the angels (1), a name which is above "every name that can be named, not only in this age, but also in the age to come" (2); it is a "new name, which no man knows, except he that receives it (3). This name is "called the Word of God" (4). To confess this name is to say that it is "Lord" (5). Jesus did not come for his own glory (6), but to make known the Name of the One who had sent him (7). "Jesus" is not the revealed name, but he reveals the Supersname.

We may surmise, if we wish, that the reason for this is precisely that "the names that can be named are not unvarying names" (8), or again, because "it was from the Nameless that Heaven and Earth sprang" (9). However, there is no need to draw from another tradition. We could equally well say that "the Kingdom of God is not *in* word ($\epsilon\nu\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omega\varsigma$) but in power ($\epsilon\nu\ \delta\upsilon\sigma\upsilon\lambda\mu\epsilon\iota$)" (10).

(1) Cf. Hebr., I, 4.

(2) Cf. Eph., I, 21.

(3) Apoc., II, 17.

(4) Apoc., XIX, 13.

(5) Phil., II, 11 and passim.

(6) Cf. Io., VIII, 50; etc.

(7) Cf. Io., XVII, 6 and 26; etc.

(8) Tao Tē Ching, 1 (translation by A. Valey), The Way and its Power, New York (Grover Press), 1958.

(9) Ibid.,

(10) I Cor., IV, 20. The context suggests that logos here means speech or rather, talk.

The verses previous to our main text affirm thematically that the reason for the Superscription is that the carrier of that name "emptied himself" (1), not only in a moral way "becoming obedient unto death" (2), but also in an ontological manner "bearing human likeness" (3) in spite of being as he was "in the form of God" (4). "Taking the form of slave" (5) he was at the bottom of the human scale so that his name could never be felt as an imposition. In point of fact, this "annihilation", this "emptying himself" made it possible to transcend the world of "forms and names" (6), and have a name, certainly, but that which is above every name (7). He is not the nameless,

(1) Phil., II, 7.

(2) Phil., II, 8.

(3) Phil., II, 7.

(4) Phil., II, 6.

(5) Μορφῆν δούλου λαβών , Phil., II, 7.

(6) Cf. the indian background of nāma-rūpa, as an expression for that which is not the ultimate reality.

(7) Cf. Ps., CXXXVIII, 2 "magnificasti super omne nomen ²sacrum tuum", says the Vulgate (137). "For thou hast exalted above everything thy name and thy word" (RSV), or literally: "Thou hast exalted thy word above all thy name", though the text may be uncertain (Cf. Jerusalem Bible), "for thou hast made thy promise as the heavens" (NEB).

not the apophatic reality, nor sheer transcendence, not the unapproachable Godhead, not the disincarnated principle of the eternal archetype; he is the spoken mystery (1), the revealed epiphany (2), which was concealed since the beginning of time (3). There is no vagueness here, however. He is the Logos which was made flesh (4), yet did not remain in a body of death (5), but converted into a body of life (6), for he has overcome death (7), and taken a spiritual body (8). The Superscription is Word (9) and not just a name, it is Logos and not mere denomination (10). "To all who did receive him [the Word] gave power to become children of God, to those who believe in the name of him" (11). But it is not mere Logos; it is the spoken Logos and what ^{it is spoken} out, is the Spirit (12),

- (1) Cf. Rom., XVI, 25.
- (2) Cf. I Cor., II, 7-10.
- (3) Cf. Col., I, 26.
- (4) Cf. Io., I, 14.
- (5) Cf. Rom., VII, 24.
- (6) Cf. Matth., XXVI, 26; Marc., XIV, 22; Luc., XXII, 19.; etc.
- (7) Cf. I Cor., XV, 55 sq.
- (8) Cf. I Cor., XV, 44.
- (9) Cf. Io., I, 1.
- (10) Cf. the upanisadic saying quoted before.
- (11) Cf. Io., I, 12. Significantly enough the NEB translates: "to those who have yielded him their intelligence". The name here has clearly not yet been spoken. The subject of the sentence is the "true Light which enlightens every man coming into the world" (v. 9).
- (12) Cf. Io., VII, 37 sq.; XIV, 15, sq.; etc. Cf. the theological controversy around the Filioque and the here suggested greek orthodox interpretation.

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the Spirit which is going to teach us all truth (1), the Spirit which permeates the whole universe (2), which has the knowledge of every word (3), is mentioned in any authentic name (4) and makes new everything (5). The Supersname is not an empty word, nor a mere label. It is not only named, it also names.

We may try to formulate our problem in a philosophical way. The revelation of the name does not represent the freezing of the vital human activity of naming, which would entail favouring a particular name, which may become frozen and dead, as happens soon or later with all names. It is rather the affirmation that there is always a name, that there is no salvation without a name, without a saving name. The revelation of the name is precisely the revelation of the name and not only of the word. It is the revelation of the vocative and it is the revelation of the

(1) Cf. Io., XIV, 26; XV, 26; XVI, 13; etc.

(2) Cf. Sap., I, 7 as utilised in the Liturgy of Pentecost, etc.

(3) Ibid., and also Matth., X, 20; etc.

(4) Cf. the homology between the spirit and truth: Io., IV, 23-24; XIV, 17; XV, 26; XVI, 13; etc.

(5) Cf. Ps., XIII (104), 29-30 as used in the Liturgy of Pentecost, Apoc., XXI, 5; etc.

maximum of concreteness -there is nothing more concrete than a name- combined with the maximum of universality. A name is only such if it names something, if it has a content somehow intelligible. A name is more than just a sound and yet is nonetheless concrete. But a name, precisely because it names, is universal also. The name draws the so named 'thing' from its isolation and unreality, from its hiddenness. A name is communication, it conveys a meaning, of whatever type. Moreover, a name is infinitely more than this. A name is also communion. A name is a real name only when it establishes communion, at least between the 'namer' and the 'named'. Furthermore, this communion can be shared by whoever understands the name. This is the reason of the power of names and of the human wish to keep some names secret, because they are too intimate or too powerful, for he who shares in the name establishes communion immediately with the thing so named. (There is no need on this occasion to adduce examples from the most ancient cultures up to the present day (from 'thou-ing' to calling 'names' or 'education' as familiarity with names, etc.).)

A name is in itself concrete and universal and has at the same time the tendency to become more concrete by being monopolised, dominated, utilised, manipulated by a particular class, cast~~e~~, culture, etc. It also tends to become more universal by overflowing its boundaries through translation, imposition (for domination) etc. The revelation of the Supername seeks to keep the balance. We cannot do without names, nor, on the other hand, can we freeze names so as to confound the living name with a technical label.

We may exclude both extreme views as untenable: On the one hand, the postulating of an individual as universal Saviour and, on the other hand, the diluting of Jesus to a mere abstract^{ion} or to a conventional sign for salvation.

Christ the Lord and Saviour is, for the christian, the symbol of that mystery which is unveiled in or through Jesus. The christian's act of faith in Jesus extends far beyond a mere reliance upon historical memory trusting in the testimonies of the elders. Ultimately, the christian does not worship Jesus, who is the way (1), but the Father. (Blessed are those who do not see and yet believe (2). He who sees him, sees the Father (3). He came in order that the life and unity which exist between him and the Father might be also between him and the believer (4). He did not want to be proclaimed Son of God, lest some misunderstanding arise because of the wrong attitude of the believer (5). Furthermore, it is good that he goes and disappears (6); otherwise man will make him king (7) or God and forget that his

(1) Cf. Io., X, 7; XVI, 6.

(2) Cf. Io., XX, 29.

(3) Cf. Io., XII, 45; XIV, 9.

(4) Cf. Io., VI, 57; etc.

(5) Cf. Luc., IV, 35; 41; Marc., III, 11-12; (Cf. also Luc., IX, 21 and parallels.

(6) Cf. Io., XVI, 7.

(7) Cf. Io., VI, 15.

name is like that of his 'typos' (1), a truly admirable name (2), an unnamable name (3). No christian prayer ultimately stops at Christ but proceeds to the Father through the Son in the Spirit or by the Son through the Spirit (4). (There is no need to dwell now, however, on christian tradition (5).)

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- (1) Cf. Gen., XXXII, 29 and the whole mystical tradition stemming from this passage.
- (2) Cf. the Psalms passim, etc. Cf. vgr. Ps., VIII, 2.
- (3) Cf. christian commentators from at least Dionysios onwards describing God as 'anonymos', 'polynomos', vgr. DIONYS. De div. nominibus, VII, 3 (P.G., 3, 869 sq.) De myst. theol., I, 2 and 3 (P.G., 3, 1000).
- (4) Per Dominum Nostrum Jesu^{ch}ristum, ...in unitate Spiritus Sancti, Deus... has been since time immemorial the end of christian liturgical prayers.
- (5) Cf. the passage of Meister ECKHART, I. Expos. Genes., given in the Opera Omnia, Lateinische Werke (Edit. E. BENZ et alia) Vol. I, pp. 95-96, nn. 298-300: "Cur queris nomen meum, quod est mirabile? Primo sic: 'nomen meum est mirabile', Psalmus 8, 2/: quam admirabile est nomen tuum; Ysa, 9/6: vocabitur admirabilis. Secundo sic: 'nomen meum admirabile -quod est', quasi dicat 'hoc quod est' sive 'qui est', ipsum est nomen meum mirabile, Exo., 3^o/14: 'Ego sum qui sum; qui est misit me; hoc nomen meum. Tertio sic: 'cur queris nomen meum quod est mirabile?' Mirabile quidem primo, quia nomen et tamen super omne nomen, Philippens. 2^o/9: 'donavit illi nomen, quod est super omne nomen'. Secundo nomen est mirabile, quia nomen est innominabile, nomen indicibile et nomen ineffabile. AUGUSTINUS, primo De doctrina christiana, locutus de deo, sic

ait: 'diximusne aliquit et sonuimus dignum deo? Si dixi, non est hoc quod dicere volui. Hoc unde scio, nisi quia deus ineffabilis est; quod autem a me dictum est, si ineffabile esset, dictum non esset? Et sic nescio que pugna verborum, quoniam si illud est ineffabile, quod dici non potest, non est ineffabile, quod vel ineffabile potest dici. Que pugna verborum silencio cavenda potius quam voce petenda [C: petenda] est. Quarto: 'cur queris nomen meum? quod est mirabile' -scilicet te querere nomen meum, cum sim innominabilis; mirabile certe est querere nomen rei innominabilis. Secundo mirabile querere nomen eius, cuius natura est esse absconditum, Ysa, 45/15: 'vere tu es deus absconditus'. Tertio mirabile querere foris nomen eius, qui non extra sed intimus est. AUGUSTINUS, De vera religione: 'Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi, in interiori homine habitat deus, veritas, ad quam nullo modo perveniunt qui foris eam [E: eum] querunt. (apud V. LOSSKY, op. cit., p. 14).

(Jesus Christ is the Mediator, the medium quo, though not an intermediary because the quo is not separated or disconnected from the quod, because he is a person and we are also persons, because we all are in the quo ^{at least} /as long as the pilgrimage lasts, "in regione dissimilitudinis" (1). His mediatorship is not primarily epistemological but ontological and thus, it is ultimately not necessary to see him, provided we see through him; and one may dare to say that the more transparent he is, the clearer is the vision through him. Otherwise the Paraclete, who will teach us the whole truth, will not come (2). He said explicitly that he had achieved and finished the work entrusted to him (3) and

- (1) A traditional expression in christian tradition to express the existential human condition after Adam's fall. Cf. AUGUST., Conf., VII, 10, nn. 16; BERNARD., Serm., XLII, 2 (P.L., 183, 661); etc. Cf. the rather interesting platonic origin of the expression ^{apud} A.E. TAYLOR, "Regio dissimilitudinis", Archives h'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age, VII, pp. 305 sq. E. GILSON, La théologie mystique de Saint Bernard, Paris (Vrin), 1934, pp. 63, sq. and V. LOSSKY, op. cit., pp. 175 sq., take up again this expression.
- (2) Cf. Io., XIV, 26; XVI, 13; etc.
- (3) Cf. Io., IV, 34; XVII, 4; etc.

repeated it in the most solemn and unmistakable way:

'consummatum est' (1).

Christ is not the revelation, not the revealed name, but the revealer of the name. The name Christ reveals is a Superscription, a name which was prepared before ever the sun came to be (2), a new name, so new that just to repeat it without applying one's mind and heart to it would be to rob it of its saving power, so secret that we cannot have it in front of us as an object, so saving that he who utters it -and the sounds and voices may be infinite- knows for certain that in that name all the treasures of the godhead dwell in the most corporeal manner (3). He also knows that that Name has made its splash-down upon earth in innumerable tongues (4).

(1) Io., XIX, 30 (Cf. also 28).

(2) Cf. Psalm., LXXI (LXXII), 17: πρὸ τοῦ ἡλίου διαμενεῖ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ says the LXX and 'ante solem permanet nomen eius' says the Vg. Jewish and christian traditions interpreted this text as referring to the 'pre-existent' Messiah. Cf. H.A. WOLFSON, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, Cambridge, Mass. (Harvard University Press), 2nd. ed., 1964, Vol. I, pp. 157 sq. Modern translations render: 'enduring as long as the sun' (Jerusalem Bible), 'may it live for ever like the sun' (NEB), 'a name to endure while the sun gives light' (Knox), etc.

(3) Cf. Col., II, 9.

(4) Cf. Act., II, 3.

5.- Jesus, the Lord.

To say "Jesus is the universal Saviour" means, therefore, that there is universal salvation, but that the Saviour is not an individual, not merely a historical figure, nor basically an epistemological revealer. Salvation -whatever it may ^{consist of -} is always a personal act, thus, a personal experience and a personal encounter.

It is always in the Spirit that man encounters his saviour, not a disincarnated saviour indeed, but equally not a merely temporal or geographical individual; and yet for the christian the way to this encounter may have to pass through the historical manifestation of the mystery.

99 ← (Jesus is Christ because he was anointed by the Holy Spirit at his baptism, says christian tradition (1).

Christ is the Anointed, the anointed one with the chrism of universality, the māshīah, the anointed not only by God but also by men. Jesus as the universal symbol for salvation cannot be objectified and thus reified as a merely historical personage.

The christian experience of salvation in Jesus cannot be ^{expressed} ~~(in an)~~ ^{objectifiable statement} ~~petrified sentence~~, as if somewhere there were some superman who saves, either only those who believe in him, or also those who do not do so explicitly. Nor does it mean a subjective disposition only, which could find its

(1) Cf. the striking formula of PAUL OF SAMOSATA referring to the baptism of Christ: "having been anointed with the Holy Spirit, he was named Christ" (which does not need to be interpreted in a modalistic way), Apud H.A. WOLFSON, op. cit., p. 593.

~~contents in~~ ^{meaningful} any number of 'symbols'. It means a personal discovery of the mystery of life and existence, a personal encounter with reality, not as a faceless and cold Being, transcendent or not, but as an intimate and ineffable meeting with the Person, with God, the Mystery, Nothingness, with the Ideal, with Truth, or in whatever manner and name we may prefer to express it.

The normal way for the christian will be revelation of the name by Jesus, whom he believes is risen. But the christian will not deny a priori that this meeting, experience, conviction or in whatever form it may be called, may take any other form and epiphany. He, for himself, will be convinced that the mystery with which he is in communion through Jesus is the mystery which saves, gives meaning to existence, hope to living and love to reality to any being capable of experiencing the same through as many forms as ever there may be. "Jesus is the Lord" (1) is the shortest way the christian may formulate this belief.

By saying personal encounter we intend to avoid the purely subjective and anthropomorphic feeling as much as the merely objective and doctrinal approach. To reduce personal experience to a merely sentimental or subjective discovery of 'another' 'personified' being would amount to degrading the person to a subjective bundle of feelings.

Personal encounter means a personal discovery by which the different constitutive poles of the person,

(1) Phil., II, 11.

become what they are precisely because they respond actively and passively to the mutual stimulation from the different poles. The person is not the I alone (which alone has no meaning whatsoever; there is an I only over against another personal pole) nor the Thou alone, but the constitutive relationship of the I - Thou - He/She/^{It} relationship in the singular and the plural. Personal encounter is, then the discovery of my personal being in and through the inclusion of the different poles of personal existence. It is far from being an anthropomorphic category in the usual term of the word (1).

97 → The affirmation 'Jesus the Lord' would, then, consequently mean, first of all, that I find that my being is not exhausted in an isolated and almost solipsistic private self, nor in ^{any} equalitarian horizontal relation with similar selves, but that it needs a Lord, a superior instance which opens up for me the ultimate horizon where my person can exist. It means, further, that this Lord whose Lordship can appear in innumerable forms has taken for me an ultimate form which is indissolubly connected with Jesus of Nazareth.

We may now turn to the possible understanding of this classical christian tenet from a perspective that has in view other religious traditions. The language of a hindu or buddhist is, obviously, very different from the use of language and the meaning of words of a modern secularist or an atheist, for instance. We may try to address ourselves, first to a traditional religious language and then,

(1) The reflections from the french "philosophie de l'ésprit", specially E. MOUNIER, L. LAVALLE, R. LE SENNE, G. MARCEL, M. NEDONCELLE, etc. should be remembered and incorporated here.

to a more secular and modern idiom. (मि.क.प.११)

6.- The Lord of Religions.

We may assume, only for the sake of concentrating our attention on our single problem, that there is a common language regarding the meaningfulness of salvation or liberation (sotēria, moksa, nirvāna, ...) and of a saviour, be this a person, grace, an illumination or whatever.

First of all, the meaning of the traditional christian sentences can only be understood assuming the notion of time, history, man, salvation, revelation, etc. proper to the mediterranean cultural and religious area in which they were formulated. Secondly, they make sense only within that proper context.

Outside the cultural christian area, the statement "Jesus is universal saviour" is almost bound to be understood, as saying: "the christians, out of their peculiar faith, personal experience or limited horizon believe that 'their Christ is the only one saviour of the world so that if the non-christians are saved at all, they are saved by an alien saviour, namely the saviour of the christians". Or, "the man Jesus of Nazareth in the eyes of the christians is converted into the only door of salvation".

If Jesus has to be understood, as being the unique Saviour, in a way which does justice to the experience of the other peoples of the world and to the deepest christian insights, he cannot be linked with the biblical tra-

dition exclusively. In other words, the context in which the text is inscribed, is no longer tenable. The message of the Bible is valid but is not necessarily the only one. The basic function of the Bible is not to carry a cognitive message but to perform a strictly historical role, namely the historical (of the people of Israel was born Jesus in whom the fulness performance that out of the godhead did dwell in a corporeal manner (1). Assuming for a moment that tomorrow all the Bibles of the world were destroyed and even that people would no longer remember any single literal sentence, the fundamental function of the Bible would remain unharmed, because the historical genealogy of Jesus would remain unchanged -as it does, even if the existing records differ (2). What has happened historically, has happened historically and so, it remains.

The History of Salvation is not the salvation of history, but the acknowledgement of salvation through history, even for those who do not live in history, because in the last analysis salvation is not an historical fact, but a transhistorical act.

Whatever this may be (-for it is not our purpose now to elucidate this problem-) we may venture a series of sentences which we consider christian, i.e. acceptable for a christian and not repugnant to other traditions of the world.

The first affirmation would be that there is universal salvation (3). The christian believes, not only

(1) Cf. Luc., III, 22 and Col., II, 9.

(2) Cf. Matth., I, 1 sq.; Luc., III, 23 sq.

(3) Cf. Rom., V, 12-21.

that God wants every man to be saved (1), but that he also has provided the means (2). The christian may even quote Scripture and Tradition (4) (3)/to substantiate his hope in a universal restitution. Furthermore, if the scheme of History of Salvation has to be applicable outside the peoples of the Covenant an almost immediate corollary follows, namely that the different religious traditions of the world are the normal and ordinary ways for salvation willed and provided by God, whereby the term religion remains sufficiently vague and open to the future also (5).

The second affirmation is the uniqueness of the Saviour. If the christian were aware of another one having "words of eternal life" (6) he would also follow him, for he has learned that "who is not against you is on your side" (7) and has understood the distinction between the sociological relativism of the visible groups following Jesus and the uncompromising ontological attitude vis-à-vis the Master (8).

(1) Cf. I Tim., II, 4.

(2) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism, London (Longman, Darton & Todd), 1964, p. 51 sq.

(3) Cf. Act., III, 21 and also Marc., IX, 12, besides the later qualifications of the Church (Cf. DENZ. 211, 429, 531).

(5) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, "Christianity and World Religions" in Christianity, op. cit. p. 109, sq.

(6) Io., VI, 68.

(7) Luc., IX, 50. Cf. also Marc., IX, 40: "For he who is not against us is on our side".

(8) Cf. Luc., XI, 23: "He who is not with me is against me". Cf. Matth., XII, 30.

(4) Cf. among the most recent documents: "The Church, to which we are called in Christ Jesus, and in which we acquire sanctity

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through the grace of God, will attain her full perfection only in the glory of heaven. Then will come the time of the restoration of all things (Acts., III, 21). Then the whole world, which is intimately related to man and achieves its purpose through him, will be perfectly re-established in Christ.

(Cf. Eph., I, 10; Col., I, 20; 2 Pet., III, 10-13)", Lumen Gentium, VII, 28, Transl. W. M. ABBOT, Ed. The Documents of the Vatican II, New York (Guil Press), 1966, p. 24 sq.

He has been made aware of the cosmic manifestations of the Lord (1), so that the uniqueness he claims for the Lord is in no way an epistemological monopoly. Significantly enough, only when in recent periods of western christian history modern man has tried to get rid of metaphysics and ontology has he fallen into the temptation of interpreting Christ's uniqueness in epistemic terms, so that he who would not take epistemological notice of Jesus would be outside the realm of salvation (2). In a word, the uniqueness of the Lord rests with the Lord and not with us.

Uniqueness belongs to the qualitative and not to the quantitative order. It belongs to the personal and not to the reified mere objectifiable order. Every person is unique and thus, un-exchangeable and incomparable. Uniqueness is the phenomenological characteristic of mystery. Every mystery is irreducible to anything else: it is unique.

The third affirmation states that the christian has not only no monopoly over Jesus, but that he has no control either over the ways in which the Lord brings about salvation. It is not only a question of acknowledging that Jesus has other sheep/⁽³⁾which even the Apostles do not know (4),

(1) Cf. the already quoted passages of Io., Col., Eph., Apoc., etc. regarding the so-called cosmic or pre-existent Christ.

(2) Cf. the many works on the so-called "Salvation of the Unbelievers", specially one and two decades ago. Cf. some bibliography in my book, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism, op. cit., pp. 50-52. Cf. (recent the) bibliography given before on the problem of universal salvation.

(3) Cf. Io., X, 16.

(4) Cf. Marc., IX, 38.

but furthermore to affirm that his ways are never our ways (1) nor his measure our measure (2). Not even the Son of Man knows the mystery of the 'hour' (3).

Fourthly, the christian will refrain from propounding with certainty any theory regarding the problem of salvation. He remembers well that neither those of the right nor those of the left were really conscious that they were doing to Christ what they did, so that it merited ^{them} salvation or damnation (4). Furthermore, he will not venture to investigate except tentatively and only on the level of theological speculation, the concrete ways how the Lord is present and efficient though hidden and unknown in any authentic form of religiousness (5).

Fifthly, as it should have become clear from the preceeding reflections, when the christian says "Jesus" in the Spirit, he does not mean only nor mainly the historical

(1) Cf. Rom., XI, 33.

(2) Cf., Io., VII, 6.

(3) Cf. Marc., XIII, 32; Act., I, 7.

(4) Cf. Matth., XXV, 37 sq.

(5) Cf. my already quoted, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism,

Nazarene, but the risen Lord, whom he has encountered in his Emmaus (1) or Damascus (2) or Nathanael (3) or Thomas (4) or ~~Magdalen~~ (5) or other experience (6). And this forbids him to exclude other ways of meeting the Lord, even if he does not understand (7).

There remains, sixthly, the historical dimension of his belief. This constitutes both his strength or peculiarity and also his weakness or rather his limitations. Facing types of religiousness other than historical, the christian feels that he is at pains to express his belief because until now the christian understanding has not yet liberated the text, i.e., the christian fact, from its interpretation within a certain context. He will stress the uniqueness of the historical fact of the 'coming of Christ', but he will be prone to identify the historical epiphany -real as it is- with the mystery manifested in and through history (8). He will not exclude the theoretical possibility of another interpretation of his belief, but he will have

(1) Cf. Luc., XXIV, 32.

(2) Cf. Act., IX, 5: "Who are you, Lord?"

(3) Cf. Io., III, 1 sq.

(4) Cf. Io., XX, 28; "My Lord and my God!"

(5) Cf. Io., XX, 16; "Rabbuni!"; Matth., XXVIII,⁵ "Do not be afraid!"

(6) Cf. H.A. WILLIAMS, True Resurrection, London (M. Beazley), 1972, just to mention the most recent book.

(7) Cf. Luc., IX, 50; etc.

(8) Cf. Rom., XVI, 25-26.

to confess that until now there has hardly been any serious attempt at understanding the mystery of Christ in a context other than what we have called the mediterranean world-view (1). The understanding and reception of Christ has been a mediterranean one. No wonder that outside that aerea there are only colonial christian enclaves. This is a point in which pure speculation is out of order, for we touch the very root of the mystery of human existence: we have not yet lived our lives nor exhausted the possibilities that reality offers us. Christian speculation like any other real human activity is not just repeating past models but creating new possibilities and paradigms. The present day christian consciousness of the emerging planetarian context of human experience is looking for and ready to welcome any possible interpretation which accounts for the facts which, *it* believes, have to be preserved in all their historical reality and allows, at the same time, a really non-sectarian universality and self-image. This interpretation, however, is not the interpretation of a single historical event, having taken place at Bethlehem or Jerusalem, but the interpretation of that event in *the* real and complex human tradition encompassing not only twenty centuries of christian Church or millenia of human history, but also all the eons of human experience crystallised in the depths of human life. Neither the purely mystical discovery of Christ nor the merely historical approach will do. The principle of growth underlying

(1) The present writer, *for instance,* had suggested almost two decades ago, that a christian theology for India, should not begin with "Creation" but straightaway with the "Eucharist".

this method is equally distant from mere continuity as from sheer discontinuity.

The seventh remark will recognize that there are no bare facts and thus that pure historicity is far from being the only criterion of reality or reality as such. The so-called historical fact, for instance, presupposes an understanding of history which in no way can be called the only possible interpretation of temporal reality. There are no bare facts, for the understanding and acceptance of any fact belongs already to the fact. The question is, thus, not as simple as clothing reality with another conceptual garb, once we recognize that the old one is no longer proper, -because the garb, though not a particular one, appurtains to reality. Can another radical interpretation of a so-called bare fact be still considered only another reformulation of the 'same' non-existing hypothetical nude fact? The christian will have to recognize that he was and is superimposing structures, which he cannot get rid of, which are not given with the unfolding of the mystery, but only with his acceptance of it. To recognize this does not imply that one is already accepting any other interpretation. It is one thing to accept that my vision is neither perfect nor universal, and another thing to accept another insight as equivalent of what, until then, was considered incontrovertible. Who is going to decide whether it is a normal growth or a cancer? This is the place of dialogue not as a means of 'converting' the other not even of gathering information about the other, but as a way of coming to know and discover oneself and thus,

grow together (1). It would then be preposterous to plan beforehand and almost a priori the way that this new understanding has to go. Here it is literally true that the way is made by going it. (Perhaps this 'freedom of the children of God' (2) is also 'good News' (3).)

What we are saying here is that the authentic religious dialogue in the true meeting of religious tradition lays bare the modern christian myth of history as being the criterion and exponent of reality (4).

Our eighth observation will then revert to the question of whether it is at all possible to accept

(1) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, "Témoignage et dialogue", in Le Témoignage edited by E. CASTELLI, Paris (Aubier), 1972, pp. 367-388, specially 376-379.

(2) Cf. Io., VIII, 36; Gal., V, 1.

(3) Cf. Marc., XVI, 15; I Thes., III, 6.

(4) Cf. W. TAYLOR STEVENSON, "History as Myth" in Cross-Currents, XX, 1 (Winter, 1970), pp. 15-28 showing "that what is commonly termed "history" is a mythic perception of reality" (17). The same author has written an entire book on the subject.

Jesus in a non-semitic way which at the same time may not be considered unacceptable for the jewish-christian mentality (1).

If Jesus has to be relevant to those spiritually outside Israel he has to relate to them either through the mediation of Israel or because he also speaks to the general humanness of mankind. In the first case we have the common present-day christian interpretation of Christ. A christian is accordingly not only a man who discovers the lordship of Jesus but who interprets this lordship in a concrete historical way relating to the *unfolding* of Yahweh's dealings with his people and through his people to others.

The second alternative is offered by the notion of the so-called cosmic Christ. He appears then as a universal saviour directly related to the history of mankind having appeared and been active in the jewish Covenant, completed afterwards by the New Testament. Jesus here as epiphany of the primordial mystery (2) relates to the general human experience and at the same time is connected with one particular people and with one of the phylums of man's history. In order to be a christian, here, one does not need to negate one's particular religious and cultural tradition, but one has to join the main phylum of the world's history and of human development. The other traditions are here not excluded but subordinated (3).

(1) It is well known today that this is one of the capital and agonising problems which the so-called young churches of Africa and Asia hardly dare to put in this almost crude way.

(2) Cf. Rom., XVI, 25-26; Eph., I, 9 sq.; Col., I, 15.

(3) Cf. Io., IV, 22; Rom., IX, 4 sq.; XI, 1 sq.

There is still a third hypothesis. Jesus would here be considered not only the Jesus of history (first alternative) and the human manifestation of the cosmic mystery (second hypothesis), but as the concrete anthropological symbol through which christians come to experience the fullness of reality and the fulfilment of human life. Here Jesus is understood as disclosing the saving Supername, which in each case is known as naming the saviour of the particular believer or believing tradition.

The central christian mystery for the first hypothesis is the Incarnation. The Jesus of history is the incarnated Logos and the stress is here in the "skandalon" of concreteness, the human condition and the Cross.

The central christian mystery for the second hypothesis is the Resurrection. The cosmic Christ is the risen Jesus and the stress is on his universal lordship as the cosmic center into which all converges.

The central christian mystery for the third hypothesis is Pentecost (1). The descending Spirit is the Spirit of Jesus allowing each person or tradition to speak its own language, being well aware that though they may not understand one another they nevertheless know that they are extolling the same "great things" (2).

(1) Cf. among other passages, Act., XVI, 7; Phil., I, 19; Rom., VIII, 9; I Petr., I, 11; II Cor., III, 17; Gal., IV, 6; II Cor., III, 18; for the relationship between Jesus and the Spirit.

(2) Cf. Act., II, 11;

In this latter alternative Jesus relates thus, to those outside the western-christian area not by means of the history of another people or by means of a general cosmic experience but by means of their own human traditions. Jesus in this case would be one of the names of the cosmo-theandric principle, which has received practically as many names as there are authentic forms of religiousness and which at the same time finds a historically sui-generis epiphany in Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus is here the Man (1), the purusa (2) or whatever symbol which opens us up to the mystery.

The three attitudes can still say that Jesus is the Saviour, but within different contexts. The first one will say that the historical Jesus is the only historical saviour of mankind. The second hypothesis will understand the same sentence as saying that the cosmic Christ whom christians come to know through the historical Jesus and whom they practically identify with the Risen Lord is the universal saviour. The third hypothesis will also consider the statement as valid in as much as it says that the who whom christians see in Jesus is the only universal saviour.

It must be added here, that the moment that the mystery of the who is mistaken by the objectification of the what the third hypothesis ceases to be such and certainly it is no longer christian. It does not say, in point of fact, that what christians call Jesus is what buddhists call Buddha or hindus by other names. The moment that the mystery of the name

(1) Cf. Io., XIX, 5.

(2) Cf. RV X, 90.

fades away, the Supurname is only a psychological or a dialectical device and our third hypothesis becomes a merely ecclectical position.

Finally, it would remain a major theological problem, this being our ninth remark, to find an adequate theology of religion, capable of encompassing the whole range of man's religious experience today (1). It could be still a christocentric theology, even if the greek name of Christ is not mentioned, for He does not stand only for one single event but for that cosmo-theandric principle which being incarnated in Jesus of Nazareth, has not only spoken many times through the prophets (2) but also has not left himself without witnesses in any moment of history (3) -to quote only one of the many sacred scriptures of the world.

116 2 [7.- The Lord of History.

The meaning of Jesus' universality may be even more difficult to understand in this context, which some would like to call the post-christian or secular,

(1) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, "Philosophy of Religion in the Contemporary Encounter of Cultures" in Contemporary Philosophy - A Survey, edited by R. KLIBANSKY, Firenze (La Nuova Italia), 1971 pp. 221-242.

(2) Cf. Hebr., I, 1

(3) Cf. Act., XIV, 17.

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 than in the traditional religious world. The main divergency here does not ^{concern} ~~lie in~~ Jesus as symbol for universal salvation, but ~~is~~ the interpretation of salvation itself. This is, however, a problem which we have excluded from our investigation.

If christian experience has to open itself up to cultures different from those in which it has been couched, it has to be still more open to world-views which have derived from ~~christian~~ interaction ^{with christian ideas}

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 The proper task of Fundamental Theology as a separate discipline is not to defend a priori a particular philosophy as more adequate than another for explaining christian belief, but to have such a deep, and I would add mystical experience of Jesus, that one may express it in whatever cultural tools one may have at his disposal (1).

In this context Jesus does not stand, as in the previous one, in contrast to some other possible saviours. The question here is whether the whole language of salvation has any meaning at all and, further, whether there is need of any saviour. What is the sense of a saviour when the very notion of it appears to be meaningless? Shall we have to say that the kerygma here has first to create the need? The problem is complex and we need not go into it.

(1) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, "Metatheology or Diacritical Theology as Fundamental Theology", Concilium, Vol. 6, Nr. 5, Nijmegen (June/1969) pp. 21-27.

Can Jesus be said to be a secular saviour? Has he anything to say to secular man? Probably not that he is the saviour in a traditional way and, in fact, modern christology is trying to argue that it is the concept of salvation and even the concept of religion that have to change, whereas the figure of Jesus towers perhaps greater than ever among men, precisely because he has been demythologized from his divine pedestal and converted into universal Brother (1).

We may agree or not agree with the directions of many a theological school, but we may understand them as being efforts at discovering the context in which Jesus is not only relevant, but central to the quest of modern man for happiness, love, community, justice, a better world, a more human life, etc.

We may be dispensed of further references because this constitutes one of the central problems of present day christological speculation: How to relate Jesus to history, both to universal and to personal history (2).

We may only retain, the already mentioned shift from the cosmological to the historical myth, the historical centrality reserved to the place of Jesus, the experience of history triggered by the Jesus event and the

(1) We could cite here extremes so interesting like Ch. de FOUCAULD and the 'Death of God' theologians, Th. ALTIZER, P. v. BUREN, etc. or theologians like K. ADAM and H. COX, D. BONHÖFFER and K. RAHNER.

temporary examples of this problematic.

(2) Names like R. BULTMANN, O. CULLMANN, W. PANNENBERG and in another sense G. VAHANIAN, P. BERGER, etc. like all the innumerable followers of the so-called christian humanism are con-

caution not to superimpose one particular Jesus model on other cultures and world-views (1).

8.- The Lord of Faith.

This study should not be reduced to a theological reappraisal of the christian claim. I think that there is a more positive and constructive approach to the question, without denying the point of truth contained in the cosmological reduction, as well as in the anthropological and epistemological interpretations. Some may call it the mystical approach, but perhaps it could be simply characterized as the approach of simple faith.

It may be again another aspect of the paradox that the more personal a language, the more universally understandable it is. Concreteness is the way to universality -but hardly vice-versa.

To say "salvation in Christ" or "Christ is the universal saviour" is an extremely general and objective statement, which has meaning only within a particular context. And it is difficult to descend to the concrete from the universal. If I were to formulate my belief I would not speak that way. I would simply say that I have the experience of a new name, which is constantly new and renewed for me, a name,

(1) Cf. the different essays by K. RAHNER, J. RATZINGER, G. THILS, W. DANTINE, etc. in Th. MICHELS (ed.) Geschichtlichkeit der Theologie, Salzburg-München (Pustet), 1970.

which is hidden to the outsiders, not because of any type of esoterism or particularism, but because a name -unlike a term- is only such if it really names, i.e., if it is discovered from within, if it is a name by which I am called or with which I am calling. This name/makes, redeems me. In this name both my Saviour and myself are one because the calling belongs to the called and to the caller alike (1). And yet in the internal polarity of the person the poles are neither identical nor interchangeable.

The name here is not a label, but real symbol and a symbol is neither object nor subject.

But this name -which is new and unknown, except in the act of naming (calling) it, otherwise it is only a term or a sound, -this name is, at the same time, a surname, it is a name above all names (2). In discovering it as a surname, I realize that I have no monopoly over that name, that I cannot objectify it without killing it, that it is a name only in the vocative and that I do not know it fully (only the winner

(1) Cf. Io., VI, 56; XVII, 6-8; 21.

(2) Cf. Phil., II, 9.

can eat from the tree of life (1)), for it is still veiled to me because the name has not yet fully emerged, is still in a process of birth -of being spoken.

This supurname, this mystery, as others may prefer to call it, is opening up in and through my life: my sensitivity, heart, and mind, in and through my dreams and my feelings, as well as my dealings with others and all my actions. It is as an empty space and a virgin time that allow me to grow, to penetrate into both so that my treading into them becomes actually a new creation. This progressive revelation of the name, as some may wish to put it, takes always the form of a personal discovery, which amounts to a personal encounter. The disclosure of the saving name is thus, not the discovery of a thing, as an object, not even as an 'other', if we mean by this, another 'individual', but it is the inner (which makes me truly me, because the same relationship unveiling of another 'pole' of that integral relationship/also makes him ^{truly} him(2).

This supurname cannot be discovered outside this living and loving constitutive relationship. This is the name which so many religious traditions have forbidden to utter in vain or to pronounce in the third person, because

(1) Cf. Apoc., II, 7.

(2) Cf. Cant., II, 16: "my beloved is mine and I am his."

such an exteriorization or objectification of it would kill the living name and would no longer be the saving name. Only to him who overcomes in the struggle, the hidden manna is given and the white stone in which a new name is written, but which no man knows *except* he who receives it (1). It is not only the name of God or the name of the new city but the new own name that man has to discover (2). A name which nobody knows but the self (3), not because it is not profered aloud or kept in secret, but because the name is only a name when it really names the named, the called.

I am, further, aware that this experience of mine, that this belief of mine, is my view-point and my understanding of it, but I am fully aware also that the name which is revealed to me is not in my power nor can it be labeled by denominations of any kind. Furthermore, I shall be uneasy about both questions, the one concerning universality and the other concerning particularity of the Lord, the saving process, saving power, saviour, grace or in whatever form one may like to refer to it. Not because I know no answer, but because I know no question. It is the surname which cannot be named, because it is at the source of all names and all

(1) Cf. Apoc., II, 17.

(2) Cf. Apoc., III, 12.

(3) Cf. Apoc., XIX, 12.

naming. Because I experience myself as a person I experience myself as unique, not in a solipsistic way but in a relational way. I am unique, not because I am a single individual of a series, but because I am a unique expression, an image, a mirroring of the entire reality -/creator and creation included, in the terms of a certain tradition.

In other words, the question about the universality or non-universality of the saving power of Christ is not a valid question at this level, or rather no question at all, for it does not ask anything. The question is a wrong question which forces me into a false perspective. It puts me under the 'objectified' and 'individualized' perspective, as if the Saviour were an object and I an individual. (The Lord who saves, is not an independent disconnected force, nor an absolute somebody unrelated^{to me}, so that he can choose to 'save' me or any other 'thing', in point of fact, ^{as} an objectified, independent, unrelated saviour ("in itself") does not exist: it is a purely mental construction, or rather a false mental construction, a mere extrapolation. Certainly, I may confess that I am saved by Christ, but this Christ my Saviour is neither an 'other', nor it is my ego. No need to quote Saint Augustine to recall that he is more interior to myself than myself (1), when we could also cite Saint John speaking of the eucharistic and trinitarian identity (2) and a universal tradition, east and west, sacred and secular, modern and ancient (3). What I mean to say

(1) AUGUST., Confessiones III, 6, 11: "tu autem eras interior intimo meo et superior summo meo".

(2) Io., VI, 57; XVII, 21-23; etc.

(3) Cf. R. PANIKKAR, Misterio y Revelación. Hinduismo y Cristianismo, Madrid (Marova) 1971, p. 213 sq.

is that the process of salvation is not an extrinsic process nor an automatic event we can bring about with our individual capacity alone. When the Lord saves me, when he discloses reality to me, he does it not to a private individual, but to the whole world, mirroring microcosmically the macrocosmic process. Neither "He" nor "I" are individuals. Moreover, my person is saved in the same measure that my individuality is lost (1).

One may feel that the saving power bubbles up from within or comes from without. In fact, it is constantly both, transcendent and immanent, though some temperaments may be more sensitive to one or other aspect and interpret it with more intrinsic or extrinsic categories.

One analogy may perhaps be helpful. Just as the traditional philosophical proof for monotheism states that even under the assumption that there were two or more Gods, those 'Gods' would be ontologically indistinguishable and thus would have to be ontically one and the same God, so -but this is only a simile- 'salvation' in whatever form it may be

(1) Cf. Matth., X, 39; XVI, 25; Io., XII, 25; etc.

conceived of, and the 'saviour' whatever image we may have of 'him', are respectively one and the same salvation and saviour.

The most common way, within the christian world, to express this experience is to use the biblical context, but I do not exclude the possibility of accepting the lordship of Jesus -to put it still biblically- of a Jesus who is not the monopoly of christianity, however, and discover him at work, or as I would like to express it, present and efficient, in any religious tradition in whatever name and form Through Jesus, handed down by christians or simply by history, I may come to discover better the riches of my own tradition as also through my buddist or hindu or whatever tradition I may be able to deepen the christian understanding of the ultimate mystery (to call it in some way). There is no convincing reason today why someone cannot accept the person of the Lord as he appeared in Jesus of Nazareth, have sincere respect for the twenty centuries of christian tradition, and at the same time, out of love for and faith in the same Lord, accept and follow the particular branch of his human religious tradition, in as far as there is no incompatibility in his life and commitment (1). There are indeed, serious theological pro-

(1) Cf. Matth., XXIII, 13, and the representative modern cry of ROGER GARAUDY: "You, who have been enjoying the great hope of which Constantine spoiled us, you, men of the Church, give Him [Jesus] back to us: his life and death belongs also to us, to all for whom that hope is meaningful, to all who learned from him that man is created as creator". "L'homme de Nazareth" in Evangile aujourd'hui (Paris, ed. Franciscaines) Nr. 64.

blems to clarify and one cannot foretell whether the effort at creating a theology of religion valid for more than one religious tradition will succeed, but it cannot be said to be an a priori impossible enterprise.

9.- The Word of the Spirit.

We have gone a long way. We have said that no statement has any valid meaning outside its proper context, that the context varies with the growth or change in human consciousness and that traditional contexts today are no longer sufficient to sustain any claim at universality. On the other hand, we have tried to show that the claim to universality, in one form or another, is implied in any statement with a truth-claim. Further, we have also said that in the existential and real issue of salvation the question of universality does not properly arise; that it arises only under the assumption that there is a universal conception, i.e. a universal understanding of universality, as in a platonic world of ideas, for instance. We have, further laid emphasis upon the fact that universality can have only an acceptable meaning if it is not disrupted from concreteness, which lead us to the core of the problem and also to the core of the cosmotheandric constitution of that principle which christians call Christ. Furthermore we have suggested that our understanding of Jesus would rise to a more universal understanding the moment we enlarge the horizon against which we understand him and that this is true of any other homologous

figure in the traditions of mankind. We asserted also, however, that this process cannot be planned or manipulated, but that it corresponds to the historical situation and depends on the factual growth of the peoples of the earth. We have hinted, further, at the distinction between individual and person and suggested that a certain nominalistic tendency in interpreting names as mere labels has had the double effect on the one hand, of alienating from the christian position those who could not accept such a sectarian interpretation as to exclude from salvation all those who do not confess one particular denomination; and on the other hand, of hardening those who under the umbrella of the 'foolishness of the Cross' would not allow for any deluting of the name, again here understood as a particular denomination. "The name, which is above every name" is a supurname which cannot be identified with any particular sound nor with any particular denomination. The ancient prohibition of Buddhism, Israel and Islam, among other religious traditions of not having any 'idea' (picture), image of representation of God, could analogously be applied here to the supurname with the only difference being that the supurname is indeed a name, has body, is concrete, is -christianly speaking- incarnated and not a simple reference or/^ano-name at all. It has in each case a name which is above all names. Its name could be (as some traditions would prefer) a No-name, but a name, after all. Utter silence cannot be contradicted, because it does not offer any 'diction' to contradict.

There is a Name without which there is no salvation: There is no salvation without a Name: Salvation belongs to the level of the Name, properly speaking of the Supersame. It is the realm of the Logos, the sphere of the Word, the level of Language, the kingdom of History. Outside this kingdom, besides the Word, in utter Silence, transcending the Logos, there is no salvation. That there is no salvation does not mean that there is condemnation, i.e. non-salvation, but that salvation has no meaning, no place. Salvation means salvation from the present human condition, redemption from the realm of the necessary verbalisation of all things, of the private self-consciousness. Salvation is salvation-history, which amounts to the salvation of history, so that only the historical dimension of reality, so to speak, can be saved, because only that dimension needs to be saved.

When the Holy Spirit came at Pentecost every people tongue^u and race praised in their different ways the great things of the Lord (1), everyone spoke in his own manner and tongue. Certainly they did not understand each other as if from simultaneous translation. They understood, however, that they were extolling the same things, that they were involved in the same venture, that they were in true communion and that their sayings, words and gestures were all directed towards the same goal, which they worded differently.

Religious traditions are not only complementary, they are rather supplementary, they support and enforce one another. But even more, they are interpenetrated and interpenetrating. Each of them represents a unique mirroring of

(1) Cf. Act., II, 11.

the whole; they embrace each other in an intertwined unique structure so that each religious tradition contains the whole of the human experience available to man at a certain time and space, in spite of the fact that the accent is laid upon different moments or aspects of the whole. In other words, Jesus is unique because represents and re-enacts in a unique way the mystery of salvation.

It is not time and again the warning given that God has to be worshipped in truth and in the Spirit (1), that nobody is good but the God (2), whom nobody has seen (3) except in and through the Son (4), the Way (5)? Is it not explicitly said that the Risen One "is not here" (6) so that to pinpoint him to a space and place would be negating his resurrection? Did He not disappear from their sight in the moment that they recognised him? (7) Is not this the real recognition? That He disappears and is present in his constant absence? Were not proclaimed blessed those who believe non seeing so as to suggest that to believe is to see not, to pierce all seeing, all appearances? (8).

(1) Cf. Io., IV, 23.

(2) Cf. Matth., XIX, 17.

(3) Cf. Io., VI, 46.

(4) Matth., XI, 27; Luc., X, 22; Io., I, 18; VI, 44; XIV, 9; etc.

(5) Cf. Io., XIV, 6.

(6) Cf. Matth., XXVIII, 6.

(7) Cf. Luc., XXIV, 31

(8) Cf. Io., XX, 29.

It was our concern to indicate an understanding of Jesus according to christian Scripture and human contemporary Tradition, an attempt to explore one of the central problems of 'fundamental theology': the awareness of a cosmotheandric principle, of an incarnated mandalic center, which could become one of the bases for a 'theology of religion', to use a consecrated expression.

Our concern has been to unearth a little that underlying myth which peoples of the world are beginning to rediscover, that the World that was at the beginning, did have and is having the 'ten thousand' echoes of a polyphonic symphony.

R. Panikkar

Santa Barbara, California,

May 11th. 1972

Feast of the Ascension of the Lord.