Hinduchristian Encounter

THE HINDU-CHRISTIAN ENCOUNTER

Some Essays on Eastern-Western Philosophical Understanding

"Before Abraham came to be,
I AM".

Io., VIII, 58

"He is!"

Katha Up., II, 3, 12

R. PANIKKAR

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R. Panikkar

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1 - Introduction

Vinde !!

Posuite in lucem gentium Is; LXIX, 6 (1)

This volume was not intended to be a book. It is not a systematic treatise. It has no intellectual unity and does not claim to offer a complete survey of the problem of the relations between Hinduism and Christianity.

The unity underlying these studies is of a deeper kind. The author has not spent these last five years in India in order to "write" a book, but to "live" a life. He is not an author, but only a person. If at all he should appear as an author, he would claim to be considered as an author of his own life, and even then as a secondary author for it is God, in and through Christ who remains the principal author of his ~~own~~ life. This present volume has come into being in the most casual way. Of the ~~articles~~ chapters composing it, some were written as a result of an inner compulsion to pinpoint some intuitions by writing down an intellectual "translation" of them, while others owe their origin to some purely external circumstances connected with the human obligations of the author's life, such as the call to deliver a lecture here or to submit an article there. The collection of those essays together in bookform of friends. was also casual as it was due to suggestion.

Nor is the book a systematic approach to the problem. To begin with, the appraisal of the question is incomplete, as many central points have had to be reserved for later occasions. Yet a more fundamental reason is that there can be no "system" in regard to a subject that is still

Voir

(1) quoted by Act., XIII, 47.

living ~~...~~ still in the making and dependent on many existential factors which would delay any systematisation. The heart of the matter here is not a system but "Mysterium" in the Pauline sense; and only God the Father has the clue to the "Sacrament" of His divine "Oikonomy" with mankind. Vital and true philosophy is never a systematic and closed body of doctrine, and this is even more true of Theology. The theologian's real theological message to his fellow-beings is his whole life, from which his writings, of course, must not be excluded.

Hence what gives this book a deeper unity is the fact that it is an expression of the author's serious attempt at existential incarnation. It may be that the infra-systematic synthesis of a part of his own life which appears in the present essays will be of some assistance in the "edification" of ~~his fellow-being~~. One of the most urgent tasks of our time.

x x x

The central idea which inspires these essays and which will emerge here and there, without being worked out explicitly, could be condensed in one simple word: Christ. We do not mean that Christ is an idea, but that the true idea of Christ is the ~~connecting~~ guiding thread binding and giving meaning to the following essays. Were we to unfold that idea in a few very condensed sentences, we would speak about the divine, and human natures of Christ, all in one, about his absoluteness, in whom and from whom everything

that is subsists and has its being. Being is a Christophany. He should speak about Christ acting before Abraham and present also where He is unknown and even ignored. He should speak about this unique Ontic Mediator who relates God with the World, the Trinity with those who partake in its Life and Being, Being with beings, the just with the sinner, the believer with the un-believer, matter with spirit, Christianity with all Religions, Man with his cultures. The encounter of a Christian individual, collectivity or culture with its non-Christian counterpart carries with it this wonderful-and yet dangerous-challenge; Either Christ becomes for you the rock and foundation of the understanding and of loving of the other and this will lead you to widen and deepen further your intelligence and love of Christ, or your Christian faith drops out, being consciously rejected or unconsciously abandoned through the atrophy of one of its fundamental raisons d'etre.

The present studies have been arranged in ~~three~~ two parts.

The first part deals with some aspects of Hinduism. As already stated we do not tackle Hinduism systematically, nor shall we give an account of its main tenets: we shall simply consider some particular problems that may give us a partial, but correct idea of the world of Hinduism. Only too often people make a caricature of an opposed doctrine, philosophy or party and succumb to the temptation of faking

~~of~~ the opponent to be a man of straw.

After a long chapter on the present Hindu Spirituality which has merited the "imprimatur" as it were of Hindu orthodox believers and scholars, there follows an article which attempts to suggest an answer to a question which was debated by the "Indian Philosophical Congress" a few of years ago, namely the need for re-orientation in Indian Philosophy.

The third essay contains an introduction and the basic material for a work in preparation on one of the central metaphysical problems concerning which, Christian and Hindu Thought are said to differ fundamentally, namely on the problem of creation. Our study will at least show that there is scope here for a fruitful dialogue and perhaps also for mutual enrichment.

The last chapter of this first part deals again with a relevant philosophical problem and starts with the criticism of a recent Indian book. If our views are correct the title of this chapter "The Crisis of Indian Philosophy" will help make it clear that the encounter between Indian and Western Philosophy will only bear fruit when we meet in the metaphysical depths of the problem of contingent being.

~~The second part of this collection deals with Christianity and is therefore the counterpart of the first. The pitfall of "micrology", i.e., of belittling the openness~~

~~and profundity of Christian orthodox~~, is very often responsible for a certain negative attitude that considers conversion synonymous not with change of heart and mind but with change of system and of culture.

The first chapter, "Outside the Church there is no salvation", points out that not only the "wording", but also the "true" concept of Church, of Catholic Church, is the ontological and mystical one which does not discard but embraces other partial interpretations. Not by making undue concessions but by living the Christian truths up to their very end are we going to reach an understanding, as far as it is possible.

The following two articles aim at exposing in a way that would be intelligible to the Hindu mind two very different Christian topics: The first on the meaning of the Bible (Christianity is not a Religion of the Book!); the second, on the life of sanctity, exemplified in two Christian saints.

The last article dealing with the Christian Encounter with India on an existential level introduces the third part of this volume. We shall consider here the problem how to understand and eventually to assimilate or reject another religious culture.

The ~~third~~ second part of our volume, consecrated to "Hinduism and Christianity" contains ~~seven~~ five essays of very different extension and scope. We face first the problem of the Meaning of Scriptures in Christianity

~~the relationship between Hinduism and Christianity. Here we deal somewhat exclusively with the central point of this question and we leave aside the study of other important aspects which would surely qualify our thesis.~~

The two next Chapters enumerate the principles on which a theoretical integration and a practical collaboration with Hinduism is possible from a Christian point of view. Some of the principles worked out here are applied to an issue that is very important both from the theoretical and from the pastoral points of view. We study further one dimension of priesthood and search for the relationship between Christian and Non-Christian priesthood at least from one perspective.

~~The papers on Indian Christian Art which follows may perhaps serve as an example of a concrete problem that faces the Christian community in India today.~~ Human values and laity

The last study contributes to our main theme from a very different angle. Instead of making a comparative study, we tackle here a central philosophical problem with the tools that both traditions put at our disposal. We approach the problem of truth from the angle of an "existential phenomenology" which analyses the data given by both the Western-Christian tradition and the Eastern-Hindu culture.

~~And finally the last essay is a bold attempt at doing something to which we feel we are entitled, namely to comment~~

~~on one of the basic utterances of Indian Philosophy as a whole in the light of Catholic theology. A single commentary on a single point may not take us very far, but it could eventually open up a way for further and deeper contacts.~~

A word now to the reader. In spite of the geographical and technical achievements of our times and notwithstanding the general desire for mutual understanding, there are still among us too many compartmentalisms and closed systems, even if our minds are open and our wills well disposed. The author has only one misgiving in placing this material before an undiscriminating or wide circle and that is of being misunderstood.

Whatever shortcomings and defects these studies may suffer from and the author is aware of many of them---one thing is certainly not there: intellectual dishonesty. This does not refer to personal good will or subjective truthfulness---that goes without saying---, but to the objective honesty regarding the problems themselves and the two great religious and philosophical traditions which we are here trying to meet.

The author believes---and he makes here an open plea for it---that he holds purely orthodox Catholic views and he is convinced at the same time that his Hinduism is something more than an external knowledge. He is convinced that he has a deep fidelity to Hinduism which transcends the specific doctrines of merely school one or another sect. Did not Saint Paul

said that he was a Jew according to the flesh and a Christian according to the spirit, that he remained a true son of the Old Testament and yet had entered into the New Covenant? Minutia minuendis This may stand also for the present writer.

Yet it is difficult to write in a way that would be pleasing to both sides and to be understood by both traditions. It would have been better to write one book exclusively for Hindus and another one only for Christians, both with the same ideas. They would have been ultimately the same but their language would have been very different. If only one book instead of two is produced, it is owing to a radical honesty at the price of personal prestige. It is easy to write to Hindus or to Christians alone. When writing to people of two different religions, cultures and philosophies, intellectual asceticism is required in which all sorts of non essential elements are laid aside.

To Christians the author would have said: You are right in abhorring syncretism and being afraid of levelling down all differences between religions. You do well to keep the essential difference between the natural and the supernatural, the cosmic elements and the historical facts. Not a single chapter here attempts to overlook differences or to wash out distinctions. But remember that dualism is not a Christian doctrine and that duality is not ultimate; keep in mind that Christian concreteness does not mean limitation but a closer touch with the real; do not forget that Christianity

is Catholic, ecumenical, universal and broader, therefore, than our present cultural and philosophical conceptions. These essays do not belong to Apologetics but to Fundamental Theology.

The special edition for Hindu readers would have said: do not fear any attack from the following pages, nor any hidden intention beyond what has been plainly stated; do not be afraid of losing anything that is everlasting in Hinduism as you try to encounter Christianity. Forgive ~~some~~ those expressions that may appear too blunt and interpret them as the manifestation of an internal dynamism of Hinduism itself that keeps it going and progressing. The greatness of individuals and cultures is measured by the human and intellectual courage with which they face the challenges of time.

Needless to say, everything here is just an attempt and has been written ~~with~~ in the hope——not the fear——of being corrected from both sides. Only thus the author will feel that he has not wasted his time——and time is a measure for existence——revising and re-writing these pages, because in him also will be accomplished that mysterious law of life on earth: He must increase and I must decrease.

Benares,
by the banks of the sacred river,
in the Epiphany of the Lord of
1952

R. Panikkar

To write a book, in a sense, is to stop living. Life is again responsible for the delay in publishing these essays. Minor corrections and some adjustements have been done in the meantime.

R. P.

Rome, Easter, 1962

SOME PHENOMENOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF HINDU SPIRITUALITY TO-DAY

"Religiositas custodiet
et justificabitur cor"
Eccli., I, 18

I N T R O D U C T I O N

A - HINDUISM

In the world there is anxiety about the future of Religion, not only because it appears to be menaced from outside, but also because it seems jeopardized from within. Creeds do no longer have the protection of the walls of a town or the weapons of an empire. While mutual influence among Religions increases the tension between purity and comprehension, orthodoxy and tolerance, sanctity and catholicity become only too obvious. In this meeting of Religions, Theology and Philosophy have the last word, at least in the theoretical sphere, but Phenomenology comes first in order that we may know what we are discussing. Thus, the purpose of the present chapter is clearly limited by its rather descriptive title.

1.- Phenomenology

A phenomenological study must have a certain scientific sobriety, not only in its style, but also in its statements, so much so that it forbears from drawing any conclusions. It seeks only to furnish material for philosophical analysis and theological speculation, but Phenomenology as such is not committed to them.

The phenomenological method in such subjects is also very unpretentious and difficult. It is the golden mean between the superficial experiences of the tourist, the journalist and the enquiry-minded investigator on the one hand, and the deep studies of the philosopher and the theologian on the other. Its proper method is neither the empirical which destroys spontaneity and spoils facts by meddling with them, nor is it the theoretical study of the ideas, the myths and the sources.

① - a version of this chapter appeared previously in "Christ of the Desert", III, 3/4 March (15-X-1957)

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1.- Phenomenology

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(1) - A version of this chapter appeared previously in "Oriental Thought", III, 3/4 Nasik (IV-X-1957)

which should not be confused with the direct observation of the raw incongruities of sociological facts. This method relies on the in-sight gained by a specific kind of (phenomenological) observation, by living with the people, being one with them and yet detached from them at the same time, solely for the purposes of the sociological study.

Our problem, however, is not how to describe the phenomenological method in religious-sociological problems, but how to apply it. The results will speak for themselves. We have only to find suitable formulae for what everybody is capable of discovering for himself.

2.- Hinduism

It has often been said that Hinduism is so vague or so vast or so manifold that it cannot be defined. Hinduism is, for such critics, not a Religion but a bundle of _____ religions from the most "primitive" animism down to the most abstract advaitism. It all depends, of course, on what we expect a religion to be. But putting nominal discussions aside we note from the very beginning two important features on Hinduism.

a)- Hinduism is that religion which cannot be de-fined because it has not limits in which it could be circumscribed. It has no specific dogmas, no particular rituals, no proper organization. Even the most basic ideas like God, mosa, karma, dharma can be interpreted in very different ways. In fact, there would be utter confusion if we forget the second feature which gives meaning to the first one.

b)- Hinduism is not an idea, and thus does not need to be a coherent idea. It is not a doctrine and so it is not committed to one. The very name of Hinduism is alien to it and obscures its real nature. A real Hindu will hardly call himself a Hindu. He will say: I have been call d a Hindu by those who wanted to distinguish themselves from me. It was the Muslim who first called

me a Hindu, meaning by that a non-Muslim. Christians also call us Hindus to separate themselves from us. The better name for Hinduism is sanātana dharma, the immortal dharma in the sense of that famous verse of the Mahā-bhārata: "That which supports, that which holds the peoples together, that is dharma" (Karna - parva, LXIX. 59).

This has a far-reaching significance, the disregard of which has created unnecessary conflicts and suspicions. It means, [illegible], that the orthodox idea of Hinduism points not to an idea, but to a living reality. Hinduism does not belong to the realm of essences, but to the sphere of existences. I would even say that it requires a kind of metanoia, a sort of "conversion" and "repentance" to grasp what the sanātana dharma holds with regard to its own nature. Even here, at the very introduction of our subject, an unbiased phenomenology proves of so much use.

Hinduism considers itself not so much as being true, as to be [illegible] truth in an existential way. At a subsequent stage Hinduism will be seen to concede that the truth is embodied in some propositions or books or fundamental attitudes, though primarily Hinduism stands for the existential path of the individual and, in consequence, is personal, incommunicable. But we cannot remain long in the purely existential domain. We must utilise concepts also for expressing existential realities, and moreover our concepts are never chemically pure, but are pregnant with the [illegible] of millennia of culture. Here lies a twofold possible source of misunderstanding: first, we must be aware that we are translating from the existential field into the realm of essential concepts, and secondly, we must not forget that the meaning of these concepts tends to be coloured by our own diverse cultural backgrounds. That is another reason for the necessary

"conversion" mentioned before in order to realise what Hinduism stands for. And Hinduism stands for truth and truth alone. If something proves to be truth and is not yet incorporated in Hinduism (seen as a way of life), it will not hesitate for a moment to accept it. We shall see some examples later. How can a tribesman realise God or reach salvation except by a certain animistic attitude and idol worship? So we find that Hinduism stands for idolatry. But how can a highly developed soul avoid discovering that all externals are only symbols of deeper realities and that ultimately the Absolute is beyond all names and forms? So, on the other hand, Hinduism also stands for absolute nirguna-Brahman, for a purely transcendant Godhead devoid of attributes. We are not speaking now of a certain eclectic attitude. On the contrary, we are making an attempt to describe a concrete existential position. That will explain, by the way, why Hinduism is essentially so tolerant and existentially so intolerant.

We do not have to apologise therefore if we do not consider any Hindu doctrine in particular, or if we do not describe the forms of worship of this or that sect. Of course, these forms are very different and also very interesting, but we prefer to limit our study to that central nucleus of Hinduism.

It is very instructive to note that phenomenology can describe the nature of Hinduism either in Hindu terms or in any other terminology, say, for instance, in Christianity. Hinduism is simply dharma, it claims to be the existential coefficient of each individual in regard to his karma, it is the entic place of each member of the Mystical Body in its growth toward the fullness of its being. Whether Hinduism is what it claims to be or whether it is able to fulfil its mission is another question, altogether beyond the competence of Phenomenology.

3.- Spirituality

We are not concerned here with the definition of Religion as such, but rather with the description of a particular religious attitude that we call spirituality. We shift from the ontological and objective sphere of Religion to the anthropological and more subjective realm of spirituality. We should like to enumerate some basic moods, some unquestioned values, some underlying presuppositions of the Hindu religious attitude. Our description does not pretend to be exhaustive, but would like to be characteristic. We do not describe Religion or religious values but rather the anthropological attitude of Hindus towards Religion. Some of the features here described can be found also in other Religions in India, such as in Islam and in Christianity, for we touch some layers of the Indian soul itself, although this is not now our main concern.

4.- To-day

We limit ourselves also to the contemporary scene, being concerned not with the forms of religion and religious worship of ancient times, but with the situation of the present generation. In studies about Hinduism, a distinction is often made between classical and highly developed Hinduism as it is found in the sacred books and in small selected minorities on the one hand, and popular [illegible] Hinduism as it is practised by the common folk, on the other. That presupposes a previous conception of a high and a low Hinduism which though it may be philosophically true, has, as such, little phenomenological basis. We may find a similar division between the "pandits" and the "people", but even then we do not assume that one form is higher than the other, or that one corresponds to pure Hinduism while the other corresponds to the primitive Religion not yet fully absorbed by the former.

Obviously the present cannot be understood without

a knowledge of the past, but on the other hand history is not of prime importance in an phenomenological approach.

5.- Hindu Society

In order to increase the coefficient of certainty of our descriptions we must distinguish some homogeneous groups within the fold of Hinduism.

For a philosophical analysis of religion the adequate division would be that of the different sects and systems and religious schools. A historical study would prefer to follow the double division of regions and castes But I think that a phenomenological analysis works better under the following simple scheme:

We find in India today three kinds of persons:

1- Those who have received secondary and in particular higher education in Universities and Colleges. I should like to call them, with a bit of irony but no ill-will and less of disregard, the "caste" of the "literates".

2- Those who have received the classical and orthodox Hindu formation in ashrams, maths, in the lap of families and similar institution, whether or not they have also received the "benefits" of "secular" education. We could call them the "caste" of the "orthodox". Though this word by its many other connotations can only be applied to Hinduism in a very relative way, we use it in the way it is commonly used in India today for lack of a better expression.

3- Those i.e. the "people", who have not received any kind of systematic training.

We shall examine each of these groups under three sub-headings.

6.- Inherent limitations of this study

To begin with, however, three words of warning are necessary here in order to evaluate properly the conside-

rations that follow:

a)- We are not speaking about Indian Culture in general. To describe it, we should need to introduce many other values. We do not intend to give a panoramic view of the Culture of India today. Our purpose, as already stated, is a humbler one.

b)- Our phenomenological descriptions have a double relativity. That is to say they are not absolute, either in characterising the group to which they refer, or in themselves. In other words, the features of each group do not belong exclusively, but only predominantly, to that group. A University man, for instance, belongs also to a certain sect, family or caste and ultimately springs from the people of India. So, individually he may be better described by other features than by the values of his group. And secondly, each point cannot be taken as being absolutely appropriate to the group to which it belongs , not even in itself as one being completely valid. Only when considered as a whole they may give the right atmosphere.

c)- It is well understood that Phenomenology neither draws consequences nor exacts responsibilities. If we say, for instance, something that sounds rather negative concerning University graduates, that does not mean that these factors as a whole, i.e., integrated in the whole man, cannot have or have not very positive effects, and again it is not meant that the students themselves or the systems should take the responsibility for it.

i- The Literates

There are in India today 34 Universities, three of them just a century old (1857). Besides this, there are at least 42 other institutions of a technical and research character. The number of University students in 1947 was roughly 230.000 (according to other statistics 183.000)

and in 1956 reached the figure of 720.000. That means an average of 0.2% of the total population. Needless to say this minority is a leading group and, at least for the present, the destiny of the country is in its hands.

The caste-system, or better, the caste-mentality is fortunately or unfortunately - I would not dare to decide too hastily - so deep rooted in India that the first observation to make is that this group appears almost as a caste and undoubtedly it forms a "class" by itself of "educated" people. Precisely because of this it presents a much higher uniformity than in other countries.

1- Up-rootedness

A good number of the University teachers and student present a certain up-rootedness which we can describe in its extreme form, though as such it may seem a caricature.

This type of man, teacher or student, is uprooted, he has been abruptly severed from the traditional Indian life, has no history behind him and has not been able to identify himself, in spite of external assimilation, with the new (Western?) Culture he has adopted. But that Culture is "learned", it is not re-created, or discovered. He himself is a "learned" man and if he personally still maintains in his heart the sacred fire of his ancestors he then is ashamed of these feelings and tries to wring out all the supposed superstitions that remain, together with the (according to him) regrettable customs which have caused India to be a dominated and subjugated country for centuries. He has broken with the past, with the real gravitating past in Indian life to-day, although he may feel some pride when looking back at the very remote times of Indian greatness. To him all this past simply belongs to an utopian realm, useful perhaps as a symbol of poetry and art, but inefficient as a real factor for the shaping of the present. Like those students educated in a supersaturated religious atmosphere without personal participation and interest who

think that they have had "enough Religion" for the rest of their lives, our typical man thinks that India has had enough religious "inflation" in the past so that now it is no longer required of him to take an interest in Religion when there are so many other urgent tasks to perform

He is, on the other hand, - and that may save him! - shallow, that is to say, trivial, superficial, without real interest, or better, without religious consacration, although he will merely say that he is free of religious fanaticism in these things he studies or with which he deals. Why should he have this kind of passion for the subject-matter of his studies or his profession? He is not going to eliminate his blind beliefs in the supernatural to fall in to the trap of another belief.

He stands in a kind of no-man's-land. He does not and cannot belong to the West. He does not even surmise the theological roots of the Culture he tries to assimilate. He will not - and very often it is an act of the will - be identified with the past that is past and ought to be dead. In his best hours he tries to look forward to the future, but generally he waits. He is in an expectant mood.

Religion is, in consequence, in the best of cases, an individual's own affair. If the individual still feels the necessity ofsome kind of worship or of belonging to a sect, let him join. It may be that it still gives some relief to the individual, but for the building up of a new society it is at least irrelevant if not harmful.

2.- New idolatry

The old Hindu religion may still be of some use for the illiterate masses, our group thinks, but it has to be substituted by the modern values of the new world: Democracy and Science.

The meaning of Democracy for these "learned" people is very simple. It has not the connotations as for the West, a certain social structure arising out of the failur

of other forms of organising society, ... It means simply Justice. Religions may be good, or more or less necessary, but they have, to say the least, tolerated a social order that makes the reign of Justice for everybody impossible. The question about God or gods is therefore not only irrelevant, but merely relative in comparison with the absolute problem of Justice, identified with Democracy. If Religion were meant to bring man in contact with the Absolute, the new idol that now arises is Democracy, more or less tinged with Nationalism and other values. Democracy cannot be questioned, it is absolute.

If Religion claimed to give an answer to the main questions of man here on earth, the new altar from which salvation for mankind is going to come is Science. Even those who for various reasons still hold on to the old faith or traditional practices justify themselves by saying that those practices are quite scientific and have a provable scientific foundation.

It is not quite fair to say that Science is the new idol, or the new God, because Science does not want to be an idol or a God at all. But Science does effectively, or at least will do, what Religion tried to do - and the new faith starts. Science is, thus, not a new Religion, but the true Value for which Religion stood in the past.

The Indian mind is wise enough not be be revolutionary. It is not a question of fighting against Religion or of discrediting it, but a question of patient and effective substitution. So the old superstitions will die of themselves, being substituted by a scientific outlook in life. Science means almost everything positive, it stands for cleanliness as well as for reason. It is not uncommon to read in advertisements for the most common products of daily life expressions like this: " scientifically packed".

3.- Criticism

Blind faith has been shaken off, but the new idols

have not yet reached the firmness and stability of the old ones. The minds in the Indian Universities are open to fair criticism or, to put it differently, are slightly tainted by a certain scepticism. The Science coming from the West carries with it a heavy burden of negative values: Materialism, Imperialism, mental diseases, etc. The new idol is still carried in procession, but has not yet been enthroned in its niche.

Where Religion is concerned, this attitude leads to a certain scepticism, which has as its consequence a passive attitude of following the line of least resistance.

Even those who claim to be atheists - more because they do not believe in gods than because they deny God - do not completely reject Religion, but are rather cautious in accepting it en bloc just as it comes down to them. They show a critical attitude, but on a whole they would be disposed to discuss the appropriateness of a purified and "scientific" Religion. This possible new Religion ought to be, besides, purely spiritual, (as a reaction against the excessively incarnated forms of Hindu Religiosity) and utterly individualistic, the latter characteristic being a reaction against the communitarian principle of most of the Hindu sects. They are tired of Religions, but would not condemn Religion as such, if such a thing could be found (or founded).

Sometimes this critical attitude leads them to consider Religion at a certain distance and from outside. And as a consequence they express the conviction that Religion as a good, or at least as a tolerable thing for those who have not yet reached the higher status of Science of of a higher Spirituality devoid of forms and earthly ties and attachments. In other words, Religion can have its place either in a lower stage of human development, or in the highest level of pure renunciation. For themselves it has but little meaning. They "know" too much already. Religion is not precisely "opium", but the "food", the spiritual pabulum of the people. It is only that one has to strive for more substantial diet.

They can speak about Religion, they may even show a sincere respect for it, but they do not take it for themselves. That is why generally speaking this generation does not pray. Prayer is seen as an inhibitive or as an easy but ineffective consolation. Against innundations - dams, against storms - lightning conductors, against diseases - medicines are more useful than all the possible mantras. The other known form of prayer, namely meditation, is generally looked down upon either as a waste of time or as a mere technique for getting power. But Knowledge and Science prove themselves more efficient and relatively easier to get.

More or less consciously this critical attitude is tending towards a higher synthesis between East and West, Old and New, Village and City, Past and Future. There is a general consciousness that things are on the move, that something has to be achieved. This leads also to a certain openness, to a certain "undogmatic" attitude, that does not stick to old things and recognises at the same time the relativity of the new acquisitions.

The group's religious attitude

I once asked a research student, and purposely choosing not a student of Science but of Arts, whether he was going to participate in a great popular feast of Śiva. He had not even thought about it, but immediately as a kind of justification or simply as an explanation he said: "ahamśiva" (I am Śiva!). (So there was no need of external worship).

The following summarises the attitude of the majority:

Indifference, or lack of interest in the popular forms of Hinduism, and the same attitude regarding all forms of worship and any kind of active or organised Religion.

Respect for those very forms, so that they will defend them vehemently if foreigners or non-Hindus attack or ridicule them.

Tolerance, or a kind of resignation to the idea

of continuing those religious practices once they go back to their homes and settle down in life (for the sake of the women, the parents and the children afterwards). It is almost understood as a natural phase of his evolution, that the modern university student - in contrast to the old type of brahmacharya - must pass through that period of irreligiosity during his studies. After all he receives nothing but secular training. So, a secular attitude fits better for the time being.

ii- The Orthodox

It is difficult to give a numerical account of the number of Hindu religious institutions existing today in India. In any case they are very many in number, thousands, imparting the sacred teachings of Hinduism in one form or another. If we suppose - that in every ten villages there is at least one math or ashram imparting training to disciples, we will have the figure of 70.000 bulwarks of orthodoxy. Roaming about in the country in search of perfection - and food - there are about 7.500.000 holy men (sadhus), the mere presence of whom is at least a reminder that traditional Hinduism is not at all a matter of the past. Though not all those saffron-robed men (and some women also) fulfil the requirements of detachment and sanctity proclaimed by their garb and not all of them are propely initiated into Hinduism, very many of them possess a deep knowledge of their own particular religious sect. But conscious orthodoxy is not limited to the third and fourth stages of Hindu spirituality. Many householders, i.e., many men and women living a married life in society also worthy representatives of traditional Hinduism. We are not concerned with this class of enlightened or conscious orthodoxy. The others belong to our third group.

4.- Crisis

The orthodox Hindu intelligentsia not only realises that Hinduism as such is undergoing a crisis, but they themselves are suffering a like crisis in the most profound and manifold meaning of the word. Crisis does not simply mean

fermentation and much less implies fall, degradation or disorientation. Crisis means that special turning-point in the life of an individual group or society in which a plurality of ways is open, the choice of which depends on the decision, the power to make a judgment, the power of discrimination in the man, or group, or being that undergoes the crisis.

Though these two crises are closely related, we leave aside the eventual crisis of Hinduism to describe only the particular crisis of the followers of traditional Hinduism. Hinduism, they say, has survived all kinds of attacks from all sides and has overcome even greater dangers than the present one. So it has nothing to fear. But the process is now going on in the very minds and hearts of the best of its representatives. Hinduism will change and adapt itself to the new requirements of the times, as it has always done. Meanwhile they feel that they are at the crossroads. It may be that ultimately all is part of a cosmic process in which man is nothing but an instrument without personal liberty, but nevertheless that process is carried out, they think, in and by the attitude of the enlightened minority.

And this orthodox flock feels that Hinduism has to face the challenge of the modern times, and thus become purified and enriched. What is everlasting and what is time-conditioned in Hinduism, what has to be purified, what must change and what must be preserved by all means, are problems concerning which there is no unanimity.

A right wing would like to conserve almost everything as it was in the olden times, and they submit the modern trends of man and society to-day to a very sharp criticism. They want to go back to the sources and purify Hinduism by getting rid of all the rust that through time and the modern Western impact has accumulated upon it. They are maximalists.

A left wing, on the contrary, considers the essence of Hinduism to consist in a very few principles and

tries to adapt them not only to a new pattern of society, but also to a new religious consciousness.

In between there is, of course, an almost complete gamut of opinions and shades.

5.- Science versus Faith

One of the common features in this reaction of Orthodoxy and the new vitalisation of Hinduism is the felling of the conflict between Science and Faith and the effort to find a harmonious way out. Europe of the last two centuries knows a little about this, but its experience is here not directly utilised, or at least only to a very small degree. It is simply a case of a parallel movement emerging from a similar dialectical situation.

We have already said that within Hinduism there is a kind of universal claim to becoming scientific. The problem starts when we try to give a content to that almost magic word. On the whole we can say that "Science" stands for "Reason". But again - there is a considerable difference between the ideal of a "reasonable" and that of a "rational" Hinduism.

A most interesting process is going on in this respect. Summarizing a number of dialectical tensions and of movements of thought we could put it like this.

On the one hand, in the Indian cultural scene, "Faith" is disappearing and being replaced by "Science". What the people hold by mere Faith is stigmatized as superstition and blind belief. And Education very often is considered as the very process of giving a Scientific outlook in life and replacing a blind, credulous routine. Medicine is not the only example here; biological and physical sciences as well as Philosophy can be included in the scheme. Everything in life, our practices, our way of life, our ideas, even our religion must be at least "reasonable" if not "rational". Hinduism does not shun Reason, and in fact welcomes Science.

The purification of Hinduism alluded to and even its growth, as far as this "historical" concept can be applied to it, is closely connected with the acceptance of Science and the adoption by the Hindu people of this scientific attitude. They try to solve this conflict between Faith and Reason by saying that it is only apparent, that is to say, that there is no conflict at all, because either faith is a pre-scientific attitude that gives place to reason, or real Faith is but another name for Reason and Science. What the old Hindu sages happen to have written down for the generations to come is nothing but pure "Science" that the world now is slowly beginning to discover again. So the classical "samskaras" are justified as hygenic, rational and scientific.

Real faith is simply Science. That is the first side of the antinomy. Very often it looks like the rationalisation of everything and hence the very destruction of Faith results. Either faith is real, they say, - and then it is Science- or else it is a blind belief, and then it must be replaced by Science. It would be quite ... "unscientific" to recognise a kind of "supernatural" sphere where Faith could move on its own, unchecked by reason. That would be simply superstition or an absolutely gratuitous and "dogmatic" belief beyond proof or justification.

But it would be wrong to think of modern Hinduism as a kind of "naturalism". It is rather the contrary. This is the other side of the antinomy. The first side was rather the levelling down of "Faith" into Science. Now they lift up "Science" into Faith.

According to this view, Science is increasing and becoming a Faith if not actually a kind of Religion. The unconscious assimilating power of Hinduism is absorbing - and probably transforming - Science. Reason is not the enemy of God. Reason is God. Science is not destroying Religion. Science is Religion. And as a matter of fact the

whole attitude towards Science is a religious one. Science is a part of, if not actually identitied with, the old jnana. It is simply Knowledge, but not a secularised knowing but a Wisdom that saves and produces release here and hereafter. The conflict in the West took another form, because Christianity claims to belong to a supernatural sphere and Christian faith to be a superior form of knowledge irreducible to Reason though not contradictory to it. That is not the case with Hinduism. Hinduism claims that it does not lose anything by becoming "scientific". Science and Reason are not suberdinated to higher forms of Knowledge, but they can be the highest expressions of human life and Religion. Whether this "Science" is the same that has been imported from the West, or whether "Reason" works exclusively on the principle of non-contradiction are two important bridge-questions that would lead us beyond the field of a sober phenomenology.

6.- Thirst for Unity

All through the ages the Indian mind in spite of its richness and variety has been a monolithic monument to Unity. Not without a deep meaning is the Aśoka pillar the symbol of Indian Culture. And, by the way, on it could be inscribed that saying of St. Thomas Aquinas: "Everything is intelligible in so far as it is one. For he who does not understand the one, understands nothing" (De Veritate, q.21,a.3). The orthodoxy of our days is not an exception to this. This thirst for Unity is characteristic of the religious attitude of the traditional Hindu mind today.

First of all among the enormous variety of Hindu religious forms and sects, the underlying unity is always kept in mind, discovered or even forged when necessary. A Hindu pandit will always stress the unity before the multiplicity. Hinduism is considered as one, because animism, polytheism, deism, theism, absolutism and also atheism, as well as a spirituality of action, of love or of knowledge,

are regarded as being a manifold manifestation of one and the same spirit, of one and the same Religion, of one and the same Truth. A learned Hindu pandit may consider the followers of another sect somehow wrong, but he does not want to "uniformitize" Hinduism, because he thinks that unity is already there.

The same attitude is to be found regarding other religions. All are considered as several roads leading to the same goal, like different rivers flowing into the same sea. Hinduism is so fond of this "catholicity" that if it has to criticize other religions, it does so precisely because they do not recognize its standpoint: intolerant so to speak of the lack of tolerance of the other "creeds".

Whatever the judgment of this position may be, this harmonizing attitude which smacks of eclecticism or syncretism is nothing but a longing for synthesis and a desire for unity. In order to understand this we may recall what has been said in the Introduction about the existential status of the Indian spirit. It is inclined to believe that all forms of Hinduism are equal and all religions the same but evidently not with regard to their doctrines and ideas as they are formulated. But their identity would lie on a deeper level to which the several religions are compared. The rivers are actually different. Only the sea is the same and the function the rivers perform is the same; they carry water from the earth to the ocean, Christianity by way of comparison, would agree with the initial metaphor, pointing out only that sometimes rivers do not run into the sea, but flow into other rivers, that rivers sometimes carry more than water, or even that it may happen that some water evaporates on the way, but that as far as they are really rivers, all carry the Christian water that flows into the everlasting sea. But this already transcends phenomenology.

The group's religious attitude

" Do you not fear that Hinduism might undergo

a tremendous transformation and crisis in our days?", I asked once a very learned and pious pandit. He did not think so nor did he fear so, was the substance of his reply. We could summarize, accordingly, the state of mind of this group:

Optimism, or firm conviction that Hinduism will survive and continue to flourish. It is not only that we have faith that it is eternal; historical experience also proves it. Orthodoxy, in consequence, is not worried by such problem, and has little concern about them. They appear a little queer, or artifical, or perhaps Western.

Scientific faith. We have no need to fear because our Faith is not at all a blind belief but has a rational basis, that, just now, Science is discovering. We must not be ashamed of our Faith and we must overcome that inferiority complex which some centuries of foreign domination has created in us, because our Faith has foreseen precisely what Science is just now arriving at. Not only our Astrology, but also our ways of worship and our customs are quite scientific. And what is not scientific is not genuinely Hindu, and if by chance there are some unscientific elements, they will be eliminated.

Conciliatory attitude. We really believe that Hinduism well understood is superior to any other form of Religion because it is more subtle and more universal in its doctrines, but we do not condemn any Religion, nor any form of worship, and are even prepared not only for peaceful coexistence, but also for a sincere fraternity. There are many kinds of people and Hinduism does not claim any monopoly.

iii- The People

India has over 550.000 villages and over 80% of the population lives in them. That means roughly that we are speaking of an imposing mass of 300 million of people, of which over 90% are illiterate (82% in the whole of India cannot read or write).

This does not mean that such people are un-educated in the real sense of the word, nor that they do not possess a fine and deep culture, for India still has an unwritten, i.e. a "spoken" civilisation. Moreover the people can certainly do speak and listen!

We are not going to describe the popular devotions of India, in all their immensity, the colourful festivals, the moving pilgrimages or, for that matter, the sordid practices, but only the religious anthropological attitude of the people. The first distinction to be drawn is that between the men and the women. Man is man from the very beginning and strives to embody a set of masculine values. Woman is woman and not only her code of law and behaviour are feminine, but also the goal she has in life and the values she longs for are feminine. There is almost no undifferentiated human value. It is either masculine or feminine. That is still to be felt even among the Literates. Just recently the Government has rejected the claim of a certain medical College in Delhi to continue exclusively for women. (After over than a year the decision was withdrawn). The most interesting psychological conclusions could be drawn from the discussions. It is the fight between deep human instinct still strongly rooted in the soil of India and modern "Reason" that, like "Humanity", "Science", "Democracy", ... is neither masculine nor feminine. The values of "modern" culture are so high and disembodied or so low and material that they are above or below the difference between man and woman.

We could therefore subdivide the three following values according to a masculine and a feminine slant. They have a manly and a womanly side, but for the sake of brevity and because of the danger of being misunderstood without long previous explanations, we are not going to pursue such distinctions but shall continue our description in hermaphroditic terms. The reader will easily imagine the other side of the picture.

7.- Telluric department

There is almost a contradiction involved in speaking of chthonic values; they are rooted in the unconscious and the very moment you raise them up to the level of consciousness they fade away like unwashed photographic film. We can only try to describe externally something that is happening in the underground of the soul and ask for understanding from the very roots of our own nature. Fortunately those who are the main holders of such values are not able to "read" this paper and be thereby spoilt in their innocence, or in their direct attitude towards life. Human reflection is a double edged sword.

The first and most striking value you find among the people of India (through not exclusively of India) is this telluric value. I mean by this the following:

There is a sober and naked acceptance of life as it is, as it is there, and not as it could be or as it ought to be, or as it will be (if we think, if we act morally, or if we work and act to transform our human existenc). Existence is there, human life is there. There and no more. It has been given us and we shall give it again (to others) and give it up (after a little while). This existence has primarily not to be thought over, or ornamented with cultural and ultimately accidental values, but it hs simply to be lived, to be ex-sisted- outstreched in hope, fear, love, suffering, faith and anguish.

The danger of negative resignation and of pure passivity is only too great. But we are not speaking about the perils or possible abuses of an attitude, but describing the situation and even discovering a tremendous positive and central value in such a position.

The human being is simply there just as a flower the sea and the sky are there too. The purpose of creation, - or to avoid this term, the meaning of the world is not that I may know the sense on it, but the fact of its very exi-

stence. If the world has a meaning, this meaning is not my knowing it (that can be very interesting or even important for me), but it. The meaning of the world is the world itself and not my knowledge of that meaning. It may be - it is surely so - that it would be better if I knew the meaning, but it is not absolutely essential, just as it is not necessary for the full sense of the life of a bird that it should know its meaning. Man is certainly an intellectual being and so his existence itself demands some intellectual awareness. But this awareness does not need to be a reflective one. And besides, there is something such as a tree that brings knowledge of good and evil. (The present "theological" discussions of the West about the destiny of children without baptism, could perhaps draw some enlightening consequences from this fact).

"Quaestio mihi factus sum". I made a problem out of myself, said the first Occidental man, though an African. The folk of India do not ask such a question. "La rosa non a perchene" said a medieval Christian mystic. The rose has nowhy. It is simply there and all the reasons our mind can discover are neither ultimate, nor central. They neither explain nor produce the rose. They give only some explanations of many "hows", but they do not touch the "why". Any existence is irreducible. And that is the deep unconscious ... (surely not knowledge, nor generally experience either, nor properly speaking awareness), we must say unconscious value of the people of India. It is an underlying presupposition, it is taking for granted that life is a gift that has been given to us without consulting us, that our existence is there, and this is what ultimately matters, the pure existence of our being prior to all "hows", to all ornaments of culture and civilisation.

It has often been noted that the Indian has no appreciation of nature, no feeling for the beauty of the message of nature. The deep explanation lies here. He has no such sense because he does not feel the need for it,

being himself nature, a part of it. He has not the necessary distance or elevation to see nature under some external perspective, from outside. He is another thing among the things of the cosmos. He is not a foreigner, not a tourist, not a visitor of this world neither is the lord or master of creation. He is a part of it, he is a piece of this cosmos. He belongs to nature as the forest and the animals and the rivers belong to it.

His religion is a cosmic religion and his life a chthonic life. His actions are not ultimately motivated by his ideas, not even by his human instincts, but the telluric forces, by the rhythm of the earth, by the dynamism of the whole world in which he simply plays a role. I used to feel scandalized reading in the European newspapers in big letters and with great todo, about two or three ~~victims~~ casualties in some Western country and only a small notice about the deaths of hundreds or sometimes thousands in some Eastern catastrophe. Of course ~~this disposition was wrong~~ the western newspaper may have not thought of it, but one finds in India that the implied attitude of these news papers corresponded unwittingly to a real situation. The telluric humanity of the East can afford such a loss of lives, not only as nature can resist an earthquake, but as a pilgrim can unexpectedly find a vehicle and reach his goal much sooner. There is no frustration in life if the sense of human existence does not consist in any external achievment. The important thing is to have lived.

Telluric department means, further, means a direct attitude ~~in~~ To the main issues of life. There is knowledge about the meaning of things, of course, but there is no reflection about the meaning of the meaning, no crisis of faith in the Christian sense, no reflection about the possibility of change regarding fundamental things. Just as physical cancer is a "modern" ailment,

so also the rational cancer is unknown among this "unmodern" people. If life has a purpose, it has a purpose and I have no need to worry about it. But we now are ourselves reflecting too much about something that is simpler than all this.

The telluric value lies in the Unconscious. The dreamless stage in Indian Philosophy is supposed to be one of the highest because then you simply are, without being disturbed by doing this or thinking that, and it is precisely in some such way that the people here simply carry on their naked existence and "are".

Religion, in consequence, is neither an act of reflection, nor the fruit of a conscious decision, but the natural and spontaneous blooming of a chthonic existence. Neither are the appeals to the intellect, nor the assent that morals demands of the will the most central part of Religion, but this prior dedication of our whole being to the One who is (though it may take many forms) the full acceptance of our entic situation (as we are). Or, more elaborately, Religions consist in the acceptance of our contingency (or "creatureliness"), of our dependence, and the recognition of the One (or the Self) on which we depend. Man is religious, not primarily because he discovers or recognises his relationship with God, in whatever sense this concept may be filled up, but because of the reality or the ground on which such an awareness is possible, i.e. because he is in reality, in fact "is bound up together" with that God. That is to say the first element of Religion is not consciousness, but being, be-ing, contingency. His dependence on God has something in common with that of the animals, plants and the earth, it is a cosmic bond with the Cause, Principle or Source of this very cosmos. If we fail to understand this dimension of the religious attitude of the people of India (as well as of other people) we shall both misrepresent it.

and do an injustice to the Religions of this country.

8.- Sense of sacredness

More visible and easier to explain is the sense of sacredness pervading everything The "liberal" division between the sacred and the profane does not exist simply because there is not place for the latter. Everything is sacred, every action has an echo well beyond and above its autonomous sphere. The whole world is nothing but a symbol and a shade of a higher reality. Nothing is irrelevant. Every mistake, every misdeed is a kind of sacrilege. The consciousness of sin, properly speaking is almost non-existent, but the sense of sacrilege is everywhere alike.

Not only is life sacred, but also every being, and every action carries a magical, or at least a sacramental, effectiveness. Ask any doctor or any medical student of any hospital in India whether they have been able to convince a peasant and much less a peasant woman of the autonomous efficacy of the medicines they use. It may be that penicillin or quinine are remedies, but it is generally felt that they cure not because of their chemical constitution or properties (why should the sulpho-amyd group have precisely such effect, after all?), but because of the presiding deity of each plant, of each medicine, or because of the spiritual power of the person who utilizes the remedies. The "vis" of the medievals here is still a living spirit.

If Religion is at home in the realm of the sacred and everything is sacred, Religion is everywhere. It is not for certain hours a day, or only for the individual, or exclusively for old people. Religion pervades every human activity and the whole world has a religious dimension that shows us the real face of the universe.

The danger of superstition and of magic credulity is only too obvious, but very often historians of religions and philosophers have overlooked the deep insight into the world and the nature of things which such an attitude carries with it.

This sense of sacredness as an universal attitude, precisely because it is not opposed to a profane sphere and cannot be de-fined by anything because there is nothing be-sides it, has a very peculiar consequence that has baffled many a scholar. If everything is sacred, there is not only a certain vagueness about this character of sacredness, but also a kind of familiarity, of naturality, of normality in it. The "mysterium tremendum" and the "numinosum" is tempered by the character of "proximum" and "quotidianum" of such a "Numen". Fear is there and fascination also, but if you happen to believe in evil spirits and you see and hear them every day and you know that your head-ache of the last ten years is due to one of them, you continue to be careful, but not so terrified.

This has another consequence of some interest for our subject. I would call it the experience, or the attitude, or the subconsciousness of transcendence in the human and in the immanence of the divine. Or in other words, the people think or feel or are aware of God, that is of a transcendent being, in terms of immanence, and they do the same with man, immanent being in terms of transcendence. When they speak or think of God, they stress his immanence because more or less unconsciously they take for granted that he is transcendent. When they refer to men, they stress his transcendence because they do not even imagine that we can doubt his immanence. We could put it again like this, in paradoxical terms: You say men and they instinctively fell that man is more than "man", than pure man. Man is a part of God, man is somehow divine,

man is in some way or other everlasting ... You say "man" and they think God! You say, on the other hand, God and they automatically feel that God is also less than God, that God is either also an avatar, or that God is also you, or in you at least, that God is somehow human. The danger of pantheism is clearly at hand, but the attitude as such is not pantheistic. Ultimately it is an amazingly deep theandric position (but a phenomenological study is not the place to develop the Christ implications of this fact).

9.- Hierarchy

Let us recall that the abuse or misuse of a value does not prove anything else than that the value was there. Where there is Faith there is the danger of credulity, where there is a strong sense for Hierarchy there is the danger of personal exploitation and unjust privileges.

If you go to a village and observe life there properly without being a factor of disturbance or an exception, you will observe that everything is as regulated as in a monastery. There are not only castes and subcastes, so that the individual alone is not conceivable, but there is a hierarchy in everything: who has to greet first and how, who may call a woman by her name or by her husband's name, who has to eat first and who in the second place and the third, who can perform this job and who that one. When you meet somebody, the meeting is not a casual encounter of two individuals, but the convergence of two hierarchical worlds. The nakedness of human existence we spoke of is here tempered by this other dimension, here it is wrapped up with all possible values of history, culture and personality in which your whole status is taken into account. Who you are is one and the same thing with where you come from whose father you

are, of which caste, with what knowledge and wealth, etc. The stranger without pedigree and unknown is either an enemy or a god.

This sense of hierarchy pervades the whole of life and, of course, Religion. Modern India has made strenuous efforts to open the Hindu temples to all castes. It may be good and necessary, but it has affected the higher castes as well as the lower ones. Theoretically the function of the Brahmin is to pray, but the prayer of the Sudra is to work. Equality is not an absolute equal, but a relative concept. It can only mean that I will be judged, or an account will be demanded from me according to what I have received or what is expected from me. It is only a proportional equation. Not everybody has the same duties nor do all people follow the same Law. All the codes and judicial customs of India beginning with the laws of Manu have different standards and different punishments for the "same" crimes committed by the different castes. In fact, externally identical actions are not the same. To lose sight of this sense of hierarchy, makes the hierarchical Culture of India appear inhuman and incomprehensible.

Children, wife, husband, parents, uncles, grandparents, etc., all have ___ a particular status and must behave in a particular way. Westerners and modern Hindus revolt sometimes because not everybody is allowed to say the same mantras or to pray in the same way. Why curtail their rights in such an unjust way? And here they may betray their wrong perspective in approaching Hindu society. It is not primarily a matter of rights, but largely a question of duties. It is not that only the father of the house of a high caste family and the Brahmin of the village have the right to do something that is denied to others; on the contrary, it is that they have the duty to perform certain actions and the

others do not have those duties, but instead they have other ones. Of course, each duty implies a right and vice-versa. It is only a matter of emphasis. If some of these duties are burdensome and others light and easy, it is ~~—~~ another problem altogether. Likewise, the frequent abuse of hierarchical privilege or the anachronism of such a society, cannot be dealt with here.

The world of the gods and that of the spirits is also a hierarchical one. The law of karma, ~~—~~ probably the most important and universal belief of Hinduism, and the so-called transmigration are other expressions of this sense of Hierarchy. A stone cannot reach union with God immediately because it is not capable of it, but nevertheless as a stone it can be perfect. In a similar way not all men can obtain ultimate salvation. They must be reborn first in a higher status. The West does not feel it as an injustice that an animal cannot reach heaven, so the people of India do not consider it wrong that moksa is only for those who are at the summit of the hierarchical order among men. To the others, nevertheless, a chance will be given, in the next births. No peasant would dream of becoming a raja. It does not pertain to him to become a raja and therefore he will not fell unhappy at not becoming a raja. Now peasants are told that they can become the President of India. But they still do not believe it.

The group's Religious attitude

A place in a quite modern hospital was offered to a very poor man suffering from leprosy in a rather advanced and painful state. He was rather reluctant to go, but his wife was quite definite against his going. In the hospital there would be hundreds of lepers. At home, she was alone with him and for him. She would not let him go. And so they lived together in their miserable

hut for eighteen years. That is the Indian people.

Full acceptance of life as it is, or as it has come down to us. Resignation, passivity, surrender.

Urano-causality. The whole process of the world down to the smallest of the human actions is conditioned not by what we could call second causes, but by supra-worldly forces, generally envisaged as gods.

Distrust and diffidence towards the modern world, towards anything new and towards a God without gods, or angels or spirits completely transcendent beyond this material world.

Epilogue

Some of the characteristic described above will appear to be almost contradictory. We have already pointed out that they are not mutually exclusive but complementary. If we were allowed to overlook many important differences and were asked to summarize once more in a form valid for India to-day as a whole, we would make the following observations:

1.- Religion in the forefront. In one way or another, for good or for bad, Religion in India is still in the forefront and has its weight in all the manifestations of the social as well as the personal life of the country. We cannot do without it.

2.- Evolution of Religion. Whether Hinduism has been always dynamic or not, the fact is that now the Religion or religions of the people of India are on the move, are evolving. This evolution, either for good or for bad (it does not belong to us to decide) present a double feature: Adaptation to the modern conditions of life, and purification according to the previous pattern of what Hinduism is supposed to be.

3.- Weakening of Religion. Whatever the efforts of the believers may be, Hindu society faces to-day not so much the attacks of other religions, or the inherent debility of quarrels among the sects, as the powerful impact of an a-religious mentality. We can call it a wave of secularism, a movement of desacralisation, or by many other names. If in the new awakening of India, Hinduism has a unique chance and a great role to play - the great India was Hindu India - , in the new awakening, Hinduism is being kept aside and put in a corner - the subjugated India was also Hindu India and Hinduism is made responsible for the subhuman conditions of life.

In short, if the human being has been defined as "homo religiosus", the Hindu of to-day is a striking example of it and we can say that, in spite of all, his religious attitude is the fundamental dimension of his being.

III

II

WHY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY ASKS FOR RE-ORIENTATION

Notes for Discussion (4)

A - The Problem of Indian Philosophy Today (5)

I - A few years ago "The Indian Philosophical Congress", which represents the ~~greatest~~ bulk of the "official" ~~culti~~ promoters vators of Philosophy in India, put this question to its members: "Does Indian Philosophy need Re-orientation?"(1) The discussion held on that occasion and the papers that were published before or afterwards reveal most clearly the present trends of Indian Philosophy.(2) It seems to us, nevertheless that the problem of re-orientation springs ~~up~~ from a much deeper level.(3)

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(1) Cf. Proceedings of the XXXI Indian Philosophical Congress, Annamalainagar, 1956.

(2) Cf. also for instance many articles of The Philosophical Quarterly years 1950 sq.;
Contemporary Indian Philosophy edited by S. RADHAKRISHNAN and J.H. MUIRHEAD - London, 2nd edn. 1952; [Allen and Unwin]
S.C. CHATTARJEE, Studies in Philosophy (2 vols.) Calcutta, 1956, 1958;
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M. HIRIYANNA, Indian Philosophical Studies, Mysore, 1957;
R.D. RANADE, A Constructive Survey of the Upanisadic Philosophy, Poona, 1926;
M. HIRIYANNA, The Quest After Perfection, Mysore (kavyalalya) 1952
S.C. CHATTERJEE, The Problem of Philosophy, 1949;
S.C. CHATTERJEE & D.M. DATTA, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Calcutta (3rd ed.) 1948;
S. RADHAKRISHNAN, Indian Philosophy, 2 vols., London, 1923, 1927;
N.K. DEVRAJ, The Status of Vedantic Thought and Culture, Calcutta, 1927; etc.

(3) We do not support the statements of the following pages with quotations, for anybody slightly versed with Indian and with modern Western Philosophy can find as many instances as he desires.

(4) the reader is earnestly requested to keep it mind throughout this chapter that we are just jotting down "notes" which don't pretend to give a comprehensive account of the number of problems we are forced to touch upon in order to sketch an answer of the central question of this chapter.

The question concerning the re-orientation of Indian Philosophy, that is, the query regarding the lines along which present-day Indian philosophical speculation should proceed if it is to make an effective contribution to the philosophical world of to-day, is a very important question indeed.(2) Yet it involves a more fundamental problem in which the whole of traditional Indian Philosophy is at stake, namely the very conception of Philosophy itself.(1)

II - There is a double conception of Philosophy, one of which Indian tradition as a whole holds. We would even say that it must hold the other, modern, conception of "Philosophy" as the West holds it, and we would even add that after the Christian impact on human intelligence it cannot but hold that other picture of Philosophy.(2)

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(1) Besides the bibliography given elsewhere (p. 5), cf. etc. [illegible] of chapter III, 10, of. following, which [illegible] W.JAEGER, Die Theologie des frühen griechischen Denkens, Stuttgart (W.Kohlhammer) 1953 (a revised version of Gifford Lectures appeared in English, Oxford 1947); E.CAIRD, The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers (Gifford Lectures 1901,1902) 2 vols., Glasgow, (J.MacLehose) 1904

L.LAVELLE, De l'acte (Coll. "Philosophie del'esprit") Paris (Aubier) 1946

RD.MORDT-HR, Le pensée négative (Coll. "Philosophie del' esprit"), Paris (Aubier) 1947.

JEAN LECLERCQ, L'amour des lettres et le désir de Dieu, Paris (Cerf) 1957.

M.-D.CHENU, La Theologie comme science au XIII siècle ("Bibliotèque Thomiste", Nr.33) Paris, 3rd ed.(Vrin)1957.

id., La Theologie au douzième siècle ("Etudes de Philosophie médiévale" Nr.45) Paris (Vrin) 1957.

→ Cont.

~~Philosophy~~(2).

(Foot-note No.(1) of page 2 continued)

G.MISCH, The Dawn of Philosophy, London (Routledge & Kegan Paul) 1950 (enlarged edition of Der Weg in die Philosophie, 1926)

Th. SOINCH, Heilige Theologie, Regensburg (Pustet) 1939

H.M.CHRISTMANN, Lebendige Einheit, Salzburg (O.Müller) 2nd ed.1938

M.HEIDEGGER, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, Pfullingen (G.Neske) 1954.

R.ANDRÉ, Wunderbare Wirklichkeit (Majestät des Seins)(Coll. "Wort und Antwort" Nr.12) Salzburg (O.Müller) 1955;

R. GUARDINI, The End of the Modern World, London (Sheed & Ward 1957 (transl. from -Das Ende der neuen Zeit)

R. PANIKAR, El concepto de naturaleza. Madrid (C.S.I.C.)1951.

id., El Dios y la Filosofía del sentimiento, Buenos Aires (Sapientia), 1946.

~~Bibliography of the Problem:~~

(1) Cf. the further bibliographical references:

Cl. TRESMONTANT, Études de métaphysique biblique, Paris (J.Gabalda) 1955.

id., Essai sur la pensée hebraïque, Paris (Cerf) 1953.

P.ROUSSELOT, L'intellectualisme de St. Thomas, Paris (Beauchesne) 1924 (English transl, London (Sheed & Ward) 1935)

J. MARECHAL, Le point de départ de la métaphysique, 5 vols. Louvain, 1926 sq.

F.V.AJA, El Cristianismo en la crisis de Occidente (y otros temas) La Habana (Sociedad Cubana de Filosofía) 1953

V. FATONE, El Hombre y Dios (Col. "Esquemas", 17) Buenos Aires (Columbo) 1955.

(2) When an adjective does not make clear the sense of the word "Philosophy", for clarity sake we should use "Philosophy" (inverted commas) to denote the technical western concept of Philosophy as opus rationis

(2) For a survey on the present trends of Philosophy in the Indian Sub-continent cf. C.I.K.CHARI, Philosophy in India, in "Religion and Society", Bangalore, VII, 3/4 (1950), pp 106-114 and R. DE SMET, L'activité philosophique au Pakistan, in "Archivio di Filosofia", XXIII/3 (1953) ff. 403-453

could distinguish this double conception

Scholastically speaking one ~~can~~ easily. Philosophy, in India is defined by its material object, namely the knowledge of the ultimate Reality. Here the goal is to apprehend that Reality one way or another and be one with It. "Modern" however Philosophy is defined by its formal object, that is, the rational or rather intellectual knowledge of the ultimate Reality. Here the stress is upon the acquisition of ultimate knowledge, that is, a critical knowledge which in one way or another, authenticates itself. Indian Philosophy tries to decipher the mystery of being because we are ontically involved in it. ~~adventure~~. "Modern" Philosophy for its part cannot by-pass the critical attitude of examining the grounds on which such a knowledge stands.

The gap is sometimes felt so profoundly that many Indian scholars would say that Indian Wisdom, Vedānta for instance, is neither Science, Philosophy nor Theology, nor Religion, but another knowledge, which is in fact supreme. But, curiously enough, by doing so they pay their tribute to a "Western modern" mind which besides is no longer characteristic of the present-day West. They take Science to be synonymous with Natural-Science, Philosophy to rational enquiry — if not mere Dialectic —, they consider Theology as pure exegesis (Mīmāṃsā) and sheer "Dogmatism"; and they regard Religion as a set of ceremonies. Others, would like to filter, as it were, from the bulk of Indian Wisdom the philosophical precipitate which can offer a counterpart to the "Modern" (Western) Philosophy. ~~We follow neither of these two ways which are too dependent on a particular~~

~~philosophical current and are also alien to Indian tradition, but take Philosophy in its broader and, we think, also deeper sense as ultimate Wisdom. So, we think, for example, that Upanishads contain a Philosophy, and Yoga and Vedanta are also Philosophy.~~

Between these two conceptions of Philosophy was ultimately

III - The ~~[illegible]~~ process of discrimination, due to the fundamental distinction introduced by Christianity between reason and faith. Faith and only faith saves. Reason may help faith from below, as it were, and in such a case is welcome, and their embrace is what Christian tradition knows as Theology. But reason may well also stand in the way and hinder the work of faith when it pretends to be alone or supreme in the quest for the absolute Truth.

Indian Philosophy knows also of a certain distinction between reason and faith; it is the distinction of two modes of knowledge, like that between inference and intuition, for instance. Both forms of knowledge are needed for an integral Philosophy. That is the reason why Indian Philosophy is essentially religious and theological. This constitutes its greatness and its weakness at the same time.

Christian faith is somewhat different. It is not only a form of knowledge. It is also a free and real gift of God. It is further the beginning of the divinisation of man. One of its primary effects is indeed the higher enlightenment of our mind. Though this faith is not refused to the philosophers, it is given primarily to the poor and the little ones. This

faith is not against reason, but at the same time, it is not the mere continuation of rational Philosophy. It seems as if it would make Philosophy superfluous, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ its saving character. What will save, ~~xx~~ Christianity is not ~~xxxxxx~~ Philosophy, but faith. Philosophy has been deprived of its direct religious function. There is a natural and a supernatural ~~sphere~~ level, both are not separated, but they are distinct. The conflict between reason and faith is a ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ phenomenon arising from a christian context -and cannot-

for once faith as such has been introduced, mere Philosophy is lost

IV - And yet Christian faith could not be for a long time in the air, as it were. It could not—and did not intend to ~~xx~~ either—displace Philosophy altogether. It had to face the challenge of Philosophy and ~~xx~~ developed into a kind of "Philosophy", which the result of this meeting ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ was called (Christian) Theology.

The mutual challenge of faith and reason has lasted through the whole history of European thought from the Patristic age down to our times. Overlooking its various phases the result has been this: the precious ~~xx~~ concept of Philosophy as saving wisdom, as the intellectual dimension of Religion, has disappeared and instead two other typically Christian-European products appear: Theology on the one hand and pure Philosophy on the other.

Theology in the Christian sense is in a way the successor of the integral and undiscriminated Philosophy of the precious period, but with a fundamental difference: Theology is still the Science of salvation, the integral knowledge about the ultimate Reality, but as such it has no saving power. It is not Theology, but

Faith that saves. Theology is the product of the believing mind, but theological knowledge is not necessary for salvation.

Pure Philosophy, on the other hand, is detached from Religion also and is considered as a human enquiry seeking to discover by means of our reason the ultimate meaning of Being, including in a very special way the analysis of our very knowing powers. For the believer Philosophy is the necessary instrument of Theology, for the non-believer it is the highest wisdom possible.

We have therefore three different "things". Religion as an essential factor of human existence; Theology as an ultimate Wisdom in the light of the Self-disclosure of the Supreme; and Philosophy as the "natural" and intellectual inquiry about the meaning of Reality, starting with an analysis of our means of knowledge.

V - Now this triple distinction, which is a fundamental one for the West is not understood in the same manner in Indian Tradition. In fact, Indian Philosophy embraces all three levels. Indian Philosophy is Religion, Theology and Philosophy all in one. For a Vedāntin's instance, Religion is his Philosophy, and he will look upon his darśan as a Religion, as a Way of Life and Salvation. A pure technical "philosophical" discussion - in the Western sense - is for him altogether unfeasible it would be a blasphemy.

On a first level there is, therefore, Indian Philosophy

merely
as Religion. Religion does not mean here, of course, ~~cult~~ or religious practices, but a way of realisation and salvation. It is not that Indian Philosophy is a substitute for Religion - this is only the danger for pure intellectuals - but it is itself a Religion. That is why Indian Philosophy takes so often the form of Apologetics in discussion with Western Philosophy. On this level Indian Philosophy claims to have a saving-power and to be a Religion,

Or, at least its intellectual dimension. It is on these grounds that Indian Philosophy stands facing the claims of Christian Religion

as Theology

On a second level there is an encounter between Indian Philosophy and Christian Theology. This encounter is of paramount importance. They meet in the fact that both have the same aim and tackle the same material object. Both want to be more than mere speculation and attempt to be the science of salvation and the integral and ultimate wisdom. The main problem however is the clarification of the two different concepts of faith. But as faith can neither be proved nor imposed the dialogue comes soon to an end or steps down to a merely philosophical encounter.

As a matter of fact Indian Philosophy in our times has not properly met Christian Theology and has hardly had any encounter with believing philosophers of the West. Its dialogue has been mainly with the autonomous "Philosophy" of Europe and America. This fact explains many of the reactions from both sides.

This leads us to the third level, i.e., to a meeting of Philosophies, in the sense of the "Modern" Western-philosophical point of view. Here the dialogue can touch on an indefinite number of topics except one, which is for Indian Philosophy the most important one and for a pure Philosophy simply non existent: the supra-rational approach to the ultimate problem. It may very well be that this dialogue leads, in Kantian language, to the "breaking up of reason", i.e., to the acknowledgment of the insufficiency of mere reason and of mere "Philosophy", but we may wonder whether the second part of Kant's intention might

result from
~~whether~~ this experiment, i.e., a "room-making for faith" for
the nature of Christian faith is not that ~~of~~ of Indian Philosophy and both do
~~not~~ not even play the same role.

~~As a matter of fact Indian Philosophy in our times has not properly met Christian Theology and has hardly had any encounter with believing philosophers of the West. Its dialogue has been mainly with the autonomous and mere Philosophy of Europe and America. This fact explains many of the reactions from both sides.~~

VI - This may give us perhaps an aspect of the answer to the question heading these notes. Indian Philosophy feels a sound need for re-orientation and suffers a wholesome uneasiness not only arising to its proper movement and vitality, but also ~~whether~~ because it is beginning to feel the effects of the Christian impact like in ~~past centuries the Hellenic systems of Philosophy had to face the challenge of Christianity and vice versa.~~ a still very remote and indirect way.

We cannot now substantiate or develop this statement. But it looks as if the modern self-consciousness of Indian Philosophy, its being self-reflective in regard to a problem like that of reason and faith, ~~its questioning to~~ and its questioning to some extent the very nature of its Philosophy, ~~looks as if all this~~ were the beginnings of an encounter with ~~the~~ Christian ideas that are to be found widespread in almost all philosophical speculations of the West.

Still the differences are very great, and it is philosophically desirable that Indian Philosophy does not yield too easily to the Criticisms of the West. It should not be satisfied to be a mere Philosophy; neither should it remain idle or brooding over the past only. Rather it would be good if it would let those ideas penetrate itself, and then come forth, at the right time.

VII - A phenomenological confrontation may be a necessary step for further clarification if we are not to lose sight of the deeper divergences. It is in this spirit of a cautious approach on a phenomenological level that the two following sections of these notes are written. To reach a certain formal agreement, even when the material contents are still diverse is nevertheless a certain amount of progress and opens a door for mutual integration, understanding and enrichment.

→ 10,1

from 10,1 →

B - Philosophy and Theology, Reason and Faith

(An essay of phenomenological Clarification)

I - Philosophy means "the human quest for the Ultimate Reality"; or if we prefer to stress a little more the intellectual aspect, Philosophy would then mean "the human quest for the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality".

II - Theology has the same formal meaning as Philosophy described above.

III - So long as man was searching for the true or ultimate Reality with all his being, no discrimination was made

from 10.

From a Christian point of view any phenomenological study on the subject will fall short of reaching the xx crucial Christian problem: that of the natural abd of the supernatural. The reader should keep in mind this ~~thm~~ inherent shortcoming of phenomenology in order not to misunderstand Chritianity. On the other hand, only a phenimenological approach, inspite of its incompletness, will allow us to enter into they problem from an angle making sense for both sides. Phenomenology may detect the difference between a merely natural and a supernatural faith, for instance, but ~~in~~ it is not allowed to draw from it any metaphysical conclusion, nor it is allowed, on the other hand, to overlook the phenomenologically common structure of both conceptions of faith. (1)

→ 10

(1) Cf. Instructio ~~ssss~~ SSCS offici of 20-XII-1949 (A.A.S., XLII, 2 (31-1-1950) ff. 142-147

between Philosophy and Theology, except for a slightly essential stress on the part of Philosophy - what is reality? (that I may reach it)! - and for a soft existential over-tone on the side of Theology - How to reach Reality? (for which I must know it).

IV - It is the assumption that Reality is given - open - to human reason and hence that man must discover and see (Philosophy speaks of evidence, intuition - all metaphors of the eye) that ultimate Reality. This is the distinctive feature of what in "modern" times is called Philosophy.

V - It is the presupposition that ultimate Reality is given to man - whose receiving organ for it is human faith - and in consequence that man must accept and hear that Reality, that characterises it what later on, in the discriminative period has been called Theology. (Theology speaks of following (a call), hearing, all based on metaphors of the ear).

VI - When we approach the knowledge of the ultimate Reality by means of reason, we have "Philosophy", when we do it by way of faith we have Theology.

VII - Reason is understood as the intellectual power of human evidence; it is the noble human capacity to see things as they appear to the human mind. We cannot, however, jump over our own shadow; the boundaries of visibility of our reason coincide with the limits of of our reason. We cannot properly see - that is, to have rational evidence - beyond the ontological field of our reason itself. The

reality which we see with our reason is only the rational reality, or even rather the rational aspect of reality. To be sure, with our reason, we can know that reality transcends reason - because we can be reasonably aware that there are many things which transcend reason - but we cannot see, i.e., understand rationally the transcendence. If rational Philosophy claims to be the highest knowledge about reality it must either absolutise and divinise reason, or transcend it. The first case leads to idealistic Philosophy, the second one to a philosophical Theology.

VIII - Faith is utilised by Theology as a source of a higher degree of knowledge, which gives us the adequate human knowledge of the Absolute (or the Ultimate Reality), during the time we are still here on earth philosophising (viz., theologising). Faith is not based on our intrinsic evidence. We could use perhaps the metaphor of an intrinsic hearing (acoustic grasping). Faith could be compared to a kind of extrinsic evidence, of hearsay, not of seeing. If the Ultimate Reality transcends us, it would be grounded not on man, but founded somehow on the other shore already. cannot be visible, but audible. Reason is the inner eye; it can see perhaps clearer than any other form of knowledge, but it does not reach very far. Faith is the inner ear; it can hear - perhaps not so distinctly as the eye can see - but it perceives Reality far beyond. We should but not however abuse of any metaphor.

seeing-power

as it has to have some connexion with us, we could use auditive metaphors and say that the Absolute may be somehow

IX - Faith and Reason make room for two different forms of knowledge. The latter presupposes that we are open to Reality, (We discover); the former that Reality is open to us, (we hear).

-13-

Reason is given to every normal man in lesser or greater degree. Faith is also given, in several degrees. (We believe in the words of our parents, teachers, friends - in the word of God - if we are able to hear it).

But reason and faith are not on the same level, they are two different light intensities of our human knowledge rather than two different independent modes of knowledge. The relation is however a particular one.

α) Reason cannot exist without a certain amount of faith; it must have faith in reason itself as an organ of truth, it needs faith to accept the evidence of what it sees. (One has seen pupils so suspicious that, full of mistrust for their teachers, they accept only as provisional the most striking evidences: 2 + 2 really to be 4; but ultimately who knows? They do not have faith in evidence. Does not Euclid's axiom of the parallels seem to be equally evident - and yet it is not?)

because human evidence is never complete.

A Totally perfect evidence could presuppose an Absolute knowledge of the truth known and all its implications, which is not possible for a limitated mind. Any act of reason is founded in presuppositions which have not been rationally investigated. It is in that sense that it always presupposes the acceptance of something. This acceptance is accepted not by reason, but by a certain confidence - in the very structure of our mind - which would I call faith ①

β Faith cannot do without reason: it may not see the internal evidence of the spoken words, but it must somehow see (have evidence of) the speaker and understand the meaning of his words. I cannot have faith in my parents if I do not know that they are really my parents. I cannot have faith in God if I do not even know that there is a God.

Moreover, this relation is so close that it is given in one and the same act. By the very act of obeying my parents, because I believe in their words, I realize that they are my morphologically corresponds to what phenomenologi

① → 13,1

(1) Even that famous argument that to deny the "evidence" of the first principles one has to make use of those very principles needs an act of a certain faith in order to break the circulus vitiosus. In fact, because we cannot disprove them, this does not mean that they are "proved". If we cannot disprove any of such principles, because the counter-argument already presupposes them, the only strictly rational consequence would be complete silence and utter agnosticism if we had not a certain faith in ~~that very~~ the mechanism of our mind.

parents. I realize at the same time that their words for me have a special weight (authority). Rational evidence produces conviction; but also conviction leads to rational evidence. And this conviction is the acceptance of something because it is given (~~it is~~ in some sense heard, not because ~~it is~~ seen).

X - There is no "Philosophy" without a certain faith; there is no Theology without reason. "Philosophy" has faith in reason. Theology must needs give some reason for its faith.

However with one essential difference: the faith presupposed in "Philosophy" is not ~~an~~ proper by theological faith; whereas the reason presupposed in Theology is the philosophical reason. "Philosophy" has a certain consistency of its own; it is based on human reason; but it ~~is not~~ claims of being ultimate. Theology is nothing without "Philosophy", it requires the collaboration, the service of Philosophy; however ~~it~~ it goes further than Philosophy; it is ultimate, it is in one sense ~~the prolongation of Philosophy, or better~~, the information, the enrichment and transformation of rational Philosophy into super-rational (viz., super-natural) or plainly theological Philosophy. — if (again) faith exists.

can only subsist if faith exist therefore Theology do not exist.

Theology is not grounded on dogmas, but on faith. But faith requires reason and in some sense is founded on reason. So Theology discovers and formulates dogmas as Philosophy discovers and formulates metaphysical principles.

XI - Properly speaking Theology and Philosophy go together. The work of discrimination begun by ~~Thomas Aquinas~~ the Greeks

and completed in the "modern Philosophy" was somehow necessary in order to stratify the several degrees of knowledge and their own realms. ~~Only that~~ And To-day however the possibility is there of integrating - without mixing up the different strata of human knowledge in a real and all comprehensive Philosophy or theological Philosophy, or philosophical Theology. To be sure, this is not the work of Philosophy or of Theology, but of Faith and even more so of Grace. → 15.1

from 15,1

C - The Discovery of its Theological Background for the Re-orientation of Indian Philosophy(1)

(Some Reflexions) ~~for Indian Philosophers to-day~~

I - Necessity of re-orientation.

A-priori we can and must affirm that any living Philosophy needs a constant re-orientation, and ~~must~~ needs it for two main reasons. If Philosophy is to be something more than a museum piece or a matter of archaeological interest, it has a double link, active and passive, with human Life and Culture. On the one hand, Philosophy as an integral outlook about Reality, influences and shapes all human activities and behaviour here on earth, so that any cultural manifestation has

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(1) This Section is a modified and enlarged version of an article appeared previously in "East and West" (VIII, 1), Roma, April, 1957, and in "The Philosophical Quarterly" (XXX, 3), Amalner, October, 1957.

XIII- Summing up our terminological clarification, we could say:

1- Reason is that power of the human intellect which discovers truth on the basis of evidence.

2- Faith is that light of the human being which accepts truth on the basis of a qualified testimony.

3- The functioning of the human intellect presupposes reason as well as faith.

4- Philosophy is that conception of Reality based on reason.

5- Theology is that conception of Reality based on faith.

6- Pure Philosophy or pure Theology in the sense of a total exclusion of the other form of knowledge is not possible.

7- When reason leads and controls faith we are philosophizing.

8- When faith leads and controls reason we are theologizing.

9- There is a kind of faith whose nature requires direction and control from the part of reason, this is the - infra-rational - natural faith. This is the realm of Philosophy.

10- There is said to exist a kind of faith whose nature requires direction and control over reason. This is the realm of Theology. - supra-rational - supernatural

11- As a matter of language, <u>what</u> some cultures have called "Philosophy" corresponds to <u>what</u> has been defined here as Theology.

12- The thesis of the following pages will be:

a)- that whereas the Westwrn modern speculation has clarified the concept of "Philosophy", it has empoverished it too by reducing it to one of rational Philosophy, and

b)- that one of the possible contribution of Indian Philosophy could very well be tha re-instaŵration of the concept of Philosophy as Theology without denying nevertherless the justified existence of a rational philosophical Science.

→ 15

always a hidden, at times disregarded, philosophical source of inspiration. On the other hand, human life with all its implications provokes and determines to a great extent the Philosophy of its time, so much so, that a philosopher is always a product of his time and is only fully understandable from the cultural background in which he lives.

Thus, it belongs to a dialectical necessity of Philosophy itself to search for a continuous re-orientation of its tenets along with the development of human history, and, again, to receive a regular re-orientation from culture and human life.

II - Reasons for re-orientation.

A posteriori we can, moreover, discover the urgent need for the re-orientation of Indian Philosophy. Owing to obvious historical causes neither has Indian Philosophy been very effectively present in the shaping of the Indian life of our times, nor has the cultural situation of the world today and of India specially, had a very direct influence on Indian Philosophy. Instead, Indian Philosophy is and remains as a whole a matter of the past, or, at best, a simple adaptation or translation into modern garb, when not actually a mere repetition, of ancient problems and answers. It does, therefore, need re-orientation.

Re-orientation, however, does not mean that we have to deny or to ignore the past and be slaves of sheer novelty. Rather it does mean that even the so-admittedly ever-lasting problems and their answers have to be not simply expressed in modern terms, but re-thought and "re-lived" in the actual present by and for the actual man, though the response may coalesce with

the most traditional ones.

III - "Modern" Tributs.

Moreover, almost all recent interpretations, expositions and even advances in Indian Philosophy have been made, if not always in dialogue with the Western "modern" Philosophy, yet in accepting in one way or another the main underlying reiniss of that Philosophy, namely the very conception of Philosophy itself. Even when the differences could not be denied, Indian Philosophers have only too often stressed that Indian Philosophy is also rational, also Philosophy in the sense in which the "modern" West understands it, also "scientific" and the like. In other words, the background from which modern Indian Philosophy actually arrives at self-reflection and the light by which it tries to renew itself or attempts to continue its growth, is ultimately, to a great extent, borrowed from that "modern" philosophical tradition of the West.

Thus, the first re-orientation that Indian Philosophy needs, is, in the most literal meaning of the word, a re-orientation, that is, to be turned again towards the Orient. Re-orientation means nothing else than to direct a thing again eastwards. The very word is a symbol and a challenge! Jewish, Christian, Muslim and Indian Cultures can quote from their Scriptures and Traditions and find a deep meaning in this attitude of facing the East. But the Levant is never where we are! The Orient, where the sun rises, is always beyond the earth.

IV - End of the "Modern"age.

Hence, this re-orientation would be completely misunderstood if interpreted in a kind of proud and foolish self-sufficient way of re-coiling on itself and being severed from the West and from the universal tradition of a "perennis philosophia". On the contrary, the re-orientation needed is a new link with the philosophical tradition of the world, a new opening to the full human reality and a deepening into the integral conception of Philosophy.

With an almost absolute unanimity the thinkers of to-day, to whatever trend of thought they may belong, recognise that a new epoch in world history is dawning, that the "modern" culture closes a cycle and that we are assisting at the "end of the modern age". One of the consequences of it is that the very conception of Philosophy, valid in that "modern" period, must be revised and re-orientated.

This is the main purpose of these notes, which we should like to formulate and to explain as clearly and briefly as possible, — the consequence being that the re-orientation of Indian Philosophy is by no means an Indian problem and in no way a simple dealing with the past, but a universal philosophical problem, an urgent task of the present and a heavy responsibility towards the future.

V - Philosophy versus Theology

The fundamental difference between "modern" Western

"Philosophy" and the other conception of Philosophy, could eventually be termed as follows: the "modern" concept of Philosophy accepted in the European Philosophy from Descartes down to Nicolai Hartmann, is not the traditional meaning of Philosophy. Or, the common conception of Philosophy as a purely rational enquiry about Reality or ultimate Reality is an antiphilosophical conception of Philosophy as seen from the other point of view. Or again, what the "modern" mind takes for Philosophy is a "scientific", not a "philosophical" Philosophy. We can obviously define "Philosophy" as rational knowledge about ultimate Reality. But we are neither allowed to identify this kind of Philosophy of ours with what other cultures have understood by Philosophy or "purge" from it all that does not coalesce with our definition, nor can we claim that it is the ultimate and integral Wisdom about all that is, viz., we can not assume, without proving it, that there is no higher instance in the endeavour towards the ultimate problems.

On the other hand, that restricted meaning of Philosophy has undoubtedly a positive value in itself and is one of the greatest achievements of the human mind——here lies precisely its great danger——, but it is neither the traditional conception of Philosophy, nor does it fulfil the mission for which Philosophy always sought.

The question, thus appears like this: Should we define Philosophy by its material object? If so, then we should find that Indian Philosophy and Christian Theology

are both Philosophy. But if we define Philosophy in terms of its formal object, neither of them can be called Philosophy. Philosophy would then be reduced to what the post-cartesian cultural world understands by such a name.

The question becomes more entangled when we try to understand the relationship between the two objects. To the Christian believer, for instance, who at the same time is a philosopher in the restricted sense, "Philosophy" will exist and have its justification, but will not be the ultimate Wisdom, i.e., will not be at the same level as Theology (or as Indian Philosophy for the Hindu). But to a non-believer, Philosophy in the restricted sense, will be ultimate Wisdom and he will say - not without "reason" - that Philosophy is by definition ultimate and so stands on the same footing with Indian Philosophy or even with Christian Theology, though he will reject both as "dogmatic" or at least as non-rational constructions. It is obvious that if the non-believer does not believe in any superior form of knowledge than human reason he cannot admit anything beyond Philosophy, as a rational understood endeavour. In order to face this challenge Christian Theology has produced an hybrid science called Apologetics, and for the same reason Indian Philosophy has suffered - and is suffering - the temptation of resigning itself to its supra-rational contents and becoming "Philosophy". Hence also the "apologetic" character of many Indian philosophical works of to-day (Nothing is more "hygienic" than Hindu saṃskāras, more "reasonable" than intuition, more "logical" than faith, more "up-to-date" than Vedāntism, etc.).

We should like to recall to Indian Philosophy its need, to be loyal to its tradition and to resist the aforesaid temptation while remaining open to progress and evolution. But we are now only concerned with the explanation of our main point. For this we can adduce three different orders of considerations.

VI a) General historical perspective.

That kind of

If we look at the conception of Philosophy in all the cultures of the world, perhaps with the single exception of the adventure of the European mind, roughly from Descartes till our times, we find, first of all, that most of them do none of them not distinguish and separate Philosophy from Theology. Greece, the Christian Fathers of the Church, the Middle Ages, the Arabic, Chinese, Jewish and Indian Philosophy, have always considered that the Queen of all forms of knowledge, that the ultimate Wisdom about the Universe, including ourselves and God, was Theology, which often the (called also Philosophy or sometimes Metaphysics, or even Contemplation. This Universal Wisdom, Theology or Philosophy, brahmavidyā or darśana, purported to be an integral in-sight, a complete vision about the ultimate problems of Reality. Except for the previously mentioned period of the European culture, Philosophy was never limited to the one and only rational source of knowledge, but tried to embrace and to sift all possible kinds and modes of information. Moreover, Philosophy was considered as an integral human attitude which required not only mental acuity, but also

moral virtue and a full human development. This Philosophy or Theology is at the service of Man, for it is nothing else but the integral human effort to grasp and understand the mystery of Being and of our being and destiny and by that to save us from hell, from unreality, from mere appearance, from an unauthentic existence here on earth. Philosophy has always been the intellectual part of Religion, the human quest for the understanding of the meaning of the entire universe (Being, Reality...). That kind of Philosophy has followed Religion because, in spite of their external tension, it has always been an effort of understanding critically - and of purifying - the answers given by Religion.

As a matter of fact, philosophers have not only been believers, but they have built up their Philosophy out of their own faith with the help of their reason as an instrument; they simply wanted to explain and to analyse what they held as true, i.e., that which they believed. Philosophy was not an irrelevant human activity or a kind of sport or hobby for the privileged few, but was the conscious and intellectual part of Religion regarded as the most serious problem of human life, concerning every mortal here in this world ~~of ours~~.

May we add a somewhat auto-phenomenological reflexion? Fichte's saying that the Philosophy one has depends on the kind of man (or woman) one is, has here a profound application. If I am a believer, I am in an altogether existentially

different position in my philosophising as if I were it not. Philosophy unless it steps down to phenomenology cannot put existence into brackets and much less can the philosopher make an abstraction of his existence and his convictions. The more "philosophical" enquiry of a believer and of a non-believer, say, on a problem like the existence of God is radically distinct. (1) The "objective" reasons may be the same and may have an objective validity, but neither my capacity of discovery is the same when I really doubt or when I already know, nor the power of conviction of the arguments is the same when some "discovered" truth fits into my expectations (I believed already in it) or it comes like an undesired guest. The believer when he philosophises has no danger the original innocence or the radical ignorance of the non-believer. (2)

→ 23,1

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(1) May I relate a story to illustrate my meaning?

You are reading with thrilling interest a detective novel. I have already the book and tell you who has been the author of the crime. Even if you want you could not now read the book anymore as if you were not knowing who the "murderer" was. The situation has changed radically. A believer cannot - existentially - philosophise as if he did not know the issue. He can technically and theoretically put his faith aside, but he cannot forget it. Philosophy for the unbeliever has an almost tragic character. All depends on his philosophy. For the believer it has a quite different meaning. He will check, prove, clarify, make intelligible what he already believes he knows.

(2) Another may clarify the meaning still further.

A lover is complaining to his friend. "For two years I have always been writing a letter daily to my fiancee and now she tells me that she is going to marry the postman!" For three or four centuries the European mind is dealing on the ultimate problems by means of pure reason as intermediate means, doing pure Philosophy and putting aside Theology. What wonder that it has fallen in love with reason and rejected faith! If there is not the immediacy of faith we cannot but "write letters" with our reason. Perhaps our age of television will help us to get out of the impasse.

The diverse meaning of Philosophy for the believer and for the non-believer could ~~be eventually~~ finally be illustra ted by saying that Philosophy for the latter represents the ascending ~~uncertain~~ path towards an unknown summit - by means of his critical reason - whereas for the former it would rather represent a ~~descending~~ excursion to the plains from some inaccessible peak ~~wherefrom~~ from which he is somehow returning - by means of his reason too -. The way, as such may be the same and both see the same landscape and analyse the same portion of Reality when they are on the same stretch of the path; yet the difference is immense, in effort (the one is climbing up, the other going down hill), in aim (the one wants to reach the summit of Being, the other to clear it up, i.e., to understand it as far this is possible), in security (the one does not even know whether there is an end or a peak or what he will find there, the other already knows - believes himself to know - what is there and looks only for a clarification). When they meet on the way they may greet one another and even discuss on some issues with ~~sense~~ profit when they are sitting down on the same spot, but the moment they speak on the summit or they want to go further they discover that they are marching in the opposite direction. It may have been a pleasant talk for a while, and even a fruitful one, but there is no escape in front of the ultimate issue, which is one of conversion: One of both has to change direction and proceed the opposite way, a real change of mind, of life. There is no other alternative, unless the both sit down on the ground and give up their human pilgrimage.

→ 24

from 28.1

Lao-tze and Confucius, Parmenides and Heraclitus, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, Augustine and Thomas as well as Avicenna and Algazel, Philo and Maimonides, etc., all were, properly speaking theologians, ~~i.e., true philosophers.~~ They did not ask merely for a rational, almost rationalistic clarification of the rational data, but for a whole understanding of all data, viz., of all that is given. Why reduce all data only to the sense or to rational date when many other things are also given - (data) - to us? Why trust only in reason when in fact we give credence also to many other things? A different problem altogether is a philosophical analysis, an intellectual understanding - and intellect transcends reason - of all given things, including our forms of knowledge.

In short, Philosophy was not considered down the ages as the discovery, or rather, the invention of Reality by means of our reason, but as the integral Wisdom, that is to say, as the spiritual answer of man to the problems of existence. The expression of this answer may be an intellectual one and, in consequence, reason is not excluded, but is only a part - though essential one - of the human instrument to face the demands of Being and of our participation in it.

VII. b) The evolution of the concept of Philosophy in the West.

The colossal adventure of the Western mind began in Greece with the conception common to all cultures that Philosophy is synonymous with Theology, as an integral attempt to

understand the ultimate problems of Reality. in the light of all the forms of knowledge man has. Philosophy is love of Wisdom, and this Wisdom is an experimental knowledge, a tasteful logos about everything that is, and especially, in consequence, about Being, as the Absolute or God - and the clue to all that is. Philosophy, or as Plato will say, coining a new name, Theology, is not only connected with Religion but is the true Religion, it is a standing preparation for death (Plato), for death, is the beginning of the real, everlasting life; the philosopher is a philomythes (Aristotle), a lover of the myths, for in them we have crystallised in a popular way, the meaning of life and the idea of being. Philosophy is the path of salvation (Stoa), for only the contemplation of Being makes it possible to reach that very Being and be united with it; The wise man is the one who works for the salvation of his soul (Epicurus). → 25,1

fran 25.1 →

This Philosophy or Theology includes all forms of knowledge, for everything is connected with the ultimate questions. It is indeed a Science, or better, it is simply Science, but science throughout this period down to the Middle Ages means the cognition of things in their causes, i.e., as they really are, or more exactly, the knowledge God has of the things. And we, by means of Theology with the help of all our knowing faculties, participate in such a Science. Philosophy contains in seed and in potentiality all that afterwards is going to be denominated particular sciences. These are only the branches and again give back to the trunk their results so that Philosophy can use them for the harmonious welfare - or

from 25 to

It should not be forgotten that we are not ~~saying~~ introducing any novelty from the Christian point of view (1). In the Christian Patristic, Philosophy means sanctity (2), asceticism (3). Christ "has shown us with his life and works the true Philosophy" (4). Philospphy means "monastic life" (5), undesstood as the life of the perfect imitation of Christ (6). Adam, we are told, was made similar to God by means of "Philosophy" (7). "Philosophiae supremum culmen" (8)is the close following of Christ (9). "Philosophiae desiderium" (1o), means the urge for supernatural perfection (11). Even during the Middle Ages this idea of Philosophy was prevalent (12). The whole modern problem of a "Christian Philosophy" had but little sense during all this period (13).

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(1) Because the real danger of forgetting it in Christians themselves, we allow us to make an exception to our way of writing and add some footnotes on this particular point.

(2) IOHAN.CHRYSOST., In Matth./ hom.,18,4 (P.G.,57,269).

(3) Cf. G.PENCO, La vita ascetica come "Filosofia" nell'antica tradizione monastica in "Studia Monastica", Barcelona (Montserrat) (196o), vol.II, pp. 79-93.

(8)(*) IOHAN!CHRYSOST. Adv. oppugnatores vitae monastic., III, 14 (P.G.,47,373).

(4) NIL., Epist.,II,54 (P.G.,79,223).

(5)GREG. NAZIAN., Oratio,VI (P.G.,35,721).

(6) Cf. I.HAUSHERR, Direction spirituelle en Orient autrefois, Roma (Pont. Inst. Orient. Stud.) 1955, pp. 56 sq.

(7) NIL., Sententiae,34 (P.G.,79,1244).

(9) Cf. G.BARDY, "Philosophie" et "philosophe" dans le vocabulaire chrétien des premiers siècles, in "Revue d'Ascèse et Mystique" 25 (1949),pp.1o6 sq.

(1o) IOHAN.CHRYSOST., Adv. opp. vit. monast.,III,12(P.G.,47,37o)

(11) Cf. J.LECLERCQ, L'Amour des Lettres et le désir de Dieu, Paris (Cerf),1957, especially pp. 217 sq.

(12) Cf. M.-D CHENU, La théologie au douzième siècle, Paris(Vrin),1957.

(13) Cf. E.GILSON, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, London (Sheed & Ward) 1936, pp.1-41.

salvation - of the whole man.

It is well known that little by little the particular sciences, owing mainly to the dialectal pressure of their own methods, got rid of the protection of Philosophy, broke more and more from the heteronomy under which they lived, and developed into autonomous sciences. The whole evolution of European culture is synthetised in this double movement of positive emancipation on the one hand and negative disintegration on the other. Music, Mathematics and Astronomy began the process, Medicine and Natural History came afterwards. The birth of the "nuova scienza", the "new" Physics - and yet old - is another turning point in the Western culture, and now-a-days we have witnessed the emancipation of the last offspring of Philosophy, Psychology, as a "science"; and we can still recognise its crisis of adolescence, stressing its own autonomy and independence, claiming that it has nothing to do with Philosophy, because it wants to be a "science" like the others which have reached so high a prestige.

Now, the most striking fact in this evolution has been that even Philosophy has tried to emancipate itself from that central all-embracing Wisdom. The peculiar fate of this movement, however, has been not only that the philosophical daughter has gone away from the mother, carrying her sacred name of "Philosophy", but also that the mother, so despoiled of the integral Philosophy, or philosophical Theology has almost lost her central place, her position as the trunk, and was became

another branch, a partial science. There is the conception of Theology as a pure "science" too, as a dialectical drawing of conclusions from a ready-made Revelation. It goes without saying that we do not use the word Theology as a particular, though "first science", but in its most genuine sapiential and universal sense.

The work of Thomas Aquinas and his school was precisely to elaborate a precise and technical distinction between Philosophy and Theology without allowing a mortal separation.

This divorce was the work that the nominalists in the Middle Ages prepared, Descartes properly started, and "modern" European Philosophy continued. There is, of course, a deeper underlying continuity in the Western Philosophy as a whole, and the everlasting tradition has never completely disappeared. Heresy is understandable only in connection with Orthodoxy, and its very life depends upon it. The patronizing attitude of a monolitic Philosophy (or Theology) was no longer tenable.

It is well known to everybody versed in the evolution of the Western mind what that process was like. Descartes simply drew the consequences of the cultural situation of the Europe of his time (as recent as the middle of the XVII century). And here lies his importance and his limitations all in one. The Philosophic-theological Wisdom was suffering a serious crisis from without and from within; from outside, for the autonomous branches of the particular sciences with their spectacular success were spreading the "belief" that they could save man and make humanity happy without the need of Philosophy or Religion whatsoever; from inside, for the multitude of

disparate opinions, of irrelevant discussions, in short, decadence was shaking the very foundations of that general incontrovertible Wisdom. With the best intention Descartes wanted - he, the first "modern" man is deeply rooted in the Middle Ages - to save that Wisdom, but seeing the debility of "classical" Theology and the prestige and achievements of "Science", he tried to convert Philosophy into a Science too, or at least - and here lies the almost tragic dialectic-to introduce the scientific method in Philosophy. By this very fact he was emancipating Philosophy from the ~~true and complete~~ integral and theological Philosophy to convert it into a "sure", "precise" and "scientific" Philosophy.

In order to establish a sure and incontrovertible system of truth above all the discussions of the "Schools" the scientific method of pure reason was introduced. All that I see with clarity and distinction cannot be false and therefore I must needs accept it as true. This is a correct criterion, but not the inversion of it, nor its absolute objectivation. Why do I assume that truth is only that which I can accept as true? Who told us that Truth does not surpass us or that our mind (mens) is the measure of everything rather, than the mirror (reflexion) of the "measurability" of being? Why should I accept only what comes to me clearly and distinctly? Is my mind only sensitive to rational evidence? I must, of course, accept as clear and distinct what I see clear and distinctly by; I am not allowed to take as evident what I do not see as such, but why should I reject what I hear, for instance, or what I see with less clarity? I should not accept it as "clear" but

I must take it as it is given to me. Could it not be that precisely the "ultimate" and most important things are not within the power of my sight of my limited naked eye? If I identify truth with what I see clearly as true, I cut off by this very fact all that which lies above or underneath or behind a very particular element of my faculty of knowledge, viz., reason. Philosophy then becomes purely the rational endeavour to discover or to produce Reality, which Descartes reduced to its rational frame.

From that very moment Philosophy as a "science", Philosophy, as a branch of the old Wisdom was born. This Philosophy is non-committal regarding the main problem of human existence. These were relegated to Theology. Philosophy is then "pure" "critical" "mathematical" "rational" "logical" "dialectical", but it is no longer wise, nor an integral knowledge, it has no longer any saving power, it is no longer integrally universal. It is a technical doctrine, a partial wisdom. Even Theology has been dazzled by "Science". The "Sedes Sapientiae", the Seat of Wisdom was vacant in Europe for a long time, though it was the coveted seat of "Theology", Science and also Philosophy. And precisely here lies the complexity of the problem. The new Philosophy, the daughter, has inherited the claims of the mother. Philosophy has discovered its formal object, but will not give away its claim on the whole of the material object. That is to say, all true philosophers also within this rational period have felt in one way or another the ultimateness of Philosophy and have

– it may be "common" to all men, but does not take account of the whole man and much less does it not embrace the whole of reality.

asked about the unavoidable and everlasting problems of our existence: what is man, wither does he go and whence does he come, what shall he do? etc. Only, the scientific method they used, the purely rational approach to these supra-rational problems made it impossible to give a full answer to satisfy the human ontological thirst for truth and desire for salvation.

This fact of the existence of an irreducible remnant within mere Philosophy, or in other words the internal presence of a supra-rational element continually emerging constantly in all pure rational enquiries has been a constant spurning factor in the evolution of Philosophy in the West and has brought contemporary Philosophy to its present paradoxical situation. The philosophical "Theology" of the Middle Ages has been replaced by a kind of theological "Philosophy" (Cf. Existentialism for instance).

VIII. c) Some inner philosophical reflexions.

In fact the very idea of a pure rational, - rationalistic - Philosophy is also philosophically untenable.

Psychologically we can easily prove that it is not my reason alone that discovers the meaning of Reality for me, or forms my philosophical convictions. When I become aware that I am in the world, that I am knowing, willing, feeling, and, in short, living, I have been already for a while doing all this without being conscious of it. When my consciousness awakes, many things have already struck it and many a

factor shaped it, and perhaps it is due to this that my consciousness is awakened. Anyhow it becomes self-consciousness by a non-conscious act in which my consciousness receives as given a full set of elements that lead to what we can call primary convictions. These convictions need not all be true and objectively correct, and I have the power and the duty to check and to confirm them, so that my lasting convictions are the result of a free act of intellectual discrimination. We say fruit of an intellectual acceptance and not conclusions of logical deductions, for it is precisely our most deep convictions e.g., that of our existence, of good and evil, the origin and goal of our life, that are not of a merely rational character. Moreover, the whole instrument by which we try to get an organic understanding of Reality, ideas, words, feelings, culture, history etc., and even our own intellect, is given to us. Perhaps a science can be without presuppositions if we limit and define its field and if we have a footing outside that realm, but no Philosophy can get rid of Being and start out from nothing. For we, ourselves, not excluding our reason, are immersed in that very Being and are present at the very starting point.

Dialectically we can affirm that the very concept of a merely rational Philosophy is begging the question under discussion. If I try to philosophise with my pure reason alone, I shall be able to detect only the rational structure of Being. "Reality" will be rationality and nothing else because my instrument is not sensitive to anything else. Thus, if I presuppose that reason is the only source of

knowledge I shall recognise as real only that which I can discover with my reason and so I simply abolish and ignore the specific nature of any other kind of supra- infra- or extra- rational Reality, except the rational precipitate of these spheres of being. The knowledge of being as being depends on being itself, and on the kind of being that I am. Why should I presuppose that I am only reason, or that only with it can I get contact with being? Why should we have this blind confidence in reason and only in reason? Why should we trust, further, only in the conclusions of our reason? We remember that even Descartes had to invoke faith in God in order to justify his trust in reason. → 32.1

from 32 → Anthropologically, or simply philosophically we can state again that Philosophy as an ultimate Wisdom cannot rely on reason alone, because it does not belong to the essence of reason to discover Reality nor to lead the human person actively, but only to check and confirm, to explain and verify what is given to it and to control passively the behaviour of man. Besides reason, man has many other faculties and even the best part of our intellect is not reason but intuition; and if Philosophy has to be a universal "Science" and an all comprehensive knowledge, it cannot be limited to the statements of reason alone. It has to be integrated in a higher and broader intellection. Moreover, reason itself helped by the higher part of our intellect can discover its own boundaries and therefore set a limit to its own pretensions. The working out of this superior limit of reason - the

from 32.

The aforesaid does ~~We do~~ not intend to ~~contest by saying this~~ the power of our reason to reach transcendence. The fact is that reason pays the price of reaching transcendence with the ~~obliged~~ recognizing of its own insufficiency. That is to say, reason can well get a glimpse of the existence of the Absolute, but, first, it discovers the outer crust of the Absolute, as it were and secondly, once that Absolute is discovered, human reason must logically - i.e. reasonably - lay down its pretension of being the leading and the ultimate human instance and accept the leadership of that very Absolute. ~~In one~~ In a word, the highest role of a rational Philosophy is to give up its claim of being the highest wisdom.

→ 32

law of contradiction being its inferior one - is one of the most important problems of the Philosophy of our times in order to incorporate scientific "Philosophy" into philosophical Philosophy.

The evolution of the West, however, has not stopped here. After banishing metaphysics altogether, metaphysics and even Ontology appear again as the central philosophical discipline. After ignoring Theology as a short-sighted almost primitive discipline, Philosophy to-day becomes theological and raise again all the theological and even religious issues of mankind.

In one word, "Philosophy" itself is emerging from a deep but indiscriminate "Sophia" as a definite human discipline and is becoming conscious of its own nature. On the one hand it is concerned with the ultimate problems (material object). On the other hand it becomes aware that it has not the last word regarding these problems because pure Philosophy is tied up by its peculiar and rigorous method (formal object). It makes room also for Theology and for Religion. It becomes humble, because it discovers its proper place and is aware of its insufficiency in answering the ultimate urge of man.

IX. The meaning of re-orientation

These notes are not meant to develop further these ideas and to sketch the nature of an integral philosophical Philosophy. It goes without saying that when we say "integral" we do not mean a closed system, an

achieved construction, a perfect vision that has no place for progress, for evolution, no room for the "mystery" and no understanding of what transcends all understanding. Not only all human knowledge is here on earth imperfect, but the human being itself is un-achieved and itinerant. Two ideas however may help to connect the above mentioned reflections with the problem of re-orientating Indian Philosophy.

The first could be expressed as follows: Re-orientation may signify facing the East again, but the Orient is something more than a pure geographical concept or a mere anti Western metaphor. Orient means the Origin of something (of the direction where the sun arises, in Geography) coming, from oriri (to rise). Indian Philosophy like any other Philosophy or simply Philosophy as such must be re-orientated towards its origin, i.e., towards Philosophy itself. Indian Philosophy must be re-vitalised not as Indian but as Philosophy. It must go back not simply to the Indian sources of the old Indian speculation, but to the fountainhead of Philosophy as such, that is to say, to the problem themselves and to the real living man as he is and exists here and now. A problem is never merely objective. That is why we did not say to go back to the "things" themselves. A problem is never merely subjective either. That is why a mere recoiling about ourselves or about the past will not do. A problem lies precisely in the line of intersection between the subjective and the objective, man and the rest of reality. That is also why a problem is always something actual and present. Only if

we are present, if we are actual, shall we be everlasting. Indian Philosophy must be re-orientated by the hand of Philosophy itself and not with any other nationalistic or sentimental motive.

And this is already the second idea: Philosophy itself. After the incomparable experience of Western Philosophy, after the destruction and reconstruction of the European adventure, there is no ~~more~~ question of mere repetition of old heteronomia abuses, nor also of indulging in autonomia reactions and resentments. It is precisely the momentum of our historical present that is a real possibility of a new antinomia synthesis, in which Unity does not destroy Variety, nor Synthesis Analysis, nor the Absolute overshadow the Relative, but everything has its place, its own order (antonomy) following its proper ontological laws (nomos) in this wonderful cosmos of ours. It is thus not a question of undoing all that ~~has been~~ achieved in the west - any more than of ignoring it -, but of integrating it into a real catholic i.e., universal Wisdom. The "heresy" of the autonomous "modern" Philosophy was perhaps the necessary byway in order to get rid of the heteronomous patronizing attitude and to develop the full possibilities of human reason; but now is the right time for a higher recapitulation.

The most striking feature of the authentic philosophical endeavour in the West to-day is the internal discovery of the bankruptcy of pure "Philosophy", or in other words, the

radical insufficiency of mere "Philosophy" has been a philosophical discovery Anguish, fear, death, doubt, openness, and even evolution, ex-sistence, de-zein, limit-problems and many other categories of the present philosophical world like philosophical faith, philosophical myth, symbol, etc. are nothing but signposts of the itinerary of Philosophy towards a more embracing and mature Wisdom which points to a more comprehensive and yet a-systematic - because always broken and fragmentary - theological synthesis.

And yet that bankruptcy of, that sense of frustration all in Western Philosophy to-day brings with it the purification and salvation of Philosophy, for it makes room for Theology and Religion. Philosophy does not attempt to save man - any more -, but it is still ultimate in the sense that saves God for man, so that God - and not Philosophy - can really save man.

Indian Philosophy is still in the phase of unity and indiscrimination. It is superior to Western Philosophy in the sense that it is still Theology and Religion all in one, but here lies its weakness and danger at the same time: Its weakness, in so far as the technical and precise aspect of Philosophy is concerned, as it may of aspire by means of to save man its "philosophical" and not its "religious" contents. The weakness and danger of the Western Philosophy, on the other hand, lie in its not being Theology and of its falling into the temptation of denying - or replacing - Theology and Religion.

We could perhaps understand better these two different

attitudes if we consider one striking difference in point of the main philosophical preoccupation of the West and of India.

Western Philosophy, as a [illegible], is worried rather with the first problems whereas Indian Philosophy is more interested in the ultimate problems.

Western philosophical speculation has been always concerned with the problem of the principles of things, and of our thinking, with the question of the foundation and the ground of our knowledge, of human life, of society, and of being. So many philosophers have begun anew, not simply because of a fancy for originality or of non-conformist attitude, but because they were convinced that it is the lot of Philosophy to begin and rebegin again and again, for the philosophical problem καθ' ἑξουσίαν is precisely that beginning. It is not irrelevant in this context to note that two of the most relevant Christian scriptures, the one centering the whole of the Old Testament attitude and the other giving the clue to the New Covenant, start telling us that "in the beginning" God created and that "in the beginning" was the Logos. Western speculation is constantly harrassed by the problem of the [illegible], of the primary foundations. Constantly in our present Western culture new meta-sciences appear (meta-logics, meta-psychology, meta-painting, meta-history...etc.). And it is not without meaning that the supreme science of being is called also meta-physics and interpreted not so much as science of the transcendent being beyond, but of the immanent ground behind. There is a difference between asking what is beyond

being or in searching for what is behind it. And we know that each new turning point in the History of Western Philosophy is concerned with the discovery of a previous foundation, a new prior basis. To the ἀρχαί of the first Greeks Socrates opposes something prior, his τέλος. Scholastic metaphysics Descartes asks for the prior guarantee of the knowledge of the metaphysician and so does Hume and Kant and Hegel and Husserl and Heidegger. They all try to return to a previous problem, to a deeper ground, to a more radical beginning.

Indian Philosophy, on the contrary deals with the ultimate and endeavours to go further and further beyond time, and space and mind and being. Turya (and even turyātita) is a category of the Indian mind: to transcend everything and go always beyond. It is not principles that are under investigation but the end. It is not the principle of change, for instance, that is the main problem of movement, but the end of change, its final stage. In Or word Brahman (and this even as saguna) is the typical object of a Philosophy dazzled and attracted by the ultimate. It is not secular primarily but religious and eschatological. The ultimate problem is the main problem. What not knowledge of the foundations is important, but the reaching of the goal, the knowing of the end, the realizing of the ultimate.

Of course, extremes meet, and in digging to the foundations one can find the ultimate source. Not only in physical

space is circular, but also the mental space where our mind works. On the one hand the ultimate ~~m~~ of Indian Philosophy is conditioned by its religious attitude, but on the other hand it is also ~~m~~ by a mental bias and developed by a multisecular tradition. The mutual enrichment that can come out of the meeting of these two philosophical mentalities is obvious.

It is ~~m~~ that Indian Philosophy can show its full potentiality if it tries to assimilate all the Western experience and to link it up with the central forgotten line of a theological Philosophy. Whether we have to reserve the name Philosophy for the scientific, viz., pure rational Philosophy, and call Theology that other more comprehensive Wisdom, or whether, on the contrary, we have to ~~c~~ again ~~a~~ Philosophy as all other cultures have done, is perhaps a relevant cultural-political question, but it is not of philosophical ~~m~~. I would be inclined to re-establish the role and central position of Philosophy (Sophodicy) as an integral effort towards an ultimate Wisdom and therefore not distant from Theology. It goes without saying that this Philosophy is neither irrational nor a-rational and that reason plays an important, essential part, but has no monopoly among the human forms of knowledge and does not exert any kind of totalitarian dictatorship, though it is there to allow no other unnatural imposition from other sources of knowledge or rules of action.

It would mean, ~~n~~, to miss the point of these notes and much more to lose the given opportunity to for

Indian Philosophy if those reflexions were interpreted as a kind of pharisaic self-contentment of Indian Philosophy, as if the West now would begin to discover that Eastern Wisdom was after all not so wrong and as if Indian thinkers had nothing else to do but to smile at the contrivances of Western Philosophy awaiting them in their old categories. First of all the meaning of the Western development is not regressive but a positive step ahead and secondly the urgent need of Indian Philosophy is not to brood over the past but to think on the present. Both will further ahead on the true grounds of an open and intinerant Theology.

Summing up, or rather reaching the summit of our problem, we discover again that cosmic and triumphant law of the Cross, which is valid here also for the destiny of Indian Philosophy. Indian Philosophy - as well as Western Philosophy - must disappear, it must die, it must surrender and consecrate itself to the real problems of man to-day, detached from everything which it could be attached to only because it is Indian - or Western -, and so it will rise again not only more truly Indian, but also more universal, as an integrating part of an oecumenic, everlasting Philosophy.

X - The theological re-orientation

Neither Philosophy nor Theology as human constructions are a-temporal values. The problem of the possible or desireble re-orientation of Indian Philosophy, being as it is a philosophical problem presents a concrete temporal feature. The re-orienting of Indian Philosophy depends not only on that Philosophy but also on the stand of the rest of the philosophical world today. On this question we would like to say just one single thing: the real arena palaestra where Indian Philosophy may re-orient itself or re-affirm its positions lies in its encounter with Christian Theology.

Indian Wisdom is not a "Philosophy" - in the restricted sense - but a Theology. This does not mean that it is pure mīmāmsā, only a commentary of a given text, nor that it is based on dogmas despising reason. In fact, Theolofy is that effort of understanding the whole of Reality by means of all forms of knowledge man has, in which Theology regognises the primacy -not the exclusivity - of faith. Indian Wisdom tries to decipher the mystery of Reality, tries to ex-plain the meaning of all that is, without forgetting that the leading thread of all its endeavours is not merely intellectual curiosity but the existential concern for man's salvation. Indian Wisdom is not a merely speculative Science, it is also a practical Art. There has not been the smallest harm done by Western influence, that some modern pandits have succumbed to the high technical prestige of modern Western Philosophy and have tried to interpret Indian Wisdom in merely rational categories of an almost rationalistic character.

The challenge to Indian Wisdom, because it springs from the same deep religious preoccupation is not Western Philosophy but Western Theology, and concretely Christian Theology. It is there that Indian Wisdom finds its counterpart and it is there also that Christian Theology faces its challenge. Both Indian and Western Christian Theology should make ample use of the philosophical analysis of modern Philosophy and accept and adopt as much as required of the insights and discoveries of "Philosophy", but should be extremely aware that their concern is deeper and wider than that of mere "Philosophy". Deeper, because faith does not destroy reason, but integrates it, enlarges it and let us penetrate into the entrails of being by a new light that reason does not possess. Wider, also is their concern, because they have not only to do with mere speculation or just thought, but with lived life in the most concrete form of letting the human living individual reach his goal and find his fulfilment.

Indian Wisdom would find an inspiring source for re-orientation in Christian Theology - and vice-versa. We have used, however, in the past paragraph the word "challenge", because that encounter fruitful and enriching as it may be, touches the very foundations of Indian Wisdom. An encounter between Indian Wisdom and mere post-cartesian Philosophy is a non-commital and superficial visit. Indian Wisdom may borrow from that Western Thought or it may refine its proper categories or deepen its own analysis and the like, with the help or with the occasion of that meeting with that "Philosophy"; whereas its encounter with Christian Theology takes place at the very core of both the Wisdoms.

The identity of concern and the similarity of problems let precisely discover the deep and unavoidable divergencies, which cannot be any more overlooked or minimised once discovered. The encounter is a real challenge. The re-orientation is not then just some fine face powder for the face but a real re-orientation which has to be critically examined. Theology, unlike technical Philosophy, is committing, obliging and engages the whole man in it. It is an authentic κρίσις, crisis, for it is the existential Truth, i.e. the very Way for man's salvation which is at stake.

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It is not our task here not even to suggest the issues of that encounter, nor less to indicate the lines along which such an encounter should proceed. We shall only adduce a couple of instances as mere examples of the problem.

We have been speaking since the beginning of this chapter about faith, not as a blind belief but as a form of knowledge and as a higher understanding which includes reason within it (faith has only meaning in a rational being - a dog cannot have faith). Now, Christian faith, though satisfying the general requirements of what we call faith claims to be a faith of a strictly super-natural order, i.e. divine order. This faith is a free response to a free gift of God and can be neither proved nor imposed. All this is not too alien to Indian Wisdom, which deals at length with this sort of problems. The issue is, however, first, to check both conceptions of faith and secondly, to examine both faiths in themselves in order to reach the very core of the problem. On that level

the problem of re-orientation becomes a burning question.

Indian Philosophy, further, is dealing with the problem of the Absolute in close connexion with the destiny of Man. Here again the encounter with Christian Theology puts us before an eventually possible re-orientation which is much more than to adopt a certain terminology or to tackle some particular analysis. The same could be said regarding issues, like personality, grace, etc. In ~~one~~ a word, the reorientation of Indian Philosophy is a theological query. The challenge comes from within an meets another Theology which puts human wisdom in crisis, i.e. in the situation to decide, to find its way and to renew itself. Any true re-orientation is a ~~little bit of~~ to some extent a con-version - to the Way and the Truth.

III THE INDIAN METAPHYSICS ON CREATION

1- The Idea of Ontonomy

Western culture as a whole has gone along its multisecular history through two almost complete stages: theologism and then humanism. At present it is about to step into a new epoch, which we could call theandrism (1).

We shall not even attempt a summary of these two past epochs. That would require a precise set of qualifications lest our historic outlook be misleading. Instead we shall limit ourselves to underlining their two basic aspects: heteronomy and autonomy. Our aim is to develop in opposition to them the concept of ontonomy, which, in our opinion, gives us the clue to understand the present day cultural situation and an insight as leading thread to find our way in the central problem of "creation" in Indian Philosophy.

We have to resist the temptation of explaining this concept drawing upon cultural considerations or upon the philosophy of history. This is not possible in a short space and would not be relevant for our problem either. Therefore we shall only deal with the metaphysical aspect of this complex question.

The ultimate problem of human intelligence is that of being, and, more precisely, that

(1) - This first sub-chapter is an English version of a paper published in the Proceeding of the XIth. International Congress of Philosophy, Bruxelles, (North-Holland), Louvain (E. Nauwelaerts) 1953, vol 3, p. 182 sq.

of the being and the beings. It is the problem of Plato's ἓν καὶ πολλά ——— , of India's ātman-brahman, of the Islamic (Sūfism) Haqq - Khalq, etc. The effort to solve this problem within the frame of the traditional cultures has moved within the climate of heteronomy, while autonomy has come forth as a reaction against the absolute hegemony of the being in favour of the own consistency of beings.

a)- Heteronomy

The first historico-cultural period could have called itself perhaps a theonomic attitude rather than an heteronomic one. In fact, the Patristic period and most of the High Middle Ages had grasped the real situation of the creature, but could not express it and were not fully aware of it. In fact, a certain inconscious attitude belongs to heteronomy, which is only felt as such once the heterogeneity-consciousness of the creature has appeared. In other words, the deeper awareness of the great people of that period was not perhaps heteronomous, but the available conceptions were not accurate, not self-conscious enough to define the relation between beings and the being without negeloting somehow the peculiarity of "things". Inexactness of expression, conceptual vagueness and a certain lack of self-consciousness did open the road to the humanistic criticism, which is the dominating feature of the second epoch. It goes without saying that these two epochs are

not rigid chronological compartments, often they overlap themselves and they cannot be mathematically fixed; yet within the Western ~~history~~ world history detects the first category predominatly till the coming of the "Modern" Age and the second from then up to our times.

Because heteronomy does not feel itself as such we have to describe it supposing already the autonomic consciousness. We could sum it up as follows.

Beings are contingent, that is, the reason of their existence, even the ultimate foundation of their being, is ab alio, it comes from anOther. From this Other they receive all, both their existence along with their essence and the logical, physical, metaphysical or ethical laws governing them. The most - and pushed to extremes ~~x~~ the only - relevant thing in order to know what a being is, and particularly what it must do, is not to know that being isolated in itself but to know the purpose of the Other. Revelation, here understood as the extrinsic Word of God, discloses to us not only the way of salvation, but ~~gix~~ offers us the best if not the unique means to unveil the nature of all other beings and the meaning of all events. Medical experimenting with dead human bodies, for instance, was not forbidden only out of respect for ~~it~~ them, but because no need was felt to recur to experimentation in order to know the true nature of man not excluding his mortal body.

Heteronomy underlines God's transcendence and at the same time His Absoluteness. God is good, therefore his domain is not a tyranny, but a realm of love. Nevertheless, He is an external king that commands and has to be obeyed. On the other hand, heteronomy is strongly realistic. God is anOther precisely because we are ourselves. If a strong ego-consciousness were not there, God could not have been interpreted as the absolutely Other. Likewise He is envisaged as transcendent, because there is here - we, ourselves - something to transcend. To be sure, an innocent heteronomy would not subscribe such prepositions because would never have thought that its conception could lead to such an interpretation.

The main lane of heteronomy passes through the contingent character of the creature and the transcendence of the Divinity. Not only all beings are moved, being God the only immovable mover, but also he atracts us ὡς ἐρώμενον (as being loved by us) by means of a certain external appeal. Beings depend entirely upon God and the discussion whether this dependence hangs from the Nature or the Will of God opens already a door to the autonomous attitude.

b)- Autonomy

This second attitude offers a twofold aspect: the first one is rather a negative reaction

against heteronomy. The second represents a positive attempt - from its point of view - to shape a concept of being without requiring any external supreme Being.

The first aspect leans towards pantheism, and the second towards atheism, though none of them have to fall necessarily into one of these two extremes.

The autonomous approach rejects any imposition from outside. The first negative aspect emphasizes the freedom of the human spirit and the individuality of beings, especially the dignity of the person. A typical example is offered to us by Kantian morals: a morality of ends is an impure morality, an ego pursuing his own perfection and happiness would represent the worst spiritual selfishness, etc. It could be historically shown that this reaction against an extrinsic and transcendent God leads to the absolute identification of beings with the Being, to pantheism. But a dialectical reflextion shows also an identical result: if a thing cannot have its being outside itself (as autonomy would critisize heteronomy) - which seems to be a requirement of the principle of contradiction (if the being of A were B, A would then be not-A) - that means it has in itself both the foundation and the end of its being. This is the very principle of autonomy. Now, if it is true that beings are in themselves, if everything they must be and their progress is nothing but an expansion of their nature, that means there is an intimate divine core which is the deepest depth of theis being. Autonomy cannot admit the

the indigence of beings, therefore it divinizes them in their principle. Not only the so called "modern philosophy", but also a certain Christian "Modernism", move about this line.

On the other hand, the attempt to build a positive autonomy leads to atheism, as all the idealistic experiences illustrates.

Autonomy needs to rest upon something different from an external God. This foundation can only be Reason - human reason at a second moment. It will be the yardstick of truth, and also of goodness. The process is well known. Reason is looked upon as an absolute, as a God. Nevertheless reason rests unsteadily on this pedestal of Divinity. Thus it will be made clear that such a divinisation is just an anachronistic remnant and utterly unnecessary at that. The next step is then the feduction of Reason to a relativistic reason, existential, individual, atomized, with no need to be absolute. This is already atheism.

To keep to the metaphysical order, the framing of the question is clear: if a being is, it is; and as such, as being (νούμενον ,"Ding an sich", "Wesenheit", etc. - the rest is mere appearance, δόξα "Erscheinung") it is independent, it is in itself, and within itself it must find the laws governing its development. There are then "monads" without God, and consequently without any possible relationship. Solipsism, "communication is

an illusion", "the hell are the others" and the like, follow on this line. Autonomy is the imprisonment of the being within its own walls, the asfixiation and annihilation of being from lack of communion with the Being.

c)- Ontonomy

~~If~~ The creature is not God, God is not the creature: this, at least, seems to have to be affirmed according to the very principle of contradiction. However, this statement is not exactly true. The relationship between God and the creature is neither heteronomous, nor autonomous. The word is, in both propositions is not univocal, but only analogous. ~~If~~ The creature is-not God, certainly, but it is not true that God is-not the creature. No"is-not" has a meaning in the Being that absolutely is. God is no-creature, certainly, but everything that is must be somehow God, as we shall immediately see. Moreover, the creature neither is no-God (because God is, there is not no-God absolutely) nor it is God. The creature is-not God, but is is-of God, it is-in God and by God. The creature is-not, but ~~it~~ is-with. The reality of our being is the reality of an esse-ab, an esse-cum and an esse-in, of an ex-sistence, a con-sistence and an in-sistence, which renders impossible all autonomy and all heteronomy. Beings do not have their being without themselves nor within nor with themselves (God is not above nor inside beings nor mixed with them), but they are, and their being is a "be-ing", a "to be" of, by and with the Being.

The νόμος of every being is neither an autonomous law of its own, flowing from its in-dependent, detached (autonomous) nature, nor an extrinsec and foreign (heteronomous) law imposed on it by anOther.

God is not the Other, nor the All, nor the Same with regards to beings. Furthermore, He cannot be considered to be the being's soul, the intimate core of every being, the entelechy, the form, or whatever it may be. All these expressions in spite of their desire to mantain the unity with God are still too dualistic.

Beinga are-not God, but neither are they not-God. We said above that they are-of, are-with, are-in(God). If we are well understood we can further say that they are not-nothing and are-not God, since beings are-not-yet, i.e., they are not nothing, because they have ceased to be nothing, they are not God because they will-be God. A being is as far as it will-be - as far as it will-be-being, i.e., will-be-God. At the end - when all things will be subject to Christ - God will be all in all. But, to be sure, no confusion should be made between creature and divine Persons: God will-not-be God, God is. On the contrary, we will-be-God. Temporality, or more precisely tempiternity is the token of our creatureliness. The created being is not only a potentiality to be, it is also a hope to become the Being.

Beings are nonada - not-nothing - according to the profound Spanish saying. Misticism speaks of a-no-nada-miento - it is necessary to destroy -a- (with apologies to philologists!), our negation of the nothing - no-nada - in order to recover our real being end to end in God.

The ontic structure pursued by ontonomy is neither an intrinsic link nor an extrinsic relation. God is not the ἕτερος, nor the creature an αὐτός Just in case, we are rather a σεαυτός, still better, a σεαυτοῦ (from thou), and He, God an ἑαυτός (ἄυτός) - Himself - or, still more exactly, ἑαυτοῖς (ἄυτοῖς) - to themselves - (Trinity). One has too often considered the divine dynamism as if it were an imperfection because movement in the created world implies unfulfilment. Gor neither moves nor does He remain quiet in our sense. In God there is an internal divine tension, relationship, life, ... This very "dynamism" is somehow participated ad extra. That is why the traditional idea of beings as pure dependences of divine knowledge and love is the nearest to the truth. Creatures exist in so far as known and loved by God, they are nothing but the term of an amorous glance of the Divinity.

Ontonomy seths forth this particular feature of beings and discovers the deep laws arising from the οὐ, as seen in its totality and in its sui generis relation with the Source and Origin of every

being.

There is a striking example in the history of Christianity, though this instance as belonging to a constitutive feature of our mind is also to be found in other religions, and this is the famous theological discussion de auxiliis, between Thomism (or rather Bañezism) - tending to safeguard the rights of Divinity and, ~~xx thi~~ with this scope, emphasizing the heteronomy of the created being's actions - and Molinism - born in a humanistic century and tending to defend the rights of the creature, particularly those of free man and endeavouring to give to human autority its due place. The solution, however - as history sufficiently proved - cannot be found along heteronomous nor autonomous lines: it has to be sought in the ontonomous order of beings. In this latter one it is not a question of an action of mine that I do beside God (on the moral level efficient but unfortunate formulae have come out, like "help yourself and Heaven will help you", "act as if everything depended on you and pray as if everything depended on God", etc.), nor an action which is God's and is charged upon me. In fact the point in question is an action truly theandric - whimh will be properly grasped only after having introduced Christ -, an action coming really from my being, a being however which is-of, ~~fm~~ by and in God, not only in its deeds, but also in the ultimate structure of its own entity.

Ontonomy uses no violence on

violence on beings, imposing upon them an extrinsic and heterogeneous law, at the same time, it does not ignore the linked nature of beings, theis deep unity and their constitutive relationship with the Being. It discovers the hidden, because intrinsic laws allowing the harmonic development - only to a certain extent, ~~xxxx~~ on account of Original sin - of a being, according to its intimate constitution without doing violence to other beings. There is an ontonomous order which must be discovered ~~in~~ because only this order expresses the real structure of the world.

The νόμος of every being, in a way, is an expression of an aspect of the Divinity. These laws are the being's laws, i.e. they are the expression of the very structure and real constitution of the things, but these laws, along with the beings of which they are the laws come from, are of and in God; they are the laws of the Divinity ad extra, as it were. It is obvious that we are using the term "law" not in its exclusive legal meaning but in its metaphysical sense.

Ontonomy is the expression of the specific way whereby every being is in a position to become actually being, that is, to return to the Godhead's bosom from where it came. Ontonomy points out how the cosmos' return to God is effected, the regressus of the universe or rather the hidden nature of the ~~new~~ heavens and the new earth, as discovered in the form, the σχῆμα of this passing world. It is therefore understandable that, after

the fallxs cosmic fall of the world this return cannot be a dialectical development of being, but the onward progress (an aspect of which could be dialectics), the actual historical itinerary of beings towards their ontic Origin. The path is Redemption.

The funtion of ontonomy appears equally clear when we apply it to the relationship among different spheres of beings. Only ontonomy allows the truly natural development of the lower sphere without breaking its own nature, while making possible instead a harmonic collaboration with the superior xxxxx spheres. Example: everybody knows it is sufficient to render the economic order autonomour to smother man, for the economic forces let to themselves grow like a financial cancer encroaching upon society and fettering man like a slave. On the other hand, if an attempt is made to control and direct the economic laws from outside, that is to enforce heteronmmy on it economy, the result is statism, tyranny and political totalitarianism. Conversely, ontonomy will endeavour to find the deeper structures of the very economic order and to discover the growing points of contact with other anthropological dimensions permitting the safeguard of higher values and man's dignity and also the true - and not only just - requirements of the economic sphere. These laws may be ones of the lowest probability, thus requiring the presence of catalysers, of factors - people - which do not follow just the path of less resistence or only xxxxxxxx sensitive to the demandings of the lower

levels of the human being ...Here we have an important task for the philosophimal and theological reflection of our times...

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After all, the relationship between beings and the Being offers to our philosophical mind such apories, not only because it is srrounded by the same divine Mystery, but also because, as seen by pure philospphs, does it not correspond to the ultimate reality of the actual existing order. Already the boldest traditional answer asserted that beings <u>are</u> creation and that creation is nothing but a certain relationship, a <u>relatio quaedam</u>. Now, the true existential relationship between Being and the beings - to be unveiled only by an authentic Christian (Christocentric) consciousness - does not belong to the order of - mere - "creation", nor even of - mere - "nature" -, but to the order of <u>facticity</u>, of having been <u>made</u> by Christ, by whom everything has been done, begotten, or, more precisely, by whom everything has become to be, πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο Beings <u>are</u> generation, γένεσις by Christ, where this <u>genesis</u> means a <u>certain</u> <u>becoming</u>. All beings are <u>in</u> Christ, <u>by</u> Christ and <u>with</u> Christ. The "made" or "created" being is nothing but a <u>Christophany</u>. Gor is transcendent. He abides in light innaccessible, nobody has ever seen Him. It is His μονογενής dwelling in His bosom who has revealed Him to us. Christ is the ontic and not only the moral Mediator. Beings <u>are</u>

by participating in Christ. From a divine perspective there is nothing outside God. And within God - while not being entirely God - there is nothing but Christ. All that is, is - in Christian terminology - Father, Christ and Holy Spirit. All existing beings are just parts, participations, imitations, potentialities, hopes, expectations, pieces, ... - language fall short of needs -, members, in one sense or another, of Christ's Mystical Body, members of the total Christ. Only from this Christocentric point of departure we may pierce the mystery of the relationship between God and creatures and thereby understand the background and justification of the concept of autonomy. Beings are with Christ, of God, by the Word and in the Spirit. But all this - as is the case with every ultimate problem - goes beyond Philosophy...

~~THE INDIAN METAPHYSICS ON CREATION~~

The Category of Creation

We must not begin by asking ourselves from where, in time, does the world come or how - scientifically - did the universe come about, or out of what - materially speaking - is it made? Not only are these questions, as to the temporal, the scientific and the material, too Occidental in their approach and a hindrance to grasping the Indian problem of creation; they are also such as to make us incapable of getting hold of the ~~very~~ mystery of existence itself.

We must not begin by examining from where or why or for what or how does the world or the universe exist. We must simply ask "what" the world is. Our limitation of thought and expression has obliged us to slip in that little word "what". For it is not really the "what" we are after but the "is"; in other words, the being.

Ultimately the problem of creation is not the problem of beginning or of the process of coming to be, nor even a problem of the origin or the principle; it is the problem of being itself. The separation in European metaphysics of these two problems - that of creation and that of being - (there is, of course, a difference, but it is not an ontic one) has resulted in a so-called metaphysics, which is not much more than a philosophical physics.

It is true that the structure of our thought - though not necessarily that of being - is so constituted that we can hardly say anything about the being of things without calling on the help of the other secondary or prepositional questions.

In this family and its meaning - therein lies the real problem of creation. The Western Christian culture - I do not say simply Christian culture - will answer that the things, the beings, are creation - creatura -. The "what" of creation, even grammatically, can only be a relation. But with that we have not exhausted the problem of the already "made" beings, the beings that have become. Perhaps India can add something and a Christocentric - theandric - conception has certainly something more to say.

To understand the Indian texts on creation we must face the fact that the problem of creation - more exactly, the active and passive creation-character of beings and perhaps of being - is a category in itself, which cannot be reduced to other categories and indeed can hardly even be compared with them.

If, for example, we say that the world came to be out of nothing or was caused by God, then we are speaking of a coming-to-be and a causation so special that they have nothing real in common with our ordinary worldly processes of coming-to-be and of causation. They are such that we can only understand them in a derived or transcendent sense. If the world is creation, if the universe is a creature, then there are no worldly things or processes which can have this character. If what is created is a relation, then it is a singular and special relation. This analogy is itself unique, that is to say, it is only analogous to other analogies. Creation is creation, the creature is creature and can be referred to no other category.

Now the Indian texts are neither "metaphysical" in a heteronomous sense, nor merely poetical or metaphorical in an autonomous sense. I would call them "meta-theological" within an ontonomic atmosphere, which is not always clearly defined. They have no ulterior aim; they simply describe in numerous ways that unique and special thing - creation. One must read the texts - singing or praying them one would understand them better! - without subjecting the concepts used to an over-logical or rationalistic scrutiny; above all, without interrupting the symphony of word or song to slip in comparisons and essays in the analysis. If you don't understand them entirely.....that goes with it. If you find the parts dangling ~~particles~~ or weak links... they too must be integrated and assimilated. The monks don't interrupt their choir to look up dictionaries! The principal intuitions of Indian cosmology are right on the whole, even though the actual thinking out is often faulty and heteronomous. Let us ignore the question whether and to what extent the Indian tradition understood and interpreted rightly the true - or Christian - core of its "holy" or "inspired" texts. These texts certainly contain many elements of great truth, which have been forgotten by the Occident but which belong to a more universal "Philosophia perennis", elements whose integration constitutes one of the main tasks of culture at the present day in our time. It is entirely possible that Indian philosophy has not drawn the full truth out of the conception of creation contained in the sacred books and that the full depth of these principles will only become evident through contact with the spirit of Christianity.

3) "Creatio a Deo"

European Christian thought has always stressed a particular aspect of the act of creation which appears here in India as not very important or central, ~~even~~ though not entirely strange or inopportune. As a reaction against the Greek hypothesis of a primeval substance, Christian theology has stressed the fact that the divine act of creation was a "creatio ex nihilo". For otherwise it would not be creation at all, but production, shaping or the like.

Reading the Indian texts from this point of view one will understandably term the entire Indian conception as "pantheistic." But studying the texts in their true context and against the background which gave birth to them, we must admit that the Indian speculation deals not with a "creatio ex Deo", which would indeed be pantheistic, but with a "creatio a Deo", which is doubtless right or allows at least a right interpretation, precisely because Indian thought has its centre of gravity not in the physical but in the meta-theological sphere.

It is true that some Indian schools have a pantheistic ~~streak~~ strain, but this is not generally the case, nor is the original sense of the main texts pantheistic. These texts do not say that God had the world come to be out of His own "substance" - causa materialis -. No, this ~~very~~ same sentence must be turned around; It is the world which came to be out of God, from God, (even though it came about in a secondary manner through love, or through joy in play, or even perhaps through an ineluctable will). Creation, seen from the standpoint of the world, is

certainly necessary. Without it there could be no world.

Moreover, the one-sided stressing of a "creatio ex nihilo" would break the ontonomy of creation and would give rise to the thought that the world, once it was created out of nothing by God, could then exist on its own and out of itself. The central Indian theme is directed precisely against this autonomy of creation. The world is always "a Deo." Though now outside nothingness - "extra nihilum - and having emerged out of the creative act - "extra causam" - it is still bound constitutively and structurally to God. Why? Because it is not only "ex nihilo", but also still and in a continuing manner it exists "a Deo" and even "in Deo."

Thus creation is seen not as a making-to-exist-out-of-self; the creature is not <u>autonomous</u>, even if it does not remain slavishly <u>heteronomous</u>; strictly speaking it is <u>ontonomous</u>.

3) <u>The Horizon of Creation in Indian Metaphysics</u>.

There can be no doubt that there is <u>one</u> Indian wisdom. Or, in other words, there are certain main views of Indian thought in regard to the ultimate problems. But India is not a strict philosophical or theological unity. As soon as Indian speculation approaches the almost universally recognised textual sources, a splintering takes place and the different systems appear.

There are several doctrines of creation in India. Our task here is not to present them. And no doctrine of creation should be drawn from the texts presented. It will be

sufficient to try to understand their meaning in themselves.

But no understanding is possible without some grasp of the background out of which the sources have arisen.

Out of what ~~horizon~~ background do the Indian statements on creation emerge? This is not an easy question. But I should like to sketch that ~~horizon~~ background in the following manner.

1. God and the world are not two independent, self-sufficient beings. The world may be different from God, but it is neither independent of Him nor separate from Him. And again, God does not depend on the world in the same way that the world depends on Him, but somehow He too is (co)-dependent on it. God and the world are perhaps two heterogeneous and dissimilar aspects of one and the same reality; or else the world is appearance and only God is real. In any case "creation" does not only mean one part of the relation, and creature never means repose-in-oneself or a state of being-slung-out-of-God.

2. Psychologically and perhaps epistemologically we first perceive the world and then think about its cause. However, the Indian conception, or rather, the ~~horizon~~ background from ~~out of~~ which the question arises, is the other way around. I mean that creation is taken as being primarily a God-problem and not a world-problem. It runs something like this: The world is already there, it exists with or without creation. The world does not need to give any account of itself if I do not question it. But God would be no God <u>for us</u> if He were not

in some sense a Creator. Not only is He responsible for the world, His creation, but He is only approachable by us from and out of creation (in some sense or other). The world as creation is of course a problem, but it is really a God-problem. God is precisely the creator of the world. In other words creation is not a purely cosmological, but primarily a theological problem.

3. It is a theological matter and in the very strictest sense, namely, it is a problem of revelation. The problem of creation does not arise as a purely philosophical or apologetical question, but as a statement of the Divine regarding the world or, as the case happens to be, regarding Itself; a statement that is either written down in the sacred books, or imprinted in the heart of the seer and the saint, who have received from God that enlightenment, whatever the idea of the deity may be.

4. We shall misunderstand the second and third points if we lose sight of the first one. I mean, I could have said, just the opposite, i.e., that the problem of creation is a world-question and a philosophical concern. The point is simply that we must take the opposite direction within the same perspective. The world does not direct us to God or, as the case may be, to its primeval cause. Neither does a God from outside the world send us a revelation. No, it is the world as such, that is, the whole-of-what-is, that reveals and shows to us its divine structure or its divine principle. The world as it in truth is - that is the world which reveals itself in the revelation. The Shruti is Revelation not because a

God from outside the world has revealed it, but because it has no human author. It is the word that illumines out of the depths. In other words, we have to do neither with dualism nor pantheism but with advaita and theopanism. If we were to understand it rightly we could call that ~~horizon~~ background a-theist, because ~~in fact~~ - de facto - there is no God without the world; and again, a world without God neither is nor can be.

5. Not only are the forms of expression in the most ancient Indian texts to be taken mythically or symbolically, but the manner of thought must be taken this way too. We have to do neither with an (Aristotelian) epistemological symbolism, for which a simple analogy would be adequate; nor with a (Platonic) realistic symbolism, for which every base being is the expression and manifestation of higher orders of being. No, this is rather a remarkable and special symbolism, for which the only manner of expressing higher realities is the mythical parable. For reality lies neither wholly within nor wholly beyond our thought and our concepts. Consequently, the concepts we use, such as Person, Water, Fire etc., are neither mere analogies nor formulae of expression requiring interpretation. They are myths "cum fundamento in re - atque in verbo."

6. The descriptions of creation are often characterised and darkened by dialectical antinomies. The Indian mind is a mixture of purely intellectual and even suprarational? suprational views with penetrating and merely logical-dialectical conceptions. An intuition is taken as the point of departure and that intuition

can find its formulation only in contradiction. Then the keen logical statements are developed on the basis of that contradicting statement. On the one hand, for example, God is being and non-being; but on the other hand, how can the world spring out of non-being? On the one hand nothingness is the pure non-being; on the other hand it is only undifferentiated, unformed existence. God is neither being nor non-being, and yet He is both being and non-being at the same time. If both elements are held in view, the Indian horizon can be discovered.

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NOTES:

This selection is not exhaustive, nor does it take all the existing perspecting into account. And yet it would like to be central and chacteristic. We consider the Shruti alone, i.e., the "inspired" books of Hinduism, namely the Vedas and the Upanishads. We leave the Smriti out. The selected texts deal only with the ontological problem of creation as such. We leave out the other texts of a cosmologic or cosmogonical bias.

Our division does not claim to be a sharp logical compartimentalisation. It would like to be only a certain ordering and to be of some use for a further study and comprehension of the texts and of the problem. We renounce to give a short commentary of the texts. They are almost incomprehensible for those who do not know already something about Indian Philosophy. I hope to publish

a fuller study on this subject later on.

~~R. PANIKKAR~~
~~BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY,~~
~~Advent 1956.~~

ABBREVIATIONS

A.U.	-	Aitareya Upaniṣad
A.V.	-	Atharva Veda
B.G.	-	Bhagavad Gītā
B.S.	-	Brahma Sūtra
B.U.	-	Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad
C.U.	-	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
Īsa U.	-	Īsa Upaniṣad
Kaiv. U.	-	Kaivalya Upaniṣad
Kaṭ. U.	-	Kaṭha Upaniṣad
M.B.	-	Mahābhārata
Maitr.U.	-	Maitrī Upaniṣad
Manu	-	Mānava Dharma Śāstra
Mund. U.	-	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
Prasn. U.	-	Praśna Upaniṣad
R.V.	-	Ṛg Veda
Ś.B.	-	Śatapatha Brāhmana
Sub. U.	-	Subāla Upaniṣad
Ś.U.	-	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
T.B.	-	Taittirīya Brāhmana
T.S.	-	Taittirīya Saṃhitā
T.U.	-	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
Tānd.M.B.	-	Tāṇḍya Mahā Brāhmana.

B)- TEXTS

I)- The Problems

a)- As such

1* I ask the wise men, because I do not know it, who has ordered these six worlds in the form of the unborn? Who was the One?

(R.V., I, 164, 6).

2* What is the cause? Brahman? Whence are we born? By what do we live? On which basis do we stand? (sampratiṣṭhāḥ). Overruled by whom in pains and pleasures do we live our various conditions, O Ye Theologians (brahma-vido)? (S.U., I, 1).

3* I ask the extreme (para) end of the earth; I ask the seed of the male (organ) horse; I ask the navel of all existence; I ask the highest (parama) firmament (vyoman) of speech (I asked about the universe's centre and touching highest heaven, where speech abides).
(A.V., IX, 10, 13).

4* What is the goal (ground, and way, movement, gati) of this world?
(C.U., I, 9, 1).

b)- Its atmosphere

5* That is full, this is full (fullness, completeness, pūrṇam). From fullness, fullness proceeds. If we take away the fullness of fullness even fullness then remains (B.U., V, 1; Intro. to I.U.; Cf. A.V., X,8,29).

6* Not by speech (vācā), nor by mind (manasā), not by sight (cakṣuṣā), can He be apprehended. How can He be comprehended except by him who says "He is" (Kaṭ. U., II, 3, 12) (Cf. text 50).

7* When He is apprehended as "He is" His real nature (specific being tattva-bhāvaḥ) is made manifest (id., 13).

8* In the beginning this was only the ātman in the form of a Person (puruṣa). Looking around he saw nothing else than himself. He said first:

"I am". Thence arose the name "I". (B.U., I, 4, 1).

9* All this, whatever moves in this moving world is enveloped by God (īsāvāsyam). (Īśa U. I, 1).

10* How is it that ... How does it could be...? (Cf. text 71). Then he (Yājnāvalkya) said: O Gārgī, do not question too much, lest your head fall off. In truth, you are questioning too much about a divinity about which further questions are not to be asked! O Gārgī do not question too much! Whereupon Gārgī, the daughter of Vacaknu held her peace. (B.U., III, 6, 1).

II)- The Vedas

a)- The Mytho-logical themes

- The Hymn of creation

11* There was not the non-existent (not-being, a-sat), nor the existent (being, sat) then. There was not the air nor the heaven which is beyond. What did it contain? Where? In whose protection? Was there (the primordial) water, un-fathomable, profound? (R.V., X, 129, 1).

12* There was not death, nor immortality then. There was no appearance of day and night. That (tad-ekam) one (alone) breathed breathless (windlessly), by its own power (svadhayā). Other than that there was not anything beyond! (id., 2).

13* Darkness was in the beginning hidden by darkness. Indistinguishable, this all was water. The primordial being (the primeval potency, the first essence, ā-bhu) was covered with the void, that One (tad-ekam) arose (was born) through the power of heat (creative fire, asceticism, effort, concentration, tapas. (id., 3).

14* Desire (longing, wish, love, kāma) in the beginning came upon that, that was the seed of mind (spirit, intellect, manas). Sages seeking in their

hearts with wisdom found out the bond (relationship, bandhu) of the existent (being) in the non-existent (not-being. (id., 4).

15* The cord was extended across. Was there below or was there above? There were setters of the seed, there were powers: there was energy below, there was impulse (will (?), prayati) above. (id., 5).

16* Who knows truly? Who shall here declare whence this creation was born (produced) and whence it came? The gods are beyond of the creation (visarjanena) of this (asyā) (universe). Who then knows whence it has arisen? (id., 6).

17* Whence this creation came, and whether he made it or not, he alone who sees in the highest heaven he only knows it, or else does he not know it? (id., 7).

B- The Cosmogonic Hymn

18* In the beginning was a golden germ (hiraṇyagarbha). From his birth he was the only lord of creation. He made firm the earth and the sky. Whom shall we worship as the god of our sacrifice? (R.V., X, 121).

19* He who is the giver of the breadth, the giver of strength, whose ruling even the gods obey, whose shadow is immortality, of whom is death. Whom shall we worship .... ? (id., 2).

20* Who by his power reigns over the moving world as the only lord, reigning over those who breathe and those who sleep, over men (two-footed creatures) and animals (four-footed creatures). Whom shall we worship ... ? (id., 3).

21* He through whom heaven is terrible and earth made first, the light established and the vault of the sky, and who measured out the air in the spaces. Whom shall we worship ... ? (id., 5).

22* When the great waters went everywhere, setting the seed, begetting the fire (agni), then was an exhaled the one life breadth (life) soul,

spirit) of the gods (devānām asur ekaḥ). Whom shall we worship .... ? (id., 7).

23* He who in his greatness surveyed the waters as they have power and begot the sacrifice; who alone is god above all gods (devenṣv adhi deva ekaḥ). Whom shall we worship .... ? (id., 8).

24* He shall not harm us, begetter of earth and sky, whose laws (satya-dharmā) are very everlasting, who begat the great shining waters; whom shall we worship .... ? (id., 9).

25* O Prajāpati! (Lord of creatures) none but you encompasses all these created things! Whatever desire we beg of you, let it be ours: We would be masters of wealth abounding. (id., 10).

γ - God the Creator

26* Thousand-headed was Puruṣa (Person) thousand-eyed, thousand-footed. He having covered the earth on all sides, extended beyond it the length of ten fingers. (R.V., X, 90, 1)

27* Puruṣa is this all. That has been and that will be. And he is the lord of immortality, which he grows beyond through food. (id., 2).

28* Such is his greatness and more than that is Puruṣa. A birth of him is all beings. Through birth of him are what is immortal in heaven. (id., 3).

29* That three quarters Puruṣa rose upward; one quarter of him here came into being again. Thence he spread asunder in all directions to what eats and does not eat. (id., 4).

30* From him virāj (the bright one) was born, from virāj Puruṣa. When born he reached beyond the earth behind and also before. (id., 5).

31* When the gods perform the sacrifice with Puruṣa as an oblation, the spring was its melted butter, the summer its fuel, the autumn its offering. (id., 6).

32* The Ṛṣi, the Hotṛ, our father who offering all these worlds has taken his seed, desiring wealth by pious benedictions, the first inventor has entered inferior (beings).

(R.V., X, 81, 1). (X, 6, 13, 1).

33* What was the station? What was the material? How was (it done)? So that the beholder of all, Visvakarman, (was) generating and disclosed heaven by his might.

(id., 2).

34* Having eyes everywhere, and having a face everywhere, having arms everywhere, and having feet everywhere, he traverses (heaven) with his arms, (earth) with his swift moving (feet), and exists a god without companion generating heaven and earth.
(id., 3).

35* Which was the forest, which the tree, from which they fabricated heaven and earth? Inquire, sages, in your minds what (place) he was stationed in when holding the worlds.
(id., 4).

36* Let us proclaim with a dear voice the generations of the gods (the divine company), who, when their praises are recited, look (favourably on the worshipper) in this latter age.
(R.V., X, 72, 1). (X, 6, 4, 1).

37* Brāhmaṇaspati filled these (generations of the gods) with breath as a blacksmith (his bellows); in the first age of the gods the existent was born of the non-existent.
(id., 2).

38* In the first age of gods the existent was born of the non-existent; after that the quarters (of the horizon) were born, and after them the upward-growing (trees).
(id. 3).

39* The earth was born from the upward-growing (tree), the quarters were born from the earth; Dakṣa was born from Aditi, and afterwards Aditi from Dakṣa.

(id., 4).

40* The maker of the senses, resolute in mind, engendered the water, (and then) these two (heaven and earth) floating (on the waters); when those ancient boundaries were fixed, then the heaven and earth were expanded.
(R.V., X, 82, 1).

41* Visvakarman, of comprehensive mind and manifold greatness, is all-pervading, the creator, the avenger and the supreme supervisor; him in whom the desires of their (senses) are satisfied with food; they call (him) supreme beyond the seven ṛsis
(id., 2).

42* He who is our preserver, our parent, the creator of (all), who knows our abodes (and knows) all beings, who is the name-giver of the gods—he is one; other beings come to him to enquire.
(id., 3).

43* What was that embryo which was beyond the heaven, beyond this earth, beyond the gods, beyond the asuras, which the waters first retained, in which all the Gods contemplated each other?
(id., 5).

44* The waters verily first retained the embryo in which all the gods were aggregated, single, deposited on the navel of the un-born (creator), in which all beings abode.
(id., 6).

45* You know not him who has generated these (beings); (his life) is another, different form yours; wrapped in fog, and foolish speech (do they) wander (who are) glutonous and engaged in devotion.

(id., 7).

46* Truth (of Thought) and Truthfulness (of speech) were born of arduous penance, thence was might generated, thence also the watery, ocean.

R.V., X, 190, 1). (X, 12, 40, 1).

47* From the watery ocean was the year afterwards produced, ordaining nights and days, the ruler of every moment.

(id., 2).

48* Dhatri in the beginning created the sun and moon, the heaven, the earth, the firmament, and the happy (sky).

(id., 3).

49* In the beginning this world was water, ocean. The Lord of creation walked among them (the primaeval waters) in the form of the wind. He gazed upon this (earth). He took the form of a boar and held the earth. Then He became the Maker of all things and wipped (the earth) dry. He expanded Himself and became earth. This is the extension of the earth. On it He made penance. Only then He let appear the gods, the Vasus, Rudras and the Āditiyas.

(T.S., VII, 1, 5, 1).

That art thou (tat tvam asi) Ch.U., VI, 8, 7.

50* ~~He is (astīti). (Kat. U., II, 3, 12). (Cf. Exod., III, 14: sum qui sum).~~

III)- The Upanisads

a)- The Meta-physical Element

α - The One and the Manifold

51* In the beginning, my dear, this was being (sat) alone one without a second (ekam evādvitīyam). Some people have it say: "In the beginning this was just non-being (a-sat), one only, without a second. From that non-being being was produced". (C.U., VI, 2, 1).

52* But how, indeed, my dear, could it be this? said he. How it being be produced from non-being? On the contrary, my dear, in the beginning this (idam) was being alone, one only, without a second. (id., 2).

53* At that time this (universe) was undifferentiated (not outspoken, revealed, avyākṛtam). It became differentiated just by name (nāma) and form (rūpa). (B.U., I, 4, 7).

54* The one, controller (of all), the inner ātman of all things who makes his one form manifold ... (Kaṭ.U., II, 2, 12. Cf. S.U., VI, 12).

55* The ātman, verily was this, one only, in the beginning. No other winking thing whatever. He thought: "Let me now create the world". (A.U., I, 1, 1).

56* From him (Puruṣa), also the gods are manifoldly produced. (Muṇḍ.U., II, 1, 7).

B)- The non?-being

57* In the beginning, verily this (world) was non-existent. [The not-being (a-sat) was this in the beginning (?)] . Therefrom verily being (sat) was produced. That made itself (svayam akuruta) an ātman. Therefore it is called well-done (su-kṛta). (T.U., II, 7. Cf. contra 52*).

58* The sun is Brahman—this is the doctrine. A further explanation thereof (is this): In the beginning this (world) was merely non-being (non-existent, a-sat, asat evadam agra āsīt). It became existent [tat sad āsīt, it was existent (?)]. It grew. It turned into an egg. (C.U., III, 19, 1).

59* Non-existent (a-sat), himself does one become, if he knows that Brahman as

not-being. /If one knows that Brahman exists, such one thereby knows as existent (one becomes thereby an existent). (T.U., II, 6).

60* In the beginning nothing whatsoever was here. This world was covered over with death, with hunger, for hunger is death. Then he created the mind (Logos, spirit, manas). (B.U., I, 2).

61* From the non-existent the manas came out.
(T.B., II, 2, 9, 10).

62* In the non-existent is the existent made firm; in the existent is being (bhūta) made firm; being is set in what is to be; what is to be is made firm in being.
(A.V., XVII, 1, 19).

8 - The All-embracing

63* There are, in fact, two forms of Brahman: the formed (mūrtha) and the formless, the mortal and the immortal, the stationary and the moving, the actual (existent, being, sat) and the yon [that what is beyond, the transcendent (?), sac-ca tyac-ca]. (B.U., II, 3, 1).

64* He discoursed in the following way: What was there then? He (Brahmā) said to him (Subāla): It was neither being, nor not-being, further it was neither being and not-being. From that emerged darkness. (Sub. U., I, 1. Cf. II, 1).

65* When there is (was) neither darkness, nor day nor night; neither being nor not-being, only the Blessed (kindly, auspicious) one alone (śiva eva kevalaḥ) is (was). (Ś.U., IV, 18).

66* Verily, in the beginning this (universe) was, as it were, neither non-existent nor existent; in the beginning this (universe), indeed, as it were, existed and did not exist: there was then only that mind.
(S.B., X, 5, 3, 1).

67* Wherefore, it has been said by the Rishi (Rg. Veda, X, 129, 1) "There was then neither the non-existent nor the existent": for Mind was, as it were, neither existent nor non-existent, (id., 2).

68* I am immortality and also that, being and non-being, O Arjuna! (B.G., IX, 19).

69* I shall describe that which has to be known, but that which is to be known and by knowing which immortality is attained: The beginningless supreme Brahman, who is said to be neither being nor non-being (na sat tan nā sat). (B.G., XIII, 12).

b)- The Meta-cosmological Element

d)- The Background

70* Visva (the all) are you, Vaiśvānara (the fire, the all-pervading belonging to all men) are you. By you everything that is born is supported. Let all oblation enter into you. Their creatures live where you, the all-immortal art. (Mait. U., VI, 9).

71* Then Gārgī, the daughter of Vacaknu, asked him: "Yājñavalkya!" said she "since all this (world) is woven, warp and woof, on water, on what, pray, is water woven, warp and woof?"—"On wind, O Gārgī"—"On what then, pray, is the wind woven, warp and woof?"—"On the worlds of heavens, O Gārgī" (and so the process goes on through the worlds of the Gandharvas, of the son, of the moon, of the stars, of the gods, of Indra, of Prajapati, and finally of the worlds of Brahmā . Then follows text 10. (B.U., III, 6, 1. Cf. 9, 26).

72* And what else could its root be than food and in the same manner, my dear, with food as an offshoot, seek for water as the root; with water, my dear, as an offshoot, seek for heat (tejas) as the root; with heat, my dear, as an offshoot, seek for being (sat) as its root. All these creatures, my dear,

have Being as their root, have Being as their home (abode, dwelling, sad-āyatanāh), have Being as their support (sat-pratisthāh). (C.U., VI, 8, 4).

73* Manifest (yet) hidden, moving in the secret place, the great abode. Therein is placed all this which moves, breathes and winks. (R.V., X, 121, 3. Cf. A.V., X, 8, 6). What that is, know it as being (sad) and non-being (a-sad) (S.U., IV, 18), as the supreme object of desire, higher than understanding, as what is the best of creatures. (Mund.U., II, 2, 1).

74* The gods spoke 'Verily, there is no other foundation than this: let us restore even him, our father Prajāpati, he shall be our foundation.

(S.B., VII, 1, 2, 2).

β)- In the Beginning

75* You are the beginningless (anādimat tvam), you abide through omnipresence; you from which all beings are born. (S.U., IV, 4. Cf. id., 10).

76* Him who is without beginning and without second, in the midst of chaos, the creator of all, of manifold form, who alone embraces the universe. By knowing god (deva) one is released from all fetters. (S.U., V, 13).

77* He is the beginning, the efficient cause of combinations. He is to be seen as beyond the three times (present, past, and future, trikāla), without parts (a-kāla) too! Worship him first of all as the one who is many-forms, the origin of all being, the adorable god, who abides in one's own thoughts. (S.U., XI, 5).

78* If it is said, not (that is not possible), for want of any distinction in work (before creation). No, because (the world) was without beginning. (B.S., II, 1, 35).

79* In the beginning, ātman verily one only was here. Nothing else whatsoever winked. He thought, "Let me now create the worlds!". (A.U., I, 1, 1).

80* He created these worlds, celestial water, light—rays, death and the waters. (Id., 2).

γ)- In God

81* As the mighty wind moving always everywhere, abides in the spaces (ākāśa), know you that in the same manner all beings rest in Him. (B.G., IX, 6).

82* (He is) the One who rules over every single source, in whom all this dissolves and comes together.
(Ś.U., IV, 11).

83* In Him (It, Brahman) all the worlds rest and no one ever goes beyond Him (It). (Kaṭ.U., II, 3, 1).

84* He in whom this whole world is always enveloped, the knower, the author of time, the possessor of qualities and all knowledge. (Ś.U., VI, 2).

85* He knew: "I indeed am this creation for I produced all this". Thence arose creation. Verily, he who knows this comes to be in that creation of His. (B.U., I, 4, 5).

86* All this is His creation indeed and He Himself is all the gods. (id., 6).

87* From Him all proceed (is born, jātam), all rests (exists, subsists, pratiṣṭitam), and to Him all return. I am that Brahman without a second. (Kaiv.U., 19).

88* He, indeed, is the god who pervades all regions. Before time Aforetime was he born (the first born, pūrvo hi jātaḥ) and he is within the womb. He has been born and he will be born. He stands opposite all creatures, having his face in all directions. (Ś.U., II, 16).

89* The god who is in fire, who is in water, who has entered into the whole world, who is in planets, who is in trees—to that god be adoration! Yea, be adoration! (Id., 17).

90* Fire is His head, His eyes are the sun and the moon; the regions of space are His ears, His speech the revealed Vedas; wind is His breadth (life, prāṇa) and His heart the whole world. Out of His food the earth. Indeed he is the inner ātman of all beings (sarva-bhūtantarātmā). (Mund.U., II, 1, 4).

91* And whatsoever is the seed of all beings, that am I O Arjuna. There is no being moving or unmoving that can exist without me. (B.G., X, 39).

92* By me all this universe is pervaded through my unmanifested form (a-vyakta-mūrtinā). All beings abide in me but I do not abide (dwell) in them. (B.G., IX, 4). (cf. VII, 12).

93* And (yet) the beings do not dwell in me. Behold my divine yoga (mystery, power). Bringing forth and supporting the beings my ātmā does not abide in them. (Id., 5).

94* The one god, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the inner ātmā of all beings (sarva-bhutantar-atma), the ordainer of all deeds (karma), ~~the~~ who dwells in all beings, the witness, the knower, the only one, devoid of qualities. (S.U., VI, II).

8)- Out of God

95* As a spider might come out (ud-car) with this thread, as small sparks come forth (vyuccaranti, from vi-ud-car) from the fire, even so from this ātman come forth (vyuccaranti) all breadths (vital energies, prāṇaḥ), all worlds, all gods, all beings (bhūtāni). Its secret meaning (Upaniṣads) is the truth of truth (the real of the real, the being of reality, satyasya satyan. Vital energies (breadths, prāṇā) are the truth, and their truth is He (It, the ātman). (B.U., II, 1, 20. Cf. Maitr.U., VI, 32; et Mund.U., I, 1, 7; et S.U., VI, 10).

96* His name is the real of the real (the truth of truth). (B.U., II, 3, 6).

97* This is the truth. As from a blazing fire sparks of like form issue forth (prabhavante) by the thousands, even so, O dear, beings manifold are born (produced, prajāyante) from the imperishable and they return thither to. (Mund.U., II, 1, 1).

98* I am the retainer of all, from me everything proceeds. Knowing these the wise worship me with right consciousness. (B.G., X, 8).

ε)- Outside God

99* It moves and it moves not. It is far and it is near. It is within all this and it is outside of all this. (Īśa U., 5).

100* As fire, though one, entering this world adopts itself in form to every form, so the one inner ātmā of all beings (sarva-bhūta-antar-ātmā) enwrapped in every form is yet outside (bahis). (Kat. U., II, 2, 9. Cf. et 10* & 11*).

101* He who dwelling in the earth yet is different (antarah, means also "within") than the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who controls the earth from within, he is from ātman, the inner controller, the immortal. (B.U., III, 7, 3).

102* O Lord of creation, you are the primordial protector, the Father of the gods, the producer of the creatures, the Lord of the whole life, the transcendent protector.
(T.B., II, 8, 1, 3).

η)- Towards God

103* Into whom (god, deva) in the beginning and at the end, the universe is covered (its end and its beginning the whole world dissolves). (Ś.U., IV, 1. Cf. 82*).

104* In the dissolution of the world He alone remains awake. From that space

He, assuredly, awakes this world, which consists of thought alone only. It is meditated on by Him and in Him it is dissolved. (Maitr.U., VI, 17).

105* All beings, O Son of Kunti (Arjuna), go back to Him Prakriti (nature) at the end of a cosmic circle (kalpa: and at the beginning of the kalpa I send them forth. (B.G., IX, 7).

c)- The Meta-psychological Element.

a)- Through the Logos

106* And this is also brahmanaspati. The word (speech, vāc) is Brahman. He is its lord. Therefore, this is brahmanaspati. (B.U., I, 3, 21).

107* By that speech and that soul of his he created all this (universe) whatsoever there is, ...
(S.B., X, 6, 5, 5).

108* Verily in the beginning Prajāpati (the lord of creatures) stood alone. He had no happiness, being alone. Then meditating upon himself (ātmānam) throwing his thoughts within himself) he created numerous offspring (Maitr.U., II, 6).

109* .... but Prajapati is speech, and that doubtless is the supreme speech which is (the outcome) of seventeen drums: he thus wins the supreme speech, the supreme Prajapati.
(S.B., V, 1, 5, 6).

110* I distinguish not if I am this all, for I go perplexed, and bound in mind; when the first born (perceptions) of the truth reach me, then immediately shall I obtain a portion (of the meaning) of that (saved) word.

(R.V., I, 164, 37). (I, 22, 8, 37).

111* I have gone forth around the earth and heaven, I have approached the (Upastha) first-born Son of Order (R.T.H. Griffiths). ~~About heaven and earth at once I went; I approached (upastha) the first born of~~ righteousness (order) (rta).
(A.V., II, 1, 4).

112* (In the beginning) only this Prajāpati was. His vāk was (he) himself

(svam). The vāk was his second. He contemplated: I will deliver this vāk, (so that) it will produce and achieve all this (whole world, universe). He (then) delivered the vāk and he (vāk) produced all this (universe). (Tānd. M.B., XX, 14, 2).

113* Brahman is intelligent (knowledge, vijñanā). For truly beings are born from intelligence, when born they live by intelligence and they enter into intelligence, when departing again. (T.U., III, 5).

114* That which all the vedas proclaim, that which all austerities (tapas) declare, that desiring which man live a life of a religious novitiate (studentship, brahmacarya) that word shall I tell to you briefly. That is Aum. (Kaṭ. U., I, 15).

115* That syllable (Aum) is verily Brahmā (everlasting spirit, sacred word). That syllable indeed is the supreme (the highest end). (Kaṭ., U., I, 16).

β)- With the Will

116* For the self-existent (svayambhū) having performed austerities, created in the beginning, out of his own mouth. (Manu, I, 94).

117* Verily all these are centered in the Will (decision, intention, conception, saṁkalpa). In the Will they have their atman (saṁkalpa-atmakāni). In the Will are they established (have their abode, are grounded, pratiṣṭhitāni). Through the Will were heaven and earth formed, air, ether, water, and earth were formed through the Will. (C.U., VII, 4, 2).

118* The ātman desired: Would that I were many! Let me procreate myself! He performed austerity. Having performed austerity he created all these, whatever there is here. Having created it, into it, indeed, he entered. (T.U., II, 6. Cf. A.V., V, 32).

119* In the beginning this (world) was just the ātman, one only. He desired

(kāmayata): Would that I had a wife, then I would procreate. Would that I had wealth, then I would offer sacrifice (perform rites, fulfil a work, karma). This much indeed is the (range of) desire (kāmah). Not even if one desired, would he get more than that. (B.U., I, 4, 17. Cf. Praśn.U., I, 4).

120* I am the father of this world, the mother, the supporter, the grandfather (ancestor, pitāmahah). I am that which is to be known, the purifier (pavitram), the Aum (aumkāra), the Rg, the Sāma, and Yayur (veda as well). (B.G., IX, 17).

Mādhyamika and

The "Crisis" of Indian Philosophy Today

A Challenge to Mādhyamikas

- A note on an important book (1)

Indian Philosophy to-day stands at the cross-roads, not only between East and West, but also between Past and Future. Aware of this problem, the Indian Philosophical Congress asked recently its members and the philosophers of India in general, whether Indian Philosophy needs re-orientation and organized a Symposium on this subject, and we have said already something about it. But more important than a philosophical self-reflection making plans of spinning projects is a positive contribution to the Philosophy of our times.

A - The Madhyamika versus Philosophers (aim of)

It is with this spirit that we are dealing with a philosophical "opus" and not simply with an historical exposition of an obsolete Philosophy that we would like to discuss The review the recent book of Professor Murti and allow ourselves some philosophical criticisms. Amicus mihi Plato ...

problem

role of The Mādhyamika regarding The self-renewal of Indian Philosophy today (1). → p. 14

For undoubtedly we deal here with one of the most important works that have recently appeared either in India or outside, not only about Buddhism, but also about Indian Philosophy in general. It is not the study of a mere scholar who has become short-sighted from deciphering old palimpsests and ignores the context which alone gives relief to his topic, but it is the work of a philosopher who has gone into the core of one Philosophy and on the way and at the end meets with the representatives of other philosophical systems and engages them in dialogue in order to clarify and deepen his own metaphysical urge. The book deserves attention and study because it is not only a striking example of the perenniality (more of perennial does not exists) overlasting-ness of Indian Philosophy jumping over transcending time and space, but also of the opportunity and temporal chance—Kairós, the Greeks would say—of the same Indian Philosophy in the philosophical struggle of Today our times. Those who think (vague in p. 14)

(1) In order not to enter into merely scholarly debate we shall utilize for the Mādhyamika the excellent work by

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(1). T.R.V. MURTI, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (A Study of the Mādhyamika System), London (G. Allen & Unwin Ltd.), 1955, pp. 372 (We put in brackets the pages of reference).

that Indian Philosophy is only a matter of archaeology or that its renewal should break with the Indian tradition should read this book to become convinced that there is still room for another "via media" that makes the Indian Wisdom of the past, present amidst us and effective for the future.

The book opens with a masterly exposition, ~~original in its thinking out of implications~~, on "the two Traditions in Indian Philosophy": "one having its source in the ātma-doctrine of the Upanisads and the other in the anātma--doctrine of Buddha" (10). The first one is "the substance-view of reality" conceiving substance as immutable and always identical with itself ~~is the current of~~ this tradition mainstream of the classical systems of Indian Philosophy. Sāṁkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta all consider the ātman as "the very pivot of their metaphysics, epistemology and ethics" (10). "The other tradition is represented by the Buddhist denial of substance (ātman) and all that it implies. There is no inner and immutable core in things; everything is in flux" (10).

Professor Murti explains and proves at length that the interpretation of Indian Philosophy "as having evolved out of one single tradition--the Upanisadic" (14) and which considers Buddhism and Jainism as deviations rather than as radical departures from the Upanisadic tradition" (14) is an oversimplification "not fully alive to the vital differences and exclusive attitudes inherent in the Brāhmanical and the Buddhist systems " (14). Buddhism is not merely an heresy of Brāhmanism, but a radical ~~point of~~ departure from the opposite presupposition that underlies the whole of the Upanisads. It is a consistently worked out and fundamental nairātmya-vāda, not simply a diatribe against the

ātma-vāda, but a genuine philosophy emerging ~~out of~~ from an opposite solution to the fundamental philosophical problem. This problem has two sides as it were. Its existential side is the fact of pain and the aim towards its removal. The Upaniṣadic way is the positive path to attain bliss—ānanda—realising the ātman as Brahman. The Buddhist solution is the negative path to reach nirvāṇa by de-realising the ātman, i.e., denying it altogether (cf. 18 sq.). Its essential side on the other hand, consists in the problem of change. The Upaniṣadic solution will lead to the denial of it—as real—on the ground of the static and changeless ātman: the Real is the permanent and only the permanent. The Buddhistic trend will affirm the contrary: the permanence, the changeless is the great illusion, is the unreal; the "universal" is Thought-construct, a vikalpa. Change is also denied, because there is nothing to change. (Mādhyamika is at sight) (Cf. 55 sq.)

Our author takes great pains to show that, against some modern interpreters of Buddhism, primitive Buddhism never affirmed the ātman, so that the Mādhyamika does not need to appear as a deviation from the early teachings of Buddha, but as its culmination and its "real heart" (55). In this manner he justifies the apparently ambitious title of the book, the Mādhyamika being the Central Philosophy of Buddhism. According to him this system not only "created a revolution in Buddhism and through that in the whole range of Indian Philosophy" (vii), but "the rise of the Mādhyamika system is at once the

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(1) (of page 1.) T.R.V. MURTI, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (A Study of the Mādhyamika System), London (G. Allen & Unwin Ltd.) 1955, 372 pp.

rise of Buddhism as a religion" (6). Moreover, from the beginning (9) down to the very end (341) Murti is convinced that the Mādhyamika absolutism is a valuable and almost definitive critique of all philosophy. Not that he dared, to call his book: The Central Philosophy of Philosophy ... (Cf. p. 93).

The second chapter is an effort to interpret the famous "silence" of the Buddha, not as anti-metaphysical, merely agnostic or purely nihilistic. The Buddha kept silence because no "rational" answer could be given, because any answer would have been wrong and led to barren speculations--diṭṭi-vāda (which Murti calls "dogmatism", in a rather restricted and peculiar sense) (*). "He has realised that the Real is transcendent to thought" (45). He wants to lead us "to the non-conceptual knowledge of the absolute" (49). The silence of Buddha not indulging in rationalistic antinomies and raising us "to the higher standpoint of criticism (40) is the birth of the Dialectic that is going to be very nature of the Mādhyamika.

The first part of the book is closed with two long and scholarly, though not at all heavy chapters, dealing with the "development of the

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(*) Everybody is free to use the words he thinks best to express better what he wants to say, provided he clarifies their meaning in an univocal way. Inspite of the Sanskrit equivalent dṛṣṭi (theory--from theorein, to see, to realise! to have an "intuitus", a vision of the spiritual reality) he prefers to translate it by "dogmatic" taking it in an even more restricted sense than Kant himself. "Dogmatists invariably confound the Transcendent with the empirical" (45). Dogma in the Christian sense--from which it has come into the modern languages--is the expression of a saving truth as it is "seen" by the human intellect when it is illumined by the Knowledge God has about Himself (and in Him everything included). Dogma is meant to prevent the going astray of faith by giving it a certain formulation. Dogma is not the superimposition of a doctrine upon faith. Prof. Murti is, of course, not alone responsible for his particular use of the word.

two traditions and the emergence of the Mādhyamika system" (55-103) on the one hand, and "the influence of the Mādhyamika dialectic" (104-117) on the other. The very genius of the author helping us to assist at the birth and growth of several Indian systems and showing the logical connexions between them, ~~betrays~~ disavows a little his introductory statement that "systems of Philosophy are the elaboration, through concepts and symbols, of certain original intuitions" (55). The material is so finely woven that he leaves little room for those intellectual mutations alluded to. In fact there is no opposition between intuition and logic. We can only recommend these pages to the student of Indian Philosophy. He will certainly learn more here than in many text-books, because Murti philosophizes along his historical itinerary.

It is interesting to read if ~~wk~~ somewhat startling there. That "the great contribution that Buddhist thought made to Indian Philosophy was the discovery of the subjective—the doctrine of appearance" (57). If this is true it is understandable that the exposition of Indian Philosophy reduced to the "six systems" is not only one-sided, but radically vitiated, for the fundamental conception of appearance would now have to be regarded as of Buddhist origin.

Another ~~very illuminating~~ important point is his remark regarding the evolution of the monism of the older Vedānta into the advaitism of Gaudapāda, Maṇḍana Miśra and Śankara. (63/64). Unfortunately the ~~Gaudapāda~~ author does not follow up this thought, and I am afraid that he for-

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~~course, not alone responsible for his particular use of the word.~~

The Problem of Human Cultures

gets it again when returning to a monistic interpretation of Advaita. The substitution of vivarta-vāda (appearance) for parināmavāda (modification) should prove a true progress towards an advaita-vāda that does not ignore the complexity of māyā.

The second and central part of the book (121-289) is concerned with "the Dialectic as System of Philosophy". The philosopher Murti and the expositor of the Mādhyamika system go here ~~so close~~ so close by hand in hand that the reader is forced to believe that the author is a Mādyamika Vedāntin who accepts the whole of Buddhistic Central Philosophy without throwing over his Vedāntic absolutism. It seems that he incorporates fully the Mādhyamika "technique" into his Vedāntic Philosophy without paying attention to the Mādyamika's claim that there is no other Philosophy than that "technique" which reduces all Philosophy to ashes. "Extremes meet".

Excessively impressed by the Kantian, "Copernican revolution" —which symbolically enough modern astronomy has made almost irrelevant— our expositor applies that same pattern to Indian Philosophy. As Kant tried to overcome the deadlock of Empiricism and Rationalism by an internal critique of Reason itself in order to find out its validity and its limits, and in so doing converted (the whole of) Philosophy into criticism, so "the Mādhyamika ~~would~~ characterises both the ātma and ānatma views as dogmatic (dṛsti)" (123) and rejects all views and the whole realm of Reason in order to reach the Sūnyatā (the Absolute of the Mādhyamika) identical with the "Intellectual Intuition" ~~and~~ devoid of all content and forms and thoughts.

Murti attributes to the Dialectic in general and to the

Dialectic of the Mādhyamika in particular a double function, the second of which , in my opinion, obviously transcends the scope and nature of the pure Dialectic. From the very beginning of this book, and he will repeat it without number, times, he tells us that Dialectic "is the consciousness of the total and interminable conflict in Reason and the consequent attempt to resolve the conflict by rising to a higher standpoint" (9), "a higher plane of consciousness" (294).

The first function of the Dialectic is the criticism of all systems, it is the pure application of the Law of Non-contradiction getting at an "absurdum" within each of the systems analysed— prasaṅgāpādanam (131). Disproving a thesis does not mean for the Mādhyamika approving the opposite. This would level down the Mādhyamika to another "view", "theory" and it claims constantly that the denial of all views is not another view. "Every thesis is self-convicted, not counterbalanced" (136). But Professor Murti contests again and again and it seems to us very rightly, that Śūnyatā is not nihilism and the Mādhyamika not positivism or scepticism, but a supra-rational system that realises the Real as Transcendent to thought and attainable by, nay, identical with "a higher faculty, Intuition (prajñā) with which the Real (tattva) is identical" (126). This "conclusion" (138) is not arrived at by the first function of the Dialectic, but by the second one. The first function only makes plain to us the incapacity of Reason to give a "rational" account of Reality as well as of the main metaphysical issues. For "rejection of views is not based on any positive grounds or the acceptance of another view; it is solely based on the inner contradiction implicit in each view. The function of the Mādhyamika dialectic,

on the logical level, is purely negative, analytic" (128). And yet the Mādhyamika does not stop here—as Kant would do. Kant's Critique has a certain tragic character. It was intended to put an end, once and for all, to metaphysics, the self distraction of which alone can prepare the way for faith. But Philosophy—for Kant—cannot proceed further. If there is anything beyond the threshold, Reason does not know it. It has opened the door, but does not know at all what is beyond, whether Being, Nothingness, Light or Darkness. "He should have—Murti points out—, as complementary to his doctrine of transcendental illusion, accepted a knowledge of the real; though necessarily, it could not be in the thinking way". (141) (Italics mine) (cf. also 213). This is what the Mādhyamika does: complements (cf. 142) the first function of the Dialectic with a second one and accepts (Cf. 214 and also 235) "intuition of the real" as the true knowledge ~~in~~ which ~~there is no difference~~ does not differ from Reality itself. Mādhyamika's Critique is not a real tragedy for metaphysics, but only a cathartic drama. Metaphysics as a system of spiritual realisation do not sink down in a total shipwreck, they are saved when all seemed to be lost by that "implication" (212) that the "real is [only] overlaid with the undergrowth of our notions and views" (212). The intuition—prajñā—of the Mādhyamika "is supra-rational" (219).

Whence does this intuition come from? The Mādhyamika will say that it does not come from anywhere, for it always was, it is always there, being the Real itself. That is why Philosophy as Dialectic has only this "uncovering function" (212) setting the intellect free from "conceptual restrictions" (213), deconceptualising the mind and ~~dis~~burdening "it of all notions empirical as well as a priori" (212).

How does the pure Dialectic perform this second function?

What would happen if I remain bogged down in the first negative function of the Dialectic and fail to discover the underlying Reality or Intuition? The Mādhyamika answer is obvious. It will say that he who asks thus has not reached the true sūnyatā, the real void; but this answer will not convince the outsider since it begs the question. And yet there is all along the Mādhyamika effort, according to Murti; the idea that the Dialectic alone will lead us to such a recognition. It tries even to prove it—utilizing by the way, the Law of excluded middle, which Mādhyamic itself denies (cf. 146 sq.). "Four and only four views are possible" (129), on any subject (Italics mine, pointing out to the utilization of the Law of excluded middle!). A, non-A, A and non-A, non (A and non A). All these "views" lead to an absurdity (prasanga), therefore, no view is valid. "Reason (buddhi) is therefore condemned as falsifying the real (samvriti)" (139). "Philosophy then culminates in intellectual intuition"(142) (Italics mine). Once the door is open to such a "culmination", the whole of Buddhism again finds its place within the framework of the Dialectic that had at first seemed so frightening: "The Mādhyamika dialectic as culminating in intuition is not only the fruition of the theoretic consciousness; it is the fruition of the practical and religious consciousness, as well" (142). "The dialectic as non-conceptual intuitional knowledge takes us beyond the possibility of pain. It is the summum bonum of all our endeavours. It is Freedom itself (Nirvāṇa)" (142). "The dialectic as Prajñāpāramitā is identified with the tathāgata (dharmakāya) —the Ens perfectissimum, which all beings are in essence and which they attain [if they are they do not attain! (both italics mine)] by spiritual discipline. —111— The dialectic

consummates the union of all beings with the perfect Being (buddha-kāya)" (142). "The Madhyamika Dialectic as negation of thought is intuition of the Absolute" (143)". Indeed we are far away from Kant--- and from any other Dialectic! And yet this is genuine Mādhyamika!

After a skillful chapter in which "some objections against the dialectic [are] considered" (144 sq.) and answered, comes one of the most important and long chapters of the whole book on the "application of the Dialectic", in which almost the whole of Indian Philosophy parades again before our eyes marching in front or rather around the critique of causality, that Murti calls, I think with justice, "the central problem in Indian Philosophy" (166, and before in 121f). This is, of course, in close relation with the problem of change, also called "central" for the Sāmkhya as for the other systems (61), as well as for Buddhism (69).

The climax of the book is ~~the~~ chapter eight where our author describes "the Mādhyamika conception of Philosophy as prajñāpāramitā" (209 sq.). We learn there again that "the Dialectic is not a body of doctrines, but their criticism" (209) (italics mine), that "the Dialectic itself is philosophy" (209) and that the "sūnyatā of drstis is not one more drsti, but is prajñā--their reflective awareness" (209) (again italics mine; can intuition be reflective?) (Cf. also 162). We learn there that the Mādhyamika not only believes that to be aware of a drsti (view) we must be aware of its falsity" (209), but also that it interprets all other (Indian) philosophies as species of scientific enquiry and "dogmatism" and "free from every trace of the problematic, the doubtful and the false" (211). If every "philosophy" would agree with such characterisation of philosophy remains an untouched problem for the Mādhyamika.

Three beautiful chapters, each of them dealing with a pair of fundamental notions ("Absolute and Phenomena", "Dialectic and Freedom"

and "Absolute and Tathāgata") close this second part of the book, and with it a full account of de Mādhyamika system as one of the three Absolutisms of Indian Philosophy.

The last part of the book is devoted to a comparative study on "The Mādhyamika and Allied Systems" (293 sq.). First it is compared with the philosophies of Kant, Hegel and Bradley as examples of Western Absolutisms, and secondly it is described in comparison with the two other Indian Absolutisms, namely Vijñānavāda and Advaita Vedānta. This latter chapter seems to me one of the best of the whole book. Murti reaches to simple formulae and clear formulations that give us the essence of Indian Philosophy without falling into oversimplification or even distortions of the previous chapter on Western Absolutisms. So often we have had the opposite case of misrepresentation of Indian thought by Western writers, that Murti's ideas here, shadowy as they are seem to us to be a presage of light and to be a symbol of the vitality of Indian Philosophy today, at least in one of its best representatives. Starting from the classical example: "This is snake", Murti shows us how "for the Vedānta the not applies to the 'snake'. This is not snake, i.e., This is real, but its ascribed snake-character if false" (323). This is only One, Brahman. "For the Vijñānavāda, the 'not' applies to the this. 'The snake is not this', i.e., the 'snake' is not out there as this, as an object independent of the projecting Ideation of consciousness, but is identical with the latter. The 'this' (given, Being) is real for the Vedānta, and the 'snake' as a creature of projective imagination is appearance; for the Vijñānavāda, it is jus the reverse: The 'this' as an other, independent of consciousness, is appearance; and the 'snake' is real, being the mode of constructive Ideation. Both have this common feature however. From the context of

illusion they reject one aspect—the appearance—(the 'snake' by the Vedāntin and the 'this' by the Vijñānavādin); it is totally false, unreal (---). They, however, salvage and retrieve the other part, the real or the prius of illusion (the 'this' by the Vedāntin and the 'snake' by the Vijñānavādin); only its relationship with the appearance is false" (323/324). "For the Mādhyamika negation applies to both the 'this' and the 'snake': This is not snake. The 'this' cannot be had apart from the 'snake' for we know the 'this' only as identified with the 'snake' (predicate) and not in isolation; the 'snake' too can be had only as identified with the 'this' (substrate, shbject). They are relative to each other, and this constitutes their falsity". (324). We regain here the classical Buddhistic tenet of the pratītya—samutpāda interpreted not in the early form of temporal sequence but as "essential dependence" (7). But for the Mādhyamika "relativity or mutual dependence is a mark of the unreal" (139). If we were to ask why, the Mādhyamika would answer because the Real (tattva) "is uniform and universal, neither decreasing, nor increasing, neither originating nor decaying". The Absolute alone is in itself (akrtima svabhāva) (235). The Mādhyamika answer for the next question (—Why has the Real precisely such features,) is only one: Śūnya. In fact the point of departure is already the goal and the end. It would have been a genial vital circle instead of a vitious one, if Murti would have not given ~~not for~~ the Madhyamika the character of being pure dialectic. And in fact Madhyamika transcends Dialectic, i.e. "Critical reflexion, which is the philosophical consciousness par excellence" (326), ~~for~~ the Mādhyamika, transcends Thought, is "Śūnyatā, ~~is~~ or Prajñā, non-dual Intuition" (326) and thus beyond the sic at non of every Dialectic.

The last chapter is a very short "Estimate" (329-341) in which the philosppher of the Banaras Hindu University only tells us that "Śūnyatā

is Absolutism, not Nihilism or Positivism" (328), for, against Nihilism, "the Mādhyamika dialectic is but the systematic form of the suggestions already found in the teachings of the Buddha as embo/died in the Pāli and other Canons" (329) (italics mine) and only concludes "that the Real is transcendent to thought and that it cannot be conceived in terms of the empirical" (330); and against Positivism "it has a spiritual goal" (331), the very objective of his dialectic being spiritual and tending "to free the mind of all vikalpa by resolving the antas, alternatives" (333).

Murti ends his brilliant exposition ~~with four pages~~ by describing in four pages the spiritual indigency of our world to-day and pointing out "the value of the Mādhyamika System as Basis for World Culture" (337), for "the Christian world has been disintegrating for centuries, since the Renaissance. There is little hope that it could regain the lost ground and reassert itself. The East is hardly better, though the disintegration has not proceeded to such an extent" (338). "Denominal religions ~~---~~ deservedly stand discredited" (340). "Only mystical religion, ~~---~~ can hope to unite the world" (340/341).

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B Philosophers versus Mādhyamika

After this long an account of such an important book, minor observations ~~always possible~~ would be out of place. It could be said for instance, that the book contains far too many repetitions so that is with the same ideas are exposed in four or five different contexts, and that the same work could have been written ~~in~~ with half the number of pages, nor are we going to linger on punctilious ~~or~~ terminological discussions. What does he understand by "thought", "knowledge", "theory", "Reason", etc. Many a ~~barren~~ fruitless quarrel could be avoided by clarifying terms.

vanno alla pag 1 Quello che va frammentario non scrivere

We would like to make only two ~~central~~ comments. 1) The one, refers to the central doctrine of Mādhyamika itself. 2) The other to the crisis it brings—in the Greek sense of the word, krisis—to the whole if Indian Philosophy in its place in the Philosophy of the world to-day.

It may well be that our evalutation of the Mādyamika is somehow conditioned by the book we are revieving. And I have the strong suspicion that our writer pays ~~two much of~~ great a tribute to the "modern" mind presenting a pure dialectical Mādhyamika instead of a more religious and rightly theological system. But even if his effort somehow displaces Mādhyamika I think that a criticism of Murti's Mādhyamika is interesting for both, the Mādhyamika itself and the Philosophy of our times.

1) The Criticism of Mādhyamika

I) Professor Murti seems to justify the claim to uniqueness of the Mādhyamika Philosophy and to explain away all the criticisms that have been made against it since the ~~very~~ beginning of its formulation. Now, the Mādhyamika's claim that it is itself no doctrine, no "view", but merely a denial and sublimation of all Philosophies, is one thing. Another thing is whether this claim is true, and still a third problem is whether this claim can be substantiated either by positive proofs or at least by showing that it is not self-contradictory.

Regarding the truth-claim of the Mādhyamika we can hardly say anything, before agreeing on the truth-criteria that we should apply to that system. Only slightly and en passant (p. 211 and 335) our author borders one of the most interesting problems of the self-reflection of the Philosophy of our times—of the Philosophy of Philosophy that of the choice between different systems of thought. ~~We had for~~ each of

them more or less coherent once its principles are accepted. We had for too long a time banished the Will from our philosophical meditations, not of course as an object of speculation, but as a philosophical factor and instrument. The problem anyway is not so easy as to be reducible to an unjustificable strike of "temperament" or "happy suggestion" (211). There is a deeper—and philosophical—connexion between the philosopher and the Philosophy, that already Aristotle had surmised (natumen systems). But we have no intention now to proceed along these lines.

We shall have to ponder on the third problem under its double aspect: (a) First, how does the Mādhyamika proves the truth, not of its contents—sometimes it will say that it has no contents—but of its claim? (b) Secondly, is its claim at all tenable, i.e., without implying a vicious circle?

- Mādhiamika's claim

a) The Mādhyamika's claim to be beyond and above all views and systems of Philosophy relies on a double and very logical step. (a) One, all "views" are false because they are self-contradictory. Here is the realm of the Dialectic. (b) Two, the negation of all "views", in the sense of not being itself a "view", opens,—unveils—to us the Intellectual Intuition that transcends all "thought" and unites us with the Real.

a)- All systems are self-contradictory

(a)-To prove that all "views" are false the Mādhyamika tries to prove, first that one view is contradictory with itself applying none but the very criteria accepted by that view. We may wonder first of all if all its arguments against a certain system are accepted by the representatives of that system, for we see those philosophies flourish

also after the Mādyamika's criticisms. But we may grant for the time being and for discussion's sake that such a refutation has succeeded.

Now, if a particular "view" is false it would seem that the opposite one is automatically true. The Dialectic of Mādhyamika denies explicitely this "consequence", a consequence which it considers false from two different points of view. First, because, according to Murti (146 sq.) the Mādhyamika rejects the "Law of Excluded Middle" on which that "consequence" rests. But, secondly, because this opposite system is subjected to criticisms analogous to the first one. Within its own dialectic this second system is also found guilty of self-contradiction.

To prove that all views are false it is not enough to prove that one is false, not even that two are contradictory. It must be proved that any view is self-contradictory. We have already mentioned that the Mādhyamika considers only four alternative "views" on any subject as possible and it rejects all four. But how does the Mādhyamika know that between A and non-A, or between A and non-A, and non-(A and non A) there is not another middle possibility if it rejects the Law of Excluded Middle? On what grounds can it be justified that "the four sets of views serve as schema for classifying all systems of philosophy" (130)? (italics mine). Not only logically from the Mādhyamika's own standpoint is this untenable, but in fact we hope to show that there exist middle positions in between the logical alternatives granted by the Mādhyamika criticism. Moreover, we think this problem important not only because of the Mādhyamika challenge, but because the issue in itself puts the whole consistency and truthfulness of Philosophy at stake. We reserve this point, to be ~~dealt with~~ considered along with our second remark.

We may say, so far, that the first step of the claim is not proved

and that the Mādhyamika has not even got the tools to prove it ~~ever~~, ~~as~~ i ~~has~~ (not have) and cannot have any criterion to prove that it embraces all systems of philosophy. This criterion transcends dialectics, for "Dialectic is criticism only" (208) (italics mine) and criticism cannot jump over itself or forget the concrete system it criticises. The best the Mādhyamik can do is/to criticise the concrete "views" that it has in view.

It may be said that the rejection of all views does not rely on the quantitative ground that it has exhausted all possible views, but on the qualitative discovery of the falsity of any view. And in fact the Mādhyamika would be more inclined to such an attitude, namely that "the self-conscious awareness of all points of view, or Reason as such, cannot itself be a view" (163) (cf. also 209). But our system can affirm this only under two presuppositions. First levelling down all philosophies to rationalistic systems, which besides being gratuitous ~~it~~ is not true. Secondly transcending positively "all thought categories" (208) i.e., "the competence of Reason to apprehend reality" (208) which a pure Dialectic cannot do. For this it should base itself on something outside and even higher than reason. And in fact it does it (cf. 163). This is the dogma—and I think the true tenet—of the Mādhyamika, but as a real dogma it lies beyond the realm of a dialectical process.

ii) Mādhyamika ~~itself~~ itself is not a system

(ii) This is already the second step alluded to, i.e., an extra dialectical jump. It leaps straight from the negation of all "views", including its own "view" if it has one, to the discovery, or realisation or postulation of the underlying Real identical with the Intellectual Intuition. The Mādhyamika says that this Intuition emerges, as it were, when all the obstacles set up by Reason have been removed. How is this

second step dialectically justified, since for the Mādhyamika "the Dialectic itself is philosophy" (209) (cf. 213, etc.) ?.

Mādhyamika affirm again and again ~~Murti himself points out several times~~ that "Criticism of other views is a means, not an end itself" (213) (cf. 218, etc.) that the rejection of views is "the only means open to absolutism, to free the real of the accidental accretions with which the finite mind invests it through ignorance" (234) (italics mine). One cannot but ask, first, how does the Mādhyamika know all this: that there is only one means, to set the Real free, that our mind "falsifies the real" (235) and above all that "there is an underlying reality—the subjacent ground" (234) (cf. 237)? This is the painful conclusion of many a system of philosophy and yet, on the positive side, it seems to be the Mādhyamika's very point of departure. The reason that Murti suggests: "If there were no transcendent ground, how could any view be condemned as false" (234/235) first of all takes for granted and for valid the pretentous anathema of the Mādhyamika against all systems and we are concerned here precisely with the justification of such a condemnation. And secondly, the statement that there must be a transcendent ground in order to make possible a false view, is either ~~it is~~ an inference and then it presupposes the very principle of causality that is precisely the first victim of the Mādhyamika critique (121, 166 sq.). (The "underlying reality" would be then the cause of the illusion of the views. This sounds very Vedāntin, but is inconsistent for the Mādhyamika.) Or, that statement is not an inference, in which case it ~~is a~~ would be metaphysical presupposition, a non-dialectical starting point. It starts namely from the intuition of the real, from the realisation of the Tathāgata.

Moreover, if the dialectic or if we prefer the rejection of all views is a means, it implies that it is a means for something, for an end not given in the means. This end is "a spiritual goal" (331 sq.) that is the finality — the final cause — the leading thread, the inspiring principle of the whole system. The Dialectic will occupy an honorific place as Philosophy, but like the Scholastic European Philosophy will be "ancilla theologiae". at the service of a higher Wisdom. Dialectic is the means of uncovering the Real, but the Real is already there and we lift the veil, and we criticise pitilessly all systems because "the possibility of intellectual intuition is not only accepted but is taken to be the very heart of reality" (214) (italics mine). The means have a consistency in themselves, of course, but are means, because they are at the service of the end. The "higher level" does not belong to Dialectics.

I feel that our author may have allowed himself to be too much influenced by the first part of Kant's system (his whole Critique of Pure Reason) and his alleged "copernican revolution" in presenting the Mādhyamika system. The dialectical coherence of Kant's Critique ends in his peculiar "rational" agnosticism. Murti wants to save the Mādhyamika from this reef, by accepting the Kantian method of the dialectics of "pure reason" and transferring it to a philosophical system, that in my opinion is much richer than a simple dialectical analysis of other systems. The noble apologetical intention of the writer leads him to present the whole Mādhyamika under a perspective that can certainly compete with that of Kant, but not with that of an everlasting Philosophy. The technique of the Mādhyamika has been identified with its very nature. And this latter is not only different from the inspiring force of the former, but much richer. This may become a little clearer if we turn now to the second point of this first remark.

f) Its weakness

4) - Is the Mādhyamika's claim tenable at all, i.e., without self contradiction?

The śūnyatā-śūnyatā, "the unreality of (the knowledge of) Unreality" (352), the kind of self-destruction of the Mādhyamika in the real of "Reason" or of "thought" will not help in saving the Mādhyamika from "dogmatic" assumptions of a much more serious order than any other system

The Mādhyamika repeats again and again that it is not a "view", at least on the same level at which it installs all other "views": ~~Murti pu~~ ~~it beautifully:~~ "The rejection itself is as much relative, unreal, as th rejected; because, it is unintelligible without the latter. The fire of criticism (itself which consumes all dogmatic views itself lies down, as there is nothing on which it could thrive; the medicine after curing the disease dissolves itself, and does not itself constitute a fresh disorder. ~~---~~ But the rejection of the dialectical criticism (śūnyatā) does not mean the re instatement of the reality of the phenomenal world; it merely means that in rejecting the unreal we have to resort to means that are themselves of the same order, like the extracting of a thorn by another thorn" (353). "The pronouncement that everything is śūnya (relative, unreal) is itself unreal; it is not to be taken for one more entity" (356). "Avidyā is it self unreal; it is Māyā" (241).

It

Does it mean that we have to do with a sheer nihilism? ~~Murti~~ ~~it several times and points out in a happy way that~~ does not seem so, "the Mādhyamika is spiritual to the core. His absolute is not void, but devoid of finitude and imperfection. It is nothing but Spirit" (332/333). "Śūnyatā, as the negative

of all particular views and standpoints, is the universal par excellence" (333).

Now, how does the Mādhyamika account for its position? If it were nihilism it could be somehow consistent at least to the extent of pseudo-destroying itself. Since it is not pure nihilism it must transcend Dialectic and with that it must transcend its claim of no presupposition and its "anti-dogmatic" attitude.

In fact, if a Philosophy is characterised not only by its method but also by its implications, its objectives and its contents, Mādhyamika transcends by far all Dialectic and it is insofar misleading to present it as pure Dialectic when this is only its method.

If the Mādhyamika claims to be only Dialectic free from all "dogmatic" presuppositions, if it were "the one system that is completely free from every trace of dogmatism" (334), or "the impartial tribunal which alone can assess the true nature of every philosophical system" (334) it should, first of all, unmistakably show its own credentials in such a way that no doubt could ever arise after the examination of them. But the History of Philosophy proves that, at least de facto it did not succeed in doing so--perhaps because the human race is still deaf and blind. And secondly, if it is to remain only Dialectic it must abolish just that which makes the Mādhyamika more valuable, namely its implications and objectives.

Let us mention only some of these non-dialectical elements of the Mādhyamika:

It presupposes that there is something higher and more valuable than "Reason". The fact that "Reason" leads us nowhere and is full of antinomies, does not prove, dialectically, that there is a higher cou

of appeal unless we presuppose that somehow all antinomies must be solved (cf. 339 etc.).

It ~~presupposes~~ assumes, again, and in connection with the first presupposition, that beyond "thought" and "negation" there is a "subject ground", an "underlying reality". "Reason" cannot discover it, ~~and~~ but the failure of "Reason" does not justify the assumption that the "transcendental illusion" must be transcended (cf. 234).

It identifies this "ground" with an "Intellectual Intuition" and assumes the dichotomy of two "levels", not only in the ~~epistemic~~ logical order "Reason" and "Intuition", but also in the ontological one "Reality" and "Appearance", the Absolute and the phenomenon. The Dialectic — and Vedānta here is more illuminating — cannot disclose to us the Absolute (cf. 220).

It identifies this "ground" with Tathāgata, God, the Absolute, etc. (cf. 224 sq.).

It assumes, further, that this "ground" is uniform, universal, immutable, and the like (cf. 235).

It may well be that Mādhyamika is not wrong in many of its assumptions, but then it must somehow justify them as any other philosophical system.

The main assumption of this Philosophy regarding its claim to uniqueness comes to this: it ~~presupposes~~ assumes that all philosophies are "dogmatic", or explaining this taboo-word, it takes for granted that all systems of Philosophy are a kind of science, ("scientism") or rationalism, of closed systems aiming at exhausting the real with their lucubrations and in most cases interpreting it as an empirical reality (cf. 210 sq.). It is very

easy to drew up a caricature of Philosophy, treat it as an aunt Sally, and then believe that we have accomplished the most stupendous revolution. (If Ptolomy was wrong, Copernicus was not much better, and in spite of all our would-be revolutions our material universe goes on and Philosophy also proceeds moves and finds itself in an itinerant mood.) On the other hand, it presupposes that it and it alone — the Mādhyamika — has access to the true realm of Philosophy that lies beyond thought and all its antinomies. We hardly need to say that both ~~sides~~ neither of this assumption ~~cannot~~ can be substantiated.

We are willing to recognize the importance of the Mādhyamika and by no means do we intend to minimise its value, but there is something odd in praising somebody or something at the expense of others. We do not need to villify all the Indian systems of Philosophy in order to discover the paramount importance of Śūnyatā.

To say it very ~~shortly~~ concisely: Its very claim ~~of~~ to uniqueness is the most common presumption of all truly "dogmatic" systems, and if this uniqueness is bought at the price of condemning en bloc all other systems as not up to the mark, the aspiration, to say the least, looks far-fetched. (Murti himself without further explicit justifications does not feel any scruple in ~~establishing~~ claiming the Mādhyamika as one form of the 3 sorts of Indian absolutisms.) And yet the powerful Śūnyatā is somehow the climax of Indian Philosophy, and the positive clue for its possible intervention in the philosophical crisis — krisis — of our times. (It is here again that the work of Professor Murti proves of exceptional interest. This is ~~already~~ the second remark we promised to make.)

2) - The Crisis of Philosophy.

II) "'That everything exists' is, Kaccāyana, one extreme; 'that it does not exist' is another. Not accepting the two extremes, the

Tathāgata proclaims the truth (dhammam) from the middle position. Nāgārjuna makes pointed reference to this passage in his Kārikās declaring that the Lord has rejected both the 'is' and 'not-is' views— all views" (51). We have referred already to the luminous synthesis wrought by Murti in relation to the whole of Indian Philosophy "showing the latter to be far wider in scope than the conventional idea of a single tradition having deviating off-shoots suggests.

In fact, the entire Indian Philosophy rests on the tension and polarity between the ātma-view and the anātma-view. The Mādhyamika is the ingenious attempt to transcend both by denial, by śūnya. Could not Indian Philosophy in its present stage, after a full elaboration of its implications and a deep—deeper—contact with other philosophical traditions of mankind be aware of another possible solution by eminence, by transcending equally both views, not in mere denial, but by a positive synthesis, that is not a simple mixture or a syncretistic compromise, but a third and yet qualified affirmation? Is there not that Middle way which the Indian mind has always been passionately looking for as the path of salvation, the via media of a philosophical path that is aware of the itinerant character of being, the contingent feature of ourselves including our Philosophy? Is there not a middle way between the static being that cannot move and change and become, and the perennial flux that has no consistency, no identity, no being? But it must be a way and not a denial of all ways because we are still pilgrims here on earth and our philosophising is still itinerant. Could not Indian Philosophy be aware of what the metaphysical tradition of the European Middle Ages called the analogy of being? There would be no need for India to copy it or to adopt it uncritically, but could we not suggest that she could discover

something of this kind that would enable her to follow her best trends, yet be Absolutistic without losing the sense of the Relative?

Perhaps such questions may sound a little naïve in their generality and perhaps, too the benevolent answer would be that in India we have already got this synthesis, for no serious system is so onesided as to deny Being to save the beings or vice versa. And yet a mere glimpse at the philosophical discussions in India among the different schools is enough to make us realise that the antinomy ātma, ānatma has not been overcome in the sober realm of pure metaphysics; or in other words that between the Parmenides of India and her Heraclitus no Aristotle has yet emerged trying for an irreducible and ultimate insight into that being which moves, changes, is not yet Brahman, though is not nothing. A study of the deep differences between the Sānkhya system and the Greek-Scholastic conceptions of act and potence inspite of external similarities would throw light in this thematic (cf. eventually 168/169 The itinerant being is not "partly actual and partly potential" (169) (italics mine). Needless to say that we are not pleading now for an Aristotelian way but for a philosophical overcoming of the main Indian antinomy. It is not enough to say that we may choose either way or none. Philosophical enquiry has always been a pioneering search for a pathway, without neglecting any sign, even if those hints may happen to come from the Stagirite.

(a) The problem of Change

Here we should like to slacken speed for a while, and bring out the general tenour of our present remarks with the aid of a couple of concrete examples. Let us take the problem of change, first, and very briefly, regarding the general thematic on causality (74/75, 121, 166 sq.) and secondly, in more detail, regarding the conception of motion

and rest (178 sq.).

To begin with, if change could not be explained rationally, this would not mean at all that change is unreal, unless we assume that rationality is the criterion of reality. It would not prove that reason is unreal either, but only that both are incommensurable heterogeneous, at least so far as a rational explanation cannot be given. In short, the problem of reality should be carefully distinguished and dealt with on its own merits.

Secondly, rational explanation does not mean full intellectual evidence. The former means to find, to be aware of, the "rational" laws by which the thing in question is governed. The latter means the awareness of the thing itself, transparent as it were to our intellect. We can rationally explain quite a numbers of mathematical theorems or physical processes, without having the intellectual evidence for them. No rational explanation can stop or satisfy as it were all the "whys" we are capable of putting. It must stop somewhere, because its function is not ultimate. So to criticise a rational explanation because it does not exhaust all the "whys" is out of the question. The contrary would presuppose that the realm of reason is absolute and illimited. The critique then would be very easy; but this assumption is not even rational.

So, the fact of the incapacity of our reason to explain causality would only mean that causality is not a "rational" category, but nothing else.

The Mādhyamika is absolutely convinced of this from the very beginning, but it puts it only as a result of its critical analysis.

We are going here only to sketch the structure of this critique, for if we entered into its details they would overshadow what we intend to bring out, and distract us from our central point. The analysis of this structure shows a certain mental scheme that is repeated in all Mādhyamika analysis.

The four possible alternatives we already mentioned are here reduced to two. This fact will show us how this rational critique cannot comprehend any middle position, paradoxical as this may sound in a system called Mādhyamika.

According to the general scheme, A, in this case the effect, may be considered "as the self-expression of the cause, or as caused by factors other than itself, or both, or neither. The last alternative amounts to giving up the notion of causation, ... The third alternative is really an amalgam of the first two" (168). Now, with the same mental scheme of identity the second alternative will be reduced to the first one. If the effect were different from the cause, then there would be a lack of relation between the two. Under this circumstance "anything should be capable of being produced from anything" (172), unless some other factor were the real cause, in which case we should have fallen into the first alternative. But the first alternative, the satkārya-vāda, is easily refuted. Causality would mean here merely self-duplication, because the sufficient reason for its own self-reproduction is already present in the effect, which would have to produce a second effect and so successively without end. Moreover, "if the cause and the effect were identical, how is one to function as cause and the other as effect" (169). So, there is no explanation possible, as far as the dialectical criticism in its structure is concerned.

Now, the first role of any sound criticism is to understand what the other wants to say. ~~Now,~~ The identity mental scheme of the Mādhyamika ~~brings down~~ reduces the most different conceptions to a logical pattern that they do not accept and recognise as their own. In the example we are now considering the dismissing of the third alternative and the mode of dealing with the second one are typical of the Mādhyamika procedure.

The Mādhyamika makes the most strenuous efforts to ~~bring down~~ resolve any position ~~to~~ in a relation of absolute identity or absolute non identity. Either the effect is equal to the cause or it is not. If it is, there is no cause and effect; if it is not, there is no relation possible— because it again levels down any relation to identity and non-dentity (partly identical, partly non-identical)— and thus there is no effect at all. This blindness ~~for~~ to relations is the most characteristic feature of the Mādhyamika dialectic. But this two-dimensional critique misses the point altogether, because the very object of its attack is a three-dimensional reality. Even mere reason is something more than the power of the yes and no—sic et non. It is also the passing from one to another from the yes to the no or vice versa. Along with the two extreme positions that our reason can think of and ~~is~~ equalises immediate and valid as they are, there is their "relation", that is to say, there is a "middle" also given.

If, for instance, the third alternative is significant at all it is not in any way an "amalgam" of the two extremes, but a real third position that tries to explain as far as possible the peculiar phenomenon under study, causality in this case, that is neither identity nor non-identity. The same happens with the second case which is not so naïve as to ~~say~~ pretend that the cause is not the "cause" of the effect. Precisely because they are not the same there is a special relation that constitutes

the very problem of causality.

Upto now we have purposely ~~not even considered~~ avoid judging which of the views is consistent. It was our ~~concept~~ purpose to show first of all the structure of the Dialectic.

8) The question of the movement.

Let us turn now to the criticism of the notions of movement and rest. We know now how the Mādhyamika dialectic works. Besides making a criticism of its critique we should also be able to answer its charges.

The Mādhyamika works here in the following way:

The notion of motion is self-contradictory and that of rest fares no better. Both are equally inexplicable.

What is motion? The Mādhyamika seems blind to the reality of movement, for obviously it is neither identity nor non-identity. In consequence, it analyses not movement, but only "three factors [that] are [considered] essential for the occurrence of motion" (178) (italics and brackets mine).

The first observation to make here is that we have lost sight of motion in order to consider certain ~~some~~ factors, conditions, ingredients and the like that we take nevertheless to be "essential" not for the nature of motion, but for its "occurrence". It is as if we examine the two factors 2 and 3 that produce the number 6. None of the factors alone will give us the product and the 6 is the very destruction of the 2 and of the 3. The Mādhyamika would dismiss the 6, because the 2 is not the 6 ~~and~~ but rather contradictory to it (the 6 is the non-2) and the same happens with the 3.

Professor Murti ~~adduces~~ gives the example of Zero. May I remark the

Zeno's argument is not valid at all, being a kind of reversed "ontological argument? It passes from the rational, logical sphere of his intellect to a reality, an existence outside it. It only proves that the notion of movement as conceived by Zeno is untenable, or contradictory. It does not even touch the motion outside his mind (Achilles is the proof!) and very few other conceptions of motion, either. ~~the aristotelian for instance.~~ Besides, we know to-day that his mental imagination of dividing "space" into an indefinite number of parts is not only practical but theoretically impossible. But we are not concerned now with the Eleatic.

Indeed, there is a fundamental difference between Zeno and Nāgārjuna, which does not lie in the fact that the former "did not distu rest" (178) whereas the latter, "denies both motion and rest" (178), but in the peculiar significance of negation in the Mādhyamika system. Here "negative judgement is the negation of judgement" (155 and 160). This amounts to saying that the Mādhyamika negation of movement is properly speaking the negation of the affirmative judgement about movement. But strikingly enough the whole criticism of the notion of movement does not deal with the judgement about motion, but about motion taken in the most "realisti way. ~~(For sake of brevity and order we renounce to comment on the impor tant point of "Dialectic and significant negation" (154 sq.)).~~ not to mix different problems shall not

The three essential factors for the Mādhyamkia's critique of motion are: "The space traversed (moved in), the moving body and the movement itself" (178).

Again at first sight the heterogeneity of these three factor is striking: The simple and naïvly realistic imagination (of space),

the physical entity (of a body) and the abstracted notion (of movement). If they are going to be "factors" it will presumably be on very very different levels.

The first factor puts up but small resistance to criticism. First of all the implied notion of space is untenable. It makes a substance out of it and manipulates it as if it were a "thing", cutting it down, dividing it and comparing it with "other spaces". And then again it applies its identity-scheme: the "space" is either already "traversed" (gatam) or not-traversed (agatam). "There is no third division of space as the 'being traversed' (gamyamānam)" (178). And only this one would make motion possible; hence motion is impossible. The logical argument is clear: any point of that "space" even in the supposed moving thing has been either traversed or has to be traversed. In short the body may move, but "space" cannot move—and does not allow movement. Even the "traversed" "space" lies quiet tranquil there. Being blind to movement, the Mādhyamika leaves every thing ~~as if~~ frozen. ~~The~~ Reason sees the static picture and from there cannot conceive motion. It would be another picture. And again the implied conception of space is untenable. It is an idea like those of the people who ask what is there after the last star or whether the antipodeans walk upside down.

The same scheme is applied to the second factor: What is the moving body? Not a single effort is made to grasp the mover as such. It kills the moving body at once distinguishing—and substantialising—a (static) mover and the "motion" inherent in it. "The mover is either motionless by himself apart from the motion, or he has a motion other than the motion which inherits in him" (180). The first alternative is a

contradiction, and in the second one, there are two motions which oblige us to accept, either two movers, or a disembodied motion; both possibilities unacceptable. The "reason" for introducing a second motion is clear: if mover and motion were identical, "the mover would always be moving" (180). Sometimes philosophers are really responsible for the discredit in which Philosophy has fallen!

We cannot here go into details on this subject, (to which we have devoted over two hundred pages in ~~Gg~~ El concepto de naturaleza, Madrid 1951 p. 95 sq.). The climax of the Greek mind represented in Aristotle consisted precisely in overcoming the static and the purely dynamical conception of beings by a right analysis of moving being. Movement is the characteristic and irreducible aspect of things. Moving being is essentially and existentially becoming.

The notion of the mover is only an abstraction. It is the mover that moves and gnaske ptēnai! It is the moving mover we have to consider, and whose condition we have to explain—or to reject—without recurring to abstractions that as such are intrinsecally incapable of explaining the concrete fact of movement. Even a Critique must know its own limits unless it is to degenerate into a rationalistic cancer!

The third factor, the movement itself is also easily dismissed with no attempt to understand the idea, but asking for the where and when of such an idea, again substantiated as a thing.

Similar considerations, which space here compels us to omit, could be applied to the critique of the notion of rest. It is not asked what rest is or might be, but simply who rests? And the baffling answer

comes: "Not the mover, nor the static—the non-mover; and there is no third who could rest. The static does not rest, for it is already stationary"; (182). Nor the mover for it would be contradiction, it would be no more mover. Besides philosophical considerations of another kind, even logically speaking the argument is weak. It takes "rest" in a two-fold sense: as "stationary" and as "coming to rest". Applies the second sense to the first part of the dilemma and the first sense to the second. The static does not come to rest, because it is already at rest. The mover cannot be stationary for it would not then be mover. But it already recognizes that the static is in rest and it is not a contradiction that the mover comes to rest.

c) The ātma - anātma ~~sfera~~ schema

~~Here I not feeling guilty about overpassing the limits of a note~~

We should like to deal at length with a second example of paramount importance: The ātma-anātma problematic, but we shall have to limit ourselves to the central issue at stake here overlooking very many other points that would make our contentions more plausible and seasoned.

Undoubtedly one of the most relevant features of the Mādhyamika system is its challenge to Indian Philosophy as a whole. (And not the last merit of the ~~scholarly~~ study we are analysing is the presentation of the whole of Indian Philosophy not only coherently, but also in an unitarian way that allows us to value the contribution of the Indian mind to the philosophical endeavour of the world.)

The ~~whole of~~ entire Indian Philosophy rests on, or rather moves in, —for it is a dynamic life,— the internal tension and polarity of the ātma-anātma thematic.

i) ātma - vāda

On the one hand, the ātma-vāda. Something must underlie

change. Amidst the rich variety of this world that changes and moves there must be something that sustains and maintains all this show, this (divine) display. This is the ground, the substance, the ātman. Now this ātman cannot change, can neither increase, nor decrease. It is Being and as such the ultimate core of everything. Ātman is the foundation of the world and the substance that "understands" everything.

Now, there are many "possible" ways of interpreting this ātman. Either in a pluralistic way: there are many ātman, elements, the combination of which produces the world; or in a dualistic manner: only two principles give account for reality, be they on a cosmological (Prakrti Purusa) or ethical (Good-Evil) or metaphysical (Prime Mover-beings) plane; or in a monistic fashion (Brahman, Pantheism, Absolutism, etc.). The summit of the philosophical speculation has still found yet a fourth possibility: the advaitic answer: God and the world, the Absolute and the Relative are not two (two examples of what? — the what would be higher, more supreme than the Absolute!). The effort to solve this dilemma constitutes the metaphysical problem par excellence, not only of the Indian mind, but of Philosophy as such. The Indian Absolutisms have struck at the problem, and deepened it in such a way that no philosophical speculation is possible nowadays without taking into account the problems raised by the Indian systems. And yet ~~it is my opinion that~~ owing ~~due~~ to the absence of an immediate intuition of the contingent being Indian advaitisms fall again and again into one form or other of monism. But we cannot ~~follow~~ continue now this exciting itinerary of the Indian advaitic ātma-vādas.

One thing remains common to all these systems. Being is Being and does not tolerate gaps, becomings, potentialities, imperfections, changes, movements. The "other", or other "side", whatever it may "be"

cannot impinge against the Unconditioned, for ~~it~~ that would amount to saying that it is not more Absolute if Being could ever be dependant on what is not Being.

ii) ~~mātma~~ anātma - vāda

On the other hand, the anātma-vāda. The whole criticism of the previous view consists here in sapping the rational or intellectual presupposition on which the first group entirely relies: There must be a ground, otherwise nothing is understandable. Why this craving to understand, to creep under the only standing of reality; i.e. change, movement? Paradoxically enough change is also denied, because there is no thing that changes. Being is the great illusion and if we speak here of be-coming we must discard the interpretation of a coming to be.

Pure dialectics must needs be inclined towards this second group. Pure metaphysics cannot give up some at least of the requirements of the first systems. The Mādhyamika cuts the Gordian knot, but at the same time it throws away the baby with the bath water.

Is there not, at least possible and perhaps even already existing as a philosophical approach, a via media a positive solution to this ātma-anātma dilemma? Could not Indian Philosophy overcome this impasse positively and discover that Being is certainly One, but that somhow, precisely because it is the Fullness of Being, of One, is Life, is Plenitude, is Silence but also Word and Love? Could not Indian Philosophy try to "accept" at least as a working-hypothesis that the Absolute (still a relative concept solutus ab—a nobis—loosen from us) is rather an In-solute, a Fullness in itself that has "something"—Life, Consciousness, Love — of which the little ātmas of this earth are nothing but shadows, participations, creatures, callings? —.

I am not making a plea for the supra-philosophical conception of the Godhead as Trinity. Nor I am not saying also that the pre-philosophical Indian Wisdom as we find it in the "Scriptures" is very much on this line. I want only to state that alone the recognition of a dynamic fullness of Being that does not distroy its Unity and Simplicity can somehow give an answer to the philosophical problem of change. ~~Whatever "beings" may be, there can be no change, no progress, no life, unless Being, the Being is somehow "responsible" for it. But the One cannot be the "producer", the "cause", the "ground"—in whatever form understood—of "that" which is not It, He, unless the dead staticity of the One is substituted by a living dynamicity of a Unit that because One is much more than what we can conceive about Oneness.~~

What is the underlying presupposition common to both the ātma and the anātma views? That change is not possible, that becoming is contradictory because being is immutable. Either what "is" is and then cannot become, come to be, to is, because it already is; or what "is" is not, because we can nowhere find such an "is". The moment that we "imagine" we have caught it, it vanishes away—it "is" no more, there exists no such "is". Ultimately ātma and nairātmya-vāda present the same structure:

There is only one way of being a "being". No "phenomenon", no "thing" ~~of~~ in this world fulfils its requirements. The is lies beyond this world, devoid of anything that might contaminate it. It is pure transcendence. And this is the ātman as well as the anātman. It does not matter at all if pure Unrelatedness is or is-not. It is not only that we have no way to prove it or to speak about it, it also makes no difference. The "thing", i.e. the cow, the house, my soul, my thoughts, this earth, --- is not. Either it is-not, for the astikas, because it, the cow, etc., insofar as it is, is Brahman, or for the nāstikas it is-not, because it, the "thing" is, neither as "thing", nor as something else.

What "is" it then? It "is" certainly not "being", but it is not "not-~~ebing~~ being" either. In the analysis of that "thing" that changes lies the whole business of Philosophy; and in finding a balanced answer the real "crisis" of Indian Wisdom. consists

Ātma and nairātmya-vāda lie here together on the one side of a higher dilemma for which Indian Philosophy has ~~not got a~~ no terminology of its own and I am afraid will find the Western concepts not adequate to express it. That polachos of Aristotle, that analogia of the scholastics, that fieri, the be-coming of some moderns could well be the provisional tools for overcoming this Ktisis of Indian Philosophy. And it is here that one of the pivots of the whole Indian Life should prove of astonishing vitality: The concept of Karma (and even in a sense of dharma), common to both Indian traditions. They would face then a third ~~emerging~~ arising tradition that could solve harmoniously the dilemma and polarity of Indian thought. Karma is much more than crystalised action, or stored time. It is something that becomes, comes to be and yet is not the Being. But ~~it does not belong to~~ a note is not the place to develop such an idea.

The dilemma is not Ātma-nairātma, but identity and difference or in one word, relation. It is Brahman--ātman, or Absolute-Relative, or Being and Beings, or in Platonic terms the One and the Manifold, or again Reality and Appearance, or Eternity and Time.

Quite rightly the Mādhyamika puts all dialectic problems of Philosophy on the one side; all belong to the relative, to the contingent, the sphere of reason, it will say. On the other shore there is Intuition, Śūnyatā, Nirvāna, the Real, Being. It provides us also with the internal dialectics to recognise the inefficiency, the insufficiency of the first side. Moreover, it will never more allow us to "substantialise" the first side, as if it were something of its own. Quite forcefully Nāgārjuna says that "Nirvāna is the reality of saṁsārā, or conversely, saṁsāra is the falsity (saṁvṛti) of Nirvāna" (162). Its only internal defect would be ~~at least following Murti's exposition that~~ that it imagines that we can jump from the first shore to the second one out of the frustrations and contradictions we find in the realm of the contingent. The jump is certainly possible, but in is first of all an existential pass-over in which we really do not jump, but are taken over, by the other side. The grace of God, the gift of intuition, the higher knowledge of Faith and the like are here more or less ~~successful~~ adequate terms expressing to state this existential situation of ours. And if I am not mistaken this is ~~a~~ quite a common opinion among the Indian Systems, the Mādhyamika not excluded. It is not a dialectical manoeuvre that saves us or that saves Philosophy, but a descending redemption, the obedience to a higher "calling", the realisation, or rather the being "realised" by the Real.

Everything is transitory, all our Philosophy is only

provisional, all our constructions relative—and false in consequence the moment they claim some absoluteness—all our being a shadow, a would-be thing. And yet, though the Mādhyamika seems to forget it, a will-be being, a being-to-be a pre-essence of the Essence, an ex-sistence of the only consistency ---.

And here lies the "crisis" of Indian Philosophy and its challenge to the world to-day: to turn back, or rather to turn upwards, to dispose ourselves in an expectant mood, not to our Reason, or our possible faculties or efforts, but towards the Source, of which Reason and our whole selves are a humble and weak, but yet somehow real spark, because in It we breath, move and are.

R. Panikkar
Banaras Hindu University
19th March, 1958

V

THE PLACE OF SCRIPTURE IN CHRISTIANITY (1) X

~~R. Panikkar~~

"Littera enim occidit.
Spiritus autem vivificat"
(2)

Every great religion has its Sacred Books (3). This is a common feature. On the other hand not every religion has the same conception of sacredness in relation to its Scriptures. The Christian Idea is summarised in a complex concept, full of meaning: Inspiration (4). Its central sense is that the author of the Bible is God (5): although the human writer can also be called author for he writes the sacred book freely, ~~from~~ with his own knowledge and in his own way (6).

The holy Scripture contains therefore the Revelation (7) of God to mankind—according always to Christianity—but the Bible as such is not the Revelation (8) and secondly it does not contain the whole of Revelation (9).

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(1) ~~As this paper is extremely condensed, it carries a danger of misunderstanding without reference to the many quotations and notes~~

(2) II Cor., III. 6

(3) This article was meant for the "Seminar of the Union for the Study of the Great Religions" held at Bangalore (India) on May 1955, but it ~~arrived~~ too late to be read there

(4) Cf. II Tim. III. 14/16 et II Petr. I,20/21; III. 15

(5) Cf. Conc. Trident., Sess. IV (Denz., 783) et Conc. Vatic., Sess. III (Denz. 1787).

(6) Cf. Conc. Vat. Loc. cit. (et Denz., 1952, 2294, etc.)

(7) Cf. Conc. Vat., Sess. III , 2 (Denz., 1785/1788)

(8) Cf. Hebr., I. 1/3. In Filio — ἐν υἱῷ, — Christ in His Being is the full Revelation, Manifestation ἀποκαλυψις and φανέρωσις of God and not exclusively in His words or teachings or even in His actions.

(9) Cf. Io., XVI, 12/12; XXI. 25; Marc., IX. 37/39: etc.

We do not intend to deal with these questions (we had to recall them in order to centre the problem) but to go back to an anterior one; "The relation between the Bible and Christianity." In what sense is Christianity the Religion of the Bible? Can Christianity be known and derived from the Bible alone? What after all is Christianity and what does it take from the Scripture?

1 — What is Christianity

Christianity is a simple name with a definite meaning. This meaning is the concept of Christianity. Many people stop here and confuse Christianity with the concept of Christianity. They may have a right, correct and to some extent also a true concept of Christianity; but it remains always a concept, an idea—or perhaps also an ideal—an essence; but they do not penetrate into the concept and go to the thing itself, to the res significata as St. Thomas Aquinas points out, to the vital and mysterious reality—the reality which always transcends itself and in consequence is a mystery—which underlies the very concept. For them Christianity is a doctrine, a creed, meaning by that a set of formulations which they may call dogmas and understand as mere intellectual affirmations about certain points (1).

I do not say that Christianity has not a doctrine, nor do not deny that it has not also a Weltanschauung. I only stress that Christianity is much more than that, much more than one concept, one essence or a set of formulae or dogmas.

If Christianity is the truth—and it claims to be that—,

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(1) God is judge, the flesh will rise again, etc.

then it can ~~only be~~ the Reality itself, for truth is much more than a mere conformity between the mind and the thing (1), than a simple correctness in our apprehension of the reality. The truth is primarily not an essence but an existence (2), and ultimately it is only there, where the essence ~~is~~ fully and thoroughly ~~existence~~, that is, in God (3).

The Christian Message has been sent down—συγκατάβασις—to ~~us~~ not only to let ~~us~~ know something more about the true nature of reality, or even to teach ~~us~~ the ultimate and real structure of the universe, but also and primarily to save ~~us~~, to help ~~us~~ to become that which ~~we~~ really shall—be (4). In other words, Christianity, or ~~rather~~ the Christian status is the state of a pilgrim—being, the real situation of the itinerant univers on its way back to God (πλήρωμα) (5).

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(1) "Adaequatio rei et intellectus".

(2) The sanscrit expression fot Truth, tattva —तत्व— ~~contains~~ conveys it better than the greek concept ἀλήθεια the primary existential character of the truth which is not ~~first of all~~ a discovery of our mind, a gnosseologic result, an extraction of that which was hidden in the δόξαι of the things, but that which really is. God is the Truth—and only—because He is तत्वमास्मि tattvamasmi, Jahwe (אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה), Sum qui sum.

(3) When Pilate asked Jesus what is truth, Christ gave him the most exact answer. (Only the Roman, and with him many others, did not understand ~~[illegible]~~ not only it, but Him). His silent Person before him was the living Truth (Io., XVIII., 38). "I am the Truth" (Io., XIV, 16. Cf. Io., I, 17).

(4) Christianity, historically is an event, psychologically could be put as a doctrine, but ontologically it is the revelation of the true existential structure of being and ontically the same itinerant existence and its fullness in God hereafter (Cf. I Cor., XV, 28).

(5) Cf. Io., I.16; Col., II, 9; Eph., I, 23; III, 19.

It is the integral structure of beings coming up to their fulfilment (ἀποκατάστασις) (1). It is the ontical growth of all sparks of Being—members of the mystical Christ (2)—to the full Light which is the whole Christ (3). It is the temporal life of Christ on earth, in the interior of all beings, in the hearts of all men of good will (4).

2 — The christian doctrine

As man is also an intellectual being with knowledge and free will, Christianity has also an intellectual aspect—which is only one side of it—with two dimensions, a theoretical one, Dogma and a practical one, Moral. Both constitute that which is called the Christian doctring.

This doctrine is the divine-human locution, i.e., the revealed expression of the unutterable truth and reposes in the Christian community itself (ἐκκλησία). The Christian doctrine is not a dead rational statement of some truth, it is not a fixed and peculiar formulation of certain facts. All formulations utilise definite concepts, and all concepts are the fruit of a determined culture and with validity only within the limits under which they have been defined and used, like the simple and fundamental mathematical

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(1) Cf. Act., III, 21 and its interpretation by the "Fathers"

(2) Cf. Gal., III, 28.

(3) Cf. Eph., IV, 13.

(4) Cf. Io., VI, 57/58; XV, 5 sq.

~~fundamental~~ law of intervals (1).

There is, nevertheless, a Christian doctrine. But it is not like the dialectical logical unfolding of a rational system out of a central axiom (2). That is why we can affirm that the Christian doctrine, although sufficient for preserving man from substantial errors is neither complete, finished, or closed (3), nor is it static, petrified, crystallised once for ever. ~~The~~ Truth is always the same, the deep meaning of the Christian dogmas, that which lies beyond the concepts, that which is the Christian reality is one and unchangeable, but the conceptual frame and the intellectual system in which the parts of this ineffable reality are moulded are as contingent as the historical cultures through which mankind passes (4). But there is even more: Christianity itself like Jesus (5) and every Christian (6) is not only pilgrim and itinerant but also becoming, growing, reaching the Church in Heaven where God will be all in all (7)...

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(1) This does not mean that there cannot be universal concepts of general human validity. But such perennial value can hardly be postulated a-priori.

(2) The Christian doctrine has been developed in a pure existential and historical manner according to the circumstances, stressing here one point, there another, due to the vital and pastoral necessity of correcting, or preventing or reacting in face of one sided explanations of the Christian mystery, and never in a "logic systematic" way

(3) This is not the case with the Revelation, fullness of which is Christ himself, who being God is infinite and therefore not closed, limited

(4) The whole question has a definite expression in Christianity. It is called the Homogeneous Evolution of Dogma

(5) Luc., II, 52, etc. (6) Eph., IV, 13

(7) I Cor., XV, 28

3 ~~XII~~ — The sources of Christian doctrine

Where then does the Christian doctrine come from? The Christian community, let us say the Church, as the continuation of Christ himself, is the ultimate source on earth of the Christian doctrine (1). If she is the ontical reality itself living, growing and coming back to the Supreme Origin of all, she can~~not~~ have ~~no~~ only other ~~outside external~~ exterior criterion ~~for~~ of the truth (2).

That is to say, that the source of the Christian doctrine is far from any individual interpretation or capricious statement of any authority. It is the Christian mind reflecting on the reality of the Church herself which tries to express in conceptual forms her real nature. The Christian gnosis—in the orthodox sense of the Patristic age—is, of course, not without an internal hierarchy. But we are now concerned not with the functioning of the Christian gnosis (principles of Hierarchy, Holy Ghost, Orthodoxy, etc.), but with the material so to say from which the Christian mind must draw its consequences and build up the Christian doctrine (3).

4 ~~IV~~ — Scripture and Tradition

The Christian doctrine is the intellectual effort within the Christian faith, or if you prefer it is the effort made by the Christian mind to

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(1) Cf. Eph., V, 1 sq.; Apoc., XXI, 9, etc.

(2) Cf. I Cor., XII, 12 sq.; Rom., XII, 5; Gal., III, 28; Col., I, 24; 28; Eph., I, 23

(3) The ~~Sacrament~~ of the Church being ultimately the same mystery of Christ is something more than the juridical frame of the Church; and in one sense—because it is the ~~last~~ ultimate manifestation—is the clue to realise the integral sense of Christianity.

formulate the Christian Weltanschauung. The source can only be the reality itself, seen under the light of the integral human intellect. This gnosis is obtained by means of all existential sources of knowledge (1).

The specific and characteristic Christian doctrine is to be found in the unique though twofold economy (οἰκονομία): Scripture and Tradition. Both are not two independent separable sources of information. They are only two distinct aspects of one and the same reality. The one is the written and the other the spoken word of one and the same Holy Spirit inspiring the sacred author and the living witness (2). The former, stresses the essential dimensions and the latter the existential one of the same economy. The one is the clue to the other and vice-versa, not in a rationalistic "vicious circle" but in a vital circle of mutal enlightenment. (5)

Tradition, although it has a certain priority, evangelium ante evangelia with the existence of the Bible as a matter of fact, has no value apart from the Scripture. It is the vital development of the living Christ—and his Message—and the existential interpretation—and realisation—of his sayings and deeds (3). But a good part of them have been written down and "The Scripture cannot be broken" (4).

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(1) Cf. the same idea in the Bhagavadgītā, IV, 34, and also the nice metapher of Mahābhārata, II, 55, 1

(2) Cf. Matth., VII, 19-20; 21-23; Luc., XII, 12; 26-27; etc.

(3) Tradition does not mean all that christians have done. It is neither said that the praxis of christians had been always stainless, good and in one word, Christian (Cf. Matth., VII, 21-23; Luc., XIII, 26-27; etc.)

(4) Io., X, 35

(5) This has been summarised by saying that the relation scripture-Tradition is not that of revelation "partim in sacris libris et partim in sine scripto traditionibus", but "totum in sacra scriptura et iterum

5 A — The Meaning of the Scripture

On the other hand the Bible outside ~~the~~ Tradition is not the Christian and Holy Scripture. It is then only a simple more or less a profound book which every body can interpret in his own way and find in it what he likes projecting into it his particular a-priorisms (1).

The Bible — like any sacred book — cannot be approached without reverence either ~~and~~ from outside or from ~~in~~ a purely particular, individualistic way. Every book can only be understood if we penetrate into ~~that which~~ what the author intends to say (2). To believe that any human expression can be understood in itself uprooted from any reference to its author, disconnected from any anthropological (individual and sociological) relation, is to fall into the most extreme rationalism (3).

I must read indeed ~~the~~ the Scripture, I must try to grasp ~~myself~~ its real meaning and to realise its vital message. I cannot leave to others what is a matter of personal effort. But this personal realisation can only be obtained if I am in ontological communion with the author, if I believe, if I read the

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(1) It is a well-known English saying which truly affirms that "the devil can quote Scripture for his purpose" (Cf. Matth., VI, 6; Luc., IV, 10-11; etc.)

(2) And in this case the author is God. We need therefore the assistance of the Holy Ghost to understand his Message. (Cf. Io., XIV, 26).

(3) It may not be necessary to know the man and his environment to understand what it means to say: for instance, "five fruits on the tree"; but that is not the case if the writer deals with ~~speaks of~~ Logos, Love, Peace, Live and similar things. Understanding may ~~take place~~ be conveyed by means of concepts and written

(Contd... 9)

sacred book from its Tradition and within it (1). That is the universally human (2) and Christian position (3).

After these statements we can summarise the relation between Christianity and Bible—regarding the main purpose of the Symposium "Religions and Scriptures"—as follows:

I — Christianity being more than a doctrine, cannot be fully contained in any book.

II — The Christian doctrine being a living and dynamic doctrine cannot be held and frozen by the statements of any book.

III — The Christian doctrine being the human expression of the divine Revelation cannot be in contradiction with the inspired main document of the Revelation, that is the Bible.

IV — The Bible being the written expression of a living Message can only be properly and truly understood from within the living Tradition where the same Divine Spirit breathes (4).

V — Since The Bible is the written bearer of a simple and unutterable divine Revelation—the Mystery of Christ—its Message cannot be grasped by taking or developing isolated sentences, but

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words; but only a man can understand a man, if we mean by understanding something more than to know the utmost anatomical rationalistic structure of a thing. In a pure philosophical way we can also prove that the condition of understanding is a community of being (a dog can only understand a man in that which both have in common, not in that which is specifically human).

(1) This does not mean at all that I cannot have my personal views and my original ideas. It only means that this my personal discovery and my own sense belong to the Tradition itself and enriches it.

(2) Every human expression—and much more of it points to the most personal and important matters—is only a means of conveyance for a transcendant otherness which can only be caught if we are in tune with the integral existential source (or cause).

(Contd..... 10)

must be taken as a whole (5).

VI — The Bible ~~being~~ having been written down in order to help mankind on its path to salvation must be considered, besides its historical character, as a spiritual, mystical religious book and not as a scientific or rationalistic one from which other deductions and consequences can be always logically drawn.

R. Panikker.

(From Page 9) (3) Common to Catholics as well as to Protestants. The latter believe so strongly in the necessity of reading and understanding the Bible within the Christian communion that they assume the Holy Ghost inspires the bona fide reader. He is not alone. The Spirit of Christ breathes within him. He is a living member of the community, and that is Tradition. Catholicism does not deny this fact, but corrects its possible abuses and misunderstandings completing the idea of community in a really human and historical sense besides the mystical one, but in unity with it. There are no spirits without a body here on earth.

(4) It is not necessary to remember that the "Spirit breathes where it will" (Io., III,8) and that the conception of Church of this paper is the ontological one with no other limits (Cf. Io., X,16).

(5) The Bible is neither the "Constitution" nor the "Canon Law" or the sacred code of laws of Christianity.

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The Integration of Indian Philosophical and Religious Thought

By Rev. R. PANIKKAR, *Banaras*

"*Quoniam in ipso condita sunt universa*" (*Col.* 1, 15)

I. The Problem

Our question does not belong to apologetics but to theology. Apologetics here would deal with the problem of how to introduce and make acceptable the Christian ideas in the non-Christian world. Our problem is the opposite one: how, and how far can Indian philosophy help us to understand and to express Christian dogma? (1)

It is a traditional idea that philosophy is *ancilla theologiae*, and the question therefore at issue here is whether Indian philosophy has such an ancillary function. It goes without saying that "ancilla" does not mean slave and that we must allow Indian philosophy the full development of its service — and for that philosophical freedom is required. Short of this freedom it would be neither "ancilla" nor "philosophia".

Indian philosophy and religious thought will thus be "integrable" into Christian theology if they prove to be a good instrument of expressing and understanding Christian dogma. This very fact of being utilized as an instrument will help towards transformation or rather *conversion* of Hinduism itself.

II. The Idea of Integration

Integration represents more than mere adaptation. It goes also a step further than sincere adoption. Adoption is to make our own something that in nature does not belong to us. It is predominantly a juridical concept. We may have full right to adopt Indian culture, but if we do not go beyond, it will remain always an adopted child of other parents. And there is the danger that the parents might claim their child back. Even if the parents were dead — they are not — the future generations living on merely adapted, or simply adopted, concepts will hardly be able to draw therefrom the full Christian life required for an autochthonous and authentic growth. Adaptation may perhaps be a necessary or previous step and adoption a useful tentative, but they can go little beyond the stage of expressing our own ideas in a foreign language.

Integration implies, to begin with, that we speak in the proper language and think in the language we speak. This problem of language is more than a mere metaphor. To know the language of Indian philosophy is today an imperative duty of

(1) This was the general topic of a Conference of Rectors and professors of Catholic Seminaries held at Bangalore in Dec. 1957 - Jan. 1958. A summary of a lecture given there appeared in "The Clergy Monthly Supplement" vol IV No. 2, Ranchi, V - 1958.

Christian theology, the latter claiming to be the intellectual exposition of a truth that affirms itself universal, catholic.

Now, there are two ways of learning a language. One, proper to adults and foreigners; the other peculiar to children and natives. The first way proceeds by comparing "words" with "words", i.e. in our case, concepts with concepts; and when it is a little more advanced, idioms with idioms, say systems with systems. The person who thinks in one language — in one culture, one philosophy — and speaks in another, however great his technique and mastery might be, will always remain a stranger in the second language — in the second culture and philosophy. The other way of learning a language is that of children. It does not proceed by way of comparing words with words, but of discovering relations between words and *things*. We cannot understand the Indian culture if we do not go — or have gone — at her school, like little children, and try to learn things and their meanings. "What is this?" asks the child pointing with his finger to a particular object. Only if we are able to point with our intellect (in its intuitive function: *intellectus*) at the very "things" of which concepts and words are already translations, shall we be capable of under-standing the answers of the several philosophies and proceed to a possible integration.

Integration means to assume really some principles, or ideas, or attitudes and make not only room for them in a previous scheme, but to *convert* them (for it is a real conversion) into an integral part of the Christian life, tradition and doctrine. In order to integrate we must, in fact, assimilate what we assume and make it our own, so that the differences between new and old elements become at least irrelevant.

Integration, assumption, assimilation and the like are all metaphors that have to be understood in the right way. They refer to the "essential" order. In the existential sphere, words like explicitation and organic growth are more apt to express the other side of the process. Christianity as "pleroma Christi" does not integrate anything because everything that "*is*", is already integrated in Christ some way or other. We integrate ideas, attitudes, principles, but we only explicitate, develop, make grow the Christian reality. Integration is not an addition of altogether new and foreign elements, but an organic enrichment, a new synthesis, a recovery or discovery (or *redemption*) of fragments of truth (which therefore are Christian by definition, if Christianity is the *whole* truth) which become "incorporated" in this growing of the Mystical Body.

III. Conditions of Integration

1. *Understanding of Christian Theology*

It is obvious that no integration is possible if we minimize or narrow the nature and extent of Catholic theology. Theology

is not a kind of supernatural metaphysics, nor a mere rational science drawing conclusions from certain "revealed" premises. God does not reveal "premises" of syllogisms, but He reveals Himself. Theology is further not a private affair of the individual nor a ready-made and closed set-up of doctrines. If we still persist in calling it a science we should not forget that it is a "scientia subalternata", a participation in the divine knowledge ("scientia") by which God knows Himself and in Him the whole universe.

Theology, or "theologia viae" as St Thomas calls it, is (also according to him) the *normal* expansion of faith, the *fides quaerens intellectum*, searching for an understanding of the reality given us in and through faith. This living theology is a constant companion of man in his pilgrimage on earth, helping him to decipher the meaning and to adore the reality of the living Word of God, that came down and dwelt among us. It is the dialogue which the believer (and this implies: *in* the Church) constantly holds with God in his interior *contemplation* and with men and the world that surround him in his Christian *action*. A theology deaf to the environment where it has to live would become very soon also dumb for that milieu. "Verbum Dei non est alligatum", says St Paul, it cannot be tied up to any particular class, world, and culture. An isolated and chemically pure theology for fear of contamination — as the Jews who crucified Christ refused to enter the palace of the "gentile" Pilate — would, to say the least, remain barren and ineffective.

2. *Theological understanding of Indian Philosophy*

Theology in India today has to make of Hinduism, as of any other religion, the subject-matter of its study, for the double reason of the eventual presence of the Word of God in it and the undeniable fact of the words of men about God. This double "Word of God" belongs to Catholic theology, to which could also be applied that injunction of Christ: "Colligite quae superaverunt fragmenta": attempt to integrate all those fragments, to pick up all those broken pieces that have fallen from heaven to earth since people began to live, i.e. to love, to think, to sin, in this land of India — for He has universal providence over all His children.

In this theological perspective Indian philosophy does not appear as a *mere* intellectual set-up of ideas — to be discussed and criticized — but as an existential reality which has, on the one hand, shaped the mind, and hence the culture of the people of India, and, on the other hand, whose *function* (in its positive elements) has been to lead the Indian people to know, to love and to attain the only true reality of things that transcends all understanding.

It is a fact that the spiritual and intellectual nourishment of the people of this vast continent since millenia has been Indian (Hindu) wisdom. Now, so far as they have led a good life, so far as they have been saved and reached salvation, they have done

it, ultimately in and through Christ, the only Mediator, but directly or immediately by the means provided by Indian culture and religion. Indian spirituality in its genuine values has been the quasi-instrument of salvation; in other words, the grace of God coming down from Christ has been wrapped and embodied in Hindu values. *Practically* and for a *time* Hinduism and Indian philosophy have taken the place, have been the forerunners and even in a *certain* sense the substitutes of Christianity and Catholic theology.

The possibility of integration is closely related to the discovery of this existential character of Indian philosophy. The ideas might not be orthodox, but the existential bearing of those ideas could well be pointing to the Christian reality. It may be, for instance, that the correct philosophical relationship creature-Creator has not been discovered by the Indian mind, but wherever a *good* Hindu is at prayer that relationship must existentially be there.

This theological approach prevents also from false " irenicism ", for it does not ignore the place and role of evil in the world, nor the necessary discrimination of doctrines and ideas. These can often be an obstacle to the working of divine grace. Not every doctrine is fit to express, not even to " contain " the Message of Salvation. Integration remains *a priori* a possibility, but only a serious study *in concreto* and *a posteriori* can decide about its reality.

IV. Principles of Integration

1. *Principle of homogeneity*

Only when there is a common ground can a real meeting take place. If there is not the same " formal object "— in scholastic parlance — no dialogue is possible. Only homogeneous elements can be integrated.

The transgression of this principle leads either to syncretism when we collect, for instance, only similar expressions of two different philosophies, religious or cultures; or it leads to an attitude of negation and refusal when we see only the expressions — or even meanings — at variance. How often identical statements stand for an entirely different vision of reality, and not seldom do different expressions try to convey one and the same truth. *Homology* is not *Analogy*, and vice versa.

If a Scotistic thesis, for instance, cannot be judged and understood from a merely *internal* Thomistic point of view, much less can Scholastic formulations be merely compared with the rather symbolic and intuitionistic expressions of the Upanishads. Neither can we compare popular beliefs with well-elaborated theological concepts.

Christianity and Hinduism are two philosophies and two faiths — two different experiences. For a Christian to understand

Hinduism, he must somehow enter into the faith of the Hindu. This leads to our second principle.

2. *Principle of profundity*

"What is *this*?" asks the child, we said. Only from an insight into that "this", only from its *real* source of inspiration is a philosophy understandable. Only then we discover its truth and also its eventual deviation from it, and are able to express better than our partner what he really *intends* to say.

A real Incarnation is required before Redemption can take place. We must experience the problem in question in its pure nakedness beyond words and concepts. It is not our specific problem now to decide how far it is possible to make this experience with Hinduism as a whole, but we may remember that the Fathers and also the holy Doctors of the Church did something of this kind.

It is precisely the fullness of Christ that allows us such an internal experience of any other truth. But the integration of such an experience belongs to the *organic growth* of the Church; it must be a development from within. This is the meaning of our third principle.

3. *Principle of tradition*

Christian integration discards an absolutely new system or a radical starting-point ignoring the twenty centuries of Catholic theology — as well as millenia of human thought. The Logos has been at work since the beginning, and history is a fundamental dimension of the Church. Even if at times the theologian feels the past as a burden, the assumption of it is a part of his co-redemptive task.

This principle means that it is not sufficient to christianize now, say, Sankara. If at all he has positive values, they should be integrated into the Catholic doctrinal body even at the price of eventually abandoning less suitable philosophical perspectives.

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Principle of tradition is not principle of staticism. This would be stagnation. On the contrary it is a dynamic principle, for tradition is a living stream in the Church that cannot be frozen and stopped. The moment we stop tradition, we do no longer convey the living message, we don't trade with it — as in the parable of the talents we are asked to do — but we bury it for sheer fear of losing it, because our faith has ceased to be living. The very essence of tradition implies that we leave behind the steps by which we climb up the mountain where the living God dwells.

* * *

The *how* of this integration is a burning problem about which I would like to say eventually a little bit regarding concrete topics as Creation, Truth, Time, Advaita. It is not now my task, nor is it that of a single man. It is the work of an entire generation. And I am convinced, this generation is ours.

It is not quite accurate to adduce the example of Thomas Aquinas in this respect. Firstly, because he did not Christianise Aristotle and much less wanted to do it. He tried only to integrate him into the Augustinian tradition that he considered synonymous with Christian tradition. Secondly, because we cannot ignore now his – and others' – efforts and do as if they do not exist. The Church has, in fact, formulated in Patristic, Thomistic – and modern – concepts many of the truths of our belief. Thirdly because the whole "world" was for Thomas the Hellenic (including Arabic) culture and the Christian one (including the Hebrew), whereas our world knows a pluralism of cultures that we cannot overlook.

This does not mean that we have to stick at old formulas or that we have to give up all new thinking and progress. It means exactly the contrary, that we cannot be limited in our intellectual concern and disregard the history of the past and of the present.

THEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR AN ACTIVE CHRISTIAN-NON-CHRISTIAN COOPERATION IN SOCIAL THOUGHT AND ACTION

SUMMARY

I - Need for a common basis
1-A common point of departure
2-A common aim

II - The triple level of Christian-human-existence
1-The Koinonia of human "nature" received from Christ the Creator
2-The Diaconia of Christ, the Mediator, calling all men to collaborate in his Redemption
3-The free calling of Christ, the Lord, of the Kerigma of His Living Word

III - The connection and Discrimination of the Grounds
1-Connection
2-Discrimination

IV - Christian-non-Christian Relations
1-Sincerity
2-The Christian Pleroma

B - HINDUISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

R. PANIKER

~~The~~ Theological Basis for (an active) Christian-Non-Christian ~~Action~~ Co-Operation.

~~R. Panikkar~~

~~Summary of some ideas exposed at the Nagpur Conference~~ (on this theme) ~~– October, 1957~~

On which grounds can Christians and Non-Christians work together?

1 — Need for a common ground

It is obvious that any co-operation worth the name— i.e., working, or rather, acting together— implies a double sharing in a common thematic, (in a common point of departure and in a common aim.) Otherwise there is no real partnership in action, but a merely "diplomatic" and passive co-existence or simply parallel actions that remain mutually foreign and collide with each other once the ~~goal~~ end is (near) at hand. Co-operation is not a race to see who is going to get the prize or who is going to reach the end first. It is neither concurrence nor competition. ~~but~~ Collaboration and partnership are the first steps towards a real co-operation (1) ~~partnership~~. ~~This double participation is:~~

a — A common point of departure.

It is not necessary to have an integrally identical ground covering the whole of ~~either~~ both personalities engaged in the common work. They may and can have different backgrounds and presumptions. However a common ground is required, that is to say, a certain parity in the ~~presupposition~~ premises of the work in itself. In other words, a subjective common ground is not necessary. ~~but~~ An objective communion would be sufficient. This means that the "work" Christians and non-Christians undertake must make sense

(1) ~~Summary of some ideas exposed at a conference of Protestant Theologians (Nagpur Oct. 1957) and published in "Religion and Society" (Vol. V, No. 1) Bangalore, 1958, Vol V, No. 1~~ (rimane lo scritto sotto) | The green writing is correct! |

for both, and as "work" have the same meaning for both.

b — A common aim.

Any action is specified by its aim, so much so that an externally equal action performed by two persons with two different aims cannot be called an action, nor co-operation, but rather complicity and exploitation (by the party aware of the diversity of aims). Collaboration means working together for a single aim. This ~~goal~~ end of the activity however does not need to be so exhaustive that it should further — but not contrary — aims in one of the parties.

a — If Christians and non-Christians have to co-operate in any activity, they need, in consequence, to have the possibility of sharing (α) a common ground in the point of departure, and (β) a common aim in the work to be undertaken.

This second point is easier to discover at first sight and moreover does not enter strictly into the proposed question. We are going to deal only with the first problem, that is to say to present a sketch of the basis on which that co-operation is possible from a Christian standpoint.

II — The triple level of Christian — human — existence

It is a fundamental Christian dogma — in its correct and precise meaning — that Christ is God, the Mediator, and the Lord, and this in such a ~~plenary~~ complete way that, in this full sense, there is no other God, no other Mediator, no other Lord. His divinity,

his mediatorship and his sovereignty are not only unique, but also universal. Every man coming into this world is under this triple influence (power, calling) of Christ whether he agrees to it or not, whether he recognises it or not.

This threefold calling of Christ is not an external and irrelevant appeal, but touches the innost structures of our being, and in fact constitutes our very existence. In other words, each one of these callings has an ontological bearing, builds by itself a layer of our existence and thus offers the basis on which co-operation among men is possible.

a) — The Koinonia of human "nature" received from Christ the Creator

All human beings have received from Christ, as Creator, a human "nature". This constitutes a Communion, a Koinonia with every human being. By this fact all human activities of the order of "creation" are common to Christians and non-Christians. There is no difference between them on this secular level and they may and must work together through the many strains and stresses of life to improve conditions and foster a worthy human life. A Christian is no less human for being Christian, and neither is he superior on the level to any of his fellow-beings. He cannot exclude himself — so far as this level is concerned — from collaboration in the common endeavour of men in the struggle for a better world and life. The eschatological character of Christianity is not a refuge for lazy people or an excuse for ignoring the

world. If at all, on this level, it is a catalytic activation; for the "time is short" and we must let the talents received yields their fruit. ~~Or~~, In other words, "grace" does not destroy "nature", but elevates and perfects it. All men are brothers. The immediate result of Christ's coming is to reveal to mankind this human—and even cosmic—Koinonia, to us, children of the same Father who makes His sun rise upon the good and the bad ... The true Christian is, like Christ, the First-born among men—a brother to mankind.

b) — The Diakonia of Christ, the Mediator, calling all men to collaborate in His Redemption

Nobody can go to God, the Father, but in and through Christ—irrespective of creed, place or time. He is the only Mediator. But this "going back" to God after Original Sin is a way of Redemption. The specific and historical character of Christ, the Mediator, is that of the Redeemer. He has redeemed mankind and the whole cosmos—not only "Christians", i.e., those who consciously acknowledge Him. History is nothing ~~else but~~ other than the real pilgrimage ~~path~~ of the family of man—and of the whole universe in a broader sense—towards the new heaven and the new earth by ~~means of~~ continuing and applying ~~to himself, collectively and personally,~~ to itself and to its members the Redemption of Christ. The ultimate meaning of human life in this historical context is to work out, to continue, to apply, to realize ... the Redemption of the world. Again, in this task

Christians and non-Christians have a common ground, because a common calling has come upon them, the calling of the diakonia, of the Service to the Redemption of the World. The Christian might have a fuller awareness of what he is working for or called to, and even might have received better tools for this job, but the non-Christian also, ~~firstly~~, has initially been redeemed and, secondly, has to collaborate in the redeeming of himself as well as of others.

In other words, all human activities that have somehow a redemptive value, offer a common ground for co-operation between Christians and non-Christians, ~~and~~ who they have to work together, although the level of awareness is different in ~~either~~ each case. The non-Christian, ~~as a result of an unknown unrecognised, which comes from out of the internal~~ moved by an internal "grace" ~~or coming of~~ of Christ, is working for the welfare of his fellow-beings. The Christian is engaged in the same beneficence— in the classical sense of the word—, witnessing Christ and letting Him act through ~~the Christian's~~ his presence and action in the world for the fulfilment of Redemption. Moreover, he "~~does~~ is aware"— because he "believes"— that Christ ~~is there~~ is present in all his ~~suffering~~ distressed brethren. This level of beneficence, or of works of mercy, is perhaps the best meeting-place for a fruitful encounter and close collaboration between Christians and ~~non-~~ non-Christians. ~~... I would rather call them invisible members of the Mystical Body of Christ.~~

This level of diakonia is the sacramental level par excellence. Certainly, the so called non-Christians do not have the fullness of the Sacraments of the New Law—though there is a baptism of desire—, but they do share in the cosmic "sacraments" of the First Covenant of God with mankind, which came just after the Fall, and ~~much~~ long before in much that came

the special Pact with Abraham. We think~~ing~~ ~~especially~~ particularly of ~~in~~ the "sacrament" of suffering, through which every man ~~that~~ who comes in to this world gets, at least, the chance of purification. It is the right and the duty of Christians to be (present) there, to be the ministers— the deacons (Diakonia)—of ~~this~~ these primeval sacraments. ~~We want to say~~ We make a special point of saying this: that Christians have the right, because they have the duty, ~~of~~ to practis~~ing~~e the works of mercy and ~~of~~ to collaborat~~ing~~e with all those who have been inspired to do the same. The works of mercy of the Church—and of every Christian—~~are~~ apply ~~for~~ to everybody. To the Bishop as successor of the Apostles has been entrusted not only the loyal sheep, but also all those ~~still~~ who are still outside, and vice-versa, ~~there~~ where mercy is in action ~~is~~ Christ is already there, and the Christian has the right, ~~and~~ even more, the duty to collaborate. He is at home wherever Love is at work.

C/— The free calling of Christ, the Lord, for the Kerygma of His Living Word

Faith is certainly a free gift of God that differentiates men and gives a new dimension to human existence. But faith is also a free answer ~~of~~ man's to ~~that~~ calling ~~of~~ Christ's. And This answer recognises Him as the Lord, for nobody can call Him Lord ~~if~~ this statement is not in the Spirit.

On the grounds of this specific, Christian answer, Christians and/non-Christians cannot collaborate in ~~these~~ activities where Christ, the Lord, is explicitely and actually negated. ~~regarded~~. However, ~~But~~ if only he, the Christian, has been made capable of giving the answer, the

calling of the Lord is universal. On this very ground he has the right and the duty to the Kerygma of such a calling to all nations and peoples—because Christ calls them through His Christians, His Church. This Kerygma is inherent in, and constitutive of, the Christian vocation.

The first ground is one of equality, of communion (Koinonia), the second is one of service and collaboration (diakonia), and the third one is a ground of witnessing and proclaiming (kerygma). And yet it is a common ground, as Christ is the Light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world and the kerygma of the Christian is not only that of removing, unveiling—re-vealing—that very Light, already in the heart of everybody. He cannot co-operate in darkening the Light, but He must collaborate there where this Light is still dimmed because of nescience, or ignored because of misapprehension, provided he is not prevented from witnessing the Sign of Contradiction in all its glaring—but yet saving—Luminosity.

This amounts to saying that when the Christian preaches the Message of Christ he is not an intruder and a foreigner, but he is the Messenger who brings "what" the people are longing and looking for, although sometimes he may not be received, not tolerated, but because cast away, like his Master, he comes unexpected and like a thief. Enough that the disciple should fare like his Master. And yet in Him have all the Nations their hope! The ground is there, but if the grain doesn't bring itself in it and die ... To be a witness means to be a martyr.

3

~~III~~ — The connection and discrimination of the grounds.

In order to be able to draw practical conclusions from ~~of~~ these principles we must keep in mind this double, almost dialectic, characteristic.

a/ — Connection.

Human life is one. Pure "nature" does not exist. Arising from that „pure nature" there are no "natural" acts and no "neutral" institutions. He ~~Who~~ is not against Him is for Him. Social action is always more than social action and even speculative thought is richer (or poorer) than pure and disincarnated contemplation.

Those three levels of Christian action are intimately interwoven, and the collaboration of Christians with non-Christians cannot overlook this fact. The Christian cannot filter, ~~or take~~ as it were, only what he finds good, ignore the rest, and offer his most cordial collaboration. ~~He cannot, on the other hand,~~ Nor can he refuse all co-operation, because optimal conditions are not there or the non-Christians ~~don't~~ do not fully agree with him. It is the theological role of the Christian virtue of prudence — the Fronema of the Spirit (science of the saints, according to Scripture) — to find out the middle way and to perform the sensible sifting, krisis.

~~2~~/ — Discrimination.

The whole issue depends, therefore, on the particular judgement ~~about~~ of the concrete case. General ideas have only a general value — which is very important, but not everything. We

would like to make a few remarks of more practical nature, though still remaining in the realm of principles.

a) The distinction made in paragraph I between the objective and the subjective, or the aim of the work in itself and the intention of the worker, should provide some guidance in this matter. Christians can cooperate in all such common endeavours where their koinonia is granted, their diakonia recognized and their kerygma respected.

b) In case of conflict among the three levels their hierarchical structure should be the deciding factor. That is to say, a Christian cannot cooperate in a type of work in which he explicitely or implicitely is supposed to give up his faith and his kerygmatic vocation (for example, common worship on an equalitarian basis). It goes without saying that kerygma does not mean shouting all the time, nor even speaking in the wrong place. Further, he cannot collaborate where his diakonia is utilised, misused by the other side against his own kerygma (for example, in the case of some of the worker-priests in France, or that of some of the patriotic Catholics in China). Again, we don't refer to the possible danger of misinterpretation, (as in the case of diakonia levelled down to philanthropy), but to a systematic exploitation of one level by the other.

c) The collision can also arise not between two levels, but between one level and the whole person, this is properly speaking a moral conflict. It is the problem of the means. Again a distinction is here required.

A Christian can be convinced — even a genuine Christian convictions — that the means for a certain

work in which he is called to collaborate are not effective, efficient and the like. This reason would not excuse, as such, cooperation. He should, if possible, try to convince, or to prove that the means are the real ones and that others, etc. This is the realm of practical prudence and he should, with intelligence and patience, try to change the pattern. (The whole world of politics can provide us with numerous examples).

A Christian can, on the other hand, discover that the means are unacceptable to his conscience, because he sees them intrinsically bad, wrong, immoral, against higher values, etc. In such a case, he must refuse his co-operation if such means are necessarily connected with the work in question, because it would amount to saying that the work in itself is immoral.

6) Finally, if subjectively the personal conscience is the last instance, objectively that very conscience receives its light not only from inside, but also from outside. Christ does not only speak inwardly to it, but He has already spoken and is speaking in His Church. In the light of Christ and His Church, which illuminates his personal conscience, should the Christian try to solve the possible conflicts.

IV - Christian-non-Christian relations.

Two, in my opinion, important ideas should be stressed, to complete this sketch.

1 — Sincerity

The co-operation of the Christian with the non-

Christian is a true and sincere service to the common endeavour in which both are engaged. The Christian should not have ulterior motives of proselytising or utilizing such an activity for other ends. If he had such an attitude he would misunderstand the very core of Christian doctrine, and implicitely that Christ is also the Creator, that creation is good, though fallen, and indulge in an heretic monodimensional supernaturalism (Montanism, Jansenismm ...) fanaticism. He has no ulterior aims, but he has a deeper insight in his work of collaboration. He does not only perform a disconnected action, he is not only fellow-worker with men, he is also fellow-worker with Christ in the Redemption of the world and for the coming of the Kingdom of God.

f) — The Christian Pleroma

Though the following idea transcends the frame of this concrete problem and cannot be developed fully now, its consideration is essential, to centralize the question at issue, for it is the underlying basis of all Christian-non-Christian relationships.

The relation of non-Christian Religions to Christianity is not one of the type: ~~of error to truth, darkness to light, evil to goodness,~~ but rather of potency to act, seeds to fruits, type or symbol to the thing and reality in itself. This does not mean that there is an irenic continuity, nor is it an indulgence in an optimistic equationism. This would be the other extreme of levelling down Christianity to the natural level and denying the central Christian mystery of the Cross. The seed must die, the symbol must give way to reality,

potency must be ~~trans-formed~~ raised into act; but in the ~~very~~ Christian dialectic of Resurrection it is the same "thing" that rises again, with a new life certainly, but it is the old man, ~~the old values~~ ~~that~~ who ~~are~~ is redeemed, transformed, re-vitalised. Neither mere continuity and passive co-existence, nor absolute brake ~~and~~ or active intolerance, but transformation, real conversion, death and resurrection, or, in ~~one~~ a word, Redemption ~~that~~ is the true Christian attitude. He did not come to ~~quench~~ snuff out the wick ~~still~~ smoking. ⊗

To make a long story ~~very~~ short I should like to utilise a classical Indian example: We all aim at the "thing", we are all ultimately attracted by the only source of everything, we all ~~know~~ somehow surmise reality, but they "think", ~~have~~ "imagine" it to be a snake and are afraid and ~~fly~~ run away. We know — for belief is a higher form of knowledge — that it is a rope, and a rope of salvation and hope. They take it for Ganapati , or (Civilization, or Mankind or for ~~whatever~~ some ideal or symbol, ancient or present; we know that its real name is Jesus, the Christ. The "snake" is merely an appearance, it is not real ; it is not a snake; but it is an appearance of the real, it is reality in the form of an appearance, in the status of "illusion". It is not to another God that we should point ~~out~~, it is not ~~towards~~ in another direction that we should try to walk. Let us go closer hand in hand towards it and discover that it is not a "snake", but it is something, it is the real, "the grace of God our Saviour (that) hath appeared to all men", but this time in its true form, in the God made flesh and dwelling among us.

① cf. chapters III, IV

~~R. Panikkar~~

VIII

A MEDITATION ON MELCHISEDECH

"Appellatus a Deo pontifex iuxta ordinem Melchisedch"

Hebr., V, 10.

R. PANIKKER.

A - THE FACTS

1 The Scriptura

a)- Old Testament

aa) Genesis, XIV

ab) Psalm, CIX

b)- New Testament

ba) Hebrews, V

bb) Hebrews, VI

bc) Hebrews, VII

2- The Liturgy

Latin Canon

3- Tradition

4- History

5- Legends

B- INTERPRETATION

1- Physical continuity

2- Pastoral continuity

3- The order of Melchisedech

The cryptic figure of Melchisedech, "King of peace", rising suddenly from nowhere - nay, from the carth simply - and pervading the whole christian spirituality, has always attracted the mind of the Church from olden days of old down to our times.(1) The reason for it lies in the deep mystical and theological meaning of his personality. I would like to sketch - it is only a draft - a partial aspect - it is only a fragment of the Theology of Melchisedech: What does it mean the order, the line, the manner, the taxis, the al-dibrati according to which God has appointed His onleybegotten Son high priest for ever?. (2)

(1) This article was published in German in "Kairos" (Salzburg) No 1, 1959

This "meditation" ~~has been~~ was preceded by a "study" on Melchisedech. We presuppose a Knowledge of this subject. The following sources supported the "study":

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A. JIRKU -Altorientalischev Kommentar zum A.T. Erlangen,

H. LIETZMANN -Messe und Heirenmahl, Bonn, 1926

(And I wouls request not to criticise this meditation except with the same spirit under which it has been written and having studies the problem seriously).

I. The facts

1) The Scripture

Unlike other christian themes it does not spring up from the tradition or the life of the christian community (Church), but it has a pure scriptural origin, i.e. comes there from the Bible, imposed so to say from above by the inspired writers.

a) Old Testament

Only in two places appears, and in both cases suddenly and withoutany previous introduction, the figure of Melchisedech.

aa) Genesis, XIV, 18-20

Abram, - not yet Abraham, and this point is important - comes back from a victorious war and he happens to meet "Melchisedech, the king of Salem. And he, priest of the most higt God (El Eljon), brought out bread and wine. And he blessed him and said: On Abram be the blessing of the most higt God, maker of heaven and earth, and praise be to the most high God, whose protection has brought thy enemies into thy power. To him, Abram gave tithes of all he ad won".

ab) Psalm, CIX, 4

This messianic psalm, quoted by Christ himself and studied in the Epistle to the Hebrews, after giving some titles to the Messias "Master", adds: "The Lord (Iahwe) has sworn an oath there is no retracting, Thou art a priest for ever in the lime of Melchisechech".

b(New Testament

The full study of the only one place where Melquisedech appears would imply long pages ebout one of the most difficult problems of biblical Theology. We are going simply to quote the text because we are not concerned with detail or messianic exegesis, but only with one of central points of the Theology of Melchisedech.

ba) Hebrews, V,5,6,10

The whole text speaks on priesthood and the priesthood of Christ. "So it is with Christ. He did not raise himself to the dignity of the high priesthood;

it was (God) who spoke to him: Thou art my Son, I have begotten thee this day; and so elsewhere he said: Thou art a priest for ever, in the line of Melchisedech. ... A high priest in the line [-Taxis, according to the order-] of Melchisedech, so God has called him".

bb) Heb., VI, -20

"Where [beyond the veil] the forerunner Jesus in entered for us made a high priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech".

bc) Hebr., VII, 1 sq.

This chapter all centered on Melchisedech and Christ has been considered as climax of the whole Epistle and the kernel of the biblical doctrine of priesthood. And it has been also said in this connexion that hardly can we get an integral idea of Christ's priesthood if we do not understand his relation to Melchisedech.

It was this Melchisedech, king of Salem, priest of the most high God, who met Abraham returning from the defeat of the kings, and blessed him: to whom also Abraham divided the tithes of all: who first indeed by interpretation, is king of justice: and then also king of Salem, that is, king of peace. Without father, without mother, without genealogy having neither beginning of days nor end of life, but likened unto the Son of God, continueth a priest for ever.

Now consider how great this man is, to whom also Abraham the Patriarch gave tithes out of the best things. And indeed they that are of the sons of levi, who receive the priesthood, have a commandment to take tither of the people according to the law, that is to say, of their brethren: though they themselves also came out of the loins of Abraham. But he, whose pedigree is not numbered among them, receive tithes of Abraham and blessed him that ad the promises. And without all contradiction, that which is less is blessed by the better. And here indeed men that die, receive tithes: but there he hath witness, that je liveth. And (as it may be said) even Levi who receive tithes, paid tithes in Abraham. For he was yet in the loins of his father, when Melchisedech me im.

If then perfection was by the livitical priesthood, (for

under it the people receive the law), what further need was there that another priest should arise according to the order of Melchisedech, and not be called according to the order of Aaron? For priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law. For he, of whon these things are spoken is of another tribe, of which no one attended on the altar. For it is evident that our Lord sprung out of Juda: in which tribe Moses spoke nothing concerning priests.

And something further becomes evident, when according to the similitude of Melchisedech there arises [this] another priest, who is made nor according to the law a carnal commandment, but in the the power of an indissoluble life: For he testifieth: Thou art a priest for ever, according to the order of Melchisedech. [That means] there is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof: -For the law brought nothing to perfection but the bringing in of a better hope, by which we come close to God.

And in as much as it is not without an oath, (for the others indeed were made priests without an oath; but this with an oath, by him that said unto him: The Lord has sworn, and he will not repent, Thou art priest for ever); by so much is Jesis made a surety of a better Testament.

And the others indeed were many priests, because by reason of death they were not suffered to continue: but this for the fact that he continueth for ever, has an everlasting priesthood. Whereby he is able also to save for ever them that come to God by him: always living to make intercession for us.

For that was the high-priest we should have: holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners and made higher than the heavens: who needed not daily (as the [other] high-priest) to offer sacrifices first for his own sins, and then for the people's: for this he did once [for all] in offering himself. For the law maker priests of men who are frail: but the word of the oath, which was after the law, [has established] that Son who is utterly perfect for evermore".

2) The Liturgy

At least since the V century the Church has in the Canon of the Latin rite the reference to Saint Melchisedech -as the Roman Council from 860 calls him - and his priesthood. In all other rites he has an equal prominent place. Number of old prefaces from all rites mention Melchisedech along with Abel and Abraham. He has a proper feast as a saint in eastern Church and even to-day the common name for the first part of the mass in the greek-syrian rite is Melchisedech (Aaron, the second and Christ, the third).

An epiklese of the Gallican church calls the ceremonies of the Mass, ritu Melchisedech summi sacerdotis oblata, offered in the rite of Melchisedech, And so also another epiklese of the Mozarabic Liturgy identifies the offerings of the Christian Sacrifice with the oblations of that "typical" priest Melchisedech.

The meaning of this lex orandi in the Church is everywhere the same: The "king of justice" is considered having offered to God a pleasant and worthy sacrifice in the same line as the offering of Christ and ours.

Latin Canon

After the consecration, the priest again prays God to accept the Sacrifice of his Son, because the Mass is not the mere repetition of the once accepted sacrifice, but our real temporal incorporation into it. And so, precisely here, the priest recollects the continuity with Abel, Abraham and Melchisedech: "Upon which vouchsafe to look with a propitious and serene countenance, and to accept them as Thou wert pleased to accept the gifts of Thy just servant Abel, and the sacrifice of our Patriarch Abraham, and that which Thy high priest Melchisedech offered to Thee, a holy sacrifice, a spotless Victim".

3) Tradition

From the very beginning the Fathers of the Church have considered the "mysterious" figure of this king and priest not only as a "type", a forerunner of Christ, but also as a representative of the divine priesthood on earth since the beginning of the

world. And so we could aduce Justin, Tertulian, Clemens of Alexandria, Ambrose, Augustin, etc.

The language of the Fathers is bold and imbued with the conviction of the cosmic meaning of Melchisedech and the catholicity of Christ, who rids us from the inutility, the ἀνωφελές of the Old Testament. So writes St. Ambrose vgt.: "Accept what I am saying, namely that the christian mysteries are previous to the mysteries of the Jews. If the Jews go back to Abraham, the figure of our sacramets was already there, when Melchisedech the high-priest came to meet the victorious Abraham and offered to him bread and wine. Who had bread and wine? Certainly not Abraham, but Melchisedech. He is therefore the author of the sacraments".

Shall it be necessary to quote St. John Chrysostom, as a representative of the greek patristic age?; "Abraham would not have given tithes to a stranger if he had not acknowledged in him a much greater superiority of honour. But what a striking thing has proved the great Apostle! He has uttered a much more astonishing and amazing truth than that of the Epistle to the Romans. There he simply declares Abraham as the king and patriarch of our religion as well as of Judaism. But here he dares something more towards this patriarch: he shows us that an uncircumcised man is much greater than he. And what is the proof gives?. He proves it by saying that Levi gave tithes to him".

Also in the Middle Ages the Theology of priesthood has been connected with this man "without mother, father not pedigree nor date of birth or death." Of Petrus Lombardus, Bonaventure, Thomas, etc. The whole Scholastic accepts and comments that "there (in the encounter between Melchisedech and Abraham - in Augustine's words -) arose first the sacrifice which now the Christian offer to God in the whole world".

4) History

Not only, so to say, the ecdesiastical tradition deals with Melchisedech but also philosophers, heretics, apocryph scriptures, rabbinic literature etc. are interested in him.

His mysterious figure is interpreted according to the main tendencies of the time or the previous conceptions of the writer. So the jewist literature tries to connect him with Noah and points out that Levi had been circumcised. Philo gives a pure allegorical interpretation of the king of peace in behalf of his Logos idea. Similarly, for the Gnosis, Melchisedech is an intermediate power in the cosmic emanation process, etc.

5) Legends

Finally all over the christian period we find typical and interesting storias about this pecualiar personality.

Perhaps the most common repeated with many variations is that of the eastern book of Adam: Melchisedech is shifting the corpst of Adam to mount Calvary and so partakes of the priestly function of Adam and is the link between him and Christ.

Of course, Melchisedech has been also interpreted as a "spiritual cosmic energy", as an "angel" (Michael, specially) and even as the "Holy Ghost". Not much later then Athanasius and figuring among his (pseudo) works we can read even to-day a fabolous whole life of this priest of the Firts Covenant.

II. Interpretation

1) Physical continuity

The whole Christian message represents something new and unkmown before, the Christian fact is a mutation in history, Christianity is not the mere development of a natural religion, und its doctrine is not a kind of sublimated theory of the pagan mysteries whatsoever. But this novelty does not cancel the complementary principle of continuity. Christ himself was the expectatio of the peoples, he did not come to abolish the Law or the Prophets and he is active since the beginning of the works; nay, by him everything has been made anf in some sense Christianity exists since the very beginning.

Moreover, because mankind and even the whole creation is

a unity nothing absolutely new and disconnected can exist on earth. Even Christ, the son of God had a Mother in order to be the Son of Man. History never begins absolutely anew and a "created human being" by God is always at the same time the product of his parents. Everything, each process in the world has its origin in previous beings and brings forth consequences to others. A new nation is an outcoming of a previous historical reality, a discovery comes out of known facts, a new sect or religion is the reform or fulfilment of a pre-existent one and it aequires its shape in dialogue with its environments.

Christ is the only one priest of the New Covenant but his priesthood being new and supreme is in the temporal order the continuation and fulfilment of the priesthood of the Old Testament and even morex of the priesthood of the First Testament.

The divine adventure - οἰκονομία - of Mankind with God its Creator and Redeemer has had three Testaments: The Covenant with Adam, the cosmic Testament of God with Man, the contract of his very being, so to say: Thou shalt be Man! Thou shalt be son of God. This Testament has a double string the primordial string before Adam's Fall and the second string of the Promise - of the Proto-Gospel - after the Original sin.

The second Testament is the contract of circumcision the Alliance with Abraham: Thous shalt be the Father of the elected people! Thou shalt be the Progenitor of the Messias!

The New Testament is the fulfilment of both. It is the Covenant of God with the whole Creation in the figure of Christ the Mediator. Thou art my most beloved Son!

Now, Christ is not only the Messias of Israel, He is not only the successor of the priesthood of the sons of Levi. He, the High Priest of the New Testament does not even belong to the priestly community of the house of Israel . On the contrary his title is in the line of the High Priest of the First Testament: Melchisedech. It is significant that the Deuil Though ponessed of Gerasa called Jesus: on of the most high God -

And this continuitu is the meaning of the mysterious encounter between Abraham and the Priest-king. And here lies the meaning of the legends on Melchisedech connecting him with Adam, Noah, Sem, etc..

Abraham has been segregated from his own country and sent away to a new spot to be the father of numberless generations and the trunk of the people of God. A novel Testament is going to be signed. God wants him to carry the responsibility not only for his own people, but for the whole world also. It is not enough for that that he bears Adam's blood. He needs, further, a special linkage with the rest of mankind, ha needs the blessing of the priest of the First Covenant , for he must be in himself something more that the representative of his own people and the father of the elected folk, but the mission of his people is not only for its own sake, but it is for all mankind. Salvation comes out of the Jews, but it is not for the Jews alone. And this link wilt Humanity is established by Melchisedech, for Melchisedech is certainly a figure, a "type" of Christ, but nevertheless he is an historic real personality; he was in fact priest of God and his priesthood was a real one not only accepted, but instituted, appointed by the Most High. And the New Testament tells us that this continuity was established, and <u>how</u> the priest king blessed the father of nation and this blessing rested upon him.

Should we remind our desecrated generation of the meaning of a blessing?. A blessing is a psycho-physic reality - preserved, by the waym in all religions - which alone proves the deep unity of the material and the spiritual world. How could a spiritual gift cling to a material thing if they were absolutely heterogeneous? A blessing is a spiritual reality descending upon a material being and remaining there. A blessed thing has "something" which an unblessed has not and this something rests upon, impregnates the matter and confers upon it a new value. A blessed thing carries with it, and in it, a spiritual content.

So Abraham was blessed and through the contac with that unknown, uncircumsised priest, he kept somehow the continuity of the priesthood from the beginning of the world.

Melchisedech has no esoteric meaning in a pseudo gnostic way, "his personality does nor meed to be interpreted in a fantastic manner, like the old sect of the Melchisedites or the new tastes of a false spirituality. The priestly King of Peace has a physical and concrete role to play, full of trascendent meaning, it is true, but nevertheless his mission is a definite and historical one; to convey to Abraham, to restablish with him the link with the universal and general priesthood of mankind since the very beginning. God has never forsaken his creation and choosing the people of Israel for a special mission on carth, had neither forgotten to link it up with the test of the world, nor abandoned the other nations of this cosmos.

2) Pastoral Continuity

The physical continuity, does not signify a denial of the moral discontinuity, nor does this pastoral continuity intends to abolish a practical discontinuity ; but they only aim at complementing the principle, or better the fact of novelty, by the principle of constancy. They belong to different levels and we do not pretend at all to controver the break-up, the novelty, the restoration, and even the revolution of Christianity, We only desire to remember the other dimension of the problem.

What does it mean that Abraham, who is going to be the cornerstone and the living symbol of the oath of Jawhe with his people, accepts the blessing of a "hathen" and pays to him tribute as to one who is greater than he himself? If we meditate upon the apparent spiritual climate of exclusivity of the Old Testament, upon the jealous God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who does not tolerate another God, nay, another form of worship than that which he minutely prescribes, we can only discover an orthodox answer remembering similer paradoxes in the Old and for all in the New Testament.

It means the same as the prophecy of Balaam's ass, it means the same as that utterance of Jesus forbiding his disciples to do any harm, to pronounce any kind of excomunication on those who were performing miracles in his name, though they did not belong to his external followers, because "those who are not against you are for you". It means the same as the Master's scolding Peter, the head of his Church, because he wanted to find out wuth a last remnant of intolerance the kind of privileged position of that beloved disciple who was to remain till Jesus' return ... It meansm in one word, that Christ was before Abraham, he the α and ω, the Beginning and End upon whom all things have consisteney and through whom everything has been made.

There is only one High Priest in the new Alliance, because there is only one Priesthood at the end of the time, at the fullness of time, that of the Redeemer. Moreover the priesthood of the Law the priesthood of the sons of Levi has finished its mission and objectively it has been abolished because it failed in receiving the Messiah.

But in Melchisedech we have the priesthood of the first covenant between God and Man, this priesthood, inspite of all disfigurations still persists in the pre-christian religions. Melchisedech is priest of the Most High and in a certain sense all priests of the Only One Godhead among the different religions of the world participate of the priesthood of the First Testament. The priests of all religions, inspite of its imperfections and however the true figure of Melchisedech migth have been concealed in so far as they are priests, are priests of Elyôn the ὕψιστος, the trascendant and sublime God.

And that seems to be the meaning of so many catholic documents, including the Council of Trent and Pius XI encyclical to the Catholic priests, when they recognize the necessitu and nalidity of priesthood for the human species. They were and are priests of the eternal Divinity, and whatever excellency Melchisedech may have had for performing his particular function, he was nevertheless priest

of this very and unique Godhead.

The religions of the world may have wrong doctrines and bad features and even sometimes diabolical intrusions; but insofar as they are religions they are pre-figurations, forerunners of Christianity and their priests are really priests in the line of Melchisedech, that is true mediators, true elected men taken form among others for their brethren for that which belongs to God, that they may offer upsacrifices and oblations for the sins of manking.

The Christian way of approach therefore at a deep level of an ontological encounter is not and cannot be the meeting of a competitor or of an enemy who has usurped a post which does not belong to him, but is the sovereingn Christian way of service and love. It consists, unlike the elder brother of the prodigal son, in imitating Christ who came to serve and not to be served and in being disposed when necessary to receive the blessings of our "heathen" brother-priests in order to integrate them into the fullness of their own priesthood according to the order of Melchisedech.

The day in which the climate of understanding has grown up to the point of making it possible to receive a blessing of the non christian priests, that day the way for one shepherd ond one fold shall not be anymore far away.

It is well understood that this blessing does not mean a Christian compromise but a Catholic embrace. It is also clear that after the reversing of the pure earthly values done by Christ, the blessing of the "haathen" to the Christian will not signify at all that the non christian is greater, but that the greater has become the servant and that he who is the first has learned to be the last. Did Christ teach us any other doctrine? Di he, the King and Judge disdain or refute to be judged and condemned by the civil authority-which comes from God and even more by the Supreme Priest of Aaron's order appointed by his divine Father?.

IX THE EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF TRUTH (5)

καὶ γε ἀλήθεια ἐλευθερώσει ὑμᾶς

Jo., VIII, 32 (1)

INTRODUCTION

Truth, like Janus, the Latin god has two faces. One of them is directed towards the internal sphere and looks at the of inside our consciousness. This is the logical aspect of truth. The other one is focussed, not on the realm of inwardness, but on the outside world, on things themselves. And not infrequently philosophers, as guardians of the spirit have felt this ontological, or rather ontic aspect of truth as a kind of spiritual infidelity of philosophical frivolity. (3)

After Descartes, the main trend of European philosophy has dealt almost exclusively with ideas and it has culminated in the accurate phenomenological analysis of E. Husserl (2). Here, phenomenology has to do with the , with the ideas as they appear to our unfocussed and purified intellect, which has put the disturbing existences into brackets ( ). And so, by our "eidetic intuition" we are able to describe things as they appear, as .

It is, however, very important to realize that appearance (, illusion, , Entscheinung, image, symbol, etc.) is nothing else than the manifestation, epiphany of being itself (Erscheinung, , Ding an sich, reality, etc.). That is to say, that being is not only the back-ground of appearance, but also that appearance is the fore-ground of being. Appearance and being are not two absolutely and independent different realities (things) but one. Appearance is the being itself

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(1) "et veritas liberabit vos" and the truth will set you free".

(2) Cf. Logische Untersuchungen Halle, 1900; Ed. I deen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie, Halle (3d ed.) 1928.

(3) This is a revised and enlarged the original and enlarged edition of Die existenzielle Phänomenologie der Wahrheit "Philosophisches Jahrbuch" (der Görres-gesellschaft), (64 Jahrg.) Munchen, 1956

(7) cf H. CONRAD-MARTIUS Redeontologie "Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung Bd. VII (1925)

precisely as it appears (1). Only through appearance can I pierce into being (2).

The consequence of this constitutive relationship between being and appearance is very important. It gives to Phenomenology a direct philosophical relevance and allows us this metaphysical use of Phenomenology.

In other words, phenomenology does not need to be inscribed in the frame of an idealistic philosophy. It is not only the right method of Gnoseology (Criteriology), but also the first stage in approaching Ontology (3). It becomes Philosophy (4).

Further more, not only can Phenomenology be used as the method of an essential Ontology, of a Metaphysics of essences, but also as the apt vehicle of an existential Ontology, i.e., of a Metaphysics of existences (5). The existences, i.e., the existential dimensions of beings can be also submitted to a phenomenological investigation. (7)

However, such a Phenomenology ought to be complemented by the essential one. The two of them together would then be an introduction to the final phase of Ontology which transcends Phenomenology, for the phenomenological method only disclosed how things appear--as essences as well as existences--and not what things are.

We are going to use this existential phenomenological method--without submitting it now to a further direct study (6)--on one of the greatest philoso-

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(1) "La chose en soi, l'irremédiable mort, ne reste pas latente derrière les phénomènes en qualité d'incunaible, mais elle apparaît en eux, encore que pas adéquatement. C'est pour cela seulement qu'elle devient objet de connaissance". S. BOULGAKOF, Le Paraclet, Paris, 1946, p. 344.

(2) Cf. The enlightening study by HANS URS VON BALTHASAR, Herrlichkeit, Himielfeln, 1947, p. 69 sq. Cf. also: "Die Dinge sind tatsächlich als verhüllte enthüllt, und in dieser Gestalt werden sie zum Gegenstand des Erkennens" (234) " ... das Enthüllt-sein des Seins ist als solches seine tiefe Verhüllung" (235), cf. 245, 254, etc.

(3) Cf. M. HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit, (Halle a.d.S.)[3] pp. 27-39.

(4) Cf. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris, 1945 (Specially the Introduction)

(5) and (6) on page 3

ptical problem and so we shall describe this second, secular, face of truth, which, by the way, is the aspect stressed by Christian thinkers from the very beginning upto Descartes' time (and again nowadays) and also by some schools of Indian philosophy. It goes without saying that the smallest philosophical problem involves the whole of Philosophy and that all is function of all. But we cannot speak about all at the same time. We are not going to say what truth is, but how truth exists. This phenomenological essay intends nevertheless to be considered valid for the greater number of the main philosophical trends,

Phenomenology will be used, therefore, not as a logical analysis of the data of our consciousness in the essential sphere within the Husserlian gnosis, but, as the existential method of detecting what there is, without penetrating into that which that there is, or, so to speak, without penetrating into the inner sanctuary of that which there is (truth, in this case). The essential phenomenology tries to analyse that-which-appears-to-me (object, picture, that which lies thrown, placed, (given-to), before me). The existential one intends simply to describe that-which-appears; for I am not a mere spectator of the world process, I am involved in it: nay, I am an actor--a factor, if we prefer--in it (1).

It seems almost superfluous to call to mind that we neither deny the one essential face of truth with the implied validity of the epistemological considerations, nor do we lay claim to a full phenomenological description of the existential character of truth. We intend only to launch again a classical and traditional philosophical method, while trying to describe just a few aspects of the existential

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(from p. 2 (3) For this see two kinds of Metaphysics cf. E. GILSON, L'Etre et l'Essence, Paris, 1948 and its English counterpart Being and Some Philosophers, Toronto, 1949.

(6) We are well aware of the boldness and far reaching consequences of our attempt.

(1) It is not our concern to develop the circular philosophical implications of this method. I say circular because all are immersed in a circle; not vicious,

(contd. p.4)

truth (1) Husserl himself spoke of an "experience of truth" (2). We think that this experience transcends the essential dimension of truth.

This study has three parts:

A - an upward analysis - ἀνά - λύσις - of the presence of Truth in the world trying to find out the metaphysical basis of truth. Truth is being-reality (I) - but it roots upon the ultimate reality, i.e., in God (II). However, not God as God is truth, but God as a Self-knowing spirit, that is, God as Logos (III).

B - a downward analysis - κατά - λύσις - of the inherent limitations of human truth. That is, in spite of A and its consequences (Truth is Absolute, True, One ...) an existential phenomenology without denying them, discloses that human truth is relative (IV), negative (V), leaving place for error (VI), pluralistic (VII) and imperfect (VIII).

C - an existential analysis - παρά - λύσις - of the anthropological characters of truth, describing two of its principal features: purification and mediation (IX).

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but vital: the Philosophy man has (man chooses?) depends on the method one chooses (one has?) and vice-versa. And both are subject - really subject - to the kind of man one is (Cf. Fichte). But man is, philosophizing, and his Philosophy belongs also to his being. Cf. the deep metaphysical sense of Aristotle's ζητούμενε ἐπιστήμε

p. 3

(1) The number of footnotes to this article which are quotations from several religious and philosophical traditions are not to be interpreted as indulging in a superficial syncretism, but as examples of convergent existential approaches to the problem and as suggestions for a deepening insight into some fundamental intuitions of our human culture.

(2) "Erlebnis der Wahrheit" - Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Halle, 1928, p. 190.

A - ~~Ascensional way~~ ind

I - TRUTH IS REALITY.

Whatever ~~be~~ he causes of error may be, its nature lies in the statement, in the proposition. The case of truth is exactly the reverse. Whatever relation it may have with the statement, its nature lies in the thing itself (1). Taking the classical example from ~~the~~ Indian Philosophy: "This is a snake", is an error. "This is a rope" is the truth (2). If we suppress the first proposition we abolish the error altogether, but we do not abolish the truth by suppressing the second one. The "this", that "this" is, will remain and remain truth, independent of any human judgement. The "this" of the false proposition will also remain, and will not be false, but true, whether the this points to the extra mental rope, or to the imagined snake (true as imagined snake). The nature of truth ~~will be~~ is thus related to the nature of the "this". "S is P" may be a true statement, but the truth is the subject (3). S is that which is truth. That is to say, truth lies in reality itself, truth is that which is, truth is inside the very being (4). P is never truth, unless it is

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(1) We do not deny thereby that for the human historical existence truth and untruth are two aspects of the same unveiling process of being. (Cf. M. HEIDEGGER, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Frankfurt a.M. (3rd ed.), 1954, p. 19 sq.). That is not our existential-phenomenological problem.

(2) It seems that this example appears for the first time in Hindu literature in GAUDAPĀDA'S Kārikā on Māṇḍūkya Up., II, 17-18, though the example is most probably of Buddhist origin and is found in much earlier Buddhist texts. Cf. The Āgama-śāstra of Gauḍapāda, edited, translated and annotated by VIDHUSHEKHARA BHATTACHARYYA, (University of Calcutta), 1943, p. 28. Cf. The ~~Arist~~ Aristotelian Opposition between as real object and as imagined or rather pictural Copis. Polit., III (1281

(3) Subject does not mean the gnoseological subject of a known object but the Reality, the ontological ὑποστάσις more than the logical ὑποκεί ἐνον, which underlines any statement. It must be said once and for all that when we speak of Subject and Object we are not doing it within the frame of the idealistic thought from Descartes to Hegel, but in a realistic, existential way much more akin to the genuine Scholastic Philosophy.

(4) Truth in Sanskrit is सत्वं - satyam, but also सत्यं - satyam - which means properly Reality (coming from अस् - as - to be). Cf. Chandog. Up., VI, 8,7; Taittiriya Up., II, 1; etc., This सत and सत्यम् satyam, is for Indian

identified with S (1). Otherwise, P may be true when it is something of S, but never the truth.

We must beware of confusing the classicial distinction between the logical and the metaphysical concepts of Truth. The locus of the first lies in the judgement, whereas the second is to be found in the thing itself. This distinction however does not solve all problems, for truth is something more than a concept (2). The truth of S is not the truth of a part of the proposition "S is P", but the real ground for that which appears as S in the statement (3).

II - TRUTH IS GOD.

Truth is reality, truth is S, truth is the subject of a statement. But, what is S? What is this Subject?

"This is a rope" is a true proposition and we said that the truth is "this", the subject. But when, I say "this", the subject of the former proposition ("this is a rope") has been converted into predicate, it has been transformed into the object (predicate) of the second one. Thus, this "this" may be true, but cannot be the truth. I cannot say--or even think-- "this" without converting it into an object. Things in so far as they cannot put themselves as subjects, are always objects for me and therefore perhaps true--always true as objects--but never the truth. And the truth is absolutely necessary also for the truthfulness of any statement.

We must proceed, therefore, in a kind of phenomenological reduction, in quest of the subject.

Where can I find the pure Subject, the pure "This". Not of course in any object, nor, for that matter, in any subject of any proposition, because as soon as it is envisaged outside its object, my thinking converts it into an object. I have only one

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Vedāntism always one of the three main attributes of the Godhead. The Absolute can be equally described as सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तम् -satyam, jñānam anantam.--Reality, Knowledge, Infinite (Taittiriya. loc. cit.). Or as सच्चिदानन्द saccidānanda--according to the later Vedānta). Being, Knowledge (?) Bliss. Cf. that the Greek Trinity would be rather: γνῶσις . ἀλήθεια . ζωὴ truth, life, light. → 8, 1

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(1) Cf. the classicial principle of the Scholastic Philosophy: Verum et ens convertuntur, truth and being are equivalent.

(2) For the spirit in which the problem of truth should be seen. Cf. HANS URS VON BALTHASAR, Wahrheit, Einsiedeln, 1947, p. 11 sq.

(3) See next page

op. cit.

refuge: myself. If I can identify the "this" with me, I shall not have the S as object, but as pure subject. Now, is that possible?

"S is P" must, therefore, be converted into "I am P". Yet this change is relevant for we are not dealing with pure dialectics. Phenomenology is the philosophical method of analysing the pure ontological data (given indeed on the horizon of my existence, in my consciousness if we prefer). "I am P" is a pure dialectical statement unless I find the P that I am. In other words, I am not a real subject--and therefore the truth--if I cannot find the identical Predicate of myself. That is to say, I must be ontologically able to answer Who Am I: i.e., to be that which I am--if the I (of the "I am P") has to be the truth, the subject. But I am not able to fulfill such a requisite as long as I am in this world. (4)

I am not my body, I am not my mind, I am not my spirit or consciousness. I have a body, a mind, a spirit; but I cannot identify myself with any of the things I have or in which I share ((1). I cannot identify my I with my am either. I am not only my am as it is now (this/at moment). My am is indeed all that I am now, but not that which I was and still less that which I shall be. I am rather that which I shall be than that which I happen to be now. The real potentialities and hopes of my being are not yet present in my am. I am surely not this petty selfish am that I still discover in me. I shall be (my) I; I am--not--yet because my "nature" (natural) is not yet full, not yet born, not yet nature (gnata). (2). No--the I we are looking for--cannot be the changing subject of mere rela-

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(3)[of p. 6:] Cf. the deep metaphysical sense of truth in D. THOM., Sum.Theol., I, q. 16; et De Veritate, q. I, sq.

((1) Cf. the probably Pseudo-SANKARA'S Commentary on Māṇḍūkya Up. GAUDAPĀDA'S Kārikā II, 38 about the internal and external truth and its transposition into the Absolute Truth.

(2) Cf. R. PANIKER, El Concepto de naturaleza, Madrid, 1951, p. 292.

(4) "De me xiste nihilnente" says AUGUSTINE, Confes. X 5,7

tive human stages; He is different from what had-been and what shall-be (1). He simply is (in the supra-temporal way) (2).

Moreover, the expression "I" has no ultimate meaning. What does it mean? What kind of ego-limitation (3)? The I is the I; I is I, my I would mean the I that is mine, namely, the I that is of me. My I can never be the absolute Subject we are searching for. My I is always an object, the pronoun is always a Predicate (of me): "I am only the I of me". That is, I am not the real, ultimate I (4). There is, let us say, a deeper I within my-self (5). In the search for the ultimate subject we have been obliged transcended the ego and to face the absolute I. (8)

In other words: The truth is Sp but S is only S, when there is identification between S and P: when "S" in "P" is converted into "S is S"; when P is melted into S so that the subject can put Himself as ... Subject and Object in the same act (6). Only a knowing and free S can put itself as P; but only an absolute knowing and free S can identify itself with itself. (9) Our contingency, which is also a phenomenological fact, presents us from falling into egolatry. We cannot say--much less be--ultimately, I. (7)

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(1) अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च - anyatra bhutacca bhavyacca-different (being elsewhere) from the past and the future "Kathopanisad II, 14.

(2) Cf. the Johannine expression for God--and Christ--: ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος "qui est et qui erat et qui venturus est" - (He) who is, and (ever) was and is (still) to come". Apoc., I, 4: et, 8. Cf. the same idea, XXI, 6, etc. Cf. etiam Hebr., XVIII, 8 cf Rg. Veda X 90,2 et RĀMĀNUJA, Gitabhasya, IX, 18

(3) Cf. SAṄKARA criticising those who confound the Atman with the individual ego, Gita-bhasya, II, 19.

(4) "And the universe responds with the joyful cry I am" says SHIVDEN in his Poem of Ecstasy (quoted by A.K. COOMARASWAMY, The Dance of Shiva, p. 92), Bombay (Asia Publishing House 1948)

(5) This is a recurrent idea in the Christian tradition. Cf. the famous "interius intimo meo" of S. AUGUSTIN, as well as the sayings of St. THOMAS, Sum. Theol.,

(8) > — 8,3 (9) — > 8,2

(contd. p. 9)

(From Leaf 8) Cf. etiam "Ce que tu vois n'est pas,
tant est grand ce qui est." JACOPONE DA TODI, ~~ibi~~
ib. and the commentary of Catherine: ... "c'est-à-dire, toutes les choses visibles qui sont créés ne sont pas, elles n'ont pas l'être veritable, tant est grand celui qui est, Dieu, en qui est tout être vrai." loc. cit. Further on, "... l'être de l'homme ne peut en vérité être appelé 'être', mais plutôt 'perte d'être', ...", ib., p. 51.

(from p. 6 note(4) of p.5) Cf. the expressions Io., XIV,17; XV,26; XVI,13, and II Epist. Clementis, III,1; XX,5.

(from 9, note (5) of p. 8) Cf. etiam for the "intimius intimo meo CALVIN's brillant page, "Quod si nostri non sumus, sed Domini, ... ergo ne vel ratio nostra, vel voluntas in consiliis nostris factisque dominetur./.../ Nostri non sumus: ergo quoad licet obliviscamur nosmetipsos ac nostra omnia. Rursum Dei sumus: illi ergo vivamus et moriamur./..." Institutioneis christianae religionis, lib. III, cap. 7 (Opera Calvini, ed. Brunsvigae, 1864, vol.,II, col. 5o5).
And again: "Das Reich Gottes, das ist in euch' [Luc.,XVII,21, Matth., XII,28]. Wer das Reich finden will - das ist Gott ... der muß es da suchen, wo es ist: das ist in dem innersten Grunde, wo Gott der Seele weit näher und inwendiger ist, als sie sich selbst ist." J.TAULER, Predigt, Que mulier habens dragmas...(apud Ein Textbuch aus der altdeutschen Mystik, edited by H. KUNISCH, Hamburg (Rowohlt) (Klassiker der Lit. u. d. Wiss.), 1958, p.82.

(from p.8 note (9)) This was the right intuition of Kant, there is no P capable of a total identification with S. The "Ding an sich" is unknowable because there is no "sich" identical with the "Ding", except in God. P expresses the predicability of S but not its identity. Its identity lies outside any possible attribute.

(from p.11 note (3)) "L'espressione ḥaqīqa al-ḥaqq è classica fra i ṣūfi. Letteralmente dovrebbe tradursi: 'la realtà del Reale', o 'la verità del Vero' (ontologico), cioè, qui, il Reale unico, Dio,..." G.C. ANAWATI, L. GARDET, Mistica islamica, Torino (S.E.I.), 1960, p. 293

(from p.13 note (2)) (2) Cf the voice of the Christian tradition: "Scientia Dei est mensura rerum, non quantitativa, qua quidem mensura carent infinita, sed quia mensurat essentiam et veritatem rei. Unumquodque enim intantum habet de veritate suae naturae [essentiae], inquantum imitatur Dei scientiam, sicut artifex inquantum concordat arti [caudae exemplari]". D. THOM., Sum. theol., I, q. 14, a. 12, ad 3. It should not be forgotten however, that "Scientia Dei aliter comparatur ad res quam scientia nostra; comparatur enim ad eas sicut causa [efficien] et mensura." D. THOM., De pot., q. 7, a. 10, ad 5.

from pg. 8

(7) Cf. the voice o f the christian tradition: Any being "in sola causa prima habet esse absolute et simpliciter" (has its absolute and total being in the First Cause only). ECKAHRT, Exspos. in Iohan., I, 1-2 Nr. 44, op.cit. Cf. etiam: AUGUST., De. Gen. ad litt., V, 15; ANSEIM., Monolog., c.34 (P.L., 158, 189); D.THOM., In IOan., c.1, lect. 2 (694 a); BONAVENT., In I Sent., d.36, a.2, q.1 arg.3; etc. (quoted apud ECHARDI op. omn. in h.l.)

(8) Cf. the following testimony to bi added to those which we shall mention later on: "Il m'arrive cependant et il est parfois nécessaire de désigner ce moi, selon l'usage du monde qui ne sait parler d'autre manière; mais quand je nomme ou suis nommée par d'autres, je ~~di~~ dis en moi meme: Mon moi est Dieu, je n'en connais pas d'autre, ~~je di~~ hors mon Dieu lui-meme." St. CATHERINE OF GENOVA, Vita, XIV. (Trad. and ed. P.DEBONGNIE, Sainte Catherine de Genes (Etudes Carmelitaines), Paris, etc. (Desclée de Brouwer), 1959, p.49. Cf. JACOPONE DA TODI, Laude, 60,

"Je vis, moi et non moi,
Mon etre et non mon etre." (apud loc.cit.) → (pag. 8,1)

And again from another tradition "I am closer to you than yourself", IBN' ARABI, Tayʼolliyat, LXXX,

I is I, in the absolute identity we are searching for. I am who am. (1) Ahamasmi (2). That may be the absolute I within myself, but not my ego. The absolute I is the real name for God (3). He is who is (4); or better He is the only one who can say I am I, or simply I am. He is the absolute Reality and the absolute Truth (5). We do not need to deny God's immanence when speaking about the Absolute as a Thou; neither do we have to minimize his transcendence by calling Him

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from p. 8 - I, q.8 (specially a.1) et q. 105 (specially a.5). Cf. etiam I, q.12, a.4 ad 3; Let us quote, because less known MEISTER ECKEHART: "Gott ist mir näher, als ich mir selber bin", Deutsche Predigten, Nr. 36 (Ed. QUINT, München, 1955) p. 323. Cf. etiam: "In Gott ... sind die Dingen innerlicher und natürlicher inwesunt, als die Dinge in sich selbst sind", - Predist, 58 (QUINT, 425). This means 1- That not a mere phenomenological reduction, but only a theological reduction of the creature is capable of "finding" God in it, i.e. transcending-immanently, of course, the ego and reaching the Absolute. (Cf. again AUGUSTIN'S famous words: "Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas"; and the

(cf. O. Thom. Sum. Theol. I q. 4, a. 2)

polarity

2 - That the ultimate "subject" of the creature is the divine I. This was the intuition also of SIMONE WEIL: "Qui dit Je, ment!"

I wonder whether this idea of a transcendent I could be somehow read in St. Paul's utterance in Act., XX, 24. (...πολοῦμαι τὴν ψυχήν τιμίαν ἐμαυτῷ —"nec facio animam meam pretiosorem quam me"— "I do not count my soul worthier than myself"). -> 8,1

(De vera religione I, 39 (ML: 72))

(6) Cf. The description of subject by HANS URS VON BALTHASAR: "Ein Seiendes nun, das sich selber erwissen kann, weil es fuer sich selber enthuellt ist, wird Subjekt genannt. ... sein Sein hat die besondere Form des Selbstbewusstseins". Unkenntl. Chr. Glt., p. 35. "A being which is able to manifest itself, it is called Subject, because it is unconcealed for itself. ... its being has the special form of self-consciousness.

P.L. 34, 154

(1), (2), (3), (4), & (5) on p. 10

page 8

cf. in I Sent. d. 37, q. 1 a. 1, sol In III Sent. d. 32, q. 1, q. 1 ad 2.

Immanence-Transcendence: "Tu autem eris inferior intimo meo et superior summo meo" Confes., III, 6, 11 "Thou art deeper than my inmost self and higher than my uttermost being.")

I (1). He is the Absolute I (2). God is I (3). I is His name (4) He is properly

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From p. 9—(1) Cf. Rg., III, 13, sq.

(2) Cf. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, I, 4, 1. Cf. ațțam 10-ahamīdrśo'smīti.

(3) It is worthwhile to remember that ओम् , m, the sacred syllable, means, also, yes, amen, an affirmation. He is a Yogi. Cf. I Cor., I, 20. Cf. the Hebrew emeth, the pillar on which a building rests, etc, from which comes amen (cf. - J. DANIELOU, God and Us, London (Mowbray) 1957, p. 92)

(4) "By the words 'He is' is, he to be apprehended"—Katha Up., II, 6, 13 (cf. ŚAṄKARA, Brahma Sutra-Bhāṣya, III, 2, 21). ŚAṄKARA has a magnificent assertion: "Brahman is known as Bhūmā" (भूमन — bhūman, plenitude, fullness of being)- Chānd. Up., Bhūmā - II, 1).

(5) Cf. P.S. RAMANATHAN, God is Truth, "The Indian Philosophical Congress" XXVI, Poona, 1951, pp.79-83.

(1) Cf. the immortal expression of the Bhagavad Gītā, IX, 4-5: "By Me all this world is pervaded through my Unmanifested form. All beings abide (rest, lie) in Me, but I do not abide in them. Nor do beings abide in Me. Behold my divine mystery (Yoga)! Bringing forth and sustaining (creating?) all beings my Spirit (Self, Ātman) does not abide in them".
An exegesis of this wonderful text where the immanence and transcendence, the total dependance of the things and the absolute independence of God is affirmed would require almost a study of its own.

(2) Cf. अहम् —aham—, I derived from the root अस् —as—to be—. The I is the being.

(3) Cf. the wonderful first lines of Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. I, 4, 1: "In the beginning this (world) was only the self, in the shape of a person. Looking around he saw nothing else than the self. He first said, "I am". Therefore arose the name of I. Therefore even to this day when one is addressed he says first "This is I" and then he speaks whatever other name he may have" (Transl. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, The Principal Upaniṣads, London, 1953, p. 163).

(4) The Old Testament can be summarised as the preparation—Jahweh always keeping →

speaking the only I (1).

God is Truth in a two-fold sense. He is Truth as the divine Subject in the divine utterance I am and He is also Truth reflected in the manifold appearance of this world of becoming (2). He is the truth of truth (3). The Christian Trinity has been also described as "The True, the Truth and the Spirit of Truth" (4).

III. THE DIVINE LOGOS

"S is P", is true in so far as "P is S"; that is, in so far as there is an identity between the Subject and the Predicate, one remaining unutterable subject and the other predicate. P does not need to become S in order to be true, but must be the real, the true predicate of the subject.

God is the only one absolute Subject and in consequence the only absolute Truth. Things are true--which amounts to saying there are--in so far as they are objects of this Subject, for they are not subjects unto themselves (5). They do not

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alive this religious thirst--to know the name of God (cf. Is., III, 6; Jer., XVI, 21). That is the task of the "Servant of Jahveh" to "declare His name" to men (cf. Ps., XXII, 23). The mission of Christ on earth was to make known the name of God (cf. Jo., XVII, 3,6,26). Only, this ἐγνωρίσθη --this making known--(v.26) is an ἐφανερώθη --a manifestation, an epiphany (v.6)--of Christ as His Son. "You will know that ἐγώ εἰμι --I am--(Jo., VIII, 24) is an echo of Is., XLIII, 10. The ἐγώ εἰμι --I am--[illegible] carries with it the solidarity, (I would say the replacement) of Christ with God" C.H. DODD, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, Cambridge, 1954, p. 96. For the importance of the ὄνομα θεοῦ the name of God as a kind of power over the Godhood itself in the magics cf. A.J. FESTUGIÈRE, L'Idéal religieux des Grecs et l'Evangile, Paris, 1932 (Excursus E: "La valeur religieuse des papyrus magiques") p.283-299.

p. 10.

(1) "Im, das Wort 'Ich', ist niemanden eigen als Gott allein in seiner Einheit", says the profound MEISTER ECKEHART, Deutsche Predigten (Ed. J. QUINT, Munchen, 1955, p.302).

(2) It is perhaps on this truth on which the gods were meditating upon according to Brihadaranyaka Up., V, 5, I: ते देवाः सत्यं एवोपासते--Te devah satyam evopasate. Cf. the subtlety of the continuation and its curious interpretation by Śaṅkara. (in h.p.)

(3) सत्यस्य सत्यं Satyasyasatyam--, the Real of the Real, the Truth of Truth--Brihadaranyaka Up., II, I, 20. → 82

(4) " Ἅλ ηθινὸς, καὶ Ἀληθεια, καὶ Πνεῦμα --Ioann. Damasc., Orthod. Fidei, XXIII, 2 (P. G. 35, 1164). ἡ ὁδὸς Ἀληθείας

(5) on p. 12)

put themselves into existence; they do not give to themselves their being (subjects) (1). By the very fact that they are ob-jects (ob-jecta) of God, they become sub-jects (sub-jecta) only in relation to the objects they produce (they ob-ject, they throw, lay before themselves) (2).

We are not concerned now in analysing the nature of this dependence. Our problem is only this: things are true insofar as they are; and because they are, they may realize the peculiar being that they have received; and they have received their being insofar as they are ideas, parts, participations, expressions, creations, emanations, predicates of God (3). Each metaphysical school will choose the word it thinks it fits better into its conception (4).

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(5) of p. 11 - cf. the Scholastic "... non sunt suum esse, sed sunt esse habentes "They are not their being, but they are having being" (referring to the angels as the most perfect creatures) Or in general: "nulla creatura est suum esse sed habet esse participatum". "Not a single creature is its being, but has a participated being". D. Thom. Sum. Theol, I, 9.12, a.4.

(1) "Universas creaturas et spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt ideo novit: sed ideo sunt quia novit ... Quia ergo scivit creavit, quia creavit scivit" "(he) does not know all creatures both material and spiritual, because they (already) are, but they are (only) because He knows them ... Therefore because He knew them, He created them; (and) because He created them, He knew them". AUGUSTIN., De Trinitate, XV, 13, et "Quia enim et esse illi [scil. in Trinitate] unum est" "To known and to be, there [within the Trinity] is one and the same thing", loc. cit XV, 14, (P.L. 42, 1076). Cf. ibid. VI, 10 et 11; Conf., XIII, 11, etc.

(2) The Cartesian cogito ergo sum (I think, I exist) has its ontological--and even phenomenological basis--in a cogitor ergo sum (I am thought, therefore I am). Cf. V. BALTHASAR, H.V. Wahrheit, op. cit., p. 68.

(3) "Deus est ens, per essentiam, et alia per participationem"--God is essentially Being; All others (things are beings) through participation--D. THOMAS, Summa Theologiae, I, 9.4, a.3, ad 3.

(4) on p. 13

Phenomenologically we distinguish, therefore, the truth of the object when it corresponds ~~with~~ to the subject--logical truth--and the truth of the subject--ontological truth when it is the "object" of the absolute Subject. What the character of the objectivity of the subject is, is a different problem (4). altogether

"This is a rope" is not ultimately true, when I say it and in the sense I ~~say~~ express it ~~is~~, but it gets its truth so far as it is God who utters "this is a rope": for his utterance of this as a rope means precisely the rope and, of course, the "this" that is a rope. On the contrary, when we say "this is a rope" we do not make the this or make the this to be a rope either. We only discover that "there is a rope" and our statement is true, as it would be an error if we ~~would~~ should say "there is a snake". Here we can see the difference. Our internal private logos corresponds to the realm of our internal private truth. It is not creative of truth, but discoverer of truth. "This is a snake" is also true if we mean by this that which we imagine or see in our fearful and dark phantasy during our twilight walk. Only if we were able to create the subject then we ~~would~~ should be creating its truth at the same time. This is the temptation into which the doctrine of Absolute Idealism has fallen and yet Idealism it is not false from the standpoint of the absolute I; for certainly ~~the~~ Truth is the product of an Intelligence. (2) Only that the divine I is more than λόγος (Logos, Intellect), it is also πνεῦμα (Spirit). ~~But~~ We can on the other hand only say "that" to the subject in our thinking or in our imagination, but not to ourselves or to the reality. (1)

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(4) of p. 12 - We do not need to recall that St. THOMAS at least once uses the fearful word "anarchic" (Cf. Sum. Theol., I, 9.45) to prove that what matters is the conception behind the words.

(1) Cf. our ~~previous~~ paragraph on The Concept of Ontology for this purpose.

① Cf. the language of Christian spirituality: "For me to be a saint means to be myself. Therefore the problem of sanctity and salvation is in fact the problem of finding out who I am and of discovering my true self." Th. MERTON, Seed of Contemplation, London (Hollis & Carter) 1948, p. 26

② → 8, 2

In other words: Truth is the product of a Logos. But our logos can only bring forth the truth of the object and is impotent towards any subject. Moreover, we disclose the object and with it its truth, because, in some way, the object has been already put as a subject by the divine Logos: i.e. has been already "thought" by God (1). The divine Logos, on the contrary by His "thinking" produces—creates—His objects to be subjects. Things are that which the Logos, the absolute intellect "thinks" of them (2). That gives to them their own intelligibility (3), and being (4).

In a special and peculiar sense—about which metaphysicians may dispute—we are "thoughts" "predicates", "objects" "things" "creatures"—through, from and

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(1) Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS: "Unaquaeque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum intellectum a qua dependet ... Et similiter res naturales dicuntur esse verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt in mente divina". Sum. Theol., I, q.16, a.I. "Everything is called true absolutely, according to the intellect (mind) on which it depends... And so the natural things are called true in so far as they attain the likeness of the ideas which are in the divine mind".

(2) "D.d.q. quodammodo una est veritas, qua omnia sunt vera, et quodammodo non.... Et sic, licet plures sint essentiae vel formae rerum, tamen una est veritas divini intellectus, secundum quam omnes res denominantur verae". D. THOM., Sum. Theol., I, q.16, a.6

"I say that the truth by which everything is true in a certain sense is one and in certain sense not ...And so, though manifold are the essences of forms of things, nevertheless one is the truth of the divine mind according to which everything is called true".

(3) "Id quod facit nobis intelligibia actu per modum luminis participati, est aliquod animae, et multiplicatur secundum multitudinem animarum et hominum. Illud vero quod facit intelligibilia per modum solis illuminantis, est unum separatum, quod est Deus". D. THOM., De spiritualibus creaturis, a.10,c. "That which makes things intelligible to us in act by the way of a participated light, is something from our soul and is as numerous as the multiplicity of souls and men. But that

(contd. p. 15)

in the Absolute.

"Thou art that" (1). I have made thee "what thou art" (2). But my ego cannot say, "I am thou". To myself, of course, the Absolute I is saying "(I am) that", "(I am) you", otherwise my that, my ego, His ~~xxx~~ would not exist at all. The whole mystery of this worldly existence is that He, the Absolute I, God, is uttering--so to say--"That", "You" without completing the expression "I am that", "I am you" from our temporal point of view. Indeed, he is uttering this, but to us, it appears as a future: "(I) shall be that", "(I) shall be you". When time is over (I do not say shall be over!) we shall be able to realise the full truth of ourselves, i.e. the meaning--and personal-identity of His saying "I am that". My ego will have realised the truth and will simply answer (my being is only a divine answer) "You!" "You are", "You are the I", "You are I". And my real personality--my true ego--is this "Thou" of yours; it is this thou that is me! (3) That what you really are is a you "That art ~~xxxx~~

(from p. 14) - which makes things intelligible by the way of illuminating sun, is the separated one, which is God". cf. Gītā, XIII, 17

(4) - Cf. the enlightening study by J. PIEPER, Philosophia negativa, München (Kösel)

(1) तत्त्वमसि -tattvamasi-, the famous formula--mahāvākya--of the Upaniṣads comes in Chandōgya VI,8,7, precisely in relation with the truth. Cf. also ŚAṄKARA, Upadeśa-sahasrī, I,2,7 and the whole chapter II,18 which bears this very title. Cf. specially vv.170-173, 192, 193, 197.

(2) So translates KNOX "Εἰς οὗτὸ τοῦτο (ἐξηγειρά σε)"--in hoc ipsum excitavi te--Rm., IX, 17. Cf. Ex., IX, 16-17 et also note (2) p. 21.

(3) This is in my opinion, the real attainment--more than merely conservation--of our own personality (My ego is properly a you) and is also the solution of the classical difficulty: "How O beloved, should he know the Knower?" (Bṛihadāraṇyaka Up., IV,5, 15, cf. also id. III,4,2. "You cannot think the thinker of thinking. You cannot understand the understander of understanding" (Transl. and. T.M.P. MAHADEVAN--The Upaniṣads, in S. RADHAKRISHNAN'S History of Philosophy, Eastern, Eastern, London 1952 I, p. 59). Cf. D. THOM., Sum. Theol., I,q.14,a.2. The knower is not known--in our

(contd. p. 16)

you (1). We are one (2). ___ "and that is three" (3)

(from p. 15) final status—as object, as known (it would be no more knower; we would know the known, not the knower), but as Subject. "Videntem videre" as St. AUGUSTINE puts it ("visio Dei viventis et videntis") Serm. X, de verbis Domini (Brev. Rom. de Comm. Abbat.). That is only possible knowing with the knower, being a part of Him, seeing with Him. Cf. the voice of Christian tradition: "Man muss wissen, dass Gott zu erkennen und von Gott erkannt zu werden, Gott zu sehen und von Gott gesehen zu werden der Sache nach eins ist. Indem wir Gott erkennen und sehen, erkennen und sehen wir, dass er uns sehen und erkennen macht". (das er uns machet bekennende und sehende) ECKEHART, Deutsche Predigten, Predigt 35, op.cit. pag. 317. Cf. also, the gnoseology of St. AUGUSTINE. Cf. vg.: F. BÖHNER, Deus in homine. (*) Of a possible interpretation in that sense of Chānd. XIII, 2. ŚAṂKARA says that "Avidyā is not a proper property (dharma) of the knower" (Chānd. Bhāṣya, h.l.). "Et in lumine tuo videbimus lumen". Ps., XXXV, 10 ("and in your Light we shall see the Light). And thus the whole Christian Tradition has interpreted that text. (cf. also Apoc., XXII, 4-5, Is., IX, 19). But on the other hand: what does the knower know?—or what do we know knowing with Him? He can only know Himself; but He as object is no longer the Knower, but the Known. That is correct and not correct. To that point the central Christian Mystery of the Trinity gives an answer. We shall be one with the Son, who is the Logos, the Intellect, the Knower. (Cf. Jo., XIV,9: "Qui videt me videt et Patrem" along with Jo., XVII, 23: "Ego in eis, et tu in me". Cf. XIV, 20). Cf. the doctrine of Nicolas Cusanus and my Introducion al "De visione Dei" del Cusano. Cf. the initial question of Mundaka Up: "What is that, Sir, knowing which that everything becomes known?" I, I, 3; and the answer of Johannes Scotus Erigena. The "beatific vision" will not be the seeing of a light, but, rather, being engulfed in Light (Cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, London, 1955, p. 126). And much before Christian Scripture — 17

(* videt (Das Subjekt des menschlichen Erkennens nach der Lehre Augustins) Philosophisches Jahrbuch (64) München, 1956, pp. 166-217.)

(1) → pg. 17
(2) → " 18
(3) → " 16, I

(3) So says for instance the Ṣūfī mystic ABUL'-QĀSIM al-QUSHAYRĪ (XI century) Risāla, Cairo (ed. Ansārī) 1948, p.136. Or, in the words of another Muslim mystic: I looked and saw, that Lover, Love, and the Beloved are all one, for in the world of union all must be One" ABŪ Yazīd YAZĪD (apud R.C. ZAEHNER, Mysticism - Sacred and Profane Oxford (Clarendon) 1957, p.196) As Zaehner remarks the attribution to Abū Yazīd of Biṣtām may not be genuine. The same identification between the Knowledge, the Knower and the Known is to be found too in the Jewish Mysticism. Cf. for instance G.G. SCHOLEM, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, London (Thames & Hudson) 1955, p. 141 (quoted by ZAEHNER, loc. cit.).

"Union, He Who unites, and He Who is united"

That is properly the Logos, the Thou of the Father (1). That is

(contd. from p. 16) - itself: "Tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum" I Cor., XIII, 12. My knowledge will not be a separated knowledge or a knowledge of objects, but I will know first of all being known (ἐπεγνώσθην) and then, being the "known" of the Knower, know--be--along with Him. Cf. also Gal., IV, 9. Moreover the way of Knowledge--not of knowing things, but of being known and so become Knowledge--is a way of Love: "Si quis autem diligit Deum, hic cognitus est ( ) ab eo" I Cor., VIII, 3. This is a Johannine motif which we should now not develop lest we digress from our main theme. Regarding the question of the Mundaka Cf. ŚAṄKARA Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya, I, 1,4. Neither Brahman of Vedānta, nor the God of Christianity is strictly speaking an object of an vision or knowledge. "Videre et videri unum sunt" "To see and to be is one and the same thing" says ECKHART (Expositio S. Evang. sec. Johan, I, 12, Nr.10, summing up an idea of St. AUGUSTINE (De Trinitate IX, 12 Nr.18. P.L. 42 970)

(1) of p. 16 - This is at least my reading of the Upaniṣadic mahāvākya quoted above. We have then a text which could be given after a point of deep contact between Hinduism and Christianity. Both recognise the supreme identity. The Hindu reading would be the following: Thou art that! That is to say: You, the real you of yours is not body, soul, ego-consciousness, but Thou art that, i.e., Brahman. It is an ontological tautology which the Upaniṣadic seer brings down to the disciple: recognise your identity with the one Self--because only the self is, and that which you can only be the in that is the Self. Thou art that; because there is only one Thou and that is the that, i.e., Brahman.

The Christian reading could be put like this: Not only there is one ultimate Thou and this is the Absolute, i.e. God, but there is still more: What you really are is a Thou. That art thou. Ultimately, that is, in the eternal order, we all are one in Christ (I Cor., XV, 28; Gal., III, 28; Col., III, 11;--which unity begins in Baptism I Cor., XII, 13;--). "That they all may be one; that they too may be one in us, as Thou Father, and in Me, and I in Thee, ... And I have given them the power (glory,) which thou gavest to me, that they be one, as we are one. I in them and Thou in Me, that they may fulfil the perfect unity". Jo., XVII, 21-23. The meaning of the temporal process is the reconciliation, the "recapitulation", the summing up, the gathering into one, of the whole creation in Christ, with Christ and into Him.

→ 18

(cf. Original 3 lines lacking)

what we are, ultimately, a part of the Logos (1). And Truth is the

(Continuation of (1) of p. 16 - (Col., I,20; Eph., I, 10; I Jo., II, 2; Col., I, 15-17). In the eternal order we are one with Christ and He is the eternal, Thou of the Father. We are the thou of God. The Trinity-tension of identity and diversity is the clue also for the ultimate problem of the reality of creation. Our text tells us--or we read into it--that we are the thou of the I, that we are insofar as He the I utters us and we are asked to recognise this our Thou-identity. It is more than a tautology. It is the Revelation of the Mystery hidden in God's eternity and unveiled in and by Christ (Eph., I,9; I Cor., II, 7 sq. etc.) We leave for another occasion the development of this point.

(2) of p. 16 - Identity cannot go without diversity and vice-versa. The Trinity is ultimately the clue to it. Vedantic tradition and as a whole Indian Wisdom has stressed the former, whereas the so called Western Philosophy has emphasized the latter. The Trinity gives us an answer equally balanced: we are one with God because we are one with Christ and Christ is one with the Father. We shall never be the I but the Thou of the I. But this Thou, though being distinct--as thou--, is not another "thing", is nothing but the Thou, the consciousness, the image, of the I; it is the I as Thou if we understand it rightly. In order to offer the atmosphere in which we said all this we may quote the following Thomistic texts: "Quidquid est in Deo, Deus est" ("Whatever is in God is God") De Pot., q.8, a.2,c. "Creatura in Deo est ipsa essentia divina" ("Creature in God is the divine essence itself") - De Pot., q.3, a.16, ad 24. "Creatura-nihil autem relicta in sua considerata nihil est: unde prius naturaliter inest sibi nihil quam esse." ("Creature, left to itself, considered in itself is nothing, hence, primarily, according to its own nature, nothingness rather than being is in it") De Pot., q.5, a.1, c. "Illud quod habet esse ab alio, in sua consideratum, est non ens." ("That which has its being from another, considered in itself is non-being"). De Pot., q.3, a.3, ad 4. ~~And in connection with the note ( ) of page 1 , we also: "Sed quia Deus sua acta et se et omnia intelligit, unicum Verbum eius est expressivum non solum Patris, sed etiam creaturarum" ("But because God by one act understands His self and all, His unique word expresses not only the Father but also the creatures"). Sum. Theol. I, q. 34, a.3~~ Cf. also note (1) of page (128).

became the Logos is the true Light of Being (2).
Logos (1). / In the Logos God and world somehow meet (3). → 19, 1

(1) of p. 17 - Cf. Ep., II, 7 and all its development in Christian Scripture and Tradition.

(1) of p. 16 - We cannot develop further in this occasion this idea which belongs to a christocentric conception of reality. Cf. beside others, the philosophic-theological works by H.U.v. Balthasar, E. Behrens, E. Hocnah, et alii, J. Daniélou, M. Schmaus, R. Guardini, and not rare, although seldom K. Barth, N. Berdiaeff, S. Bulgakof, etc. besides the traditional writings of the "Fathers of the Church" and some "Scholastics".

(1) "But it is not any sort of Word--concludes St. THOMAS--but one who breathes forth Love. Hence Augustine says (De Trinit., IX, 10): "The word of which we speak is Knowledge joined with Love", Sum. Theol., I, q.43, a.5, ad 2 (For St. AUGUST. cf. P.L., 42, 969).

(2) Cf. τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν (Io., 1.9) "lux vera" "the true Light"; ... ἡ ἀλήθεια διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐγένετο (Io., I, 17) "veritas per Jesum Christum facta est" "Truth has come to be through Jesus Christ". All this is concerning the Logos. (cf. also Io., XIV, 6 and also सत्यं ब्रह्म सनातनम् --satyam brahma sanātanam--Kaiv., Shiva-Purāṇa CXXI, 5. "Truth is the eternal Brahma", i.e., the eternal divine utterance (ब्रह्म , brahma seems to be the noun form from ब्रह्म् breath to speak, to grow, to burst forth to breathe and it is also supposed to mean holy utterance, divine Logos). I am not qualified to enter into the controversy about the etymology of brahma- Cf. J. GONDA, Notes on Brahman, Utrech, 1950: E. Thieme Z.D.M.G. 102 (1952) 91-129; L. RENOU, J.A. 237 (1949) 7 sqq., H. ZIMMER. Philosophies of India, Newyork, 1956 pp. 74-83. T.M.P. MAHADEVAN, The Upanisads, in S. RADHAKRISHNAN History of Philosophy Eastern, Western ch. cit. I, p. 60

(3) Cf. AUGUSTINE saying: "In nomine Verbi significatur non solum respectus ad Patrem, sed etiam ad illa quae per Verbum facta sunt operativa potentia" (By the name of the Word is meant not only a relation to the Father, but also to all that which has been made by the Word, through his active power") Questions, Lib., LXXIII, quaest., 63. and the important article of St. THOMAS, Sum. Theol., I, q. 34, a.3.

from 18 →

Truth is the Revelation of Being (1). It is the Light that shines in darkness (2). Any truth from whatever source it may spring, comes ultimately from the Divine Spirit (3).

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(1) "Verum est manifestativum et declarativum esse", says St. HILARY quoted by St. THOMAS, De Veritate, I,1. J. PIEPER (Traktat Uber die Klugheit, Leipzig (Hegner), p.51) translates: "Wahrheit ... bedeutet gerade die 'Offenbarkeit des Seins'."

(2) As important references for a comparative study on the light's metaphysics cf., Śvetāsv. Up., III,6 and 8; Īśa Up., V; Mund. Up., XIII,1,7; Bṛhad. Up., IV,4,16; (ŚAṄKARA's bhaṣya in h. l.); Chānd. Up., III, 13,7; GĪtā, V,16; X,41; XIII,17; XIV, 17; etc., sed necnon AUGUST., Sermo 67, c. 5, n. 8,9 (P.L., 38,437); Contra Secundinum Manichaeum, c. 26 (P.L.,42, 602); IOHAN. SCOTT. ERIUGENA, Homilia in Prol. Ev. Iohan., (P.L.,122, 290) reffered to by D.THOMAS, Expos. cant. s. Ioh., c. 15 (393 a) and somehow modified in De veritate, q. 8, a. 7 ad 2; BONAVENT., Sent., I, d. 3, p. 1, a. unic. q. 2, obi. 2; II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, ad 5; d. 4, a. 4, a. 3, q. 2; etc. Cf. etiam, "lux in tenebris lucet'. Res enim maximum omnis creata sapit umbram nihili." ECKHARDT, Expos. in Ev. sec. Ioan., I, 1-5, n. 20. "Lux deus, et omne quod divinum et perfectio est. Tenebrae omne quod creatum est ..." ib. n. 72. "Omnis substantia influens in aliam est lux in essentia vel naturam lucis habens." De intelligentiis, VII, 1 (8, 21) (apud ECKHARDT, op. cit.).

(3) → 19,2

(from p. 19,1) note (3) (3) Cf. the continuity of the Christian Tradition: "Quia super illud I Cor., XII, [3] : 'nemo potest dicere, Dominus Jesus, nisi in Spiritu Sancto', dicit glossa Ambrosii [cf. Glossa Lombardi, (P.L., 191, 1651 A); Glossa Ordin. (P.L., 114, 54c B); Ambrosiastrum in h.l. (P.L., 17, 245 B)]: 'Omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a Spiritu Sancto est'." D. THOM., Sum. theol., I-II, q. 109, a. 1, in l. (cf. etiam ad 1). There is a kernel of truth in every point of view: D. THOMx., De malo, II,2.

Cf. etiam In ~~Corr~~ I Cor., XII, lect. 1; In Joan., VIII, lect. 6.

EXEMPLAR PONTIFICIA

B. Dialectical way

IV. HUMAN TRUTH IS RELATIVE.

Meanwhile, during our pilgrimage on earth, during our being-in-time, and being-time— we are nothing but a knot of time, hoping to become, to arrive at the end of time and there to be (1); while this temporary interval lasts, we cannot reach the absolute truth, but we cannot renounce the truth either. We shall have to unveil in ourselves and in our knowledge the true nature of being (2). We must try to discover, therefore, our specifically human temporary truth (3).

"S is P" is the expression of the truth, but as we are not the absolute Subject and cannot create any real subject either, the necessary identification for telling the whole truth of S, for being the primary S, is beyond the power of our being, because it is beyond our being itself. We are only a predicate, a God's object, a God's word, besides being, at the same time and in the same act, not only the "object" of His Logos, but also the object of His Love. It is this second dimension of our being in relation to the Trinity which prevents us from falling in pure Intellectualism—even of the loftiest kind.

a. Existentially.

The proper human truth will have an inverse character in relation to the

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(1) I should have developed at length what has been stated in my "Introducción a [illegible]"

(2) Cf. the Concept of unveiling— अवधारण —avadhāraṇa in ŚAṄKARA'S Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, I, I

(3) "Nunc filii Dei summus, et nondum apparuit quid erimus"—οὐπω ἐφανερώθε — τι ἐσόμεθα —" I Jn., III, 2 "We are sons of God (even now, but it has not yet been manifested, (revealed, realized)—what we shall be [illegible].

absolute divine truth (1). My being true will consist not in being a Subject—which is He, the I—but in being a Predicate (His Predicate) (2). It goes without saying that it is not a question of a logical predicate, but of an ontological one, and even this with an ontic degradation regarding its identity with the Ultimate Subject. The more I am P, the more S is P will be true, and the more I shall come closer to S, the more I shall truly realize my self. The truth of my being will grow up in the same way as my own being approaches its goal, the fullness of Being. The truth of my being will depend upon my loyalty to the Self, upon my obedience to my being. Truth has to be searched for (3), to be sifted (4),

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(1) "Vos itaque ista quae fecisti videmus quia sunt. Tu autem quia videmus ea, sunt." (We see the things—that you have made—because they are. But you (God) because you see them, they are). AUGUST., Confessiones, XIII, 38

(2) Cf. the living and profound expression of St. Paul speaking of the life-giving —ζωοποιοῦντος —God ... καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, calling the non-beings (to be) as beings". Rom. IV, 17). Cf. S. AUGUST., Serm. 158, 3 (P.L. 38, 863) et Serm. 26, 5 (P.L., 38, 173 sq.) We are simply a non-being called to be like a being. The Call and this likeness are constitutive of our existence. Cf. the Old Testament: "Tibi servient omnia creatura tua: quia dixisti et facta sunt. Emisisti Spiritum tuum et creata sunt, et non est qui resistat Voci tuae" "Every creature of yours may serve thee: Then Thou sayest (uttered) then and they were made. You sent your spirit and (all beings) were created. There is no-thing which can resist your Voice" Judith., XVI 17. Cf. Esth., XIII, 9. Cf. also Note ( ) on page (15)

(3) Cf. the Greek expression: ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας —the search for truth— Theaetet., I, 20, for Aristotle, Hist. I, 8 (191a 24): ζητοῦντες μὲν τὴν ἀληθειαν δείαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων —They, (the first philosophers) were at the quest for the truth and nature of beings— Cf. R. FAUREZ, El concepto de Naturaleza, op. cit., Madrid, 1932, pp.95, 129

(4) Cf. the presocratic expression: "κρίνειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν" —ANAXAG., frags. 21 (and DIELS, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, I, 403, 14); et also Ep., VIII,

to be "done" (1). We must believe in Truth (2). Truth does not dwell primarily in my intellect, but in my being (3).

The consequence of this ontological character of truth is a very important one: Man approaches only to truth by being himself truth (4). A more

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16: ἥ κείσις ἡ ἐμὲ ἀληθινή ἐστιν — my judgement-separation, selection is a true one". Cf. etiam κρῖναι λόγῳ by PARMENIDES, frag. 7, 5.

(1) "ποιεῖν ἀλήθειαν", to make, to do truth is a common expression of the Old Testament. Cf. Gen., XXXII, 10; XLVII, 29; Exod., XIX, 33; et etiam Jeb., IV, 6; XIII, 6. DODD (Op. cit., 174) translates "to practise fidelity", with the meaning of "to act honourably" but the modern original and the translation have to be understood as expressions of the existential and personal dimension of truth. I wonder whether an American edition would translate "be truthfull to yourself". cf. note ③ of page 35.

(2) πίστις ἀληθείας — PARMEN., frag. I, 30: 8, 28, (apud DIELS, I, 139, 9, et, 156, 14.) πιστὰ λέγειν came to mean ἀληθῆ λέγειν (to speak faithfully means to speak truly—the truth). Cf. HERODOT., I, 132; II, 73. (apud BULTMANN art. ἀλήθεια in KITTEL'S, Theologisches Worterbuch des Neuen Testaments). Faith is properly the human organ of truth. Cf. Chandogya Up., VII, 19: "Verily, when one has faith, then he thinks. One who has no faith does not think. Only he who has faith thinks. But one must desire to understand faith". (So, S. RADHAKRISHNAN and also R.E. HUME). The German translation allows a closer grammatical connection: "Wenn man glaubt—Sraddhadhāti— dann denkt man. Der Nichtglaubende denkt nicht. Nur der Glaubende denkt. Den Glauben also muss man zu erkennen wünschen—vijijnasitavyeti—". Cf. also the striking sentence of Katha Up. I, 17: " .... as the offerings were being carried away, faith entered into him (Nachiketas), who was yet a boy and he thought ..." We have here: (a) Faith as a gift; (b) in connexion with the sacrifice, (c) not requiring the mature mind of an adult, (d) being the starting point of a—higher—thinking. For Sraddha cf. etiam Brahadāran. Up., VI, 2,9: Chandog. Up., V,4,2; etc. For πίστις cf. BULTMANN'S article in KITTEL'S, et etiam R. AUBERT, Le problème de l'acte de foi, Louvain, 1945; ~~etc.~~, etc.

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theoretical or intellectual apprehension is not possible (1). Our intellect can only adequately apprehend what belongs to its level, that is the essential or logical-- aspect of the truth, but not its existential--or ontological--kernel. Thus, Truth is not something which we possess, but rather something which possesses us, by which we

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(3) of p. 22)-The Sanskrit expression तत्वं, तत्वं --tattvam, tatvam--, expresses in another way as the Greek concept ἀλήθεια the existential and supra-intellectual features of truth. तत्वं.--tatvam--is the state of being that, is the reality as it is. ἀλήθεια , on the contrary, suggests the uncovering or unveiling of the truth, hidden, forgotten, (λήθη) in the interior of the thing. On the other hand, cf. also the truth veiling the absolute in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up., I,6,3: "This is the immortal , veiled by the truth (the real, satyena). Verily breath is the immortal (amṛtam)". For the rather dialectical relation between truth and immortality Cf. ŚAṄKARA'S Commentary on Bṛhadāraṇ. Up., V, 5,1: "Name and form are the truth (the real, satyam); by them this breath--prana--is veiled (covered) "Cf. also Gītā II, 5, 18.

(4) of p. 22)-Cf. the expression "paravam brahma-veda brahmaiva bhavati"; "Those who know the Supreme Brahman (the Truth) become Brahman (the Truth). Mund. Up. III, 2,9. This text along with others (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa , X, 5,2,20; Bṛhad. Up., I, 4,7--and ŚAṄKARA in h.l.--ib., I, 4,5; etc.) would allow to build up a metaphysical meaning of prayer, rather of contemplation akin to the Christian one (We hope to be able to do this in the near (?) future). follow in pg. 5, 1

(1) "Brahman is to be known by being it" T.M.P. MAHADEVAN, The Upanisads (History of Philosophy Eastern, Western--ed. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, I, p. 71). Cf. ST. AUGUSTINE: "Horunt fideles corpus Christi si corpus Christi esse non negligant: fiant corpus Christi si volunt vivere de Spiritu Christi: de Spiritu Christi non vivit nisi corpus Christi". Tract., XXVI in Joan. "The faithful will know the Body of Christ if does not ~~neglect~~ fail to be the Body of Christ. They must become the Body of Christ if they want to live ~~from~~ in, by the Spirit of Christ, for only the Body of Christ lives ~~from~~ in, by the Spirit of Christ". Cf. Gītā Up., III, 19, 21; XVIII, 37.

are possessed (1). Or better, in which we find the very being of ourselves. I do not approach the real truth by knowledge of the manifold, but by wisdom about the only one (2): wisdom, which does not despise the true knowledge, but has it as an element(3).

(1) R. PANIKKAR, F.H. Jacobi y la Filosofía del sentimiento, Buenos Aires, 1943, p.8 sq. Cf. S. THOMAS AQ. saying that the metaphysical truth does not belong to Man as something which we possess but as something we borrow—"non competit homini ut possessio sed sicut aliquid mutuatum" In I Metaphys., 3, (n.64). That is the same claim of S. KIERKEGAARD when he says that God cannot be object for Man because He is the Subject. Cf. the English version by A. DRU, The Journals of Sren Kierkegaard, London, 1938, entry 630. The same spirit we find in India: "With the whole Indian tradition, Śaṅkara insists on those subjective factors because, ... truth is not like the possession of an object; it is personal, it is the realisation of the innermost Self, and it requires therefore a conversion, not only of man's erroneous notions, but of his most intimate attitudes, towards himself and towards the world". R.V. DE SMET, The Theological method of Saṅkara, Rome (Pont. Univ. Gregor) Pro manuscripto) 1959, p.120/121. Cf. the Christian conception of conversion,— of μετάνοια, changing of νοῦς and of γνῶσις (spirit and intellect)—required to ~~receive~~ accept the Christian Message: Cf. Matth., III, 2; Marc., I, 15, etc.

(2) Cf. Ibid., X, 42.

(3) ज्ञानं विज्ञानसहितं —jñānaṃ vijñānasahitaṃ—says the Gītā, IX, 1. "Knowledge united with experience, wisdom joined to realisation, personal experience is the hidden secret which brings liberation from evil". Cf. also Gītā, III, 41 (ज्ञानविज्ञान —jñānavijñāna) and VI, 8. (Cf. the fine expression jñānavijñānatṛptātmā—, one—the yogi—whose spirit is satisfied by jnana and vijñāna.

Wisdom, which ~~ESSENCE~~ ultimately is a divine gift, and properly is the consciousness of being known rather than knowing (1).

But our existential access to the truth is never finished on earth. That is why nobody on earth either possesses the whole truth, or is fully possessed by it. Moreover, the way to the truth implies an internal approach with our whole being, the good will being as important as the right mind (2), the pure heart being as necessary as correct ideas (3). The πρώτον ψεύδος, the main error of the so called "modern Philosophy" has been to believe that there is a pure rational way to the truth.

The human truth is relative to our ontological position. But our ontological position is unique. Nobody can be at my place. Only that my uniqueness, does not mean exclusiveness because this my singularity is precisely my very relation with the Only One (not all exclusive, but all inclusive, because of His absolute Uniqueness).

b. Essentially.

Nevertheless, truth has also an essential side which is expressed properly in the statement "S is P". And here our truth is also relative. Not only is it impossible to identify myself with the truth, but it is also impossible to identify absolutely any real subject with any predicate, the subject being always an existence and the object an essence. The error or rather, the confusion of Western Idealism has been to believe in such a possibility, and as this identification is only real for God, it has been dialectically forced to postulate the human mind as divine Spirit.

"S is P" will be true when P expresses something that S is; but no

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(1) Cf. I Cor., VIII, 2,3: Gal:, IV,9; VI, 3. An exegesis of these texts would lead us too far. Cf. only the tension and polarity of ἐπιγινώσκω and ἐπεγνώσθην (I Cor., XIII, 12) and ἀγνοούμενοι — ἐπιγινωσκόμενοι (II Cor., VI, 9). We are, insofar as we are known, (by God), as we have already pointed out.

(2) That is a common place of Christian Theology and of Indian Philosophy. Cf. as a single example the 4 marvellous ascetic conditions of the disciple, of the student of philosophy, stated by ŚAṄKARA in his Commentary on the Sūtras—I, I.

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P can exhaust the being of S (1).

Not only can the existence of S not be translated into P; but neither can its complete essence (for our mind). "S is P" is never fully equivalent to "P is S". That is why error--and in the ontological sense, sin--is possible, when we take for granted an equivalence which does not correspond to reality (2).

In other words: the classical definition of the logical or anthropological truth given by the Medieval Western philosophy: adaequatio rei et intellectus, the correspondence of thing and idea, has acutely recognized that identity--aequatio-- cannot be reached and has introduced a deep dynamical expression: ad-aequatio (3)- con-venientia-a way to the identity, meaning that so long as we are in that world of duality(5) we can only asymptotically reach the truth (4).

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(3) of p. 25 - Cf. Matth., V, 8. Precisely those who have a pure heart will see-- ὄψονται --God.

(1) "Sein (die Existenz) ist offenbar kein reales Prädikat" said KANT in his Critique of the Pure Reason, dealing with the famous ontological argument, (Insel-ausgabe, Leipzig, 1913, p. 463).

(2) The following figure explains graphically what is ment: "S is P" is only true in the shaded part shaded field and both circle can never coincide. Besides, the pure existence on S expressed by its circumference can never be reached by P which is always just a more circle. My knowledge of S is only the shadowed one, but my independent knowledge of P can be greater. If I think that P_1 belongs to S, I commit an error; and also if I think that S is only the common sector with P.

(3) Cf. the concept संवाद् --samvāda--'correspondence', 'coherence' of the Naiyayikas's Theory of Truth, though perhaps the dynamic aspect of "adequatio" is absent.

(5) "Regio dissimilitudinis" realm of dissemblance, as St. BERNARD calls it in the XIIth Century, this our temporal world. Cf. the masterly study by E. GILSON, The Mystical Theology of St. BERNARD, London, 1940 (specially pp. 33-39).

(4) That is why it will be always true that the world will know the Absolute in Non-

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Truth has to be wrought out (1).

V. THE DEFECTIVE ELEMENT OF HUMAN KNOWL.

We are allowed, however, to formulate "S is P" and it will be a true judgment so long as we keep in mind the limitations and the relativeness of our statement. But we have a specific human way of approaching truth: the "via negationis", the way of negation (2).

"S is-not Q" is in some sense closer to the truth than "S is P" (granted of course P ≠ Q) because although the contents of the statement may be poorer in its capacity to let us know something about S, the proposition as such has not the limitations of the affirmative one.

"S is P" can never be an absolute identity; but, "S is-not Q" is an absolute negation of the identity. This logical absoluteness cannot be taken not-

knowledge Cf. the fine expression of Ps. DIONYS. AREOP., (S. MAXIM, Scholia in lib. de Div. Nom.). Ἐν ἀγνωσίᾳ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ κτῶμεθα γνῶσιν Divinis nominibus, II (P. G. 4, 216). And again: ἀγνοίᾳ γὰρ γίνεται γνωστὸς ὁ θεός "Ignorantione enim Deus cognoscitur" (Ibid). Cf. the fine distinction between "ignorantia" and "ignatia". "God is known by ignorance", but it follows immediately that is not "non quae ex imperitia— ἀμαθίας —oritur", but that "ignorance" "qui cognosci potest"— ~~ἀμαθίας~~ ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν ἀγνοίαν γινώσκεται γνωστὸς —. (Ib., 217). Cf. note (3) page (29).

(1) Cf. the text of ŚAṄKARA—~~whose~~ commentary does not belong to this place, but which allows a deep metaphysic al interpretation of the unveiling of Truth (ἀ-λήθεια): "Super-imposition, ... what men consider to be Knowledge (Avidyā), and the ascertainment (avadhāraṇa, the unveiling) of the true nature of that which is (vastusvarūpa) [the Brahman-Ātman] by discriminating it from that [i.e., from the Non-Self superimposed on the Self], they call knowledge (vidyā)" Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya, I, I (apud. R.V. DE SMET, The Theological method of Śaṅkara (~~Pre~~ Op. cit, ~~Manuscript) (Univ. Gregoriana Rome) 1955~~; p. 70.

(2) Cf. the famous ~~Neti-Neti~~ (primary utterance) of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up., II, 3 6: neti neti. "Non est hoc Deus, non est hoc" ~~simile similiter~~, St. BONAVENTURA, collatio II in Hexaemeron, nr. 32

physically. That is to say "S is-not Q" states something logically different from the metaphysically equivalent: "S is-not-Q" where we have once more the simple affirmation "S is P" (supposing, as-Q=P) (1).

About every subject we can always state more readily what it is-not than what it is. And about the absolute Reality, being ourselves relative, we go deeper into its truth by knowing what it is-not than by knowing what it is; for if it is true that it-is, it is not in the way in which alone we can think that it-is (2). He is known as unknown (3). He is a hidden God (4). Not only human

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(1) We cannot enter into the metaphysical problem of Nothing. Cf. S. THOM., In Boethium, q. 1B, a.2, ad 5: "creatura est tendens impetum et ex nihilo" "the creature is desirous in order as it is out of nothing". Cf. idem ib., q. 5, a. 1C, ad 3; etc.

(2) Cf. among thousand similar expressions: Bhâgavatam Pur., II, 3, 6, III, 9, 36; ANSELM., De Trinitate, VII, 4; VIII, 3; XV, 28; etc., De Online, II, n. 44; JOH-CHRYSOS., (P.G., 48, 711-790); GREGORIUS, Naz., 207 (P.G., 37, 307); A. BASIL MG., De Spiritu Sancto, XVIII, 44 (P.G., 32, 148 sq.); etc.,

(3) "Cognoscitur tamquam ignotum" D/ THOM. A., In Boeth. De Trinitate, prooem, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1. Cf. idem q. 1, a. 2.

(4) Cf. Is., XIV. 15. Cf. also the world as self-concealment of God as तिरोधान tirodhâna. Cf. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, The Bhagavad-Gîtâ (3 ed). London, 1950. p. 41. (Cf. Gîtâ, X, 11). Cf. the little jewel of the dialogue by NICOLAS CUSANUS- De Deo abscondito. Cf. H. PINARD, KA De Deo abscondito, "Arbor" Nr. 25 (Madrid, 1948). For a good part of the Greek tradition, cf. A.J. FESTUGIERE, La révélation d'Hermes Trismégiste-IV,- Le Dieu inconnu et la gnose, (Etudes bibliques) Paris (Gabalda) 1954.

truth; truth itself has a certain negative character (1).

On the other hand, logical negation can have, metaphysically, only a positive, that is affirmative character. Pure negation does not exist even in the ideal-realm. It is unthinkable, for it ought not to presuppose something to be negated (in which case it would not be pure negation), and if it were negation of nothing it would make no sense, or it would be the most affirmative statement. Negation is always negation of something and this something is positive. The negative Theology says that God is neither this nor that but by this and that we mean--and can only mean--the world and our limited conception. He is not this that we see, not that that we think. But both, this and that, are the starting points of our negation and affirmation that He is beyond. (2). In that sense the hetaphatic Theology includes both affirmation and negation (3). It is obviously much more than a "via remotionis" a path to clear up the obstacles of our mind (4). Ultimately the fact that we cannot know positively the Transcendence is not an imperfection, but it manifests the perfection of both, of our knowing power and of the Transcendent itself.

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(1) The Greek expression ἀ-λήθεια is a pure negation of a negative action: Not-to-conceal.

(2) Cf. the expression by Dionysius Areopagita, De divinis nominibus, VII, 3: καὶ διὰ γνώσεως ὁ θεὸς γινώσκεται, καὶ διὰ ἀγνωσίας (p.G., 3, 872) "et per cognitionem Deus cognoscitur et per ignorationem" (God is known by knowledge and by ignorance), and compare it with Isā Up. 9-11, where it is said that विद्या —vidyā— and अविद्या —avidyā— are both necessary (and both impotent) to attain the end.

(3) "How can we make such a statement about It, seeing that all else we say of it is said by negation?" asks PLOTINUS, Ennead., VI, 8, 11 (transl. S/t. MACKENNA). The answer is given boldly by ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: "Hoc ipsum est Deum cognoscere, quod nos scimus ignorare de Deo quid sit". Comm. in Dionys., VII, 14. "Precisely that is to know God: to be aware that we are ignorant about God what He is". He is known by unknowing: "Et est cursus divinissimus Dei cognitio quae est per ignorantiam cognita", in the Latin version (Joannes → 30

That is why one of the best statements about the Absolute is to say that it is सदसत् —sadasat— being (and) non-being (1). God, the Absolute is simply A and non-A and is-not A, and non-A, not because He is contradictory: but because (being beyond any possible contradiction, i.e., negation) He is infinite

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Sententiis) of Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, VII, 3 (P.G., 3, 872): καὶ ἔστιν ἕνωσις ἡ θεολογία τοῦ θεοῦ γνῶσις, διὰ γνωσθέντα καὶ γινωσκομένην and the text follows (Ming version): secundum illam, quae, supra intellectum est, unionem, quando mens a rebus omnibus recedens ac deum semetipsam deserens ...

(4) of p. 29 — So far we would agree with G. VALLIN, Essence et forme de la Théologie négative, "Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale" Paris, IV-IX-1958, (Nr. 2-3) p. 168.

(1) Properly, being and not being सदसच्चा —sadasacca— (Gītā IX, 19). "I am being and not being (Oh Arjuna!)" सदसच्चाहमर्जुन —sadasaccāhamarjuna— is the perfect formula. He does not say भूताभूत —bhūtābhūta— esse et non-esse, or better natura et naturata, but सत् et भूत (भूत past.part. of भू to be to become and सत् pres. part. of अस् to be). On the contrary He is भूतभृत् —bhūtabhṛt— (Supporter of beings) and भूतभावन —bhūtabhāvana— (source of beings) cf Gītā IX, 5. He says further not to be "being nor not being": सदसत्तत्तदुच्यते sattānnāsaducyate —Gītā XIII, 12.) This second pure negative expression makes ineffective the interpretation of सत् —sat— as manifested or present being and असत् —asat— as unmanifested and past-future being: because he is neither sat nor asat. Cf. ṛtam: "Then was not non-existent nor existent" Rigveda, X, 129, I (Transl. Max Müller). Or, "Then there was neither being nor not being" (S.N. DASGUPTA). Cf. Subāla Up. I, 1 and II, 1 et ṛtam Śat. Brāh., X, 6, 3, 1 & 2.

and being only A would be limited by non-A. So he includes both (1). But not in the sense that He is A and non-A, so to say B, for He is, neither A nor non-A (2). The negation cannot be too loud either (3). We have rather to listen than to ask (4). "He is that from which all words recoil" (5). Silence is

(1) Cf. the language of Christian mystics in the Middle Ages: "The pure Word answered and said thus: I will tell thee more: unless man can understand two contraries, that is, two contradictory things, together, then truly and without any doubt it is not easy to speak to him of such things. For, until he understands this, he has not yet started out on the path of the life that I am talking about". HEINRICH SEUSE, Buchlein der Wahrheit, c.5 (Engl. transl. and edit. by J.M. CLARK, "Honeyfuse", Little Book of Eternal Wisdom and Little Book of Truth, London, 1953, p. 190.

(2) Cf. Kenopanisad, I, 3: अन्य एव तद्विदिताद्अो अविदिताधि - anyadeva tada viditādathō avidiṭādhi — "It is different from what is known and beyond what is unknown". Cf. Gitan II, 2 "He who knows It as the non-unknown and as the known, he knows it. यो न मत्ता वेद तद्वेदनो न वेदेति वेदच - yōnmatad vēda tad vēda nō na veditī vēda ca—

(3) "Quae pugna verborum—says S. AUGUSTINE between our affirmation and the knowledge of the ineffableness—silentio cavenda potius quam voce petenda est". De doctrina christiana, 6 (P.L., 34, 21) "This struggle with words must be rather deepened with silence, that spoke by speech".

(4) "O Gargi, do not ask too much, lest thy head should fall off. Thou askest too much about a deity about which we are not to ask too much. Do not ask too much, O Gargi". Brihadarana. Up., III, 6 (MAX MULLER's Transl.). "Inquere, Domine, quia audit servus tuus" I. Reg., III, 9 Cf. St. Paul: "Non plus sapere— ὑπερφρονεῖν —quam oportet sapere— φρονεῖν —sed sapere ad sobrietatem— σωφρονεῖν — Rom., XII, 3.

(5) Cf. the laconic phrase of Taittiriya Up., यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते —yatō vāchō nivartantē— "that from which all speech turns away" (whence (all) words return"). II, 4, 1, et II, 9, 1. Cf. parallo passages: Brhad. Up., III, 8, 8; 9, 27; IV, 2, 4; Katha, III,15; VI,12; Kena.III,8,11; etc.

cf etiam Atharva Veda XI 7,28: "[Hiranya garbha - The golden embryo - beyond which nothing else is to be said" We have to stop somewhere

better (1).

VI. THE PLACE OF ERROR

"S is P" is a true statement but not the truth. It contains only a partial truth about S and about P. If we go beyond the interval for which it is valid, error appears. This can happen in two different ways.

1. Extrapolation:

This is the abuse of a partial truth pushing the subject beyond its limits. "That is a snake" is a false statement if we mean by "this" the real rope which lies on our way some steps ahead of us. We said "S is P" but in reality we should have said "S_1 is P". It is not the thing before us that is a snake, but the image we have formed in our imagination which is a true (image of a) snake (2). The most striking example in our days is the new Physics. The only error of "classical" Physics had been to extrapolate the validity of its conceptions beyond the microcosmic field for which it was—and still is (macroscopically)—valid.

We always say—and are compelled to say—S; but as we cannot get the full S, for in reality S is for us is $S_1 + S_2 + S_3 \ldots$

Thus "S_n is P_n" will be true; but not "S (n) is P (n)". We thought erroneously S = S (n).

2. Interpolation:

This is the inclusion of some heterogeneous element in the Predicate. "That is a rope" will be a false statement if we mean by rope the ultimate reality of "That" which we call with a right a rope. "That" is surely a rope; but it is much more than a rope and we fall into error if we think of "that" only as a rope and nothing more.

We say—and we cannot do otherwise—"S is P"; but we are not able to exhaust the Predicate of S and so really we mean: S (n) is P (n)" which is only true for "Pn" but not for "P (n)".

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(1) "Deus honoratur silentio, non quod de ipso nihil dicamus vel inquiramus, sed quia intelligimus nos ab ejus cognitione fecisse". "God is honoured by silence, not because we wish not to say or to search about Him, but because we understand that we

from 32 →

We said already that the place of error is the statement and therefore, that it properly belongs to the logical sphere. Error however is also connected with the existential situation of man. First of all, without falling in a purely intellectualistic identification between error and evil we can easily discover that error has also a moral resonance, and that ignorance as a cause of error is not always free from sin (1). Error can enter also when we proudly overstep the limits of the statement and fall then pray to a sheer ~~x~~ "nominalistic" nothingness (2).

In order not to complicate our study on truth by introducing the akin problem of error we shall limit ourselves to a simple remark on the place of error.

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(1) "Error manifeste habet rationem peccati, non enim est absque praesumptione, quod aliquis de ignoratis sententiam ferat." D. THOM., De malo, q. 3, a. 7.

(2) Cf. the spiritual climate of following sentence: "The essence of the 'truth' most glorious and most exalted is nothing but Being. /.../ Every 'how' and 'why' have made their appearance through Him; but in Himself He transcends every 'how' and 'why'. " JAMI, in E.H. WHINFIELD, Lawā'ih, London, 1928, p. 12 (apud MARGARET SMITH, The Sūfi Path of Love, (An Anthology), London (Luzac) 1954, p. 48.

VII. THE EXISTENTIAL INSEPARABLE PLURALITY OF TRUTH.

It is commonly said and generally accepted without much criticism that "Truth is One". We shall have to analyse this special statement "S is P".

Truth, the absolute truth, which is the unique absolute Reality, i.e., God, is undoubtedly One. But, when in human discussions that Oneness of truth is pompously pronounced, generally it is not the uniqueness of the Absolute but the righteousness of one's own opinion which is meant. And the danger of this formulation is that it overlooks the existential character of truth and indulges in a one-sided essentialism, if not, in a too narrow rationalism. "S is P" only contradicts "S is Q" in the case that Q = non P. But, for us, S accepts many predicates, because none of them exhausts the subject.

Truth, the absolute Truth is one, because Truth is the Reality of the Unique Being. But here on earth, during this interlude of our human life in which we have still to-be, in as much as we are simply in a state of becoming, truth is also the very real existence of each being and so human truth is as manifold as human existence itself. Each being, has so much of truth in it as it has of being. About the nature of that truth or the nature of that being the several philosophical systems may dispute, but it does not concern the first analysis of an existential Phenomenology.

We can, therefore, say: The relative existential truth of the world and, specifically, of human beings is one, in so far as there is one being, and is manifold in the measure that beings are manifold. Each being is truth in so far as each being is being because my being truth and my being being is one and the same thou art that uttered by God.

"S is P". I am S (thing) in so far as I am P (that) that the Absolute is "creating", "making", "calling" ... me to be. I am S—myself—insofar as I am

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are made by His knowledge'. S. THVM. AQ., In Boet. De Trinitate, Prooem., q.2, a.1

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(2) Cf. SANKARA, Brhad Up. Bhasya, V,14,4. Cf. h.l. ad ation Brhad Up., IV,1,4, relating truthfulness with sensual evidence (i.e. with that which we see with our eyes).

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(obedient to, or fulfilling the) P. (The P that I am called, supposed ... to be).

There is, nevertheless, a subtle but very important temporal difference: The thou pronounced by God is my being. The that is my truth. From the stand point of God we could also invert the terms and say that the thou is my truth, my present imminent truth--truth is here Subject--and that is my being, my pilgrim be-ing, now towards its full being--my being is here God's Predicate (not logical, of course). Properly speaking we are not yet the 'that' which we shall be, and for the same reason we are not yet the 'thou' which He eternally utters. This is the constitutive tension of the created ex-sistence about which the Christian Middle Ages used to speak. In the realm of the Absolute, beyond any time (1), my being and my truth are one and the same thing. Thou art that, is the divine "speech" of God's Being and God's truth that I am. But meanwhile, immersed as we are in time, tat tvam asi, the "thou art that" takes the shape "thou shalt be that". The truth is my goal, my end, and that which I shall-be. I have to make, to conquer my truth! (2).

In other words the truth, my truth is my real being that I shall-be. This truth is the ontological path of the becoming of my being, here on earth, and the real goal of my full-being once I have grown up to the fullness of my way (3). Truth is गति (Gati) (4).

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(1) Cf. Aitar., X, 6.

(2) Cf. Jn., XVI, 24 utilising this expression: "qui facit veritatem"--he who does, who makes the truth--which has its roots in the Old Testament. Cf. Gen., XXXII, 10; XLVII, 29; Tob., IV, 6; XIII, 6. It is not known that the Hebrew concept of truth expresses rather a moral category than an intellectual one. → 34,1

(3) Cf. Ephes., IV, 13.

(4) सत्यं हि परमागति —satyam hi paramā gati—says the Mahābharata (Śānti-parva, CLXII, 4) "Truth is the greatest end". गति Gati means way and the end of the way as well (It has been translated also as refuge). It is the state of going and of the end of the going. Cf. Gītā, IX, 18, where Kṛṣṇa says he is gati. It comes from the root गम् —gam—to go. Cf. the capital question → 35

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from p. 34 note (2) The Hebrew has not even an equivalent for νοῦς . When it rarely appears in the version of the LXX it corresponds to lêb, heart. To express the intelligence the N.T. following in this the A.T. generally says heart, καρδία, lêb.

(from p. 37 note (1) Cf. etiam, ..." quia una actione generat filium, qui est heres, lux de luce, et creat creaturam. quae est tenebra, creata, facta, non filius nec heres luminis, illuminationis et creationis." ECKHARDT, Expos/. in Io., I,5, n. 73 (op. cit., p. 61)

(fragmentos (2)

That is why the truth, is that which shall-be, and for us, human beings, it takes the shape of that which I ought-to-be. Truth is duty (1). It is धर्म —dharma (2). We have to do the truth (3). It has to be witnessed (4), not as an external imposition from somewhere, but as the inner ontological law of our becoming, of our growing towards being. This law of our MINE being is our truth and belongs to the most intimate structure of our existence, so that in this sense truth is our own being as it has to be, as it ought to be, as it shall be, if we do not fail in this earthly adventure of dis-covering, shaping, redeeming ... our own being. (5)

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34 of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad: "what is the mūla (pal, end, ground, foundation ...) of this world?" I, 9, 1

(1) Cf. Mīmāṃ., IV, 15. This is not the pure moral duty of telling the truth (Ing. XVIII, 20) and to be simply in our speech (Mattth., V, 3), but of doing the truth (ἀληθεύοντες) of being in the truth.

(2) सत्यं सत्सु सदा धर्मः सत्यं धर्मः सनातनः satyaṃ satsu sadā dharmaḥ satyaṃ dharmaḥ sadā tanaḥ—Śāntiparva, CLXII, 4 "Truth is always dharma in the beings, truth is eternal, Cf. ibid. XLXII, 24 the ethical aspect of truth: "There is no dharma greater than Truth and no sin greater than untruth. Really truth is the ground (basis, root, standpoint) of dharma".

(3) Cf. AUGUSTINE'S "Veritatem facere" (Confes. X, 1) as a traditional echo of the injunction of the Gospel. (Cf. Io., III, 21). Cf. note (1) of page 22

(4) Cf. Io., XVIII, 37: "What I was born for, what I came into the world for, is to bear witness of the Truth. Whoever belongs to the truth, listens to my voice". It is an expression which does not have model or parallel in the Old Testament. (according to BOBB, op. cit., ἀλήθεια "stands here for the realm of pure and eternal reality as distinct from the world of transient phenomena" (p. 176). But we cannot enter here in the discussion of that sentence).

(5) Cf the enlightening and deep Study by F. INCIARTE, Die Reflexion bestimmungen im dialektischen Denken, (Dissertation Cologne) Köln, 1957.

From this point of view, we cannot say that truth is one; a formula which has been used only too often to impose and compel the acceptance of truth. Truth is my being and nobody can invade that which makes the unutterable ontical relation between God who calls me and my being which is His calling (and my answer). Truth is as manifold as beings are manifold. I must follow my own personal way and there is no other way I can take in exchange or no other way is equivalent to my way. I am/very my own way.

On the other hand, this plurality of truth is ineffable, is incommunicable as my being is unutterable (1). Ultimately it is so, for the reason that my being itself is nothing else than a divine utterance and that any other expression will be always a second-hand formulation which will not give me being, but be only a translation of it.

For that reason we are not allowed to draw any conclusion from that multiplicity of the existential truth. It would be a ~~full~~ complete mis-understanding of the problem to indulge in any kind of relativism or even indifferentism. Moreover, as soon as I begin to speak about the truth, I descend to the realm of essences and there, it would be wrong or rather non-sense to defend any multiplicity of truth. The existential truth expresses the oneness, the uniqueness of each being and as such is ineffable. Whatever expression I try to formulate will be an essence and must needs be an universal, therefore common/to others (otherwise it would be incommunicable, i.e., unintelligible), and in consequence neither my truth, nor pluralistic.

VIII. THE ESSENTIAL INTRINSIC UNITY OF TRUTH.

If truth is manifold as beings are manifold, truth is also one as beings

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(1) "Individuum ineffabile" says a principle of the Scholastic Philosophy: The individual is unutterable.

are one. Things are ἓν καὶ πολλά one and many (Plato). The unity and Plurality cannot be put separately.

If there is a certain plurality of truth, it would be false to conclude that truth is not one. Not only is the absolute divine Truth one, but also our human relative truth is one. And this in two senses:-

I. Metaphysically

I am the thou of a divine utterance--my ~~de~~ I write ! ?--, but if from MY point of view my ego is not your ego, my person is not your person, from the standpoint of the Absolute, He does not pronounce twice Thou Art that! in order to call you and me into Existence. Not only is the divine and timeless Being One, but also the beings produced, created, emanated ... by His Being are one. The whole creation--if we like this expression--the whole world is also one. The "S is P" of the divine Logos is only one. He says only once an eternal "S is P" and within this P, so to say, all that is, is included (1).

Τὸὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται was the happy formulation and deep intuition of Aristotle: Being is said in many ways, πολλαχῶς , but nonetheless it remains the being- Τὸὄν --(2).

In whatever way we may explain this unity and plurality, if by creation, analogy, μίμησις, μέθεξις, δόξα , haecceitas, time, existence, monades, theism, pantheism, Parentheism, etc., the fact remains that being in its deepest sense, is one, and therefore, truth is one.

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(1) I have tried to show elsewhere that this was the common theological idea in the Middle ages and in the Patristic time. Cf. as a single traditional example: "Deus enim cognoscendo se, cognoscit omnem creaturam. Verbum igitur in mente conceptum, est representativum omnis ejus quod actu intelligitur. ... Sed quia Deus uno actu et se et omnia intelligit, unicum Verbum ejus est expressivum non solum Patris, sed etiam creaturarum". "By the very fact of knowing Himself, God knows every creature. The word conceived by any mind is the representation of all that which it, {in act}, really understands... But because God in one and the same act understands Himself and every thing else, His unique Word ~~re-presents~~ not only the Father but also the creatures" S. THOM., Sum. Theol., I, 9, 34, a.3. cf. note (1) of page 16.

(2) → 38 → 34, 1

2. Logically.

Although our intellect is not all our being and we have to be very careful not to confound the essential aspect of reality which our intellect can grasp with reality itself, nevertheless the intellectual dimension of our being is not only our most precious gift but it is also the only means we have whereby to know, to feel, to have consciousness and in some sense, to be.

We cannot give up the attempt to know the truth and even to try to formulate it.

In that sense also, the expressed, the formulated truth must needs be one, as our intellect reaches--up to a certain point, but reaches nevertheless--to the essences of beings and discovers the essential structure of the world. Here is the realm of the principle of non-contradiction which safeguards not only our thought, but also the essential unity of the world (1).

"S is P" would be the perfect essential knowledge of all things which attracts as an ideal all our intellectual statements (2). In fact our knowledge deals with "S_1 is P_1", "S_2 is P_2", "S_3 is P_3" and so on. And within each statement the truth can only be one. That is to say, if S (n) is P (n), it cannot be that "S (n) is P (n)". Our intellectual truth of S (n) is only P (n) and not P (n). The truth of S (n) is only one, P(n) and here we could apply and develop all the rules of Logic, pointing out to a dialectology of truth. In this sense also, "truth

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(2) of p. 37 - ARISTOT., Metaphys., IV. 2 (1003 a 33) cf. etian (1003 b 4)

(1) "Unumquodque est intelligibile in quantum est unum. Qui enim non intelligit unum, nihil intelligit, ut dicit Philosophus in IV Metaph., "Everything is intelligible inasfar as it is one. He who does not understand the one, does not understand anything as Aristotle says". "THOMAS AQUIN. De veritate, q.21. a. 3

(2) "Quanto scientia est perfectior, tanto est magis unita; the more perfect a science is (knowledge) the more one (united) it is" THOM AQ., Sum. Theol., III, q. 11, a.1, ad 1.

is imperishable, everlasting, unchangeable" (1).

IX. THE CATHARTIC AND ESOTERIC NATURE OF TRUTH.

Truth will set us free (2); knowing properly the hidden knowledge we shall obtain liberation (3); Truth is ever triumphant (4); life everlasting is to know Thee--Christ--and--God (5); only the wise man is free (6); ignorance, that is, the non-knowledge of truth is the cause of all evils (7); error and sin are not without an intimate metaphysical connexion (8). Everything is grounded on truth (9);

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(1) -सत्यं नामाग्र्यं नित्यमविकारि--satyan nāmāgryayan nityamavikāri--Bhāgavata, loc. cit. CLXII, 10.

(2) Cf. Jo., VIII, 32.

(3) Cf. Gītā, IX, 1

(4) Satyam eva jayate "truth alone conquers", Upaniṣads Up., III, 1, 6. Motto of the Constitution of the Republic of India.

(5) Cf. Jo., XVII, 3.

(6) That is the very title of a treatise by Philo, Περὶ τοῦ πάντα σπουδαῖον ἐλεύθερον εἶναι --"Quod omnis probus liber sit". (Cf. edit. Cohn and WENDLAND, 1896-1906) And this belief is perhaps the most common place of the hellenistic popular Philosophy, namely that γνῶσις --gnosis-- liberates from εἱμαρμένη --the fate--. Cf. C.H. DODD, Op. cit., p. 176 sq., et A.J. FESTUGIÈRE, L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'Evangile, Paris, 1932, pp. 101 sq.

(7) For avidyā, as cause of delusion cf. Katha Up., I, 2, 4: Bhāgavata, I, 3, 33, etc.

(8) It is not necessary to recall Socrates and his late posterior influence. (cf note ① of p 32,1)

(9) सर्वं सत्ये प्रतिष्ठितम्--sarvan satyē pratiṣṭitan--Vahab., loc. cit., CLXII, 5.

Excelsi", "I have said: You are gods and children of the Most High" (Ps. LXXXI,6) and its interpretation by Christ Himself: "Si illos dixit deos, ad quos sermo Dei factus est -

- et non potest solvi scriptura ...", "If He had called gods to whom the word of God has come and Scripture cannot be abolished" ... Io., X,35

Truthfulness and infinity belong together ②

true holiness is a sanctification in truth (1). In one word, truth brings liberation and truth is realization (2). These are only a few instances of a perennial human tradition, old and modern, eastern and western.

Two considerations are here obvious: First, that this truth meant by almost all religions and philosophical traditions in the world is not a mere correctness of the statement, but an existential truth (3). Second, that truth has a cathartic function (4): i.e., performs a purification of our being, not due to any magic or esoteric character, but thanks to the very nature of truth and its relation with our being (5). Truth brings liberation and carries our realization because it is in itself Freedom and Vision of God (6).

It is very instructive to follow the rise, decline and growth again of

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(1) "Ἁγίασον αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ" —Jo., XVII, 17—immediately the text adds: ὁ σὸς λόγος ἀλήθειά ἐστιν —"it is thy Logos that is Truth".

(2) "Cf. three different and yet similar concepts each of which bears a whole culture in it: contemplatio, θεωρία (theoria) and बुद्धियोग (buddhiyoga).

(3) As far as the New Testament is concerned, it has been proved—usque ad satietatem—that its concept of truth is an existential one. Cf. vgr. BULTMANN'S article ἀλήθεια in KITTEL'S Wortbuch (op. cit.); C.H. DODD, op. cit., p. 152, 170 sq; A. WIKENHAUSER, Das Evangelium nach Johannes, Regensburg, 1948, p. 168 sq., etc.

(4) For the Platonic conception of κάθαρσις, cf. Sophist., 226 d; Polit., 293 d., 303 d, 308 c; Leg., 700 d sq., etc. for Aristotle, cf. Polit., 6 (1341 a 23); 7, (1341 b 38-39), etc.

(5) Cf. T.M. CHUNG, The Nature of Truth (The Indian Philosophical Congress, XXV, Calcutta, 1950, 1, p. 200), describing the nature of truth as mantra, the function of which is neither to instruct or to delight but to awaken in us the Avatara of the Reality in order to convey to us the Supreme Being.

(6) Cf. I Jo., III, 2: ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα ὅτι ὀψόμεθα αὐτὸν καθώς ἐστιν "we shall be like Him because we shall see Him, as He is". The intuition, the perfect knowledge, the vision of God will make us God. Cf. the same idea from the standpoint of God, seeing us speaking us out "Ego dixi dii estis, et filii

~~It is very instructive to follow the rise, decline and growth again of~~ this cathartic aspect ~~in the concept~~ of truth in ~~that~~ Western thought ~~has had~~ through the ages. It is an index of the evolution of Western Philosophy.

The very concept of truth in the golden age of the Greek Philosophy springs ~~up~~ from the central idea of purification. The underlying presupposition in it is the undeniable intellectualism of the great Hellenic system. We could sketch the dialectical moments of this process, as follows:

Plato and Aristotle, as well as Heraclitus before and the Stoa and similar movements afterwards have inherited from the dawn of Philosophy as well as from human history--and nature--, that the main business of Man consists in his attaining salvation, in his union with the Divine, in his fullness or happiness. The gigantic intuition of the Greek pillars of the Western culture was to realise that the Divine is Being and therefore that union with the Godhead means assimilation to the Being. But this was laid down--and here begins the intellectualism--as if to be one with the Being meant to know the Being, then we have no higher way to reach the Being, and knowledge by itself if precisely this mysterious assimilation, union, between the "knower" and the "known", between subject and object. That is θεωρία, theory, Greek contemplation: The knowledge of Being. Only by contemplation we attain the end and aim of our life. Our mind, the νοῦς is the organ we have for it and so truth, ἀλήθεια, is the discovery of Being, the unveiling of Reality, the Union with the Godhead. Truth is the central value. The wise man is a seeker of truth and only he will be saved, he alone will attain ἀθανασία, immortality, that is to say, he alone will be divinised, will have reached the Being, the goal of Life (1). Truth becomes the only door to the Being. Philosophy now displaces Religion. It is rather the enlightened Religion. The only way towards the union with the Godhead, which now is identified with the Being is contemplation. It ~~which~~ will produce automatically the supreme realisation, with independence of the moral virtues. Truth is cathartic by itself. Nay, more,

(1) Hippolytus, the famous writer, anti-Pope and martyr of the III century can still write inbued with this hellenic spirit: εἰ ἀθάνατος, ἔσῃ καὶ θεός (apud FESTUGIERE, op. cit., p. 40). "If you are immortal you shall be, at the same time God".

truth is the purified and perfect end. Bliss is the effect of a life which has been "lived" according to the very essence of things. Up to this stage Indian Philosophy would most certainly follow most heartily in spite of some minor differences (1).

Only,--and here begins the decline--Reality, Being and even our Reality and our being, is something more than the pure Essence transparent, as known to our (2). That first conception is not wrong--though only one-sided-- and the Christian period of the Western thought clings to it, sometimes even too much; but the existential motives of sin, redemption, human failures, grace, strength and weakness of the will and the irreducibility of human life to a pure by mental scheme, moreover the impossibility, except perhaps for a very few, of reaching and practising Θεωρία , all this undermines the Greek intellectualism of Plato and Aristotle. The Christian impact begins by questioning the whole meaning of Philosophy, and Christian philosophers from the beginning down to the Scholastics, know well that truth has an existential character and therefore a very important cathartic dimension, but they could not forget that after Original Sin there is a radical incongruity in man, that all human values are fragmentary and split, that here on earth truth does not always correspond to goodness, that the whole truth can only come as a gift along with other human values and that Christian contemplation is more than an act of our mind.

Moreover, for Christianity what matters is not the psychological realisation of truth, but the ontological acceptance of truth, which does not even require human knowledge of it. Pure faith, supernatural faith, saves and even a child can be saved, without even "knowing" it in a human way. The way to salvation is not "knowledge", not even contemplation, but redemption. It is not the wise man as such who will reach liberation, but the humble one who will be set free, i.e., redeemed. Christianity does not teach primarily how to reach the Absolute, but

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(1) For brevity's sake and in order to avoid the complex problem of the impact of Christianity on the human, philosophical mind we do not tackle the Indian relationship between Truth, Contemplation and Salvation.

(2) Not without reason the gnosis has been the main Christian heresy of the first centuries.

reveals to us that the Absolute has redeemed us and unveils to us His calling. In other words, not the essential--human--truth, but the existential--divine--truth saves man. The Christian message does not tell us primarily to discover the truth with our minds, but reveals to us that the Truth has discovered us and asks us to cling to it. This Truth is neither a pure essence nor a naked existence. It is a living theandric Person, who is, at the same time, the truth and the way to it. Not self-redemption, but redemption of the self by a personal fidelity to God in Christ; not self-realisation, but realisation of the self by death and resurrection in and through Christ, is the Christian message, which upsets every rational Philosophy and yet saves us also from becoming idolaters of Philosophy (1).

With the decline of the intellectual influence of Christianity in Western culture and the rise of rationalism and idealism, Truth loses that close contact with life and existence, and becomes a simple characteristic of the pure reason, a mere correctness of our judgement (2). Theory is no ~~more~~ longer θεωρία, not contemplation either, but an intellectual value divorced from practice and ethics. Truth has neither existential, nor religious meaning. Truth has little to do with power, happiness and practical life. Truth becomes rigorous and exact. It enters into the realm of logic and does not allow anyone to come in contact with it but those who have the passport of clarity and distinction. Having so delimited and reduced its field logical truth did make enormous progress. Modern Philosophy and Science are its most striking products (3). Many adherences fall away and the dust of so

(1) Cf. the Indian spiritual closeness in Katha Up., I, 2, 23, or Mundaka Up., III, 2, 3. "It is said that the Self cannot be realised except by those whom the Self chooses". S. RADHAKRISHNAN, The Principal Upanishads, London, 1953, p.102 → 43,1

(2) Christian spirituality has always held to the existential character of truth. Let us adduce a contemporary testimony as those of other ages are rather well known and without number. "There is a way of knowing the truth that makes us true to ourselves and God, and, therefore makes us more real and holier. But there is another way of receiving the truth that makes us untrue, unholy. The difference between these two lies in the action of our will.

If my will acts as a servant of the truth, consecrating my whole soul to what

from 43

Cf.etiam the genuine Christian trądition: "Nisi enim iustitia iustificaret, nemo ipsam cognosceret, sed sibi soli esset cognitę, secundum illud: Deum nemo vidit unquam: unigenitus qui est in sinu patris, ipse enarravit, infra Io., I, (18); neque patrem quis novit nisi filius, Matth., XI, (27); et nemo scit, nisi qui accipit, Apoc., II, (17). Universaliter enim perfectionem divinam nemo novit, nisi qui accipit, puta iustitia sibi soli nota est et iusto assumpto ab ipsa iustitia. Et hoc est quod dicit auctoritas quod trinitas, deus sibi soli nota est et homini assumpto. Unde in Psalmo (LXIV,5):"beatus quem elegisti et assumpsisti". MEISTER ECKHART, Exposit. in Ioan., I, 1-5 (Nr.15). (In the critical edition of the Complete Works, Stuttgart, Berlin (Kohlhammer) vol.III (1936), p.13-14. "If the righteousness did not make righteous, nobody would know it, but it would be know by itself only, according to the Word of John (I,18)... In general it is true that nobody knows a divine perfection" except he who gets it", so it is with the rigtheousness which is know only to itself and to whom is assumed by the righteousness itself. And this is the meaning of what has been said, that the Trinity is only know to God and the Man (Christ) which has been accepted. Thus it is said in the Psalm (LXIV,5): ...".For the authority refered to cf. ALBERT.MG., In Ioh., c.I,18; 55b; D.THOM., In III Sent., d.14, q.1, a.2, obj.1; BONAVENT. ibid.a.1, q.2, obj.3; ISIDOR.HISP., Quaest. in Exodum, c.42, n.3 (P.L., 83,308); etc. (apud Eckhardi textum)

many centuries of indiscrimination has been cleared up, but truth was imprisoned within the four walls of mere human reason. The positive side of all kind of fragmentations of the last and the present century lies precisely in the effort of setting truth free from the mere logic of reason. The only thing is that truth then falls unto the grips of power, success, pleasure.

Finally European thought is realizing again that truth has also an existential side and within it a cathartic dimension; and it begins to experience again though in a more discriminated plain that truth has always practical consequences, that the question of truth can never be put aside, that truth is never irrelevant (1). And so it comes closer to the everlasting philosophical tradition of mankind for which truth has always been something more than a mere mental gymnastic display of our individual reason (2). Indeed this third stage is not a mere coming back to the first period. The typical Western adventure has not been for nothing. Truth will

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the intelligence has seen, then I will be sanctified by the truth. I shall be sincere. "My whole body will be lightsome" (Matth., VI, 22). Cf. Gītā, XIII, 17 But, if my will takes possession of truth as its master, as if the truth were my servant, as if it belonged to me by right of conquest, then I shall take it for granted that I can do with it whatever I please. This the root of all falsity". Th. Merton, No Man is an Island, London, 1955, p. 174

(3) of p. 43 - Cf. for Science R. PAULINER, El Sentido de la Ciencia actual Introducción de la ciencia, Madrid, 1930.

(1) Cf. only as one example: GUSTAV SCHMITZ "Das moralischen Ansatz des Religionsverfalls" in "Psyche" VI (1952/53) Heft. 5, p. 304 sq. (Cf. note (3) page 35).

(2) सत्यं भगवः विजिज्ञास इति —satyam, bhagavah, vijijñāsa iti— "Truth, Oh Lord, I would like to know!" is the symbolical cry of Narada, the disciple to Sanatkumāra, the guru. Chāndogya Up., VII, 16.

not loose any more the rigour it has won, but will try again to recover its existential roots and its theological foundations.

Summing up: truth began by being considered as merely another name for being (1). Indeed they are not two different realities. The second step which covers almost a philosophical Odyssey of twenty five (if we may) centuries consists - over simplifying - in the discovery and discrimination afterwards of the essential feature of truth. Truth is not being simply, not being as being, but as known, as dis-closed in itself, as be-ing, as a relation between being and "some" mind or intellect. It has indeed clarified the issue. Truth and being are not two realities, but yet there are two different dimensions of reality. Only when metaphysics disappeared for a time from the Western horizon, truth alone remained without its counterpart of being. The identification took place again, this time from the other side. The third stage which Western Philosophy is now entering into is pointing towards a synthesis of both dimensions. Truth is indeed a relation, but an ontic one. Truth is not being as such, but is being as being for us, for our way of access to being is through Truth. Is there not love another way to being? But this other way transcends now our enquiry and perhaps also the whole of Philosophy (2).

We shall continue therefore for a short while with this particular dimension of truth.

Truth in fact has a special appeal to Man, sometimes more than God, Liberation, Heaven, etc. And this is not only a sign of our times, but, it has been always an everlasting feature of truth because its specific mediating-character, because of its being a bridge between the absolute, the definitive, the eternal and the relative, the changeable, the temporal (3). Union, Oneness, Liberation, Bliss, Heaven, Vision,

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(1) The Sanscrit name for truth सत्यम् —satyam— coming from सत —sat— being is another instance not only of the ontic character of truth, but also of its indiscrimination with being.

(2) cf "Truth is higher than everything, but higher still is true conduct" says GURU NĀNAK, the Founder of the Sikh-religion (apud S. RADHAKRISHNAN, History of Philosophy Eastern, Western, op. cit. I, 513) not to quote now the Christian instances on love and goodwill.

(3) Cf. the terminus technicus, सत्यसङ्कल्प —satyasankalpa— of Hinduism as the

of God, etc., are all terms of the final status of Man--and Mankind--which we are to strive for and which we can here begin to realise, nevertheless always in an imperfect and inadequate way. Truth, on the contrary, has a specific meaning as Relation, as Mediator, as Bridge between these two worlds (1). Moreover, truth is properly this messenger between the essence and the existence. Truth--materialiter, in re--in fact, coincides with Being. God, Godness, and so on, but formally speaking, specifically, carries a special reference to us, to the Predicate of the Absolute Subject. The truth is S, but always the S of an ontological position "S is P". Over the bridge of Truth we attain the Godhead. When God speaks He can only speak Truth, not merely because He is not allowed or cannot speak untruth, but because His Speech--whatever it may be--is the very Truth. Truth has always the character of a Revelation (2). We hear first the truth, we believe in it afterwards and we realise it

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expression of a truth which is efficient and powerful in itself. Cf. Mundaka Up., I,2,1. The utterance of a truth has some efficacy "ex opere operato". Cf. the almost common conception among the ancient cultures that to know the real name of a thing or a person is to have power over them. Cf. the special case with God whose real name remains hidden in this world. Cf. the problem the Name of God in the Old Testament and the change of the names of the blessed in the New Testament. (Apoc. III, 4; XIV, 1; etc.).

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(1) Perhaps that is the deep sense why the speculations of the Advaita-Vedānta on being सत् --sat--always flows into a theory of truth सत्य --satya--and knowledge--ज्ञान --jnana--at the same time. Cf. O. LACOMBE. L'Absolu dans la Vedanta. Paris, 1937, p. 57. Cf. ~~equally~~ likewise the Greek philosophy for which the object of--γνῶσις --knowledge--is ἀλήθεια --truth. Cf. the thought-provoking passage of PLATO'S Republic (508 D sq.) in which the Idea of God is said to be the cause of science and truth-- ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀλήθεια and in consequence better than knowledge and truth (γνῶσις καὶ ἀλήθεια). Cf. also the relation γνῶσις - ἀλήθεια in the New Testament, by Jn., VIII,32, etc. "He is nothing else but Knowledge" says Aghadhuman. Up., II,4,12.

(2) "Truth speaks, and we listen, Verily is śruti, or hearing the way to truth" says G.H. MALKANI, in his Presidential Address to the Indian Philosophical Con-

finally (1). God communicates with us by His Truth, we ascend to Him only by Truth. So to say, Truth is the most human of the Attributes of the Absolute (2), because, after all, we are nothing else ~~than~~ but children of the Logos, the divine Truth (3).

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Summarising, we can put the existential phenomenological problem as follows: Why do we speak about truth? Why not about Being, Goodness, Reality, God.

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gress XXIV, Patna, 1949, p. 13. Cf. in the same line also his paper Two different Traditions of pure Philosophy (The Indian Phil. Cong. XIX, Ceylon 1954, p.39, sq.)

(1) Ironically S. AUGUSTINE points out this threefold state of mind when dealing with the greatest Christian Mystery. He says his purpose is to explain—"to declare rationem"—how the divine Tri-Unity: "dicatur, credatur, intelligatur"—is to be said, believed, understood—(De Trinitate, I, 11). We hear the truth first and repeat it uttering the right formula. We accept it as truth, only because it comes from God, i.e., we begin to believe. Finally, we understand, we realize it as our faith has ceased to be blind, and one sees, not with rational evidence, but through personal experience (fides speculata). Cf. the same structure in Indian Wisdom: The Upanishad says: "The Self, Dear Maitreyi, should be realised, should be heard of, from a teacher, and from the Scriptures, then reflected upon, through reasoning, and then steadfastly meditated upon." When Sravana (Hearing), manana (reflection) and nididhyasana (meditation) are combined, then only is the true realisation of the unity of the Brahman accomplished, not otherwise, i.e., not by hearing alone". ŚAṄKARA, Brhad. Up. Bhāṣya, II, 4,5 (apud DE SMET, op. cit., 156) Cf. ātman I,4,2. (loc. cit)

(2) There is a striking conjunction in the Bible between Mercy and Truth. Mercy is not a kind of Untruthfulness or a concession or weakening of the rights of Truth; but on the contrary, it belongs to the truth this art of comprehensiveness which is Mercy. Cf. Ps. XXIV, 10; XXV,3; XXXV,5; XXXIX,12; LVI,4; LX,6; LXXXIV,11; LXXXIX,12; LXXVIII,15;25; CVII,5; Tob. III,3; Prov., III,3; XIV,22; XVI, 16; XX,28; Is., IV, 1.

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→ 48

etc.,? (1). That is to say, what is the formal aspect--ratio formalis--of Truth?

The formal aspect of truth, according to an existential phenomenology would be the esoteric character of truth (2). Truth is really a μεταξύ, a μεσότης, a middle, a medium, an inward relation with itself. Properly, we can say that Truth is not "being"--τὸ ὄν--but "being as being"--τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν. We do not "know", we can-"not know" in what consists that which we call being: we only know what "being" is, that is to say, we can only reach "being" as "being"; and that is truth. It is the being as being, that is, as it manifests-itself, not as it appears to-us (who are not outside being) which is the truth (3).

The ἔλεος καὶ ἀλήθεια of the Old Testament could be brought in relation with χάρις καὶ ἀλήθεια (grace and truth) in the New Test. Cf. Jo. I,17, etc. Sed Cf. for χάρις etiam Father, II,9; Eccl., VII,33; XI, 37; etc.

(3) of p. 47 - That is the central point of a meta-theological Christology.

(1) We have already seen that ultimately all these names are nothing but several expressions of the "One without a Second" एकमेवाद्वितीयम् --ekamevādvitīyam Chand. Up., VI, 2,1 ("I am that Supreme One--I-- without a second" ŚAṄKARA, Upadeśasāh., X,3,7). It is interesting to remark that not only this expression is completely orthodox within Catholicism, but that it can be quoted ad pedem litterae from a Father of the Church: "Unus itaque Deus, unum nomen, una divinitas, una majestas. Nullus ergo secundus: quia principium omnium Trinitas est, et Trinitatis primatus super omnia est. Ergo unus et non est secundus. Unus est, qui secundum non habet; quia unicus solus sine / peccato, solus sine adjutorio, qui ait: Respexi, et non erat adjutor" (Is., LXIII,5)"--One God alone, one Name alone, One Godhead alone, One Glory alone. Therefore there is no second for the Trinity is the Principle of all, and the Primacy of the Trinity is above all. Thus, One and not a Second; One without a Second; for He alone is unique without sin, He alone without adjunct; He who said: I looked all around and there was none to help me". S. AMBROSE, De institutione Virginis X,66, (P.L., 16,333-323). For the whole problem and many other quotations Cf. R. PANIKKER, Mysterium Crucis. xxxx

Cf Is. XLVII, 10 "Ego sum, et praeter me non est altera" referring to the false and evil Wisdom of Babylon

(2) }—

Speaking of the Absolute, we must go beyond all categories; but without losing our foothold on Reality, we must keep always our intellect in contact with the real and avoid the constitutive danger of our limited thinking: The mere dialectical projection of our mental structures is a groundless extrapolation. We can always think beyond; but we may leave the reality and truth behind (1). Anyway, we cannot help trying to reach the ultimate stage of our thinking. We could render the same thought of the last paragraph as follows:-

If F is the uttermost and ultimate "reality", not for us, but in itself (καθ' αὑτό), when we ask what F is, it is not F which asks it (not even F in us), then F does not need to ask and does not ask at all), but we, our being (or our λόγος) which asks it. Now, we can only ask what F is. That means that whenever we "ask" for a thing, we "ask" for what this thing is. [illegible] and, therefore, the answer cannot go beyond the is, beyond the being which we are only capable to receive. I.E., "asking" or trying to "know" what a thing is, we "make" of it only a being, and we cannot do otherwise. So, whatever "F may consist of", we can only say that it is L, in which L is the being of F. This L is not different from F (is the is of F), but does not need "to be" identical with it. It is the "being" of F, it is the "being" as being, it is the truth of F (F. it "is" F (2)

Truth is the manifestation of being. We can perhaps add, the self-manifestation; but not as an object, and not to anybody. Truth is the Revelation of being, but not an external unveiling of it. There is no spectator, there is nothing

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(2) of p. 48 - Cf. , or the substantive, —The midst, the centre, middle point—and at the same time, the mediator, the mediation, relation, and none-the-less, the public manifestation, appearance (of being half way.

(3) of p. 48 - We are taking the words in "inverted commas" in a transcendent—and therefore analogical—sense, as it is easy to perceive.

(1) "Not to go beyond what is laid down for you", seems to have been an old proverbial expression incorporated, however, in the Bible by S. Paul. μὴ ὑπὲρ ἃ γέγραπται I Cor., IV, 6.

(2) It is the Logos of the Father.

outside being, (from, for and to which Being could be revealed or unveiled) (1).

And inspite of it, truth is that "Un-folding" of the "Folding-Logos" is that "Re-flection" of the "Simple One", is that "Image" εἰκών —of the "Un-imaginable", is that "Fulness" of the "Ab-solute" (Cf. solutus). We say that "Logos" of the "Silence", and that that of the Not-that, in order to stress the in-adequacy of the words and the unique specificity of those and similar conceptions when applied to the Absolute.

Being is Truth because Being is not empty, because it is full, full of Life, of Truth, of Love. Truth is the manifestation, the Epiphany of Being as Being (2). That is why Truth is the very way to Being (3). Being manifest itself as Truth (4).

Also for our time-being, truth has this epiphanic character (of manifestation, expression, appearance). And for us—grasped now—so long our "godful" state is not attained, truth is the very veil of Being, it is the wrapping under which we grasp Being (5). It is not a mere intellectual P identified with S; but

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(1) Here lies the problem of apophatism. Can we go beyond truth? Can we transcend being? Or in pure Christian terms: Can we reach to the Father leaving aside or beyond the Son? Or in a humbler way: are we able to grasp in ourselves or in itself the Source of the Divinity (name of the XI Concile of Toledo for the Father) (cf. DENZ., 275) without the image, the εἰκών of the λόγος ?

(2) For Christian Theology the absolute Being is One in a Super-oneness which is a non-numerical Trinoneness. For the danger of a pure economic Trinity, i.e., only in relation with the World and not an immanent one Cf. S. BULGAKOV, Le Paraclete (Trad. franc) Paris, 1946, p. 15 sq.

(3) Cf. Jo., XIV, 6: ~~ὁδός~~... πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα ("Via ... ad Patrem")—way—to the Father—. The philosophical problem of Truth is a part—and a manifestation—of the theological trinitarian problem.

(4) Cf. the thoughtful expression of ORIGENES.: ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ὄντα τὰ ὄντα τῶς ὄντα, καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὓς οὐκ ὄντα —Philocalia, IV,4,15; and the non-less metaphysical expression of St. Paul—Rom., IV,17 (Cf. note (2) page 21).

(5) Cf. Jo., I,18. T.H. CHUNG, points out that "Truth in its existential nature... is not found at the level of metaphysics". The Nature of Truth, loc.cit., p.199.

it is the ontological descent,--grabbing--of S as S. When the S appears as S, when the subject emerges--appears--to be, not as mere logical subject of any Predicate, but simply as being, then there is Truth (1). Truth is being as being (2).

When beings happen to be, this to-be of being, the being of being is truth. That is also why, we are, insofar as we are-truth, and, meanwhile, we are beginning so long as we are-here.

Truth is the horizon on which being is. It is the line at which earth and sky, Man and God happen to meet (3).

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(1) "Und dieses Bekanntsein des Seins ist das innerste Wesen der Wahrheit". H.U. v. BALTHASAR, Wahrheit, op. cit., p. 37.

(2) Under this light, in my opinion, must be understood--and theologically elaborated--the capital affirmation of Christ: "I am the Way and the Truth and the Life (Jo., XIV, 6). Cf. Jo., I,9 et I Jo., I,5.

(3) I have developed elsewhere the following up of this study and the theological foundation of it. The clue lies in the intimate connexion between the doctrine of the Trinity and Christology. Christian tradition has worked out so far these two problems rather independently. An exceedingly bright and deep horizon emerges when we try to bring these two theological disciplines together. The whole of reality is Father, Christ and Holy Ghost. I am bound to make a future-reference to my Introduccion a la antropologia and to Unterscheidung Christi.

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