

BOSTON UNIVERSITY  
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Box 35, Newton Center 59  
February 13, 1949

Dear Professor Ferrater Mora,

Your very interesting letter of January 29 forces me to reply—although I am spending most of my time now in writing.

You doubt whether we can convince an analytical philosopher that he is wrong in beginning with the thing. Perry, an analytical philosopher if ever there was one, admits the egocentric predicament; he discounts it, he has to admit it to be a fact. We must start with our experience of things; our experience is the evidence for things; if we disregard experience we have no things on hand. Could not these reasonings be shown to be facts, not merely selected presuppositions? We have to begin where we are, as conscious beings. Our interest may not be in ourselves, but in our objects; but our facts are in our experience, and there we must begin, whether we're interested or not! Of course, ontological the objects are prior to our knowing of them; but epistemologically, our experience is prior. I agree with your statement in El Sentido del Muerte that both points of view are needed; but it is important to see that they are used clearly and critically.

I think the library would purchase my Nature and Values if you asked them to. It is Abingdon-Cokesbury Press.

Very cordially yours,

(cont. 28/II/49.

Edgar S. Brightman